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Document 985 12th October 1984 
AGENDA 
of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session 
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1984 
I. Political Questions 
1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic 
Alliance 
2. Consequences of the Gulf war 
3. Deterrence and the will of the people 
11. Defence Questions 
The control of armaments and disarma-
ment 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Military use of space - Part 11 
2. United States-European co-operation in 
advanced technology 
IV. Budge~ry and Administrative Questions 
l. Budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1985 
2. Accounts of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1983 - The auditor's report and 
motion to approve the final accounts 
V. Relations with Parliaments 
Activities of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments - Parliamentary 
action taken on recommendations adop-
ted by the WEU Assembly on European 
co-operation in space technology 
10 
Report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments tabled by Mr. De Decker 
Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration 
Report tabled by Mr. Hackel on behalf on the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Document 986 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session 
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1984 
MONDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Meetings of political groups. 
9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
28th November 1984 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session. 
5. Deterrence and the will of the people: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
6. Consequences of the Gulf war: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
7 p.m. 
Meeting of the Presidential Committee. 
TUFSDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges. 
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10 a.m. 
I. Military use of space - Part 11: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Control of armaments and disarmament: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
3.15 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom. 
3. Control of armaments and disarmament: 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER 
Morning 8.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
10 a.m. 
1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee; 
presentation of the opinion tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
2. Relations between the Assembly and the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Joint debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; 
Relations between the Assembly and the Council: 
Resumed joint debate. 
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3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
4.30 p.m. 
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. 
5.30 p.m. 
4. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France. 
5. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; 
Relations between the Assembly and the Council: 
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order. 
THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of Assembly for the financial year 1985: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 - The 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts: 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft budget and on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments -Parliamentary action taken on 
recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space 
technology: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hackel on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
CLOSE OF THE THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1983 
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Letter from the President of the Assembly to 
the Auditor submitting the accounts of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1983 
9th April 1984 
Sir, 
In accordance with Article 13 of the 
Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, 
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts 
for the financial year 1983 in accordance with 
the statements attached hereto which refer to: 
1. (a) summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1983 (Appendix I) ; 
(b) statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
(c) contributions (Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows that 
a sum of F 1,419,033 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure is F 754,835. The difference 
between these two figures, F 335,802, represents 
the excess of receipts over those estimated made 
up as follows : 
F F 
- Bank interest 
- Sundry receipts 
321,046 
20,148 
- Sale of publications 50,673 
- Levy on the salaries of Grade A 27,499 
staff 
- Contributions 7% 341,111 
- Reimbursement of loans on 
validation 17,325 
777,802 
- Receipts for 1983 estimated in 442,000 
the budget 
335,802 
3. Excess expenditure under certain sub-heads 
of the budget amounting to F 234,053 has been 
met by transfers between sub-heads within the 
same head. On the other hand, excess expen-
diture on pensions under Head VI - due to the 
departure of three officials before the statutory 
retiring age - amounting to F 134,679 has been 
deducted from the overall amount of unexpen-
ded credits in Head I - Expenditure on staff. 
The Council has been informed of this. 
15 
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4. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary- General WEU London before 31st 
December 1983. 
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund 
are incorporated with those of the other organs 
of WEU and the entire fund is administered by 
the Secretary-General in consultation with the 
Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1983 these amounts 
totalled F 2,437,070 as shown at Appendix IV. 
On that date there remained two loans to two 
staff members amounting to F 525,550. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. On 31st December 
1983, the fund was held by Montagu Investment 
Management Limited in London. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
L. PIGNION 
Acting President of the Assembly 
Sir Gordon Downey, K.C.B. 
National Audit Office 
Audit House 
Victoria Embankment 
LONDON EC4Y ODS 
Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the accounts for 
the financial year 1983 
General 
1. The following financial statements were 
submitted to me by the Acting President : 
(a) summary of income and expenditure for 
the financial year 1983 and financial 
position as at 31st December 1983 
(Appendix I); 
(b) statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits for 
the financial year 1983 (Appendix 11) ; 
(c) statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of Wes-
tern European Union budget for 1983 
(Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1983 (Appendix IV). 
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2. My audit, which was carried out in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Financial 
Regulations of the Assembly, included an 
appraisal of the Assembly's financial procedures 
and was supported by such tests of the records 
and transactions as appeared to me to be 
necessary. 
Summary of income and expenditure 
(Appendix I) 
(a) Financial position during 1983 
3. The budget provided for expenditure of 
F 14,335,000 of which F 442,000 was expected 
to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the 
balance by contributions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted 
to F 12,915,967. Income amounted to 
F 14,670,802 comprising F 13,893,000 from 
contributions and F 777,802 from miscellaneous 
receipts. There was thus an excess of income 
over expenditure of F 1,754,835 arising from a 
budgetary surplus of F 1,419,033 (as shown at 
Appendix 11) and extra miscellaneous receipts 
ofF 335,802. 
(b) Pension scheme 
5. Under the common pensio~ scheme imple-
mented in 1977 by the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, Western European Union, Council of 
Europe, NATO, OECD and the European 
Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the 
Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assem-
bly's budget and staff contributions under the 
scheme are credited to the budget as miscella-
neous income. In 1983 these staff contributions 
amounted to F 341,111 (Appendix I). 
6. Staff ·members who had been employed 
before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to 
join the new scheme were required to meet the 
cost of validating their past service through 
surrender of their provident fund holdings. 
Where, because of withdrawals, the holdings 
were insufficient for that purpose, staff were 
required to meet the deficiency, plus compound 
interest at 4% per annum, by monthly payments 
over a period of five years from 30th June 
1978. In 1983 the final payments under these 
arrangements, amounting. to F 17,325, were 
credited to miscellaneous income. 
Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) 
7. The transfers between sub-heads within the 
same head of the budget were duly authorised 
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in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial 
Regulations. These regulations contain no 
provision for the authorisation of transfers 
between heads. However, in accordance with a 
procedure approved in 1973, the Secretary-
General informed the Council that expenditure 
of F 134,679 on Head VI had been incurred in 
excess of the budget provision for this head, 
and that this had been met from savings on 
Head I. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
8. The provident fund continues to operate for 
those members of staff who opted to remain 
affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme 
was introduced. At 31st December 1983, three 
staff members were fully affiliated to the fund 
and two others maintained balances in it. The 
assets of the provident fund of the Assembly 
are amalgamated with the assets of the 
provident funds of the other organs of Western 
European Union. During 1983 the Secretary-
General, who had previously managed the 
fund's assets, contracted this task to a firm of 
investment managers. At the end of the year 
the fund's deposits were held in French francs, 
sterling, German marks and Japanese yen. 
Variations in the exchange rates between the 
French franc and the other currencies resulted 
in a gain of F 319,200 in the value of the 
deposits during the year. This gain has been 
credited to the individual accounts of the 
members of the fund in proportion to their 
holdings. 
9. I have received a certificate from the fund's 
investment managers showing the amount of 
the joint deposits held at 31st December 1983 
and confirming the share of these deposits 
standing to the credit of the Assembly's 
provident fund at 31st December 1983. This 
share is equivalent to the balance ofF 2,437,070 
on members' accounts as shown at Appendix 
IV. Thus, at 31st December 1983, the assets of 
the fund were sufficient to meet its liabilities. 
10. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the 
Assembly during my audit. 
Gordon DOWNEY 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
27th June 1984 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1983 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest ...................................... . 
Sundry receipts ..................................... . 
Sale of publications ................................. . 
Levy on salaries of grade A officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7%) .................................. . 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) ... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation .................. . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head VI ... . 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) ..................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ...................... . 
321,046 
20,148 
50,673 
27,499 
341,111 
17,325 
12,781,288 
134,679 
13,893,000 
777,802 
14,670,802 
12,915,967 
F 1,754,835 
Financial position as at 31st December 1983 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances .................................... . 
Accounts receivable ................................. . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable ................................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ...................... . 
Lucien PIGNION 
Acting President of the Assembly 
Certified correct : 
Georges MOULIAS 
Clerk of the Assembly 
2,203,525 
206,579 
130,081 
839,350 
1,754,835 
F 2,594,185 
F 2,594,185 
Dudley SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
27th June 1984 
Signed: Gordon DOWNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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APPE 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITUR 
DETAILS 
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 
Sub-Head2 
I. Document 932 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, 
B, and C), including travelling expenses and insurance 
Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(A) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Children's allowance 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French 
staff 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
(c) Provident fund 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and 
departure of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
(DJ Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, 
etc.) 
Total of Head I 
18 
Total budget for 
19831 
5,404,100 
75,000 
191,300 
170,000 
468,200 
10,100 
33,000 
130,000 
2,000 
608,500 
180,400 
112,600 
10,000 
10,000 
40,000 
30,000 
15,000 
7,000 
664,800 
8,162,000 
in Fren 
APPENDIX 11 
1JX 11 
ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983 
ancs 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ 
transfers expenditure credits 
-
118,477 5,522,577 5,522,577 -
75,000 11,772 63,228 
5,765 197,065 197,065 -
170,000 166,727 3,273 
468,200 446,652 21,548 
11,475 21,575 21,575 -
33,000 26,216 6,784 
- - -
130,000 81,243 48,757 
2,000 1,146 854 
25,651 634,151 634,151 -
180,400 171,979 8,421 
313 112,913 112,913 -
10,000 7,254 2,746 
10,000 1,410 8,590 
40,000 30,379 9,621 
30,000 6,071 23,929 
15,000 9,457 5,543 
7,000 5,974 1,026 
161,681 503,119 - 503,119 
161,681 161,681 8,162,000 7,454,561 707,439 
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DETAILS 
HEAD 11- EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 1. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. Linguistic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the 
Assembly · 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of com-
mittees between sessions 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
6. Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem 
allowances) 
Total of Head 11 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head4 1. Premises 
2. Work on the building 
Sub-Head5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head Ill 
20 
Total budget for 
!983 
682,500 
270,000 
300,000 
573,000 
5,000 
350,000 
82,500 
164,000 
2,427,000 
396,000 
60,000 
36,000 
492,000 
APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits + -
17,000 665,500 649,336 16,164 
. 
20,506 249,494 246,243 3,251 
37,506 337,506 337,506 -
573,000 483,112 89,888 
5,000 3,287 1,713 
5,022 344,978 
I 
318,194 26,784 
5,022 87,522 87,522 -
164,000 - 164,000 
42,528 42,528 2,427,000 2,125,200 301,800 
3,903 399,903 399,903 
-
3,903 56,097 55,410 687 
36,000 26,753 9,247 
3,903 3,903 492,000 482,066 9,934 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 
Sub-Head, 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of docu-
ments 
Office supplies and hire of machines 
Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official cars 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees 
and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(d) Orphans' pension 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(d) Relief allowance 
(C) Severance grant 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Total of Head VI 
I TOTAL 1-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total budget for 
1983 
407,000 
262,000 
1,212,000 
37,000 
37,500 
500 
1,956,000 
110,000 
144,000 
3,000 
264,000 
62,000 
230,000 
230,000 
3,000 
12,000 
1,058,000 
166,000 
36,400 
18,600 
6,200 
9,300 
3,500 
240,000 
14,335,000 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 
Lucien PIGNION 
Acting President of the Assembly 
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Georges 
Clerk of th 
APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
407,000 374,453 32,547 
262,000 252,779 9,221 
10,398 1,201,602 857,520 344,082 
5,663 42,663 42,663 -
4,735 42,235 42,235 -
500 158 342 
10,398 10,398 1,956,000 1,569,808 386,192 
110,000 49,771 60,229 
15,543 128,457 95,881 32,576 
7,723 10,723 10,723 -
264,000 236,710 27,290 
7,820 69,820 69,820 -
230,000 213,255 16,745 
230,000 230,000 -
3,000 697 2,303 
12,000 2,796 9,204 
15,543 15,543 1,058,000 909,653 148,347 
166,000 220,325 - 54,325 
-
- -
36,400 38,047 - 1,647 
18,600 19,146 -546 
6,200 8,158 - 1,958 
9,300 12,048 - 2,748 
- 1,050 
- 1,050 
-
-
-
- 71,821 - 71,821 
3,500 4,084 -584 
240,000 374,679 - 134,679 
234,053 234,053 14,335,000 12,915,967 1,419,033 
983, and paid for up to 31st March 1984, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
~OULIAS Dudley SMITH 
Assembly Chairman of the Committee on 
23 Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
DOCUMENT 987 APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU WNOON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1983 
Contributions Budget surplus Budget Net Member states 600ths overpaid contributions 
in 1982 1982 for 1983 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 78,256 (-) 54,619 1,366,145 1,233,270 
France 120 (-) 159,166 (-) 111,088 2,778,600 2,508,346 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 159,165 (-) 111,089 2,778,600 2,508,346 
Italy 120 (-) 159,165 (-) 111,088 2,778,600 2,508,347 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 2,653 (-) 1,851 46,310 41,806 
Netherlands 59 (-) 78,256 (-) 54,619 1,366,145 1,233,270 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 159,166 (-) 111,088 2,778,600 2,508,346 
600 (-) 795,827 (-) 555,442 13,893,000 12,541,731 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1983 
F 
Balance brought forward : 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1983 2,741,026 
Contributions of staff members and 
Assembly of Western European Union 
Repayments of loans by staff members 
Interest received during the year 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1983 
--------------
Lucien PIGNION 
Acting President of the Assembly 
of the 
168,240 Withdrawals 
22,700 Management fee 
228,381 
Accounts of existing 
319,200 December 1983 
3,479,547 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
in French francs 
F 
1,029,046 
13,431 
staff members as at 31st 
2,437,070 
3,479,547 
Dudley SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, 
that in my opinion this statement is correct. 
27th June /984 
Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
...... 
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Document 987, Addendum 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1983 
4th December 1984 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 19831 
The Assembly, 
, submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1983, together with 
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Beix, Haase (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens. 
Biefnot, Bob!, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Foschi, Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster (Alternate: Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges). Morris, 
Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Schmitz, Stokes, van Tets, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Deterrence and the will of the people 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on deterrence and the will of the people 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
Il. Peace and deterrence 
Ill. Western public opinion and the defence of Europe 
1. Agitation against Euromissiles 
2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe 
3. Opinion polls 
4. Positions adopted by Christian churches 
IV. The will for defence 
1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions. 
9th October 1984 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir 
Frederic Bennett (Alternate : kssel), MM. Berrier, Bianco (Alternate : Mezzapesa), Bogaerts, Burger, Caro (Alternate : 
Dreyfus-Schmidt), Hill (Alternate : Ward), Lagneau, lAgorce, Lord McNair, MM. Martino, Masciadri, MUller, Prouvost, Lord 
Reay (Alternate : Atkinson), MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, Vogt, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on deterrence and the will of the people 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from 
the Council; 
(ii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a 
prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe; 
(iii) Recalling that, until more progress has been made in disarmament, the security of Western 
Europe will be ensured only by deterrence ; 
(iv) Underlining however that while nuclear weapons are an essential means of deterrence, a major 
contribution is also made by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their 
freedom; 
(v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on 
these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision 
of December 1979; 
(vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the 
democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries; 
(vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the 
limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds; 
(viii) Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole; 
(ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on 
external and defence policies; 
(x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of 
Eastern Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament ; 
(xi) Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the 
West's security, this cannot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the 
standard of living in the developing countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to keep European public opm10n informed of the dangers to which the world is 
exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering 
them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe; 
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the 
organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance; 
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence 
policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or 
disarmament; 
4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, 
ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-
range nuclear weapons; 
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe 
and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union; 
6. Do its utmost to promote the success of current negotiations on disarmament, to encourage the 
opening of further negotiations on the limitation of nuclear missiles of all ranges and on banning the 
use of space for military purposes and to develop the North-South dialogue. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. IAgorce, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. On 30th November 1982, the WEU 
Assembly adopted Recommendation 388 on 
problems for European security arising from 
pacifism and neutralism based on a report by 
the General Affairs Committee which your 
Rapporteur had had the honour to present and 
in which he defined the notions of pacifism and 
neutralism and considered that although they 
were quite distinct they embraced significant 
convergences in Europe today. In this report 
the Assembly stressed the gravity of the 
problems then raised by the development of 
pacifism in Europe and the need for the 
Western European states to take them fully 
into account in order to ensure peace and 
security, first by demonstrating their desire to 
do their utmost to ensure the success of the 
ongoing negotiations on the limitation of 
armaments and renunciation of the deployment 
of strategic nuclear weapons targeted on 
Europe, second by giving public opinion "full, 
accurate and objective information on the levels 
of forces and armaments" of both parties and 
third by strengthening their development assist-
ance policy in order to demonstrate clearly to 
public opinion that their defence effort was set 
in the context of a policy which sought to 
consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the 
world. In its reply, the Council confirmed that 
such were indeed the intentions of the seven 
WEU member governments. 
2. Since then, a number of events have 
occurred which, without detracting from these 
principles, might guide their application: 
3. (i) At the end of 1983 it became evident 
not only that the Soviet Union was not at all 
prepared to stop deploying SS-20s in Eastern 
Europe but that it was starting to deploy new 
medium-range SS-22 missiles in certain coun-
tries in that area. This inevitably led the NATO 
countries to start deploying Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles in Western Europe in application 
of the twofold decision of December 1979, and 
the United States took the first steps in this 
direction in the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic. 
4. (ii) By insisting on including French and 
British nuclear weapons in calculating what the 
Americans and the Soviets consider as western 
theatre weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union 
showed that it had little interest in bringing the 
negotiations on the withdrawal of such weapons 
from Europe to a successful conclusion. On the 
one hand it put forward a prior condition which 
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was unacceptable politically, i.e. that the United 
States could negotiate for its allies, which 
would have meant that British and French 
forces were merely a back-up for American 
forces without specific deterrent value of their 
own. On the other hand, it denied the fact that 
missiles deployed on submarines cannot be 
counted as theatre weapons but merely as 
strategic weapons. Even the French missiles on 
the Plateau d' Albion cannot be considered, 
technically, as anti-personnel weapons since the 
type of nuclear warheads with which they are 
equipped and their main role in France's 
strategy of nuclear deterrence of the strong by 
the weak precludes such a role. These factors 
set them apart from the SS-20s and Pershing 
lis in all respects. 
5. There is every indication that the Soviet 
aim in adopting this attitude was to stir up 
trouble among the countries of Western Europe 
and break the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, 
using the agitation of pacifist movements which 
were calling for nuclear disarmament. 
6. (iii) After the deployment of American 
missiles had started, the Soviet Union 
announced that it was terminating all ongoing 
disarmament negotiations. However, this did 
not affect its participation in the Stockholm 
conference which was to start in January 1984 
covering all problems relating to disarmament 
in Europe, following a proposal made by France 
at the Madrid conference on security and co-
operation in Europe. Furthermore, the prospect 
of the MBFR talks on the level of conventional 
forces being resumed in Vienna in February 
1984 seems to be accepted by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The resumption 
of the negotiations on nuclear weapons therefore 
no longer seems out of the question although 
the United States is criticising the Soviet Union 
for not keeping to its earlier undertakings, as 
President Reagan recalled on 22nd January 
1984, and although the Soviet Union is accusing 
the United States of having prevented negotia-
tions by the premature deployment of Pershing 
11 and cruise missiles on the territory of several 
of its European allies and is continuing to insist 
on the withdrawal of these missiles as a prior 
condition for negotiations. 
7. (iv) The continued occupation of and war 
in Mghanistan by the Soviet Union, the spread 
of conflicts in the Middle East with the 
formation of a force consisting of detachments 
from four western countries in Lebanon, the 
Chad crisis, the continuing highly tense situation 
in Central America and the landing on and 
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occupation of the island of Grenada by 
American forces enhanced the fears of many 
Europeans that one of these conflicts might 
deteriorate to a point where it would bring the 
United States and Soviet Union face to face 
outside Europe and thus trigger off a major 
war, this probability being augmented by the 
fact that the areas concerned are not directly 
protected by a system of nuclear deterrence, 
although it is still very improbable that Soviets 
and Americans will come to grips directly. 
8. (v) In 1982, the United States military 
authorities adopted a new doctrine for the 
defence of Europe. Drawing the full conse-
quences of the pnnciple of flexible response, the 
new doctrine was to counter by the most 
appropriate means any Soviet attack on Western 
Europe while avoiding the use of their intercon-
tinental weaponry. It was thus a matter of using 
the most sophisticated conventional weapons, 
tactical nuclear weapons and, in case of need, 
European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons to 
ward off an attack by engaging the enemy 
forces at the moment they were being concen-
trated and moved forward, i.e. before being 
deployed to positions which would make them 
less vulnerable to such preventive retaliation. 
NATO did not accept this doctrine but, because 
it was that of the American military authorities, 
it is liable to have decisive consequences for all 
the member countries of that organisation by 
committing them to action which is both 
offensive and preventive. One member of the 
committee pointed out that this difference 
between the doctrine of American forces and 
that of NATO was particularly unfortunate in 
that it was the same American general who 
commanded American forces in Europe and 
NATO forces, thus arousing serious and 
regrettable uncertainty about the true nature of 
the western allies' strategy. 
9. These various factors explain the devel-
opment of pacifism and neutralism in Europe 
since 1982. On the one hand the campaign 
against the deployment of Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles can now be said to have failed, 
after reaching a climax in autumn 1983. 
Conversely, other aspects of pacifist unrest have 
emerged which are no less dangerous for 
western cohesion. These the Assembly should 
examine and assess their implications. 
10. The main aspect is probably the growing 
awareness of the total vulnerability of North 
American territory to the possible firing of 
Soviet intercontinental missiles or submarine-
launched missiles, and hence the realisation, 
through the increased risks to European 
territory, that there has been a remarkable 
weakening of the cohesion of Euro-Atlantic 
defence such as it had been guaranteed for 
more than thirty years. Henceforth, a potential 
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aggressor is able to speculate on what he knows 
about the new American strategy and the 
various reactions of public opinion in Europe 
and in the United States in order to work out 
the odds of the Atlantic Alliance not operating 
effectively, Europe being abandoned in practice 
by the United States or the American presence 
in Europe being rejected. The upshot of one or 
other would leave Western Europe at the mercy 
of the Red Army and consequently of any 
political or military pressure exercised by the 
Soviet Union. 
11. Peace and deterrence 
11. Before considering what is discernable 
concerning the will of Europeans in security, 
defence and deterrence, a number of fundamen-
tal aspects of relevant European policy should 
be recalled. First, the aim of European policy 
is to maintain, strengthen and organise peace. 
None of Western Europe's present problems 
can be solved by the use of force and any 
attempt to do so could but have catastrophic 
effects for Europe. In this connection, pacifist 
demonstrations in recent years have revealed a 
fundamental and quite legitimate aspect of the 
concerns of Europeans who well know that any 
war between the two great powers would 
devastate Europe and kill a large proportion of 
its population. No political or other goal is 
worth this price, not even the reunification of 
Europe, which has been divided for almost forty 
years, or of any European nation. 
12. No absolute distinction can be drawn 
between a war in which limited use is made of 
nuclear weapons and a purely conventional war. 
The second world war, when no nuclear weapons 
were used in Europe, left more than forty 
million victims there. Subsequent progress in 
conventional weapons, greater urbanisation, the 
ever-greater sensitivity of the people and their 
dependence on transport, electricity and indus-
try mean that most probably another war, even 
if relatively short - as experts generally believe 
but which is far from certain - would leave an 
even larger number of victims and would ruin 
Europe's economy for many years. 
13. Furthermore, in view of the number of 
nuclear weapons of all strengths and ranges 
now deployed in Europe or on the territory of 
the two great powers, neither of which could 
possibly support the other taking over the whole 
continent of Europe, and particularly in view of 
existing imbalances in purely European-targeted 
strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons 
and of the existence of national nuclear 
deterrent forces in Europe, there is every chance 
of the nuclear threshold being crossed in the 
event of a war in Europe. No prior understand-
ing, no guarantee and not even partial or total 
denuclearisation of the European continent in 
peacetime could prevent this. Any speculation 
about the possibility of keeping a European war 
on the conventional level would be, to say the 
least, extremely risky. 
14. The defence policies of the European 
countries, as well as that which a united Europe 
might have, can therefore have no aim other 
than to avoid war or, if hostilities were to break 
out somewhere, to circumscribe it and prevent 
it becoming a continental- or worldwide war. 
This is the principal meaning of the strategy of 
deterrence to which all members of the Atlantic 
Alliance have subscribed from the very outset. 
Deterrence is not designed to ensure political or 
other advantages for those practising it but 
solely to avoid war. Disagreements between 
allies have never been about this aim but solely 
about the means of attaining it. 
15. Today western public opinion has a 
tendency - the scale of which your Rapporteur 
will try to assess in the next chapter- to refuse 
deterrence and consider peace would be better 
protected by abandoning nuclear weapons or 
even refusing to defend Europe in the event of 
aggression from without. This tendency is 
prevalent in the United States as well as in 
Europe and is illustrated in several ways which 
your Rapporteur will examine. It is based on 
moral disapproval of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and on the conviction that accumulating 
such weapons does not improve the prospects of 
true peace but increases the risk of war and 
would make hostilities worse. 
16. This argument is not unfounded and your 
Rapporteur is prepared to subscribe to any 
proposition for limiting armaments and multi-
lateral, progressive and controlled conventional 
and nuclear disarmament. Inter alia, he wel-
comes the opening in January 1984 of the 
Stockholm conference on confidence-restoring 
measures and on disarmament in Europe, as 
well as the current American-Soviet talks on 
the resumption of negotiations, be they on the 
limitation of intercontinental nuclear weapons 
or on the deployment of intermediate-range 
weapons or conventional forces in Europe. He 
is prepared to admit that for the entire world, 
expenditure on armaments is an unacceptable 
waste of material and intellectual resources 
which would be infinitely better used in trying 
to solve present international economic prob-
lems, relieve underdevelopment and reduce 
unemployment. 
17. However, he feels that no serious start 
has ever been made with disarmament. This 
can be done really and truly only if international 
society is first organised so as to ensure new 
and more solid foundations for peace. As long 
as this is not so, deterrence with its stabilising 
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nuclear elements, will still be essential for 
maintaining peace. Admittedly, international 
order based on the balance of terror is far from 
satisfactory, but it is better than no order at all 
where one or other may feel he can impose his 
own order or his own peace. Conversely, within 
the order guaranteed by mutual deterrence, it 
is possible to envisage a more satisfactory 
organisation of international order. 
18. There are two essential reasons why this 
organisation is becoming increasingly urgent. 
First, nations, particularly in Europe, are 
finding the financial effort of developing credible 
and consequently increasingly sophisticated 
weapons systems less and less bearable. It 
seems increasingly difficult for some to accept 
the feeling that their survival depends on the 
effective deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction over which they have no control but 
of which they would be the first victims should 
these weapons no longer fulfil their deterrent 
role to perfection. The other reason is that 
conventional and nuclear technological devel-
opment is progressively calling in question the 
notion of deterrence. Whereas it was almost 
absolute while the doctrine for the use of 
nuclear weapons was one of massive retaliation, 
certain concepts of deterrence have led the 
Americans and NATO to resort to the doctrine 
of flexible response. The deployment of nuclear 
weapons of various strengths mounted on means 
of delivery of various ranges has resulted in a 
loss of credibility for the doctrine of massive 
retaliation as practised by the United States 
because it seemed hardly probable that the two 
great powers would take the risk of causing 
intolerable destruction on their own territory in 
the event of an aggression limited in area or by 
the type of weapons used by the aggressor. This 
obviously does not apply to France which, in its 
concept of deterrence of the strong by the weak, 
has kept to a strategy of massive retaliation 
against the adversary's demo-economic struc-
ture should an independent operation to re-
establish deterrence fail. 
19. Today it may be wondered whether this 
doctrine of flexible response is again being 
called in question by the miniaturisation and 
improvements due to the enhanced radiation 
effect of nuclear weapons and by improvements 
in conventional weapons making the limits of 
the nuclear threshold less clear-cut. This is the 
case with the new American air-land battle 
doctrine which in fact tables on the failure of 
deterrence and recourse to a near-preventive 
use of the most modern weapons to counter any 
serious threat of aggression. 
20. The air-land battle is a combat doctrine 
worked out by the United States TRADOC 
(Training and Doctrine Command). According 
to General Rogers, this doctrine would help 
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NATO forces to defend themselves without 
using nuclear weapons thanks to improvements 
in conventional weapons. The official United 
States army handbook (FMlOO-S), published 
in August 1982 to describe this doctrine, 
underlined two crucial elements: early offensive 
action in order to take the initiative in 
operations and in-depth attack on the enemy, 
i.e. action on his areas of concentration and 
movement, before he can deploy for attack. 
These notions, which are now applied to all 
United States army operations throughout the 
world, were specifically intended for Europe 
where Warsaw Pact troops were to be destroyed 
even before being brought in and while still in 
the distant rear areas of the pact countries. 
According to the handbook, nuclear and 
chemical weapons are very suitable for this type 
of in-depth attack. But the improvement of 
~onventional weapons plays an important part 
m the new doctrine. In particular, it calls in 
sophisticated electronic equipment and so-called 
smart weapons. TRADOC explains that the 
United States army needs a new doctrine and 
new weapons systems because of the numerical 
superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces 
over those of NATO. Otherwise it would be 
necessary to resort more quickly to nuclear 
weapons in the event of Soviet attack. 
21. This doctrine has given rise to some 
~oncern in certain European· countries. For 
mstance, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of 
Defence, told the WEU Assembly on 30th 
November 1982 that "to emphasise a single 
aspect, namely conventional weapons... is ulti-
mately to cast doubt on the rest". In fact, 
certain observers feel that the corollary to this 
doctrine is the abandonment of all first use of 
tactical nuclear weapons or wonder whether it 
is compatible with the forward integrated 
defence concept. General Rogers himself in fact 
spoke of no early first use, which might seem to 
raise doubts about the American nuclear 
guarantee in Europe. But according to official 
American statements this guarantee is in no 
way at stake. 
22. This evolution has led to the progressive 
weakening of deterrence, which still plays a 
major role and largely guarantees peace in 
Europe. But this guarantee seems more and 
more precarious, which probably explains the 
pessimism of part of European public opinion in 
face of the risks of war and the conceivable 
effects of present tension in East-West relations. 
It therefore means not waiting for deterrence, 
mainly ensured by nuclear weapons, to have 
disappeared before negotiating disarmament 
and organising peace in Europe and throughout 
the world. 
23. However, this should certainly not be 
done by upsetting the international order 
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prematurely or unbalancing forces by raising 
doubts in the minds of possible aggressors about 
the people's will to defend themselves or by 
taking unilateral disarmament measures. The 
two steps would moreover probably be concom-
itant and any unilateral disarmament would be 
tantamount to political and military capitulation 
with incalculable consequences. In addition, is 
is very doubtful whether such action would 
avert hostilities. 
24. Particularly if, as is likely, they both 
occurred at once, either of these phenomena 
would most probably make disarmament nego-
tiations more difficult rather than easier because 
the potential enemy would no longer see any 
reason to yield ground if he could achieve his 
aims without concessions, i.e. obtain military 
superiority with all the inherent political 
advantages and thus be in a position to lay 
down the law throughout Europe. One has only 
to think back to the years just before the second 
world war to realise that peace based on such 
an imbalance would always be extremely 
precarious and the hope of the other party 
reducing its military effort merely because we 
showed no desire to defend ourselves would be 
little more than a pipe-dream. 
25. Consequently, whatever threats there may 
now be to deterrence and however urgent it 
may be to bring about true disarmament, 
deterrence is essential for Western Europe. 
American public opinion and leaders do not 
necessarily see the matter in this light and some 
of their reactions - the American bishops for 
instance - bear witness to this, as will be seen 
in Chapter Ill of this report. They may indeed 
consider that hostilities several thousands of 
kilometres from American soil are better than 
the risk of a nuclear strike against the American 
continent. The adoption by American military 
authorities of the air-land battle doctrine 
appears to indicate that this degradation of the 
notion of deterrence is already having repercus-
sions on American concepts. It is characteristic 
that this doctrine, which has been accepted by 
the United States, should have been refused by 
NATO, i.e. by the United States' European 
allies. 
26. This difference of view between Western 
Europe and the United States makes it essential 
for Europe to retain the wherewithal to act 
independently in the event of emergency, i.e. to 
continue to exercise some degree of deterrence 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, even if the deterrent 
value of the American component is declining. 
In this respect the national character of the 
Frenc~ an~ British nuclear forces is particularly 
essential smce they at least leave the possible 
enemy uncertain about the type of reaction to 
aggression. The fact that the United Kingdom 
or France can decide that since its survival is at 
stake the use of these forces might be justified 
helps to strengthen the alliance's deterrent 
capability, particularly as any consequent 
weakening of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the 
United States may make it hesitate about 
embarking upon any form of aggression on 
Western Europe. It is therefore essential for 
these forces not to be prematurely included in 
negotiations in which these two countries have 
not yet been invited to take part, nor should 
they do so until major cuts have been made by 
the two countries whose nuclear weapons are 
by far the most powerful. As stressed by 
President Mitterrand in his speech to the 
United Nations on 28th September 1983, the 
two great powers would have to accept very 
considerable reductions in the number of 
nuclear warheads they possess (between 8,000 
and 9,000) before the question of France's 
ninety-eight missiles could be raised. It should 
be added that the disappearance of French and 
British nuclear weapons would change practi-
cally nothing in the count of nuclear warheads 
but the political balance and the balance of 
nuclear deterrence throughout the world would 
thereby be radically changed. If it is borne in 
mind that a reduction in the number of French 
and British nuclear weapons would reduce these 
deterrent forces to nought, it will be seen that 
the problem is in fact not one of numbers. 
27. Here your Rapporteur wishes to refer to 
the interesting proposal for restoring deterrence 
made by General Copel in his very recent book 
Vaincre la guerre. His formula, which is 
reminiscent of General Rogers' no early first 
use, is not to pull the nuclear trigger away from 
home. It emphasises that nuclear armaments 
should remain purely defensive while strength-
ening their deterrent rdle since a conventional 
attack would be met by nuclear means. Such a 
strategy would imply the production and 
deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon, 
the so-called neutron bomb, which alone would 
be capable of making such retaliation credible 
because of the limited damage and losses it 
would cause in the zone in which it would be 
used. It would require close agreement between 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
and is probably worthy of close consideration. 
28. But deterrence is not ensured only by 
missiles with nuclear warheads. It is also 
ensured by all the other arms which the 
Atlantic Alliance possesses because it is unlikely 
that nuclear weapons would be used in cases 
not considered to be large-scale attacks. To 
exercise true deterrence, it is essential for the 
alliance to have retaliatory capability equal to 
the challenge. Even under the massive retalia-
tion doctrine it was never considered that 
weapons of mass destruction should be the only 
ones used, particularly in the case of limited 
incidents. 
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29. But above all deterrence is also ensured 
by the potential aggressor's conviction that the 
West will actually use the weapons it has in 
response to aggression. This is one of the 
essential difficulties raised by any deterrent 
system: one must be determined to take action 
in order not to have to do so, and any hesitation 
increases the danger of actually having to use 
one's weapons. The psychological factor there-
fore plays an essential rdle in the success of a 
strategy of deterrence. But even though the 
ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons 
is in the hands of one man - the President of 
the Republic in the case of France - the 
potential aggressor's conviction that he will take 
such a decision depends on his assessment of 
the President's character and of the will of the 
people as a whole. Such an assessment is based 
on various factors and particularly how each 
nation accepts in advance the financial and 
other sacrifices necessary for maintaining its 
means of defence or retaliation. In this respect, 
the curve of military expenditure in western 
countries is an accurate thermometer of their 
deterrent capability because of the means made 
available and the will revealed. The inability of 
most of them to increase their defence budgets 
by 3% per year as they had agreed in the 
North Atlantic Council is cause for anxiety 
from this point of view. 
30. There are other means of assessing the 
will for defence: for instance, consideration can 
be given to the type of scenario envisaged by 
military headquarters in the event of war, the 
views of military circles as exposed in specialised 
revues, their circulation among the public and 
its reactions, the positions adopted by politicians 
and political parties and the response to them. 
In short, the effectiveness of deterrence is 
ensured by the overall attitude of each nation 
towards defence matters. 
31. For governments, this implies that a 
policy aimed at consolidating peace does not 
generally involve unilateral or spectacular 
pacifist-type measures, although there may be 
cases when such measures can help to end a 
stalemate and encourage the opening of nego-
tiations on disarmament. But generally speaking 
for such negotiations to be successful they must 
be in the interest of each participant and none 
must hope to disarm the other without 
disarming himself. 
32. For all these reasons, insofar as the 
European nations' will to defend themselves is 
accompanied by no aggressive designs, it is a 
factor of security and of peace and any sign of 
this will weakening is a threat to peace. This is 
why the development of what is rightly or 
wrongly called "pacifist" agitation directed 
mainly at the deployment of American 
medium-range weapons in Western Europe in 
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response to Soviet SS-20s is a source of concern 
for those responsible for Europe's security, even 
if they consider that such security can be firmly 
established only on the basis of negotiated 
disarmament. The aim of participants in this 
undertaking was to stop the application of 
NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 
calling for negotiations with the Soviet Union 
to ban the deployment of medium-range nuclear 
weapons in Europe and fixing 1983 as t~e 
deadline for the deployment of such weapons m 
Western Europe if the Soviet Union did not 
agree to start such negotiations. One committee 
member underlined however that there was 
some credulity in pacifist movements and that 
in many cases they were taken in by Soviet 
propaganda, just as public opinion in many 
countries was once taken in by Hitlerian 
propaganda. 
33. Agitation did not prevent a start being 
made with the application of the decision at the 
beginning of 1984, when it became apparent 
that the Soviet Union was not prepared to make 
enough concessions to allow negotiations to be 
held. But it has already had the effect of 
seriously placing in doubt the will of the western 
nations to defend themselves, thus weakening 
the deterrent value of the West's armaments. It 
probably even allowed the Soviet Union to feel 
that, given enough time for agitation to spread, 
it would manage to paralyse the application of 
the NATO twofold decision and cause a serious 
split between the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance. This is why an attempt must 
be made to assess the reactions of western 
public opinion in this matter and probably to 
do more to give it the "defence spirit" which it 
now sorely lacks. 
34. Some members of the committee said 
they considered British and French nuclear 
weapons made no real contribution to Europe's 
security, as the North Atlantic Council had 
said at its meeting in Ottawa, and that the best 
way Europe could contribute to a deterrent 
policy was to develop its conventional capability. 
This is a perfectly rational view if it is felt that 
only the United States has to have nuclear 
weapons and can represent the interests of 
Europe and of its security vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. It is not so rational if account is taken 
of the considerations your Rapporteur has 
developed above. In any event, it is liable to 
make Europeans feel that they are no longer 
master of their fate and are but a toy in the 
relationship between the two great powers. This 
could but discourage them from any wish to 
defend themselves and hence deprive them of 
their deterrent ability. It seems wholly out of 
the question that any French Government 
would endorse such a point of view. 
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Ill. Western public opinion and the defence of 
Europe 
35. There has been a spectacular spread of 
pacifist and neutralist movements in recent 
years which has not failed to attract the 
attention of the press, government authorities, 
political parties and even Christian churches 
and scholars and research workers interested in 
defence matters and trends in public opinion. 
As a result, the subjects broached by these 
movements have played a large part in electoral 
campaigns, e.g. in the Netherlands in September 
1982, in the Federal Republic in March 1983 
and in the United Kingdom and Italy in June 
1983. They have also been the subject of 
statements by catholic and protestant church 
authorities in most western countries. Finally, 
they have been carefully studied and analysed 
in numerous press articles and national and 
international symposia. Thus, your Rapporteur 
has noted that in the French monthly Defense 
nationale alone, which as its name indicates 
specialises in defence questions, there were no 
less than eighteen major articles in 1983 on the 
Euromissile crisis and the ensuing discussion in 
the West whereas hitherto there had been very 
little reference to matters connected with 
pacifism. 
36. This means that your Rapporteur had a 
wealth of background information, too much 
even for him to be able to take full cognisance 
of it before tackling the subject. He believes at 
least that he has thus managed to obtain more 
accurate and deeper knowledge than in 1982 of 
the various aspects of pacifist preoccupations in 
the West, which was essential for examining 
their political implications for the Western 
European countries. 
I. Agitation against Euromissiles 
37. Since 1979, the prospect of the deploy-
ment of cruise and Pershing 11 missiles in 
Western Europe has been the hub of pacifist 
activity and propaganda in Europe. The subject 
seemed likely to mobilise a broad section of 
public opinion since nuclear war, a possibility 
to be feared but improbable as long as it was 
linked with an exchange of missiles with nuclear 
warheads between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, assumed an infinitely more 
impressive and more directly threatening shape 
from the moment missiles with nuclear war-
heads were to be deployed in a number of 
Western European countries. 
38. Moreover, for a time the prospect of 
deployment managed to bring pacifists and 
Soviets together in a joint stand against the 
NATO decision. Your Rapporteur does not 
mean that the pacifist movements were mere 
auxiliaries, more or less subsidised with Soviet 
funds, even if this seems, on occasion, to have 
been the case, but simply that they engaged in 
a joint struggle against western nuclear arma-
ments. This struggle, which sought to prevent 
the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe 
in implementation of the NATO twofold 
decision, advanced with renewed vigour after 
the election of President Reagan at the end of 
1980, probably because of the bellicose tone 
adopted by the new president and by his 
Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, which 
was certainly repugnant to a section of 
European public opinion. It first came to the 
fore in October 1981. It happened a second 
time in autumn 1983 over preparatory work for 
the deployment of Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles on the territory of certain Western 
European countries, including the Federal 
Republic and the United Kingdom. The sites 
for the first American missiles became the 
centre of large-scale, impassioned demonstra-
tions, as emphasised by the press. Although one 
should be cautious about the figures mentioned 
for the number of demonstrators, it is clear that 
there were hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, and they were extremely determined. 
39. The various participants in these demon-
strations put forward different kinds of argu-
ment which varied considerably from one 
country to another. Some purely and simply 
rejected all nuclear weapons. Others considered 
that the West had not tried hard enough to 
hold negotiations with the Soviet Union and 
called for a moratorium on further deployment 
to allow negotiations to be started on the basis 
of new concessions to the Soviet Union. These 
concessions would have involved a different way 
of calculating the balance of forces, including 
for instance French and British weapons in the 
negotiations. Yet others, particularly in the 
United Kingdom, asked their governments to 
make a unilateral gesture to start disarmament. 
40. In reality, these various arguments 
worked unilaterally against the West. Admit-
tedly, demonstrators in western cities also 
clamoured for the dismantling of Soviet missiles. 
But they had even less chance of making 
themselves heard since information given by the 
eastern press made little reference to this aspect 
of the anti-nuclear demonstrations to which 
they nevertheless gave widespread coverage. 
The demonstrations which started in certain 
eastern countries, including Poland and the 
German Democratic Republic, were immedi-
ately repressed, thus practically reducing an 
emerging pacifist movement to silence. 
41. Moreover, a moratorium on the deploy-
ment of western weapons had serious drawbacks 
insofar as the Soviet Union continued to deploy 
its own weapons as described by Mr. Hernu, 
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French Minister of Defence, in a speech to the 
Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale 
on 15th November 1983: 
"... in Europe and Asia, the continuous 
and unbalanced addition of new means of 
mass destruction is leading to a profound 
change in the international balance. More 
particularly, the number of SS-20 mobile 
missiles continues to rise: 135 at the time 
of the famous NATO twofold decision of 
December 1979 - and I point out that 
the Soviet authorities then said there was 
an approximate balance - 297 when 
President Brezhnev announced a unilat-
eral moratorium on their deployment in 
March 1982, and 360 today. These 360 
missiles carry 1,080 warheads which can 
strike more than fifty-six European, Asian 
or North African states in some twelve 
minutes, including more than two-thirds 
of the world's population. A particularity 
of these weapons is that they are keeping 
the countries of the old world hostage, 
their security thus being cut off from that 
of the Americaq continent, which is alone 
beyond their reach. This is a potentially 
dramatic situation for those countries 
which depend entirely on the American 
guarantee for their security as is the case 
for instance of European or Asian 
countries which do not have a nuclear 
deterrent force. 
In face of this the United States and the 
member countries of the NATO inte-
grated system have come up to the 
deadline laid down by their sovereign 
twofold decision of December 1979. After 
two years of discussions, the Geneva 
negotiations have produced no satisfactory 
results. Unless there is a last-minute 
surprise, Pershing and cruise missiles will 
therefore have to be deployed. We hope 
this first step towards correcting the 
imbalance will, in the long run, allow the 
negotiations to be based on more solid 
foundations and lead at some time to an 
agreement providing for the lowest pos-
sible level of armaments. A great country 
like the Soviet Union cannot avoid this 
particularly as the deployment of Ameri~ 
can missiles would not be a reason for 
breaking off discussions. The continued 
deployment of SS-20s- ninety-nine since 
the negotiations started - was not taken 
by the United States as a pretext for 
suspending the Geneva talks ... " 
42. Consequently, however well-intentioned 
pacifist agitation in autumn 1983 may have 
seemed, its military and political repercussions 
could have been more serious for Europe and 
for international peace if the governments had 
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not shown considerable moderation in their 
reactions to the demonstrations and much 
firmness in abiding by their December 1979 
commitments. However, the magnitude of the 
demonstrations might leave room for doubts 
about the will of the people of Western Europe 
to give their backing to their governments. In 
any event, the impression they gave American 
public opinion was that Europeans did not wish 
to be defended and isolationist trends in the 
United States were thus strengthened. They 
probably also convinced the Soviet authorities 
that a further propaganda effort on their part 
might swing the balance in their favour. We 
must therefore delve deeper into the analysis of 
European public opinion in order to assess its 
true reactions. 
2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe 
43. The most usual and safest way to 
ascertain the opinion of the public in democratic 
countries is obviously to study the way it votes, 
particularly in general elections. Several of the 
WEU member countries most concerned by the 
deployment of Pershing 11 and cruise missiles 
and by pacifist agitation had general elections 
between summer 1982 and summer 1983: the 
Netherlands in October 1982, the Federal 
Republic of Germany in March 1983 and the 
United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983. 
44. Deployment of these new weapons played 
a prominent role in the electoral campaigns in 
these four countries, although it cannot be said 
to have overshadowed other topical questions 
including economic and social matters. This is 
already a sign of the importance public opinion 
attaches to this matter and of the limits of this 
importance; it cannot be said that this alone 
determined the choice of the electorate. 
45. Furthermore, in none of the four countries 
which held elections in 1982 and 1983 was 
there a shift in the vote to show a strong trend 
of public opinion. In the Netherlands, the 
Christian Democrat Party, which was then in 
favour of applying the NATO twofold decision, 
subject to the results of the Geneva negotiations 
but which still has to reconsider its position on 
the matter, obtained 29.34% of the votes in 
1983 compared with 30.8% in 1981 but the 
Liberal Party, which was also in favour, 
obtained 23.07% compared with 17.32% and 
replaced the Labour Party in the coalition 
government, although the latter obtained 
30.38% compared with 28.29%. It cannot 
therefore be said that the Netherlands elections 
showed that public opinion rejected the deploy-
ment of Pershing 11 and cruise missiles in spite 
of the magnitude of pacifist demonstrations in 
the country on that occasion. 
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46. Nor can the elections in the Federal 
Republic on 6th March 1983 be interpreted as 
repudiating the parties in government at the 
time, although they were in favour of applying 
NATO's 1979 twofold decision, since the 
number of votes for the CDU jCSU rose from 
44.5% in 1980 to 48.8% in 1983, those for the 
FDP falling from 10.6% to 7%. This coalition 
therefore remained in power while votes for the 
party which had demonstrated its hostility to 
the deployment of Euromissiles the most 
vigorously, Die Gn1nen, rose from 1.5% to 5.6%, 
thus marking both the growth in and the limits 
of its audience among the German electorate. 
It should be noted, however, that the SPD, 
whose votes rose from 42.9% in 1979 to 38.2% 
in 1983, had been in favour of applying 
NATO's 1979 twofold decision, but had since 
changed its opinion and finally, at its congress 
in Cologne in November 1983, it rejected the 
twofold resolution adopted by NATO in 
December 1979. It is to re-examine its position 
on this matter in the coming months. 
47. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
Party, which had very clearly stated its intention 
to apply the NATO twofold decision, won the 
elections on 9th June 1983, still receiving 42.4% 
of the votes compared with 43.9% in 1979 and 
increasing its majority from 332 to 397 seats. 
Finally, in Italy the Christian Democrats 
certainly lost some votes, the percentage falling 
from 38.3% in 1979 to 32.9% on 27th June 
1983, but these losses were spread among 
several parties which did not all have the same 
position towards this matter. Moreover, none of 
the major Italian parties has officially rejected 
the deployment of Euromissiles outright, but 
none has given its unreserved agreement. It is 
therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions 
from the Italian elections on the trend of 
opinion towards that country's defence policy. 
48. Decisive conclusion obviously cannot be 
drawn from these elections regarding the impact 
of the deployment of Euromissiles on public 
opinion in these four countries, but it may be 
pointed out that in no case did opponents of 
deployment win elections in those two years 
and governments democratically formed after 
these elections consisted everywhere of parties 
in favour of implementing the twofold decision. 
We should not therefore be impressed by the 
scale of demonstrations against deployment in 
these four countries in autumn 1981 and 
autumn 1983. It undoubtedly shows the size of 
a determined minority but certainly does not 
show the existence of a hostile majority. 
However, the fact that a silent majority exists, 
even if it votes, and a zealous minority, indicates 
that a reversal of the situation is still possible, 
particularly if there are difficulties in operating 
the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that the start 
in the deployment of Euromissiles on the date 
fixed by the North Atlantic Council after these 
elections represented an initial defeat for 
opponents of nuclear weapons. But there is no 
guarantee that this setback is final and the 
Soviet Union is making no secret of the fact 
that it is waiting for the right time to launch or 
foster further anti-nuclear action to improve its 
moral and political positions and divide the 
West. 
3. Opinion polls 
49. The spread of anti-nuclear agitation in 
Western Europe has led most organisations 
responsible for analysing the reactions of public 
opinion to conduct inquiries into the matter. 
They were urged to do so by requests from the 
press, governments or associations concerned 
with Europe's security. Your Rapporteur has 
been able to examine the results of a number 
of these inquiries, grouped inter alia by the 
/nstitut fra1tfais des relations internationales in 
its publication Pacifisme et dissuasion, by the 
Atlantic Institute for a colloquy which it is to 
hold in spring 1984 and by the organisers of a 
meeting to study France's security and pacifism 
held in Paris on 14th and 15th September 1983 
under the title of Defense et recherche universi-
taire. He is not unaware of the difficulties of 
analysing and comparing polls carried out in 
different circumstances, on different dates, in 
different countries and with different question-
naires proposed to cross-sections of people which 
do not correspond. In particular, he knows how 
difficult it is to estimate the intensity of 
reactions on the basis of answers to questions 
which leave little room for the expression of 
more subtle views. He nevertheless thought it 
interesting to mention some of the results of 
these inquiries because they check out indica-
tions obtained by other means. 
50. Thus, a poll carried out in eight countries 
for the Atlantic Institute and the International 
Herald Tribune by the Louis Harris organisa-
tion asked: "Which of the following are your 
greatest concerns for yourself and your coun-
try?". Of ten possible answers "unemployment" 
came first in Italy, whereas "the threat of war" 
came only second in Spain, third in France, the 
United Kingdom and Norway, fourth in the 
Netherlands and Italy and seventh in the 
United States and the Federal Republic. 
"Nuclear weapons" came second in Norway, 
the Netherlands and the United States, third in 
the United Kingdom, fourth in the Federal 
Republic, sixth in Spain, seventh in France and 
eighth in Italy. "Inadequate defence" came 
tenth and last in all eight countries, the other 
concerns referred to relating to economic or 
social matters. Your Rapporteur will not give 
the percentages, which would be particularly 
difficult to interpret as totals are not the same 
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in all countries in view of the fact that those 
questioned could give several answers. 
51. Your Rapporteur considers it important, 
and it corroborates the various poll results that 
he has been able to consult, that international 
peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the 
balance of forces, although real and serious, are 
not the main preoccupation of the majority of 
Europeans. A pacifist campaign which has been 
going on for several years has admittedly 
managed to draw attention to the threats 
represented by nuclear weapons in several 
Western European countries. But the huge 
demonstrations which have taken place on this 
subject do not show so much anguish about 
such weapons as might have been thought. 
Conversely, the inadequacy of the West's means 
of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, 
does not seem very serious to a large majority 
of Europeans. 
52. Answers to a question in the same 
inquiry: "Which of the following are most 
responsible for international tension?" are also 
revealing. In six countries the Soviet military 
build-up came first, but it came only fourth in 
France and fifth in Spain, whereas the United 
States military build-up came second in the 
Federal Republic, Norway and the Netherlands, 
fourth in Spain and Italy, fifth in the United 
Kingdom, seventh in France (the only one of 
the eight countries to have communists in its 
government) and eighth in the United States. 
Among the other answers, it is interesting to 
note that in France American interest rates and 
the role of the dollar came first and that all 
countries except Norway attached great import-
ance to insufficient European unity. All except 
the United States attached little importance to 
the overconciliatory attitude of European gov-
ernments towards the Soviet Union, and hardly 
more to the rise of neutralism and pacifism in 
European public opinion. 
53. The question "Which of the following are 
most important to western security?" brought 
out three separate trends. In the answers from 
the United States, the Federal Republic and 
the United Kingdom first place was given to 
"effective United States-European co-opera-
tion", in the French, Spanish and Italian 
answers "strengthened economic unity in 
Europe" came first, and in the Norwegian and 
Netherlands answers "productive arms control 
talks". 
54. Another inquiry, based on answers to 786 
questionnaires sent to an "elite" in five countries 
by the Berlin International Institute for Com-
parative Social Research, the first results of 
which were published in August 1983, gave a 
number of interesting indications, although they 
are not comparable with those given by polls 
carried out on other bases. In response to the 
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proposition "Deployment of NATO's 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF, i.e. 
cruise missiles and Pershing 11) should proceed 
under all circumstances", 65% in France agreed, 
30% in the United States, 15% in the United 
Kingdom and 10% in the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic, although the proportion of 
those who thought that "military strength 
should be a pre-condition for detente" ranged 
from 54% in the Federal Republic to 77% in 
France, i.e. a clear majority in the five countries 
covered by the inquiry. In any event, the 
proposition that "NATO INF deployment 
should proceed under no circumstances" 
obtained 40% support in the Federal Republic, 
30% in the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands, 15% in the United States and 3% in 
France, i.e. nowhere did it obtain a majority. 
55. However, a number of polls carried out in 
France between 1980 and 1982 indicate that 
although a large section of French public 
opinion trusts the deterrent value of the French 
nuclear force to avoid a possible attack ( 62% as 
opposed to 32% according to a poll published in 
L'Express in May 1980), in November 1981, 
according to a SOFRES poll published by Le 
Figaro, only 15% of French public opinion 
considered that "if the Soviet Union were to 
threaten France directly, every means including 
nuclear weapons should be used to resist it", 
whereas 75% considered that an attempt should 
be made "to negotiate a compromise". In 
August 1982, a Louis Harris poll published by 
Ca m'interesse gave similar results: in the event 
of French territory being invaded by the Soviet 
army, 42% thought "France should try to 
negotiate", 39% that "it should defend itself by 
military means" and 10% that "it should use 
nuclear weapons". One-third (32%) of those 
questioned by IFRES for Le Quotidien in 
November 1981 said that if national territory 
were invaded they would "fight underground", 
11% would "adapt themselves to the regime of 
the invader" and 39% would "go into exile". 
56. Your Rapporteur does not know what 
answers would have been given to such questions 
in other countries but he feels the reactions of 
French public opinion somewhat compensate for 
the distortions which seem to emerge from 
comparative polls between France and the other 
western nations. 
57. There can be no question here of giving 
a larger number of poll results or a more 
elaborate interpretation. But these few indica-
tions allow several points to be clarified, the 
first being that western public opinion is only 
very partially and very imperfectly reflected by 
the mass movements which have been seen in 
recent years. Opinion seems deeply attached to 
peace but divided over the kind of danger 
threatening it and the means of countering it. 
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Above all, people seem to be ill-informed about 
the political and military facts on which 
Europe's security depends and fail to provide 
the basis the governments need for pursuing an 
effective security and peace policy. 
4. Positions adopted by Christian churches 
58. On 7th June 1982, in a message to the 
second extraordinary session of the United 
Nations on disarmament, Pope John Paul 11, 
after noting that little progress had been made 
in disarmament although the world wanted 
both peace and disarmament, gave some of his 
views on the matter. He said the catholic 
church deplored the armaments race and urged 
at least a progressive mutual and verifiable 
reduction, together with the greatest precautions 
against possible errors in the use of nuclear 
weapons. On peace movements, he said it was 
important to give due consideration, with the 
caution and objectivity they warranted, to all 
serious proposals aimed at contributing to real 
disarmament and improving the atmosphere. 
He said that in present circumstances deterrence 
based on balance could still be considered 
morally acceptable but reiterated his confidence 
in the force of loyal negotiations which should 
aim inter alia at a balanced, simultaneous and 
internationally-controlled reduction of arma-
ments. 
59. He then advocated a reduction in the 
production and sale of conventional weapons 
throughout the world, as well as of nuclear 
weapons, and said very particular attention 
should be paid to their improvement since this 
was one of the essential dimensions of the 
armaments race. He considered the work of 
experts on the link between disarmament and 
development deserved to be studied and followed 
up and added that the true cause of our 
insecurity stemmed from a deep-rooted crisis of 
mankind. It was no longer possible for rich and 
poor to live side by side without the emergence 
of resentment turning to violence. 
60. The churches have since made an unusual 
number of statements about peace in 1983: the 
catholic episcopate in the Federal Republic, the 
United States, the Netherlands, the German 
Democratic Republic, Austria, Hungary, Switz-
erland, Ireland, Belgium, Japan and France, 
and a number of protestant churches or 
ecclesiastical organisations. These statements 
were due to the apparent disarray of public 
opinion throughout the West, particularly 
following the discussion about the deployment 
of Euro-strategic missiles, and by the pastoral 
concerns of church leaders who are anxious to 
give their congregations guidance in a matter 
which is at one and the same time technical, 
political, military and moral. Generally speak-
ing, these statements avoided taking the easy 
way out, which would have been to adopt 
purely moral positions, and to varying degrees 
they showed a firm determination to respect 
ethical responsibility in the political and military 
order. 
61. An examination of the various texts 
emanating from catholic episcopates shows that 
they reflect two concerns. First, they mark their 
adhesion to a moral position of the catholic 
church towards war as defined on 11th June 
1982 in a speech by Pope John Paul 11 to the 
United Nations General Assembly. Second, 
they meet the specific preoccupations of the 
people to whom they are addressed. To refer 
only to the three texts of which your Rapporteur 
has direct knowledge, those by the German, 
American and French episcopates, he has noted 
a series of converging views, particularly about 
the following ideas: 
(i) recourse to force is acceptable only in 
a very limited number of cases, if it 
spares non-combatants and if it 
remains proportional to the aggression 
to which it is responding; 
(ii) nuclear weapons further increase the 
threat to humanity involved in 
recourse to force; 
(iii) the aim of any security policy must 
be the establishment of a system of 
inter-state relations based on non-
violence; 
(iv) deterrence, exercised in particular by 
nuclear weapons; may be a means of 
attaining this aim and its only 
justification lies in the pursuit of 
action to replace the balance of terror 
by more just foundations for interna-
tional peace. It may therefore be a 
guarantee of peace, albeit precarious, 
but cannot constitute its lasting basis; 
(v) on the contrary, lasting peace may be 
based on the promotion of greater 
political, economic and social justice; 
(vi) efforts must be made to work out 
non-violent means of solving conflicts. 
62. Together with these principles, mention 
should be made of differences of tone between 
statements by national episcopates which take 
account of each country's specific problems. 
Thus, the American episcopate recommends 
support for immediate, bilateral and verifiable 
agreements to stop the testing, production and 
deployment of new nuclear weapons systems. 
But its statement draws a clear distinction 
between recourse to force in general and 
recourse to nuclear weapons in particular, the 
latter being justifiable only in response to the 
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use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. This 
stipulation, which the American bishops explain 
is based on specific circumstances which may 
change or be interpreted differently by people 
of good will, means condemning all first-use of 
nuclear weapons. 
63. The statement by German bishops of 
15th April 198 3 associates moral tolerance of 
deterrence with the following criteria: 
(i) the immunity of civilians; 
(ii) the means considered or used should 
not make war easier or more probable; 
(iii) the means should be limited to what 
is essential for effective deterrence; 
(iv) the means should be compatible with 
the aims of limiting or reducing 
armaments and effective, bilateral 
disarmament. 
64. The statement by French bishops cer-
tainly lays more stress on the fact that, on the 
one hand, possession of nuclear weapons may 
provide the Soviet Union, referred to by name, 
with means of blackmail whereby the advan-
tages of war may be gained without paying the 
price of launching it and, on the other, the 
chemical, bacteriological or even conventional 
forms of modern warfare are just as dangerous 
as the nuclear form, and a firm stand is taken 
against unilateral disarmament. 
65. The very nature of the protestant churches 
means that the very numerous statements about 
nuclear weapons which they have issued in 
recent years are far more difficult to examine 
and interpret overall. They of course include 
most of the points raised by the catholic 
authorities but are not unanimous on one 
essential point, i.e. the value of unilateral 
disarmament initiatives. For instance, on lOth 
February 1983 the Church of England General 
Synod negatived by only 275 votes to 222 a 
unilateralist proposal in a draft text on nuclear 
weapons prepared by its drafting committee. 
Conversely, in November 1983 the General 
Assembly of French Protestants passed a 
resolution calling for a unilateral freeze of 
French nuclear weapons. Finally, German 
protestants were extremely divided about the 
value to be attached to ecclesiastical statements 
about means of maintaining peace. 
66. This report is obviously not a suitable 
context for a close and critical examination of 
the positions adopted by the various Christian 
churches in this field. It can merely call 
attention to the importance all these churches 
attach to matters relating to security, deterrence 
and nuclear weapons and note that although 
their opinions may have sometimes diverged 
about how to achieve a peaceful international 
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order, an area in which moreover they have no 
specific competence, their reactions closely 
resemble those of most western governments. 
As they wish peace to be based on respons!ble 
disarmament, i.e. leading to properly-orgamsed 
peace and international order, in most cases 
they have remained aloof from the paci!ist 
demonstrations which tried to shelter behmd 
their moral authority. 
* 
* * 
67. The various elements available for exam-
ining and assessing the reactions of European 
public opinion to security and defence matters 
at least allow the pacifist demonstrations in the 
western countries in recent years to be placed 
in their proper context. They undoubtedly 
reflect deep-rooted uneasiness and the reso~ve 
of certain groups to oppose the defence pohcy 
of the Atlantic Alliance, including the deploy-
ment of Euromissiles following the Soviet 
refusal to hold negotiations on an equitable 
basis for limiting their number. But they do not 
show a radical about-turn in regard to their 
governments' defence policies. Elections in four 
of the countries where demonstrations were 
particularly widespread resulte~ in the electi_?n 
or re-election of representatives of parties 
advocating those policies. What is known of the 
trend of public opinion in the United States 
indicates that NATO-related considerations are 
unlikely to decide the outcome of the elections 
to be held at the end of 1984. Non-political 
organisations dominated by ethical considera-
tions such as the Christian churches have not 
generally sided with the pacifist movements. In 
short movements of opinion in favour of 
pacifism seem unlikely, because of their intensity 
or extent, to change the facts of the situation. 
68. Nevertheless the deployment of Eurom-
issiles has certainly revealed a feeling of 
uneasiness which it is politically impossible to 
ignore. It would certainly be a mistake to 
consider deployment as the final victory of one 
side over another and, although it has led to 
some discouragement among pacifists, they have 
lost neither their motivation nor their influence 
over public opinion, which is quite obviou~ly 
inadequately informed of the facts of secunty 
and defence problems. Today's gains may slip 
away tomorrow if the governments fail to 
explain their decisions clearly enough and 
support them with arg~ments ~cceptable to ~he 
public. Those whose mterest ts to undermme 
western cohesion will be quick to exploit any 
weakening of public opinion in each country in 
the will to resist any form of pressure or 
aggression and, if they succeed, they will 
weaken the deterrent value of the West's forces 
and consequently, instead of strengthening 
peace, they will make it more precarious. 
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IV. The will for defence 
69. The Soviet Union for its part seems to be 
showing a flawless . will to. do eyer~thi~g 
necessary to ensure tts secunty, mat.ntam .tts 
domination over Eastern Europe, mcludmg 
Afghanistan, and further improve its P?Si!ion in 
the international balance of forces. It ts mdeed 
difficult to discern any real hesitation in Soviet 
opinion towards this policy. A.d~.ittedly there 
are dissidents who strongly cntictse the ever-
growing militarism in the Soviet U~ion, ~ut 
everything is done to control them, 1~ Sovtet 
society at least, and to keep them out etther by 
imprisoning them with or wi!hout ~rial. or ~y 
making them emigrate. Thetr a~t10n ts dts-
credited and presented to the Sovtet people as 
pure and simple treason. 
70. In an article in Le Monde on 3rd May 
1983 members of the Comite France-URSS 
who 'had been to Moscow reported on the 
activities of independent Soviet pacifists and t~e 
actions brought against them. Part of thts 
report read as follows: 
"The Moscow group for the establishment 
of confidence between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, set up in June 
1982 ... was in favour of disarmament 
based on detente from the base upwards, 
an essential condition for detente at the 
summit . . . proposed to encourage the 
policy of detente ... by pursuing educative 
action among the Soviet people to make 
them aware of the realities of the 
armaments race ... and, while seeking to 
establish a dialogue with the official peace 
movement in the Soviet Union, it proposed 
that citizens reflect on the matter and 
take independent action ... The initiatives 
taken by the group have drawn continual 
systematic insults and intimidatory meas-
ures by the authorities ... The authori~ies 
then moved on to open repressiOn. 
Arrested on 6th October 1982, a member 
of the group, Oleg R~dzin~ky, was 
imprisoned, accused of anti-Sovtet propa-
ganda ... and condemned on 13th October 
1982 to one year's prison and five years' 
deportation. To date, eight members have 
been condemned ... " 
Furthermore, the West German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 6th March 
1984 relates that five Dutch pacifists, members 
of the IKV, who visited Czechoslovakia at the 
beginning of the month to try to hold a 
symposium there, were expelled from the 
country, as was a French woman member of 
the CODEME. 
71. Furthermore, Soviet defence policy is 
presented as being solely to defend peace and 
the media depict the Soviet state as having a 
monopoly of pacifism at home and throughout 
the world. There are no true elections, public 
demonstrations of any size or opinion polls to 
show how far the Soviet public accepts 
government propaganda, but the reactions of 
the Russian orthodox church to matters relating 
to defence and peace conform to the official line 
in every respect, which allows it to be thought 
that the Soviet state has largely managed to 
convince the Soviet people of the soundness of 
its views or to impose a regime of terror and 
silence on such a scale that no criticism can be 
voiced. 
72. The situation is not quite the same in the 
people's democracies, where a few sporadic 
pacifist demonstrations against nuclear weapons, 
both Soviet and western, have been held, 
particularly in Poland and the German Demo-
cratic Republic. The catholic church and the 
Solidarity trade union in the former and the 
protestant churches in the latter have shown 
their independence of the political regime and 
at the same time their sympathy· for the 
demonstrators. However, the official position 
has always been that, since the state was 
pursuing a true policy of peace, any demonstra-
tion against its defence policy was also against 
peace. The harsh measures taken against 
Solidarity by the Polish Government are no 
secret and it is clear that the catholic church 
used its influence and margin of freedom of 
expression to try to protect some degree of 
freedom in the country rather than endorse 
agitation whose effects would quite obviously 
have been nil and might have been further 
encouragement for the Soviet Union to inter-
vene. 
73. The East German protestant churches 
were associated, particularly in 1982, with the 
development of a pacifist movement which 
claimed to be christian. However, measures 
adopted by the state and the persecution of 
some of the movements' militants led church 
leaders to discourage demonstrations. Inter alia, 
they advised against wearing a badge represent-
ing a sword transformed into a ploughshare, 
inspired by a passage from the prophet Micah, 
because the badge exposed its wearers to harsh 
measures by the state. 
74. These two examples and other indications 
emanating from most of the people's democra-
cies clearly seem to mean that, contrary to 
what has sometimes been said, "pacifism is in 
the West but the arms are in the East". The 
deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union 
caused concern and discontent among public 
opinion in countries under Soviet domination. 
This discontent may be seen as a form of 
opposition to that domination since the local 
authorities firmly repress such reactions. 
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75. However, at the meeting of the seven 
Warsaw Pact Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
which ended on 14th October 1983, the 
Romanians refused to accept nuclear weapons 
and announced that they would refuse to 
endorse the deployment of such weapons in 
other allied countries of the Warsaw Pact as a 
retaliation to NATO's deployment of Pershing 
11 and cruise missiles. The reason they gave for 
refusing was that they could not hold weapons 
of mass destruction because their country had 
collaborated with Nazi Germany. But it is clear 
that there were other reasons too for this 
reaction. 
76. These various considerations make one 
question the solidarity of the eastern countries 
with the Soviet Union and the cohesion of the 
Warsaw Pact. But as there is nothing to prove 
that Soviet society proper has been affected by 
pacifist movements, one cannot deduce that 
there has been an actual weakening in the will 
of the Soviet people to defend themselves. The 
Eastern European regimes are such that the 
appearance of cracks in the people's allegiance 
to official policy, rather than auguring an early 
change in that policy, which is imposed by the 
Soviet Union, on the contrary forecasts a 
hardening of Soviet domination which will allow 
no criticism of the peace policy which the Soviet 
Union claims to pursue. 
77. It is evident that the western governments 
do not want to pursue a policy of repressing 
pacifism, nor can they do so moreover. Even if 
they have serious reason to think that pacifist 
demonstrations might undermine their defence 
policies and jeopardise their deterrent effect, 
they consider that the only legitimate and, in 
the end, effective way of combating such an 
outcome is to accept open discussion with those 
who do not share their views, provided the latter 
more or less respect the law which is, on the 
whole, quite liberal. Certain practices, such as 
bomb incidents or kidnappings, can never be 
tolerated, but it must be said that such incidents 
have been exceptional in pacifist campaigns in 
recent years. 
78. It is, on the contrary, through information 
and dialogue that the western governments can 
and must tackle the problem facing them 
through the spread of pacifist movements and 
it must be noted that, even if information and 
dialogue have not always been adequate, they 
exist in most Western European countries and 
in the United States. 
79. When your Rapporteur speaks of infor-
mation and dialogue, he does not mean that the 
European governments should merely uphold 
their views through the media, for instance, but 
he considers that many of the pacifists' 
arguments warrant detailed study and that 
some of their suggestions are particularly 
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worthy of being followed up since they respond 
to the true concerns of public opinion. Your 
Rapporteur will select three which he finds 
particularly legitimate and in conformity with 
the interests of peace: detente, negotiated 
disarmament and development of the North-
South dialogue. 
80. The word detente has often been misun-
derstood insofar as it has been assimilated with 
a policy of weakness towards the Soviet Union, 
particularly in the field of armaments and 
forces. On the contrary, according to your 
Rapporteur it implies the development of 
relations with the Soviet Union and its allies in 
all areas not relating to the balance of forces 
and is based on the conviction that western 
regimes have nothing to lose but everything to 
gain from an increase in such exchanges and 
the removal of all obstacles. This was clear 
after the signing of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe in Helsinki on 1st August 1975: the West 
had hesitated for a long time before embarking 
upon these negotiations which might have been 
interpreted as implying the de facto abandon-
ment of some of its legitimate claims, particu-
larly the reunification of Germany, but which 
were beyond hope, in order to secure a number 
of undertakings from the Soviet Union and its 
allies in regard to human rights and freedoms, 
international trade and measures designed to 
restore mutual confidence. This led to a text in 
which the two sides' concessions were balanced 
but which the Soviet Union and its allies have 
been unable to apply because their internal 
regimes could not stand the introduction of 
certain forms of freedom. In the end, it was the 
opposition to Soviet domination in Eastern 
Europe that was thus highlighted. 
81. It is not therefore surprising that little 
valid progress could be made in the subsequent 
work of the CSCE. At least the Madrid 
conference which ended in autumn 1983 
managed to agree to hold a conference in 
Stockholm at the beginning of 1984 on 
disarmament in Europe and mutual 
confidence-building measures since only here 
could balanced concessions be expected. It is 
too early to assess the results of thiS conference 
but the very fact that it started at a time when 
deployment of the first Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles had strained East-West relations and 
the Soviet Union had just announced its 
withdrawal from current negotiations on the 
limitation of nuclear weapons constitutes a 
factor of detente, as immediately demonstrated 
by a Soviet proposal to resume the MBFR talks 
on limiting the level of conventional forces in 
Europe. 
82. But detente is not merely a matter of 
multilateral negotiations. It is also practised by 
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governments in their trade with the Soviet 
Union and its allies. Admittedly, as the General 
Affairs Committee said in adopting Mr. Atkin-
son's report on East-West trade in November 
1983, such trade must not help to increase 
Soviet military strength, nor make the western 
countries over-dependent on supplies or pur-
chases from the Soviet Union, nor allow unduly 
advantageous trade conditions for the USSR. 
However, the development of trade is a good 
thing in itself: it encourages nations to be more 
open and, if conducted normally, is a token of 
peace. Western opinion polls on the interest 
accorded to this form of detente showed that 
large majorities were very much in favour of it. 
The desire to retain armaments at a level 
sufficient for maintaining balance and peace 
must not be linked with a refusal to practise 
detente lest opponents of the western armaments 
efforts be afforded arguments which might sway 
more public support to their side. 
83. Naturally, disarmament proper cannot 
and must not be neglected at any price. In no 
case is it by refusing to disarm that those in 
favour of unilateral measures can be mollified; 
on the contrary, by proving that progress can 
be made towards negotiated disarmament, 
public opinion can be convinced of the inherent 
dangers of unilateralism. There is certainly a 
suspicion, particularly among younger anti-
nuclear agitators, that the western governments 
do not really want disarmament and that the 
interminable negotiations which have now been 
going on for more than twenty years in various 
frameworks and with few results are but a 
screen to conceal their darker intentions. This 
idea can be usefully exploited in propaganda 
aimed at dividing the West and weakening its 
will to defend itself. The West must therefore 
make it quite clear that its firm rejection of any 
unilateral steps which would allow speculation 
about the weakness of its determination in no 
way means it rejects disarmament but, on the 
contrary, is intended to allow true negotiations 
to promote balanced, verifiable disarmament 
accepted by all. 
84. This can be done only if is quite clear 
that the nuclear weapons at the disposal of 
certain Western European countries, i.e. the 
United Kingdom and France: 
(i) contribute to the security of Western 
Europe as a whole; 
(ii) are the minimum credible for a 
strategy of deterrence and therefore 
cannot be reduced as long as the 
nuclear forces of the two great powers 
remain at their present levels; 
(iii) influence relations between Western 
European countries only insofar as 
the latter have never really concerted 
their views on defence policy; 
(iv) play a deterrent role and are used 
only for defensive purposes. 
85. Where nuclear and strategic nuclear 
bombers are concerned: 
- the United Kingdom has 64 sea-to-
surface strategic ballistic missiles with 
a range of 4,000 km, with three 
thermonuclear warheads per missile, on 
board four nuclear-propelled submari-
nes; 
- France has 80 sea-to-surface ballistic 
missiles with a range of 3,000 km, with 
one thermonuclear warhead per missile, 
on board five nuclear-propelled sub-
marines, 18 surface-to-surface strategic 
missiles with a range of 3,500 km and 
36 Mirage IV strategic bombers. 
Where tactical nuclear forces are concerned: 
- NATO has 306 surface-to-surface mis-
siles with a range of between 40 and 
7 40 km, 1 ,910 guns and 603 aircraft 
whose range of action varies between 
950 and 2,500 km; 
- France has 42 Pluton surface-to-surface 
missiles with a range of 120 km and 
Mirage Ill, Super-Etendard and Jaguar 
bombers capable of transporting one 
nuclear warhead per aircraft with a 
range of action of 700 km. 
86. The means necessary for such government 
action can be combined only if there is close 
consultation between the Western European 
countries on all matters relating to their security 
and the use of their forces. This is one of the 
main reasons why, since May 1981, the French 
Government has been constantly proposing to 
its partners that new life be injected into WEU 
which associates seven of the countries most 
concerned by the security of the European 
continent and particularly the central area, 
since it is evident that neither the French and 
British nuclear weapons nor the conventional 
forces of the member countries of the organi-
sation could decisively guarantee security in the 
eastern Mediterranean and Scandinavia. 
87. In an address at the opening sitting of 
the thirty-sixth session of the lnstitut des Hautes 
Etudes de De(ense Nationale on 20th September 
1983, Mr. Mauroy said: 
" ... I made a precise analysis of our links 
with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance 
since everyone can see they are decisive. 
But France endeavours to maintain other 
links, in Western European Union, for 
instance. This European organisation is 
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the only one which can tackle matters 
relating to defence and security ... France 
considers that European solidarity 
enhances Atlantic solidarity without being 
merged with it. The similarity of the 
geo-strategic problems facing the Euro-
pean countries should lead them to take 
specific common decisions. In this respect 
WEU can be a privileged forum for 
reflection ... " 
88. In an article in Le Monde on 23rd 
December 1983, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Min-
ister for External Relations, said he placed 
some hope in the initiative aimed at making a 
renovated WEU the European pillar of NATO. 
He stressed that the notion of the defence of 
Europe should be replaced by that of European 
defence, but that United States disengagement 
from the European continent would raise a 
serious problem in view of the fact that western 
nuclear power was almost entirely in American 
hands. 
89. The wish in some quarters for rapid 
strides in disarmament one way or another 
might give the impression that now is not a 
very suitable time to reactivate an organisation 
responsible for Western European security. 
Your Rapporteur holds absolutely the opposite 
view, i.e. that real progress towards negotiated 
disarmament with the Soviet Union requires 
consultation between European partners to 
ensure that they reach prior agreement on the 
implications of their joint security so that it is 
not jeopardised by a disarmament policy. Talks 
have been started between France and the 
Federal Republic on this subject and they 
already seem to have borne fruit. It is for their 
partners to say whether they consider the 
framework of WEU to be really appropriate for 
developing such consultations. Conversely, a 
display of hostility in principle towards French 
and British nuclear weapons can but convince 
the United Kingdom and France that they must 
rely only on themselves for their security and it 
might deter them from playing a constructive 
part in global negotiations on the limitation of 
nuclear weapons. However, certain British 
members of the committee felt British deter-
rence was not in itself credible because it could 
not seriously be thought that it would be used. 
90. The third consideration arising from 
pacifist demonstrations in recent years relates 
less directly to WEU's responsibilities, although 
it is no less important. It stems from the 
irrefutable pacifist argument that expenditure 
on armaments is a waste of resources that is 
unacceptable in a world which is suffering from 
hunger and underdevelopment, particularly 
since the situation has been aggravated by an 
economic crisis which has lasted for more than 
ten years. Apart from the moral value of this 
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consideration, it also implies that the West is 
digging its own grave by leaving the underdevel-
oped countries no choice other than the 
perpetuation of a situation which is intolerable 
for them or to revolt against an international 
order which is unacceptable because it forces 
this situation upon them. The purpose of this 
report is obviously not to explore ways of 
helping the third world to transform its economy 
but merely to recall the urgent need for 
North-South co-operation which is also a token 
of peace. 
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91. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall that, 
although military expenditure is an unaccept-
able waste of resources and energy if security 
is assured, it becomes a prior condition for any 
other activity if security is not assured. 
Consequently, it is not by taking action liable 
to jeopardise Western Europe's security that 
the latter can seek to resolve the difficult 
political, economic, social and moral difficulties 
now facing it; only by ensuring security can it 
help to solve all these problems, including that 
of disarmament. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 21 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
3rd December 1984 
1. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot in the longer 
term be ensured without" and insert "would be based on sounder foundations if there were". 
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "of all kinds". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendments negatived). 
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Amendment 3 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 31 
tabled by Mr. Gansel 
3. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
3rd December 1984 
"Continue to search for a solution to the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations taking 
into account, inter alia, the 'walk in the woods' formula;". 
Signed: Gansel 
I. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 7 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6 and 71 
tabled by Mr. Millan and others 
3rd December 1984 
4. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "nuclear weapons are" 
insert "at the present time". 
5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "refusal" insert "until 
very recently". 
6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "have compelled" and 
insert "led". 
7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
Signed: Millan, Gansel, Hardy 
1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendments negatived). 
47 
Document 989 27th October 1984 
Rome declaration 1 
1. At the invitation 0f the Italian Govern-
ment, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the 
seven member states of Western European 
Union met in extraordinary session in Rome on 
26th-27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth 
anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. The Ministers stressed the importance of 
the treaty and their attachment to its goals: 
- to strengthen peace and security; 
- to promote the unity and to encourage 
the progressive integration of Europe; 
- to co-operate more closely both among 
member states and with other European 
organisations. 
3. Conscious of the continuing necessity to 
strengthen western security and of the specifi-
cally Western European geographical, political, 
psychological and military dimensions, the 
Ministers underlined their determination to 
make better use of the WEU framework in 
order to increase co-operation between the 
member states in the field of security policy 
and to encourage consensus. In this context, 
they called for continued efforts to preserve 
peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and 
thus consolidate stability through dialogue and 
co-operation. 
4. The Ministers recalled that the Atlantic 
Alliance, which remains the foundation of 
western security, had preserved peace on the 
continent for thirty-five years. This permitted 
the construction of Europe. The Ministers are 
convmced that a better utilisation of WEU 
would not only contribute to the security of 
Western Europe but also to an improvement in 
the common defence of all the countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity 
among its members. 
5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibil-
ity of security within the North Atlantic Treaty 
area. They recalled in particular the vital and 
substantial contribution of all the European 
allies, and underlined the crucial importance of 
the contribution to common security of their 
allies who are not members of WEU. They 
stressed the necessity, as a complement to their 
joint efforts, of the closest possible concertation 
with them. 
I Adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 
Defence of the WEU member states. 
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6. The Ministers are convinced that 
increased co-operation within WEU will also 
contribute to the maintenance of adequate 
military strength and political solidarity and, 
on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable 
relationship between the countries of East and 
West by fostering dialogue and co-operation. 
7. The Ministers called attention to the need 
to make the best use of existing resources 
through increased co-operation, and through 
WEU to provide a political impetus to institu-
tions of co-operation in the field of armaments. 
8. The Ministers therefore decided to hold 
comprehensive discussions and to seek to 
harmonise their views on the specific conditions 
of security in Europe, in particular: 
- defence questions; 
- arms control and disarmament; 
- the effects of developments in East-
West relations on the security of 
Europe; 
- Europe's contribution to the strength-
ening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing 
in mind the importance of transatlantic 
relations; 
- the development of European co-opera-
tion in the field of armaments in respect 
of which WEU can provide a political 
impetus. 
They may also consider the implications for 
Europe of crises in other regions of the world. 
9. The Ministers recalled the importance of 
the WEU Assembly which, as the only 
European parliamentary body mandated by 
treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon 
to play a growing role. 
They stressed the major contribution 
which the Assembly has already made to the 
revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to 
pursue its efforts to strengthen the solidarity 
among the member states, and to strive to 
consolidate the consensus among public opinion 
on their security and defence needs. 
10. In pursuance of these goals, the Ministers 
have decided on a number of specific measures 
with regard to the better functioning of the 
WEU structure and organisation, which are set 
out in a separate document. 
Institutional reform of WEU 
At their meeting in Rome on 26th and 
27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth 
anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty of 
1954, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the 
signatory states decided to make fuller use of 
the institutions of WEU and, accordingly, to 
bring the existing institutions into line with the 
changed tasks of the organisation. 
I. Activ11tion of the Council 
The Ministers regard activation of the 
Council as a central element in the efforts to 
make greater use of Western European Union. 
In conformity with Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, which allows the Council to 
decide on the organisation of its work and to 
consult or set up subsidiary bodies, the Ministers 
decided the following: 
I. The Council would in future normally 
meet twice a year at ministerial level. One of 
these sessions could take place in a small group 
with no formal agenda. These meetings would 
bring together the Foreign Ministers and 
Defence Ministers. Separate meetings of the 
Foreign Ministers and/or Defence Ministers 
could also take place, if the member states 
considered it necessary, to discuss matters lying 
within their respective area of responsibility. 
2. The presidency of the Council will be 
held by each member state for a one-year term. 
Meetings of the Council will in principle take 
place in the country holding the presidency. 
3. The work of the Permanent Council will 
have to be intensified in line with the increased 
activities ,1f the Council of Ministers. The 
Permanent Council, mandated to discuss in 
greater detail the views expressed by the 
Ministers and to follow up their decisions, will, 
pursuant to the second paragraph of the 
abovementioned Article VIII, make the neces-
sary arrangements for this purpose, including 
as appropriate the setting-up of working groups. 
4. The Secretariat-General should be 
adapted to take account of the enhanced 
activities of the Council of Ministers and the 
Permanent Council. 
5. The Ministers have asked the 
Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as 
possible, a report on the work done by the 
secretariat and to consider what measures might 
be necessary to strengthen its activities. In this 
connection, the Ministers stated that any 
reorganisation in the staffing of the 
Secretariat-General should take account of the 
adjustments made elsewhere in the other WEU 
institutions. They stressed that any proposed 
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adjustments should not result in an overall 
increase in the organisation's establishment. 
11. Rel11tions between Council 11nd Assembly 
The Ministers supported the idea of 
greater contact between the Council and the 
Assembly. 
Recalling that, under Article IX of the 
treaty, the Assembly is expressly required to 
discuss the reports submitted to it by the 
Council of Ministers on matters concerning the 
security and defence of the member states, and 
considering that the practice adopted has 
enabled the Assembly to widen the topics of its 
discussions, the Ministers wish to see the 
Assembly playing an increasing role, particu-
larly by contributing even more to associating 
public opinion in the member states with the 
policy statements of the Council, which 
expresses the political will of the individual 
governments. Accordingly, the Ministers submit 
the following proposals to the Assembly: 
I. In order to improve the contacts between 
the Council and the Assembly, the Ministers 
believe there are a number of options, notewor-
thy among which are: 
- A substantial improvement in the existing 
procedures for giving written replies to 
Assembly recommendations and questions. On 
this point, the Ministers consider that a leading 
role should be given to the presidency, making 
the best use of the services of the Secretariat-
General. 
- The development of informal contacts between 
government representatives and the representa-
tives of the Assembly. 
- If appropriate, a colloquium involving the 
presidency of the Council and the committees 
of the Assembly. 
- The improvement of the contacts that 
traditionally take place after the ministerial 
meetings of the Council, and more generally, 
the improvement of the procedures under which 
the Assembly is kept informed by the presi-
dency, whose representatives could - between 
the Assembly sessions - keep the various 
committees up to date with the work of the 
Council and even take part in their discussions. 
- The possibility that the Assembly might make 
use of contributions from the technical institu-
tions of WEU. 
2. Convinced that greater co-operation 
between the Council and the Assembly is a key 
factor in the enhanced utilisation of WEU, the 
Ministers underscored the importance they 
attach to the recommendations and work of the 
Assembly. 
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3. Without wishing to pre-empt the decision 
of the members of the Assembly, the Ministers 
also stress the value, in their eyes, of developing 
a dialogue between the Assembly and other 
parliaments or parliamentary institutions. 
4. The Ministers also stated that the 
member states were always ready to inform 
their national delegations of their governments' 
attitude to questions dealt with in Assembly 
reports and were prepared to offer information 
to their rapporteurs. 
Ill. Agency for· the Control of ArltUiments and the 
Standing Armaments Committee 
The Ministers also considered the activity 
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(ACA) and the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee (SAC). 
I. In connection with the Ag~ncy, which 
was set up in 1954 to monitor compliance with 
the voluntary arms limitations agreed by the 
contracting parties, the Ministers underlined 
the exemplary nature of these commitments, 
which had instilled confidence among the 
signatory states and for this reason they 
acclaimed the work that the Agency had done. 
Noting the value of the experience thus 
gained, the Ministers emphasised the interest 
that they attached to the development by the 
WEU member states of reflection on arms 
control and disarmament questions. 
2. As regards the SAC, the Ministers 
recalled the importance of the tasks defined in 
the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 
which established this body. 
In this connection, they emphasised that 
the existence of an effective and competitive 
European armamepts industry was a fundamen-
tal aspect of Europe's contribution to the 
Atlantic Alliance. In this context, it seemed 
very important to them that the seven member 
states of WEU should be able to harmonise 
their positions in this sphere and co-ordinate 
their efforts with a view to increasing the 
effectiveness of co-operative activity in the 
various multilateral fora. 
3. With the aim of better adapting the 
institutions of WEU to present and future 
requirements, the Ministers reached the follow-
ing decisions. 
(a) Noting that the control functions origi-
nally assigned to the ACA have now become, 
for the most part, superfluous, the Ministers 
decided, in accordance with Article V of 
Protocol No. Ill, which allows the Council to 
make changes to the ACA's control activity, to 
abolish gradually the remaining quantitative 
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controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers 
agreed that these controls should be substan-
tially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely 
lifted by 1st January 1986. The commitments 
and controls concerning ABC weapons would 
be maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed up to 
the present time. 
(b) The Ministers have instructed the Per-
manent Council to define, in consultation with 
the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the 
precise modalities of an overall reorganisation 
affecting both the ACA, the international 
secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which 
could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a 
threefold task: 
- to study questions relating to arms 
control and disarmament whilst carry-
ing out the remaining control functions; 
- undertake the function of studying 
security and defence problems; 
- to contribute actively to the develop-
ment of European armaments co-opera-
tion. 
(c) As regards the first two functions indi-
cated above, the intention would be to have 
available a common basis of analysis which 
could form a useful point of reference for the 
work of both the Council and the Assembly 
and also for informing public opinion. 
This reorganisation will have to be carried 
out taking into account, on the one hand, 
changes in duties resulting first from the 
reduction and then from the abolition of the 
control tasks and, on the other hand, the need 
to have the appropriate experts available. 
(d) As regards armaments co-operation, 
WEU should be in a position to play an active 
role in providing political impetus: 
- by supporting all co-operative efforts 
including those of the IEPG and the 
CNAD; 
- by encouraging in particular the activ-
ity of the IEPG as a forum whose main 
objective is to promote European co-
operation and also to contribute to the 
development of balanced co-operation 
within the Atlantic Alliance; 
- by developing continuing concertation 
with the various existing bodies. 
(e) In this general context, the Permanent 
Council will also take into account the existence 
of the FINABEL framework. 
(f) In carrying out this overall reorganisation 
the Permanent Council will have to: 
- propose a precise organisation table 
which will make it possible to define 
and give a breakdown of the posts 
required for carrying out the three 
functions referred to above; 
- ensure that the various arrangements 
proposed remain within the present 
limits in terms of staff and the 
organisation's budget, without weaken-
ing WEU's ability to play its role. 
The Ministers asked the Permanent 
Council to complete its work before their next 
session. They expressed the wish, however, that 
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in the meantime a start should be made on all 
or part of the new tasks as soon as possible. 
IV. Contacts with non-member states 
I. Th~ !'Jinist~rs also attached great import-
ance to ha1son w1th those states in the alliance 
which are not members of WEU. 
2. Invoking the relevant provisions of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular 
Article IV, the Ministers pointed out that it 
wa~ the responsibility of the presidency of WEU 
to mform those countries on either a bilateral 
or multilateral basis. 
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WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committeel 
by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on WEU, E11ropean 11nion and the Atlantic Alliance 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling Recommendations 406 and 407; 
{ii) Endorsing the initiative taken by its President when he handed a memorandum to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 20th September 1984; 
(iii) Welcoming the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to WEU so as to adapt it to the 
present requirements of European security and international peace and to develop the dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly for these purposes; 
(iv) Considering that giving WEU a new and wider role first implies that the Council effectively 
assume its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(v) Considering that a concerted approach by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to 
matters relating inter alia to the alliance's defence policy and the action those countries pursue 
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is essential for Europe's security; 
(vi) Noting that the increase in informal procedure may help the Council's work but might 
diminish the commitments of member countries in intergovernmental consultations and relations 
between the Council and the Assembly; 
(vii) Welcoming the deletion of the list of armaments in Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
(viii) Noting that giving the Council a new and wider role means that it must obtain different means 
of information from those afforded so far by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, in particular 
to allow it to tackle questions of disarmament and the balance of forces; 
{ix) Considering that the joint production of armaments by WEU member countries is progressing 
only slowly; 
(x) Considering that the Assembly's activities can be based only on a continuing dialogue with the 
Council; 
(xi) Welcoming the decisions taken or guidelines adopted by the Council and communicated to the 
Assembly on 27th October 1984 and the fruitful exchanges of views in Rome on 29th October, but 
recalling the urgency of reorganising the structure of WEU to allow it meet the new requirements, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Abide by its decision to convene the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of member countries at least twice a year, particularly prior to meetings of the North 
Atlantic Council; 
2. Give the Permanent Council the means to act in application of Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, and to this end: 
(a) ask member countries to appoint a permanent representation to the Council in the 
framework of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(b) give the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for 
applying Article VIII; 
3. Ensure the existence and operation of the WEU technical bodies in order to obtain the 
necessary assistance and information to allow it to examine matters relating to the security of Europe 
in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, events concerning Europe's security which occur outside 
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmament and the control of 
armaments, the prospects of European armaments co-operation and East-West relations; 
4. Progressively adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments 
Committee to these new requirements; 
5. While developing an informal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as proposed by 
the Council, retain formal procedure for exchanges between the two WEU organs. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. After its ministerial meeting on 12th 
June 1984, the Council gave members of the 
Assembly a note on the reactivation of WEU 
~hich had been prepared by the working group 
mstructed by the Council and the political 
directors of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs 
of WEU member countries to examine the 
prospects for reactivating the organisation. This 
was the first information given to the Assembly 
by the Council as such about an undertaking 
which had been under discussion for many 
months and started since March. 
2. The present study will inevitably be 
concomitant with the working group's imple-
mentation of the principles adopted by the 
Ministers on 12th June. The Assembly has 
since received only fragmentary, unofficial 
information about the progress of the work of 
the Council and the working group. Your 
Rapporteur therefore has the impression that at 
its ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th and 
27th October the Council will be able to adopt 
only decisions of a general nature and that 
decisions relating to the organisation of WEU 
will be under study for quite some time. Your 
Rapporteur therefore proposes to examine the 
12th June document in the light of events 
known at the time of writing in the hope of 
thus making an Asssembly contribution to the 
Council's examination of the reactivation of 
WEU while it is still in time to be useful. 
3. The Council's note has the merit of 
raising the question of the reactivation of WEU 
in political and not merely technical or 
institutional terms by placing it in the general 
context of member countries' relations with the 
United States and the Soviet Union. At the 
same time it refers to the twofold problem of 
the relationship between WEU and the Atlan-
tic Alliance on the one hand and ten-power 
Europe on the other while tackling matters 
specific to WEU. This note will therefore be the 
hub of this report. 
4. From the very outset WEU has borne the 
brunt of the divergent interests of the govern-
ments which signed the Paris Agreements of 
23rd October 1954. These agreements sought 
to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to 
be rearmed - a sine qua non for United States 
participation in the defence of Europe. At the 
same time, the conditions had to be acceptable 
to France whose National Assembly, on 30th 
August 1954, had rejected ratification of the 
European Defence Commu!lity treaty by adop-
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ting the previous question. Certain objections of 
opponents of the EDC to the idea of a 
"European army" therefore had to be met, 
ensuring that the new treaty could in no case 
weaken the Atlantic Alliance or the organisation 
it had set up at the Lisbon conference in 1952: 
NATO. 
5. WEU therefore involved no military 
integration, leaving signatories a free hand 
outside mainland Europe, and associated the 
United Kingdom with joint security. The Paris 
Agreements were also cautious to avoid orga-
nising security arrangements which were too 
specific lest the Americans take this as a pretext 
for losing interest in the defence of Europe. As 
the note of 12th June recalls, Articles IV and 
VII of the modified Brussels Treaty established 
very close links for co-operation with the 
Atlantic Alliance and NATO. This concern has 
not at all been forgotten by those who, in 1984, 
plan to give new life to WEU since they recall 
that "the proposed reactivation should be seen 
as a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance 
itself and not as an attempt to create a 
substitute for it". At the same time, they have 
decided to keep the members of the Atlantic 
Alliance informed of their action. 
6. In the newspaper La Croix of 11th July 
1984, Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for 
External Relations, described his views on the 
reactivation of WEU within the limits of what 
he considered to be the present requirements of 
European security: 
"As for the establishment of an integrated 
common defence mechanism between 
Europeans and without external assis-
tance, this is not for tomorrow. At present 
nothing could be more serious than to 
'uncouple' the defence of the United 
States from the defence of the European 
countries, which need the American 
nuclear guarantee. In view of the present 
imbalance of conventional forces in 
Europe, such uncoupling would place part 
of Europe under a serious threat. I do not 
say that anyone wants war; on the 
contrary both sides, East and West, want 
peace; but no means of pressure must be 
allowed to affect the ability of anyone to 
exercise their free judgment. I therefore 
think it impossible at the present time to 
separate European and American means 
of defence. Consequently, I feel it is 
dangerous to confuse European defence 
with the pooling of European means. By 
all means let us discuss our policies, the 
lines we follow and our requirements 
among Europeans, but it is not the time 
to proclaim that we and our European 
partners can ensure our defence alone." 
This same concern is expressed in the explana-
tory memorandum to the Netherlands foreign 
affairs budget for 1985, which reads: 
"The government agrees that specific 
European aspects of security problems 
should be examined. As long as European 
political co-operation provides an insuffi-
cient framework, greater use may be 
made of WEU for consultations on 
security questions. 
The intensification of consultations bet-
ween Europeans has to be directed 
towards reinforcing the Atlantic Alliance. 
Article IV, inserted in 1954, of the 
modified Brussels Treaty mentions expli-
citly the close collaboration with NATO. 
The desired strengthening of the Euro-
pean voice in transatlantic discussions 
therefore has its limits where the r6le of 
NATO might be diminished." 
Vice-Chancellor Genscher, for his part, wrote 
in the October 1984 issue of Europtiische 
Zeitung, in an article entitled "European 
security and the revitalisation of WEU": 
"NATO is and remains the basis of the 
security and defence policy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The alliance has 
ensured peace in Europe for more than a 
generation. 
Europe and America are the two pillars 
of the Atlantic bridge; they complete 
each other and need each other. That is 
why it is of decisive importance for the 
two pillars to be strong and capable of 
carrying the weight of the bridge. Ame-
rica wants, as a partner in the alliance, a 
Europe which is strong and knows what 
it wants." 
7. These statements show that in spite of 
the economic progress Europe has made since 
1954 and in spite of the development of French 
and British nuclear forces the situation has not 
changed decisively in security matters. The 
conditions which presided over the birth of 
WEU still exist and the very people who at 
that time feared that the existence of WEU 
might delay the development of community 
Europe or jeopardise co-operation in the 
framework of NATO now have to accept the 
reactivation of the organisation within the limits 
imposed by circumstances and by the Paris 
Agreements. 
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8. However, while the problems remain, 
they are no longer the same as in 1954. 
Western Europe has become a fact and an 
economic power. National confrontation in that 
area has diminished and even in defence Europe 
is no longer a negligible factor. Moreover, there 
have been ups and downs in relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union over 
the same period with a degree of rapprochement 
which allowed negotiations to be held on 
disarmament or, at least, on the limitation of 
nuclear weapons and then, as from 1976, 
tension which increased with Soviet deployment 
of SS-20s in Eastern Europe and, in response, 
the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 
opening the way for the United States to deploy 
similar missiles in Western Europe. 
9. There have also been difficulties in 
relations between Europe and the United States, 
first economic, particularly since the monetary 
policy pursued by the American authorities to 
the advantage of the dollar has kept exchange 
rates particularly high leading to difficulties and 
discontent in Western Europe, the importance 
of which should not be underestimated. These 
difficulties also affect defence matters since a 
section of European public opinion has reacted 
unfavourably to the deployment of medium-
range nuclear missiles on European territory on 
the grounds that it might weaken the deterrent 
effect of American strategic weapons and make 
nuclear war in Europe less improbable. Finally, 
certain American action outside Europe since 
the Vietnam war has not been well received by 
European public opinion. Conversely, Americans 
have frequently raised the question whether it 
was still essential to maintain more than 
300,000 American troops in Europe and 
influential members of Congress have periodi-
. cally advocated reducing this force whose 
presence is nevertheless vital for Europeans 
since it ensures the credibility of American 
retaliation in the event of Western Europe 
being invaded. 
10. In these new circumstances, it can be 
seen that the problem of relations between 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance is no longer 
quite the same as in the past. As the note of 
12th June testifies, there is certainly no question 
of replacing the Atlantic Alliance by a 
European defence organisation. There is no 
question of WEU acquiring its own military 
headquarters or directly-assigned forces. It is 
still the Atlantic Alliance and the NATO 
integrated commands which are intended to 
ensure the defence of Europe. But co-operation 
between Europe and the United States will now 
have a basis which allows Europeans to make 
their specific concerns carry greater weight 
within an organisation such as NATO. In order 
to define this new style of relations between 
Europe and the United States, it has often been 
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illustrated by the idea of an alliance based on 
two equal pillars, one European and the other 
American. Although President Kennedy was 
not referring to NATO in his Philadelphia 
speech but to an Atlantic community which he 
wished to develop mainly in the economic 
sphere, this illustration, as Mr. Genscher's 
article shows, conveys to a certain extent what 
the Europeans are looking for, even if in fact 
they still differ over the nature and importance 
of the European pillar of the alliance. For 
instance, in an address to the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in Brussels on 3rd October 
1984, Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, clearly demonstrated that 
he did not wish to give too much weight to 
WEU, which he considered should remain a 
brain-storming and not a decision-taking body, 
and that he did not intend to subject the 
attitude of WEU members in NATO to prior 
consultations in WEU. 
11. After the relative failure of the American 
proposal for a two-way flow of trade between 
the two sides of the Atlantic, it is mainly in the 
joint production of armaments that the govern-
ments of the seven WEU member countries 
now seem determined to make rapid progress in 
true European armaments production. The 9th 
July 1984 agreement between the Defence 
Ministers of five European countries, four of 
them members of WEU, on the production of 
a joint combat aircraft as from 1995 clearly 
shows that the will to achieve the eo-production 
of armaments exists. 
12. Again, from the very outset WEU was 
marked by the failure of the European Defence 
Community. For advocates of setting up a true 
European army in 1950, the Paris Agreements 
seemed to fall far short by abandoning the 
community approach in favour of a firmly 
intergovernmental organisation. For several 
years, WEU was able to play a role in building 
Europe by associating the United Kingdom 
with the European Communities in economic 
matters and by providing a framework for 
foreign policy consultations. But WEU no 
longer has any economic role and its political 
role has been considerably reduced by the 
development of ten-power political consulta-
tions. The Western European countries have 
always opted for the widest possible organisation 
for organising co-operation and WEU, now the 
smallest of the European organisations, had lost 
many of its activities. Some hoped that the 
development of Community Europe would allow 
it to assert itself in defence and armaments 
questions. There have been many attempts to 
increase the activities of the Communities or of 
the European Parliament in areas which are 
WEU's own responsibility, i.e. security and 
armaments, particularly in the European Parlia-
ment. 
56 
13. However, they have not succeeded and 
because of this stalemate consideration had to 
be given in 1983 to the possibility of reviving 
the activities of WEU, which the French 
Government had been suggesting since 1981. 
Indeed, while there might in the future be a 
European union covering defence, it could not, 
for the time being at least, be formed round a 
single community organisation and particularly 
not that of the Ten, several members of which 
in no way wish to join a continental alliance 
and one of which even wishes to keep well away 
from the Atlantic Alliance. 
14. The purpose of the present report is 
therefore to try to determine what WEU can 
do in the framework of an alliance which is still 
essential for joint security and alongside the 
European Communities which seek to expand 
with the addition of Portugal and Spain, and 
broaden their activities, particularly in arma-
ments matters. This work is parallel with that 
of the Council and alone can lead to a definition 
of the form in which WEU is to be reactivated 
and how it is to be done. 
11. WEU and the Atlantic Alliance 
15. The principles governing relations bet-
ween WEU and NATO are set out in the Paris 
Agreements and they have been well shaped by 
thirty years' practice. Even France's withdrawal 
from the NATO integrated military commands 
did not call them in question and no one is 
thinking of changing them because of the 
reactivation of WEU which, as the note of 12th 
June asserts, should be seen "as a contribution 
to the cohesion of the alliance itself and not as 
an attempt to create a substitute for it". 
16. The deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, 
the development of new weapons and the 
prospects of the arms race reaching into space 
mean that Europe's security depends more than 
ever on close understanding with the United 
States. This understanding must not be challen-
ged. On the contrary, it must be developed in 
order to meet the threat from without. Although 
probably less than in the past a threat of 
military aggression by conventional means, 
which it now seems possible to counter 
effectively thanks to the development of new 
weapons, especially in the United States, it 
extends to new areas: the security of Europe's 
oil and raw material supplies, nuclear blackmail 
to separate Europe from the United States and 
divide the European members of the alliance, 
rejection of NATO's defence policy plans by 
the people of certain European countries. 
(a) The United States 
17. It is obviously not enough to proclaim 
that the reactivation of WEU is a contribution 
to the cohesion of the alliance for it actually to 
be so. It must also be seen as such by all the 
members of the alliance, particularly the 
Americans. At present, however, the United 
States seems to want its European partners to 
demonstrate their will to defend themselves 
rather than to be unduly docile. It no longer 
takes umbrage at the French claim to a degree 
of independence but is the first to welcome the 
determination evident among some of its allies 
and also to express concern about the demons-
trations of hostility to the deployment of 
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles which can be 
seen elsewhere. Consequently, it takes a positive 
view of attempts to strengthen the European 
defence effort, including the prospect of reacti-
vating WEU which it sees as an opportunity for 
Europeans to play a greater role in their own 
security. It is therefore more flexible than in 
the past towards European armaments co-
operation. Realising that its application of the 
famous two-way street policy falls short of 
Europe's wishes, it seems prepared to reconsider 
the matter with its partners in the alliance, its 
concern being more to secure reliable, united 
allies than to keep docile customers. 
18. On several occasions the United States 
Government has showed its approval of reacti-
vating WEU, the latest being on 12th July 
when a State Department spokesman parried 
Soviet protests at the deletion of Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. He said the United States considered 
the Soviet attacks "unfounded", and added that 
it supported "current efforts to revitalise WEU". 
He went on to say that "no aspect of this 
revitalisation will affect the purely defensive 
orientation of the Atlantic Alliance" which, 
there can be no doubt, is also the point of view 
of the Seven. 
19. The argument that a European defence 
organisation would ultimately encourage the 
isolationist tendencies which have always existed 
in the United States holds neither more nor less 
water than the opposite argument since the lack 
of an organised European defence effort might 
equally encourage isolationism based on the 
feeling that the Americans would be defending 
Europe in spite of its inhabitants. At the most 
it may be thought that if the United States 
faltered - and this would probably be due to 
something completely beyond the control of 
Europeans, be it in the rest of the world or 
within American society - it would be better 
for Europe to have the best possible defence 
organisation. But this is not the problem at 
present: on neither side of the Atlantic is the 
American military presence in Europe really 
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questioned and there is no reason to think that 
WEU's activities might jeopardise this situation. 
(b) The European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
20. A slightly different problem perhaps 
arises for certain European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance such as Denmark and Nor-
way, Portugal and Spain, Greece and Turkey, 
whose position might be undermined if a 
European pillar of NATO were to be erected 
without them. Attention must be paid to this 
fact, perhaps by associating each of these 
countries in an appropriate manner with a 
European security policy, particularly in arma-
ments matters. Although a European security 
organisation can strengthen NATO's means of 
defence in the central sector of Europe, it would 
not be able to do very much to ensure the 
security of a northern front in Norway or a 
southern flank in Greece and Turkey. The 
position of the countries in these two sectors 
makes them closely dependent on bilateral 
relations with the United States. This is not so 
for Portugal or Spain. 
21. The Assembly has often invited observers 
from these various countries and the Council 
thought of associating them with the work it 
has undertaken for revivifying WEU, as 
indicated in the note of 12th June. The modified 
Brussels Treaty is open to them and the statute 
of the Standing Armaments Committee allows 
them to accede to the agreements prepared by 
the SAC in the joint production of armaments 
whenever they so wish. 
22. The Federal Republic's renunciation of 
the production of certain conventional arma-
ments, subject to Agency control, for a long 
time meant refusing any further accessions to 
WEU which would have increased the number 
of powers taking part in the controls. Since 
27th June 1984, the problem has been solved 
by the cancellation of the list in Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill, which should facilitate the 
accession of any of these countries wishing to 
join WEU. 
23. In the immediate future, nevertheless, 
there can be no question of an adequation 
between WEU and the European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance which are better represen-
ted in the NATO Eurogroup of which France 
on the contrary is not a member. This is 
certainly not liable to jeopardise the reactivation 
of WEU but may lead to a search for the 
maximum number of contacts between WEU 
and the other European members of the alliance 
or even to facilitating their accession to the 
modified Brussels Treaty when they express the 
desire to do so. Spain's request to take part in 
FINABEL may, for instance, help that country 
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to move closer to WEU, all of whose members 
are now members of FINABEL, which groups 
army chiefs-of-staff of the WEU member 
countries for defining their army equipment 
requirements. Moreover, in October 1984 Por-
tugal applied to the WEU Council for mem-
bership of WEU. Having only just been 
informed of application, the Council was unable 
to adopt a position on the matter at its meeting 
on 26th and 27th October. 
24. The possibility of opening WEU to other 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
nevertheless raises a few problems. For example 
it may be wondered whether the control system 
under Protocol No. Ill applying to armaments 
listed in Annex IV to the protocol might not 
deter some countries from acceding to the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Your Rapporteur 
considers the question irrelevant, on the one 
hand because such controls should not trouble 
countries likely to be associated with WEU and 
on the other because there is nothing to prevent 
them, if necessary, asking not to subscribe to 
Protocol No. Ill during the negotiations 
preceding accession. The question of the controls 
provided for in Annex IV is worth considering 
on its own merits but should not be linked with 
the question of possible enlargement. 
(c) The Soviet Union and the eastern countries 
25. In summer 1984, the Soviet Union started 
a vigorous propaganda campaign against the 
Western European countries and in particular 
against the Federal Republic. Its main grievan-
ces about that country were centred on the 
lifting of the last restrictions on the production 
of conventional weapons listed in Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill of the Paris Agreements, the 
presumed development of Franco-German 
nuclear co-operation and the reactivation of 
WEU which, according to Moscow, revealed a 
revanchist policy in the Federal Republic. 
26. In fact, there were not the slightest 
grounds for any of these grievances since the 
Soviet Union has no say in the Paris Agree-
ments, the Federal Republic is a signatory of 
the non-proliferation treaty and its nuclear 
industries are therefore supervised by the 
appropriate United Nations agency, and finally 
the modified Brussels Treaty contains no 
aggressive provisions. It is clear that these were 
mere pretexts for the Soviet Union to terminate 
the policy of detente inaugurated in Helsinki, 
probably because it held it responsible for the 
fact that the governments of certain people's 
democracies were taking initiatives which sho-
wed some degree of independence of the Soviet 
Union. It is typical that following these Soviet 
attacks the leader of the Unified Socialist Party 
of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. 
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Honecker, had to give up his planned visit to 
the Federal Republic in September 1984, 
followed by the Bulgarian head of state, Mr. 
Zhivkov, who was to have visited that country 
from 19th to 22nd September. Alone among 
the Eastern European leaders, Mr. Ceausescu, 
. Romanian head of state, who has frequently 
showed a relative freedom of decision with 
regard to the Soviet Union, visited the Federal 
Republic, as planned, in October. 
27. However this may be, such a propaganda 
campaign must not be allowed to influence the 
present thinking of our governments or jeopar-
dise the prospect of reactivating WEU. If it 
reveals anything other than the Soviet Union's 
fear of a trend towards independence among 
the governments of the people's democracies, it 
can but be its fear that greater cohesion among 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
might enhance NATO's deterrent power. It is 
just this fear that guarantees Western Europe's 
security and peace. It may rightly be wondered 
whether this guarantee is not the true basis of 
detente based not on speculation about the 
friendly intentions of one or other side but on 
the sound reality of mutual deterrence. In any 
event, it has to be noted that the updating of a 
thirty-year old treaty on Western European 
security is being taken seriously by the Soviet 
Union. 
28. The Soviet Union's deployment in sum-
mer 1984 of three new types of cruise missile 
in Eastern Europe can in no way whatsoever be 
justified by the proposed reactivation of WEU. 
Nor is it justified by the limited deployment of 
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles by the United 
States on the territory of certain WEU member 
countries, which is merely a response to the 
deployment of Soviet SS-20s. On the contrary, 
it is an additional warning to the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, inciting them 
to assume greater political responsibility for 
their defence, so as not to be mere pawns in an 
arms race between the two great powers which 
is increasingly slipping from their control. It is 
certainly not by refusing American missiles that 
the WEU countries can react to the Soviet 
move, but perhaps by voicing an independent 
European call for the opening of negotiations 
on the limitation of Euromissiles. 
(d) Joint production of arltlllments and the rtlle of the 
Standing Armaments Committee 
29. Since 1950, the need to organise the joint 
production of armaments has been emphasised 
regularly in both NATO and WEU without 
either of them achieving any really satisfactory 
results. In the last thirty years, however, many 
bi- and multilateral agreements have produced 
highly satisfactory results, among member 
countries of both WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
30. There is every reason to believe that 
sharing the workload between the five partici-
pating countries will raise particularly intricate 
problems stemming from different technological 
bases. The industries are not represented in the 
NATO Eurogroup, the IEPG or the SAC, 
which no doubt explains why governments use 
the procedure of reaching direct agreement 
rather than going through international orga-
nisations. Since the governments have opted for 
the IEPG or Eurogroup for studying military 
requirements and in recent years have directed 
the SAC towards studies relating to the 
armaments industries, should not the SAC, in 
the attempt to reactivate WEU, be more 
specifically instructed to ensure a link between 
industries and governments in order to provide 
a meeting-ground for those taking part in eo-
production? 
31. The SAC's statute leaves it great flexibi-
lity since it may prepare agreements between 
certain member countries as well as between 
members and non-members of WEU. The fact 
that it does not include all the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance is not 
therefore a decisive obstacle to its activities and 
does not restrict its international secretariat to 
decisions taken by the WEU Council alone. If 
this secretariat is to be allowed to play its due 
role to the full, this flexibility should be put to 
better use than heretofore and it should be 
allowed to co-ordinate the work of the IEPG, 
which does not have its own secretariat, the 
SAC, FINABEL, CNAD and all European 
bodies concerned with the joint production of 
armaments. 
32. However, current practice seems to bear 
out the views of advocates of bilateral or ad hoc 
co-operation between a limited number of 
countries. France and the Federal Republic, for 
instance, in the framework of their privileged 
relationship, have developed various types of 
armaments, especially helicopters. Although 
less systematically, many other countries have 
signed bi- or trilateral agreements, such as the 
one associating Italy with the Federal Republic 
and the United Kingdom for the production of 
the Tornado combat aircraft. Such practice 
certainly meets a need: in many cases, even the 
best projects would never get off the ground if 
the general agreement of the member countries 
had to be obtained before implementing them. 
It must be noted, however, that only the 
countries taking part really consider a project 
"European" and thus worth being the first 
choice for their armed forces. As in the case of 
the "deal of the century", for understandable 
economic and military reasons WEU member 
countries have frequently preferred American 
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equipment to equipment produced by one of 
their partners but in which they played no part. 
33. One of the SAC's roles might be to 
promote multilateral programmes and to inves-
tigate member countries' programmes for pro-
curing and replacing equipment. As pointed out 
in the note of 12th June, "the use of new 
technologies to strengthen conventional defence 
demands that no opportunity for consultation at 
European level be overlooked". While in this 
area "WEU could play a useful role as a forum 
for discussion and a source of political impetus", 
governments should define this role in greater 
detail. They can obviously hardly do so through 
the intermediary of the Permanent Council or 
the Council meeting at the level of Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs. If it wishes to assume this 
role, the Council will also have to meet 
periodically at the level of Ministers of Defence, 
who are much better prepared to work out and 
take the necessary decisions such as those taken 
in Madrid in July 1984 for the multi-purpose 
combat aircraft. 
34. Furthermore, a number of proposals were 
made to the Council in 1983 and again in 1984 
by the head of the international secretariat of 
the SAC for turning the SAC specifically in the 
direction referred to in the note of 12th June 
1984. It is surprising that, as far as your 
Rapporteur knows, apart from the pursuit of 
current work, only the proposal for a study of 
the armaments industry in Japan has been 
retained so far. 
35. It should also be noted that the SAC has 
been invited by a NATO group to resume the 
study of a military vehicle which it abandoned 
several years ago. This is not without importance 
if it is borne in mind that to date co-operation 
between NATO and the SAC has always 
followed the principle that duplication was to 
be avoided, preference being given to larger 
organisations, whereas in the present case the 
principle of work-sharing has been chosen. 
36. There is in any event no doubt that the 
technical development of armaments and their 
growing cost puts them out of reach of 
individual European countries and this will be 
increasingly so. The extremely fast evolution of 
American and Soviet strategic concepts, from 
the Rogers doctrine to "star wars", already 
makes it impossible for each of our countries to 
go ahead with the urgently-required organisa-
tion of truly European research, development 
and production of the latest weapons. President 
Mitterrand recently expressed his wish for 
Europe to produce an observation satellite. This 
idea should be taken up and studied if we do 
not wish our security to be entirely dependent 
on the United States and to lag so far behind 
technically that it would soon become impossible 
to catch up. 
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37. Armaments co-operation is quite a deli-
cate matter since each country's security 
requirements are closely linked with national 
economic interests and public or private firms' 
industrial and financial interests. This intermin-
gling is probably one of the main reasons for 
the relative failure of organising production 
through intergovernmental organisations. 
38. Plans for reactivating WEU m11st there-
fore take the utmost account of these intermin-
gling interests. In this regard, much is to be 
learned from the agreement concluded on 9th 
July 1984 between Italy, France, the Federal 
Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom for 
the joint production of a multi-purpose combat 
aircraft for the five countries' air forces. The 
agreement was concluded by the Defence 
Ministers of the five countries in conditions very 
similar to those for WEU's SAC. In April 1983, 
the air force chiefs of staff of the five countries 
concerned noted the need for such an aircraft 
for the last decade of the century to replace the 
Mirage F-4, Tornado or Jaguar aircraft now 
deployed by the five countries. In December 
1983, the chiefs of staff of the five countries 
met in Cologne to sign a protocol of agreement 
defining the operational requirement to be met 
by the planned aircraft. Experts from the five 
countries then drew up technical specifications 
for the future aircraft, which allowed the 
agreement to be signed on 9th July. Once the 
Ministers had taken their decision, industry was 
asked to make specific proposals, while national 
armaments directors were asked to prepare 
feasibility studies on the basis of which the 
Defence Ministers, meeting again in Rome in 
March 1985, will be able to decide on the 
production of the aircraft. 
39. However, caution is always required in 
assessing the possible results of a proposal for 
international co-operation in view of the 
influence which the armaments industry and all 
the interests it represents may bring to bear on 
state policies. A case in point is the Franco-
German decision to develop a combat helicopter 
to be produced by the two countries' industries 
without taking account of the existence of the 
helicopter already developed by the firm Agosta 
in Italy. In such a case, the priority given to 
bilateral co-operation jeopardises possible mul-
tilateral production based on what already 
exists. One of the main roles of the Standing 
Armaments Committee should be to avoid such 
waste of time, manpower, technical resources 
and money by keeping an open catalogue of 
industrial programmes and their state of 
progress in the various member countries. 
40. In order to remove certain misunderstan-
dings, it should be made clear that the 
interoperability of armaments is first and 
foremost a military matter and must be 
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achieved in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance as a whole. The role of the SAC or of 
any other WEU body with powers to act in 
armaments matters is not necessarily to bring 
about joint production but above all to co-
ordinate a broad spectrum of efforts in this 
sense and eventually to give the impetus 
necessary to raise them to European level. 
(e) Disarmament and the control of armaments 
41. One of the problems facing Europe is 
that negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
are conducted mainly by the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Their overwhelming strength 
makes this inevitable, particularly in nuclear 
matters, but the result is that the uncertainties 
of their domestic policies play a decisive role in 
the process of the negotiations, while the other 
members of the two alliances have little say, 
although they are directly concerned by the 
arms race. Demonstrations against the deploy-
ment of continental-range missiles in Europe 
following NATO's 1979 twofold decision show 
that the situation can have very serious 
consequences for the morale of the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and hence for 
the cohesion of the alliance. 
42. Admittedly the European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance take part in negotiations on 
conventional armaments, including the Stock-
holm conference, but even then they are closely 
dependent on alliance strategy which is itself 
determined by how the Americans plan to 
deploy their nuclear and conventional forces in 
a global strategy. Only they have the necessary 
information to guide all these negotiations and 
the means of supervising the implementation of 
agreements. 
43. It would therefore be desirable for the 
Western European countries to set up a body to 
inform those who represent them in negotiations 
and the idea was put forward, inter alia by Mr. 
Hernu, the French Minister of Defence, in the 
Assembly in December 1983, that the WEU 
Agency for the Control of Armaments should 
be used for this purpose. It must be noted, 
however, that this proposal does not seem to 
have been tackled during the first stage of the 
Council's reflection, which led to the note of 
12th June. 
44. However, while all the present work of 
the Agency relates to controls within WEU on 
the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty, it 
seems that it will have fewer tasks from now 
on. Consideration might therefore be given to 
asking it to carry out a rather different task 
which would not be defined by the treaty but 
merely by a joint decision of member govern-
ments, i.e. to set up, thanks to the experience 
it has acquired in documentary controls, a 
centre for documentation on armaments 
throughout the world which would be available 
to the relevant authorities in member countries. 
45. There is in fact every reason to believe 
that exchanges of military information between 
members of the Atlantic Alliance are still 
extremely inadequate and, in particular, the 
European members receive little information 
from the United States which alone has the 
wherewithal to inform them satisfactorily about 
the situation at world level. Because of past 
incidents and present uncertainty, it has only 
limited confidence in NATO and its partners. 
Of the latter, some seem to have excellent 
information about regions where they have 
special interests, but as far as your Rapporteur 
knows none of them individually can keep up-
to-date worldwide information. In the event of 
crisis, France or the United Kingdom have 
sometimes had to call on American means of 
information in order to take action in regions 
where they could not obtain the necessary 
information, be it in East Mrica or Latin 
America. 
46. Seven-power Europe might form the basis 
of a body capable of keeping an up-to-date 
store of information and the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments might preside over the 
exchanges and keep the files. The methods it 
now uses, including the study and analysis of 
military budgets, might usefully be applied to 
non-member countries, starting with the Soviet 
Union, where such serious publications as the 
Military Balance, published by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, show 
how little the West knows about its real military 
expenditure. Naturally, experience acquired in 
on-the-spot controls could not be used here, but 
through its information and advice the Agency 
could prepare joint positions for member 
countries participating in negotiations or in 
NATO for countries which are not participating. 
Thus, the Agency could play a rdle comparable 
to that of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency in the United States or SIPRI in 
Sweden, although it would not have the same 
status as either of those two bodies. 
47. In the explanatory memorandum to its 
1985 defence budget, the Netherlands Govern-
ment even specified that, while it was in favour 
of cancelling the restrictions in Annex IV to 
Protocol No. Ill: 
"The government considers a more useful 
task could be found for the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments, for instance 
making a study of how to verify agree-
ments governing weapons systems." 
48. The Agency will of course have to 
continue its tasks under the modified Brussels 
61 
DOCUMENT 990 
Treaty, particularly those relating to A, B and 
C weapons, troop levels and conventional 
armaments listed in Annex IV to Protocol 
No.III. 
49. It is recalled that certain governments 
have asked for the cancellation of this quite 
obviously out-of-date list, which, having been 
drawn up in 1954, could include only arma-
ments which are now obsolescent and not others 
which have become essential or, a fortiori, those 
now being developed which will play a major 
role in years to come. That is why other 
governments have proposed that this list be 
updated rather than cancelled, or have raised 
the idea of reducing Annex IV progressively so 
that the Agency may gradually direct its work 
in new directions. 
50. The modified Brussels Treaty was an 
innovation in international law since, in an 
alliance with an almost automatic military 
assistance clause, it introduced a commitment 
for the complete "transparency" of levels of 
forces and armaments among the various allies. 
This has been and probably still is an essential 
part of the establishment of mutual confidence 
from which the whole European edifice has 
benefited and which might quickly be under-
mined if the European states again had to 
resort to espionage to ascertain the means 
available to their partners. Whereas in all 
East-West disarmament negotiations the West 
has rightly stood firm in its insistence on the 
need to verify the application of any agreement, 
can it state that the controls effectively applied 
in Western Europe are now obsolete and 
difficult to tolerate? The question is in any case 
worth raising and the governments should not 
draw negative conclusions without considering 
it seriously. 
51. In an interesting article in the October 
1984 issue of the French revue Defense 
Nationale1, two French generals made a propo-
sal which would be worth considering carefully 
in the context of the reactivation of the WEU 
technical bodies, i.e. to set up a European 
observation satellite agency. The authors wrote: 
"Europe's technological capability gives it 
an undeniable space vocation. It should 
take advantage of this, hence the Euro-
pean observation satellite agency. Bene-
fiting from the contributions of member 
states, this agency should have a system 
of observation satellites and appropriate 
means of processing and circulating the 
data. Europe would thus have an indepen-
dent observation capability, whose priority 
task would be every aspect of defence: 
1. Pierre Schwed and Henri Bagnou1s : Vers une defense 
europeenne, Defense Nationale, October 1984, pages 43-57. 
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military, earth resources, agricultural 
economy, etc. 
At European level, this development could 
follow very closely after the definition of 
the concept: it should therefore be possible 
to set up the European observation 
satellite agency very quickly basing it on 
an existing concrete programme for 
instance. Dealing, initially at least, with 
defence-related activities. there would be 
nothing to prevent it at the same time 
providing Europeans with an additional 
means of contributing to the work of the 
conference on confidence- and security-
building measures and disarmament in 
Europe which it was decided to convene 
at the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid, 
which was closed on 7th September 1983, 
or to any other similar work." 
52. Moreover, some have expressed the view 
that the Agency's control task inside WEU 
might in a certain way be extended. Today, the 
problem is not so much that a European 
country might be doing too much for its armed 
forces but that some of them might not be 
doing enough, and the control of armaments, 
not solely as a negative guarantee but also as 
a positive guarantee that everyone is fulfilling 
his joint defence obligations, might play a role 
at least as great as in the past in maintaining 
and strengthening Europe's security and the 
mutual confidence of its members. An obvious 
question is how far governments are prepared 
to have their armaments efforts verified and it 
is to be feared that they will not allow very 
much. 
53. However, this would not be an entirely 
new practice but an extension of what has been 
done for the British Army of the Rhine which 
cannot be reduced without the agreement of 
the Council. This would seem particularly 
justified since, following France's refusal to 
make its nuclear armaments subject to Agency 
control and apart from the Federal Republic's 
renunciation of the production of ABC weapons, 
the United Kingdom would be the only country 
subject to special - positive - obligations and 
would thus be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis its 
continental partners, particularly if the list in 
Annex IV were to be reduced. 
54. In any event, if the work of the WEU 
Agency for the Control of Armaments is to be 
extended to matters outside the framework of 
member countries, as the' WEU Council is 
envisaging, your Rapporteur considers it regret-
table for the governments to start with the 
abolition of controls actually exercised for the 
last thirty years which have allowed the Agency 
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to perfect its working methods and train its 
experts. Effective control of armaments is 
largely ensured by keeping public information 
up to date on many subjects, and on-the-spot 
controls are merely a close complement to 
documentary controls. What might be abolished 
could not be easily reintroduced if the need 
were felt. 
55. The fact is that the non-ratification by 
France of the 1957 convention allowing the 
Agency free entry to factories, depots and 
barracks without special authorisation from the 
governments concerned and its refusal to allow 
any control over its nuclear forces have, 
whatever good will the firms concerned may 
have shown, limited WEU's means of verifica-
tion and introduced an imbalance contrary to 
the treaty by maintaining special obligations 
for the United Kingdom, with the maintenance 
of the Rhine army, and the Federal Republic, 
with its renunciation of certain weapons, while 
France is allowed to evade its own obligations. 
In these circumstances, it therefore seems 
curious that France is proposing the mainte-
nance of controls on A, B and C weapons which 
it evades and the abolition of controls on 
conventional weapons which it accepts. Your 
Rapporteur is not suggesting reverting to the 
full application of the 1954 protocols, which he 
is the first to admit no longer meet present 
conditions, but he does not wish the principle of 
declarations and controls to be abandoned. He 
therefore suggests that their application be 
brought up to date, considering inter alia that 
trying out procedure in a field where it is 
possible to verify the results obtained on the 
spot, for instance by the estimates which 
observers can make of troop levels or armaments 
involved in manoeuvres, should be of help in 
working out methods applicable outside the 
framework of the alliance. 
56. Probably in the next few years, if the 
governments give the Agency tasks outside the 
area of the Seven, its new range of action will 
assume increasing importance at the expense of 
its treaty tasks. But your Rapporteur considers 
it would be dangerous to reduce the latter 
prematurely as it gives the Agency valuable 
competence and experience for new tasks. A 
programme of progressive conversion by redu-
cing the list of armaments in Annex IV to 
Protocol No. Ill might guide such an evolution. 
Indications which have reached your Rapporteur 
about the Council's plans lead him to fear that 
it has not so far been sufficiently aware of the 
drawbacks of too sudden a change. 
57. In any event, any evolution in the 
Agency's tasks would imply changing its statute 
and its staff. It was designed as a relatively 
autonomous body, even with regard to the 
Council, because of the rigour and independence 
necessary for a task exclusively designed to 
verify the accuracy of declarations by member 
governments. The more its activities are turned 
in new directions, the more it will have to 
become an instrument of the Council and hence 
of governments. It is formed mainly of officers 
who have retired from their national armed 
forces, so as to associate technical ability and 
independence. Henceforth, it will be far more 
a matter of recruiting officials capable of 
following the Council's instructions in areas 
which will not all be the exclusive responsibility 
of the military. The Agency may therefore 
become a body for carrying out the Council's 
directives, which means placing its activities 
more directly under the Secretariat-General 
and making its work more political. With due 
regard for the order in which present officials 
leave, its staff will then have to be progressively 
adapted to these new requirements. This is yet 
further reason for hoping that measures will 
not be taken too hastily for changing the 
direction of the Agency's work. 
(/) The WEU Council and defence questions 
58. A constant concern of the WEU countries 
has been to avoid forming a bloc within NATO 
so as not to bring the Seven into conflict with 
their European or American allies, which would 
harm the cohesion of the alliance and jeopardise 
European unity. This preoccupation is ever 
present and should be taken into account in 
any reactivation of the WEU Council. It 
precludes the creation of military headquarters 
or permanent commands in the framework of 
WEU. 
59. There are nevertheless several areas in 
which consultations between the Seven may be 
useful. There can be no reactivation of WEU 
affecting only its technical bodies, and if need 
be the Assembly, and not the Council, which is 
the real hub of the organisation. Yet it is clear 
that if WEU has been somewhat lethargic it 
was due to the Council, i.e. the governments of 
which it is composed, not the technical bodies 
or the Assembly. But there would be no point 
in considering reorganising the Council if a 
start was not made by trying to define the role 
it might play. 
60. First and foremost, the tasks of the 
Agency and the SAC must be clasified, guide-
lines drawn up for their work, reports must be 
received from them and the Assembly must be 
kept informed. This has been the Council's 
main task in recent years and the development 
of the tasks of the SAC and of its international 
secretariat or the working out of new tasks for 
the Agency would bring a parallel development 
in the Council's activities. It may however be 
wondered whether its present membership, i.e. 
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the Ministers for Foreign Affairs or their 
deputies and the ambassadors in London, are 
the most appropriate authorities in the areas in 
which these developments may be directed. 
61. The note of 12th June refers to these 
aspects of the Council's role, clearly for 
armaments co-operation, less so for assessing 
the various aspects of the threat to Europe: 
military, political and psychological. It seems 
difficult to consider assessing the threat without 
also examining how to meet it, and to direct 
the Agency towards information on world 
armaments implies that the Council must deal 
with the possible use of these means, i.e. the 
alliance's strategy. The need seems even greater 
for the European members of the alliance to 
discuss this among themselves since the signs 
are that current NATO doctrines - the flexible 
response strategy and forward defence - have 
lost touch with present circumstances, particu-
larly in view of the superiority which the Soviet 
Union acquired long ago in conventional 
armaments and more recently in theatre nuclear 
weapons. The United States for its part, with 
the 1979 twofold decision, the Rogers doctrine 
and then the space defence programme, seems 
quite prepared to rethink its system of deter-
rence and defence. But there are signs that its 
European allies, without making specific pro-
posals, are finding it increasingly difficult to 
accept initiatives which compulsively come only 
from Washington, which in a way, stultifies 
strategic thinking in NATO. 
62. It serves no useful purpose to be unco-
operative since this would result in the 
Americans not taking account of the reactions 
of their allies; rather a European strategic 
doctrine should be developed, not in opposition 
to that of the United States but rather to make 
the specific viewpoints, reactions and interests 
of the European members of the alliance carry 
weight in NATO. Here too the WEU Council 
would have a role to play. 
63. The possibility of European action in 
disarmament was mentioned above. To be valid, 
it must be a prolongation of strategic thinking, 
just as American and Soviet positions on the 
. subject are based on the two countries' strategic 
concepts, and this is another area in which the 
WEU Council might also be the forum for 
intra-European consultation. 
64. The two French generals quoted above 
made a proposal in the same article which 
might also be of interest to the Council because 
it meets some of the concerns voiced by several 
of its members in recent years. It is based on 
an experience which seems to have been of 
benefit to France, by suggesting the creation of 
a high-level European defence research institute. 
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Your Rapporteur can do no better than to quote 
these two authors again 1: 
"This body's main purpose would be to 
make Europeans aware of defence pro-
blems; it would be placed under the 
guidance and control of an institution 
such as Western European Union (WEU); 
its courses would be attended by military 
personnel, civil servants and representati-
ves of all socio-professional activities from 
all the member states; it should be: 
- a research centre responsible for exa-
mining defence concepts in Europe, 
working out a general European con-
cept and co-ordinating and providing 
material support for studies and 
research likely to contribute to the 
overall political concept and make it 
viable; inter alia, this centre would 
facilitate the harmonisation of member 
states' attitudes towards the conference 
on security and co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE), the conference on disarma-
ment in Europe and any other similar 
activity; 
- a centre for stimulating opinion in the 
European defence area, where a certain 
picture of Europe would be worked out, 
i.e. in point of fact its real identity; the 
institute might be given the task of 
conveying this picture to public opinion; 
national meetings on a rotating basis 
might play a major role; 
- a privileged forum for political expres-
sion, where national leaders would 
express their views and in exchange 
obtain the reactions of experienced 
Europeans; 
- a meeting place widely accessible to 
Europe and the world, thanks to a 
policy of exchanges governed by great 
freedom of expression; 
- a technical council for the guardian 
organisation; the institute would of 
course have to be given the necessary 
means for this - particularly computers 
- to allow it to become Europe's true 
collective memory, a witness to its 
development and the centre for its 
openings on the outside world. 
Like the Institut des hautes etudes de 
defense nationale (IHEDN), whose acti-
vities have certainly played a part in 
shaping a common national language and, 
in point of fact, establishing the consensus 
1. Op. cit. pages 51-52. 
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which exists in France, the institute would 
bring Europeans to form a rational idea 
of the geopolitical and geostrategic facts 
of the day by making them more a ware 
of the strength they derive from their 
exceptional situation in the world and by 
conducting frank discussions together. 
Thus it will be possible to develop 
effectively the ideas round which the 
majorities necessary for the advancement 
of the edifice will be formed." 
65. But the most important thing which the 
Council should do is probably to ensure the 
effective application of Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty which, unlike the 
North Atlantic Treaty, requires member coun-
tries to consult each other on all matters 
threatening international peace, there being no 
geographical limit to the Council's responsibili-
ties. So far, however, consultations on the 
international situation have been very limited in 
WEU and no country has made use of its right 
to convene the Council in the event of 
emergency under paragraph 3 of Article VIII, 
whereas several of them have been involved in 
armed conflicts outside Europe. 
66. It is true that consultations have been 
held in NATO on events outside the treaty 
area in cases when the Soviet Union was 
involved because of the more widespread 
hostilities to which they might have led and the 
possible consequences for the deployment of 
NATO forces, particularly in the case of the 
United States having to redeploy all or some of 
its NATO-assigned forces outside the area 
covered by the Washington Treaty. But NATO 
makes no provision for consultations on the 
deployment of these forces or those of other 
countries which might have to be moved in 
such cases. 
67. The Brussels Treaty requires such consul-
tations and even the agreement of its signatories 
should the United Kingdom have to move 
certain forces assigned to the Rhine army. It is 
difficult to imagine this obligation being exten-
ded to other countries at the present juncture, 
but France's build-up of a rapid deployment 
force whose troops would be taken from 
divisions stationed in France and possibly 
certain equipment from French forces in 
Germany directly concerns the solidarity of the 
central front and hence joint security in Europe. 
68. Moreover, any military action by a 
member country anywhere in the world brings 
into play the security of all members of WEU, 
even if the Soviet Union is not immediately 
involved, in view of the imperative nature given 
to the casus foederis in Article V of the treaty. 
Admittedly, it would paralyse any external 
action by one of the members to make it subject 
to the agreement of its partners, but actions 
such as the French intervention in Chad or the 
British Falklands expedition were clearly not 
adequately discussed in consultations, which 
would have avoided some misunderstanding. 
While useful ten-power consultations are held 
on political matters, they cannot be extended to 
anything relating to military interventions and 
the possible consequences, whereas WEU seems 
an appropriate forum even if, as the note of 
12th June very fairly points out,"the Seven have 
no special interests to express on all these 
problems, they at least have specific viewpoints 
and ideas" about "the effects of the international 
situation on European security". 
69. This note consequently mentions a num-
ber of improvements to the Council's working 
methods, proposing that it meet twice a year at 
ministerial level instead of once as at present 
- but four times up to 1969 - in order to 
"provide the required political impetus and at 
the same time enhance the work of the 
Permanent Council". It is questionable whether 
two ministerial meetings a year would be 
enough to provide this impetus, particularly in 
armaments matters. Of course, Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs who meet very frequently in 
many different forums cannot be expected to 
devote more time to WEU, but periodical 
meetings of Ministers of Defence, with respon-
sibility in several matters which should be 
covered by the WEU Council, might be one of 
the conditions for a true reactivation of WEU. 
Their presence at the ministerial meeting 
deciding on the first steps to be taken for this 
reactivation, to be held in Rome on 26th and 
27th October 1984, is a novelty and must be 
followed up, even if meetings of Ministers of 
Defence are not necessarily linked with those of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. 
70. The measures referred to in the note of 
12th June with regard to the Permanent 
Cot..ncil - more frequent meetings and above 
all their expansion as appropriate to include 
senior central government staff - are obviously 
more substantial than those for ministerial 
meetings. But here too it should be recalled 
that the central administrations directly concer-
ned are not just the Ministries for Foreign 
Affairs but also the Defence Ministries. Only 
insofar as the national authorities directly 
responsible for defence take part in the work of 
WEU will the organisation be able to play its 
true role, that of ensuring the security of 
Europe in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
Ill. WEU and the European Community 
71. This important subject which the Assem-
bly has often examined in the past is mentioned 
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only briefly in the note of 12th June. The 
question is to what extent WEU's activities 
affect or might in future affect the development 
of the European Community whose responsibi-
lities some believe should one day include 
security and defence questions which are not 
covered by its constituent treaties. It is often 
feared that, being intergovernmental, WEU 
might lead to the establishment of another 
Europe, different to the Community geographi-
cally and in its principles, and a rival and 
dangerous competitor for Community Europe 
because the governments might use it to 
undermine supranational power. 
72. The Nine's reference at the Paris summit 
meeting in october 1972 to the establishment of 
a European union as the ultimate aim of all 
European organisations did not solve the 
question insofar as the nature of the union was 
not specified and the time limits the Nine laid 
down for setting up the union were passed a 
long time ago without anything being achieved. 
In September 1981, the proposed European act 
launched by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo 
included joint security among the areas in 
which Europe would have to assert itself, but 
without clearly saying how. In his press 
conference on 12th June 1984, Mr. Cheysson, 
the French Minister for External Affairs, made 
no secret of his view that nothing pointed to the 
geographical and institutional unification of 
Europe. Everything indicates that other govern-
ments share this view. 
73. Furthermore, the urgent need to revive 
European co-operation is illustrated by ten-
power Europe's difficulties in areas in which the 
constituent treaties gave responsibility to the 
Community bodies, the failure of the Athens 
and Brussels summit meetings, barely glossed 
over by the very relative success of the 
Fontainebleau meeting and the elections to the 
European Parliament which did not show very 
much public enthusiasm for the Community 
cause. With the present economic recession a 
revival is hardly possible in view of the difficulty 
governments have in making public opinion 
accept anything which may appear to be a 
sacrifice to the European cause. Political co-
operation seems to have reached its limits for 
the immediate future. The defence of Europe is 
probably the only area in which significant 
progress can be made. It must in any event be 
seriously reviewed and the moment now seems 
ripe. 
74. Moreover, the French Government is 
right to mention the obstacles encountered by 
the development of ten-power - and probably 
soon twelve-power - political consultations on 
security matters to justify its proposal to make 
better use of the seven-power framework. It is 
obviously right to give first place to the will to 
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succeed, even if this means provisionally giving 
up involving those who do not want a defence 
Europe: an unduly institutional view must not 
paralyse European action. 
75. If there is to be such a review, it must 
however be admitted that for a long time to 
come WEU will remain primarily a body for 
co-operation between governments anxious to 
retain their freedom of action in areas which 
are not at present the responsibility of the 
European Community. Even from the point of 
view of those who cannot imagine a European 
union remaining indefinitely without responsi-
bilities in the important field of Europe's 
security, the wise course seems to be to advance 
as far as possible with intergovernmental co-
operation among like-minded countries. The 
reactivation of WEU is now a means of moving 
forward. 
76. Nor must it be forgotten that the 
European union will never be complete as long 
as its geographical framework is not fixed and 
it is not possible to keep Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland or, above all, Spain and Portugal, which 
have applied for membership of the Community, 
out of an essential aspect of the union, at least 
not permanently. 
77. While it is probably true that the revival 
of WEU can today hardly extend beyond the 
framework of the Seven, due regard must be 
paid to the fact that some time or another it is 
destined to organise the defence of a wider 
Europe. Hence the consultations to be held in 
WEU can hardly be defined too positively: they 
are those which the Ten cannot pursue 
continously and effectively, i.e. mainly those 
which one way or another concern recourse to 
force inside or outside the continent of Europe 
and the means of avoiding it or meeting it, 
which implies security, disarmament or the 
limitation of armaments, action outside the 
NATO area and the armaments policies of 
member countries. These are the areas in which, 
in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, a 
European point of view should be worked out 
and expressed by the WEU Council. 
78. It should also be noted that the French 
initiative which led to the note of 12th June 
1984 came at about the same time as the 
Franco-German decision to develop bilateral 
co-operation between the two countries in 
military matters. Although sound understanding 
between France and the Federal Republic is 
indispensable for Europe, too much bilateral 
activity - in political or military consultations 
and the eo-production of armaments- is always 
liable to relegate the European partners of the 
two countries to the rather unenviable position 
of being unable to accept or refuse decisions 
already taken and of being pushed to the 
sidelines of the European forum. They would 
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then be in the position France rejected in 
NATO and in the long run this would lead to 
the paralysis of any truly European organisation 
in defence matters. 
79. This does not mean that the reactivation 
of WEU is jeopardised before it has started, 
provided France and Germany do not go too 
far in their agreement. Franco-German co-
operation on the contrary demonstrates a 
political will which Europe greatly needs. But 
it also contains a warning for the other members 
of WEU: if they do not take part in this 
political will, if they lag behind in the effective 
reactivation of the organisation, they will have 
no grounds to complain about the development 
of Franco-German bilateralism. It is for them 
to take up the challenge and show that they 
wish to keep their place in a defence Europe. 
The fact that Belgium has made proposals to 
its partners shows that it is prepared to do so. 
This is certainly also the case for Italy. United 
Kingdom and Netherlands reservations about 
the French proposals have made some observers 
wonder about their intentions. But one must in 
any event take it as a fact that the note of 12th 
June defines the points on which the Seven 
have managed to reach agreement. Likewise it 
may be assumed that the proposals made by 
certain governments and not included in the 
note failed to secure the unanimous agreement 
of the Seven, which does not necessarily mean 
that they must be rejected. 
80. However, there remain a number of 
questions where one may wonder to what extent 
there may be overlapping between the respon-
sibilities of WEU and of the Ten. 
81. (a) In external policy consultations on 
regions outside the NATO area, the frontier 
between defence-related questions and others is 
particularly difficult to determine since the 
ten-power bodies do not in principle hesitate to 
tackle security questions. In fact, if one follows 
the principle often advocated by the Council 
that each matter is preferably dealt with in the 
widest possible organisation, and if it is 
considered that all the members of WEU are 
now members of the European Community, the 
solution seems obvious. It is to hold consulta-
tions in WEU on questions which could not be 
handled satisfactorily in the ten-power frame-
work. There are very probably quite a lot of 
them. Furthermore, the Council should abide 
by the principle, so far accepted, of answering 
the Assembly's questions provided they have a 
bearing on matters within the purview of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, which is hardly 
restrictive, even if they are effectively dealt with 
in frameworks other than WEU. 
82. (b) Regarding the production, procure-
ment or trade in arms, the European Parliament 
and the European Commissioner responsible for 
industrial questions, Mr. Etienne Davignon, at 
the symposium organised by our Assembly in 
Brussels in 1979, claimed their right to take 
over these problems within their common 
industrial policy. It is evident that these 
questions come under industrial policy and 
defence policy too and it is difficult to see how 
a clear dividing line can be drawn between 
them. Uncertainty will probably remain for 
quite some time and there is little likelihood of 
the governments now being prepared to limit 
their options in matters in which they are the 
exclusive clients of the industrialists and often 
the major producers too. All recent coproduction 
agreements have involved authorities which 
escape, if not always the Community regula-
tions, at least any action by the Commission, 
and if there is hope for the SAC and its 
international secretariat to bring some order to 
joint production or procurement procedures it is 
because of the freedom of decision that the 
governments wish to retain. The principle of 
giving priority to the bodies with the greater 
number of members, i.e. the Community 
authorities, might there too be applied without 
jeopardising the activities of WEU and would 
leave plenty of room for the role of co-
ordination which your Rapporteur believes the 
international secretariat of the SAC should 
play. 
83. (c) While the WEU Council has given up 
the exercise of some of its responsibilities in 
favour of other bodies, this is not so for the 
Assembly which has relinquished none of its 
prerogatives even if in practice it no longer 
examines certain questions. 
84. The European Parliament for its part has 
endeavoured to affirm its role in discussing 
questions related to European security and 
European co-operation in armaments. Its first 
move in this direction was to adopt the report 
on the two-way street presented by the German 
Christian Democrat representative Egon 
Klepsch in 1978. This step was followed up by 
the institutional committee and the political 
committee of that assembly after its election by 
direct universal suffrage in 1979, but so far the 
obstacle has been the refusal of the govern-
ments, and particularly the French Government, 
to examine defence questions in a framework 
defined by the Rome Treaty. 
85. In this respect it should first be noted 
that no one can prevent a parliamentary 
assembly from examining any question what-
soever. Conversely, if the parliamentary assem-
bly has no legislative or decision-making powers, 
which is the case of the European Parliament 
in matters not directly linked with the applica-
tion of the treaties on which it is based and of 
the WEU Assembly in all fields, its deliberations 
can be truly meaningful only if they lead to a 
67 
DOCUMENT 990 
dialogue with the executive. Our Assembly has 
noted the extent to which the shortcomings of 
its relations with the Council have until recently 
limited its audience and the position of the 
European Parliament seems even worse in 
security matters, whereas the relative good will 
shown by the WEU Council in 1984 in holding 
a dialogue with the Assembly on everything 
relating to the reactivation of WEU must help 
to enhance the position of our Assembly whose 
standing is improving rapidly as testified for 
instance by the interest taken by the press at 
the last session. 
86. The problem of the WEU Assembly 
cannot therefore be viewed in isolation. If the 
reactivation of WEU at intergovernmental level 
takes effect, it will certainly improve the 
audience of its Assembly. If, on the contrary, 
only mediocre results are achieved, a parlia-
mentary assembly opposite an executive in a 
state of lethargy would have little chance of 
being heard. 
87. Again, if account is taken of the fact that 
the Commission of the Community cannot at 
present be the interlocutor of a parliamentary 
assembly for defence-related questions since 
these are the exclusive responsibility of govern-
ments, the close link between the WEU 
Assembly and the parliaments of the member 
countries remains a means for our Assembly to 
exercise an influence which the European 
Parliament has no longer had since its election 
by direct universal suffrage, most of its members 
no longer being members of national parlia-
ments. 
88. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that 
the election of the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage, rather than increasing 
its influence in defence matters, might diminish 
it and occasional suggestions to modify the 
status of our Assembly set out in Article IX of 
the modified Brussels Treaty for it to be formed 
of representatives of the member countries to 
the European Parliament might result in a 
further weakening of its authority. 
89. This does not mean that Article IX as 
now drafted and interpreted offers a satisfactory 
solution. Indeed, the delegations of the parlia-
ments of the member countries of WEU to the 
Council of Europe which form the WEU 
Assembly are first and foremost nominated 
according to the responsibilities of the Council 
of Europe. They include many parliamentarians 
more interested in the questions handled in that 
forum than in defence problems. 
90. Our Assembly has tackled the problem 
thus raised several times without finding a 
satisfactory solution. A possibility would 
obviously be to revise Article IX of the treaty 
so that the delegations would be composed in 
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the same manner as those of the Council of 
Europe hut not necessarily of the same 
members. Although generally considered ratio-
nal, this solution has never been retained 
because several countries fear that any revision 
of the treaty might lead to other articles, 
essential to the security of Europe, being 
questioned. In no case should it be undertaken 
without prior agreement of the seven member 
countries to limit the revision to Article IX of 
the treaty. Although this solution has never 
been retained by our Assembly, it is difficult to 
see why it could not be examined seriously by 
the Council. 
91. A second solution worked out by our 
Assembly and endorsed several times would be 
to ask the national delegations to choose as 
substitutes for the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe members who would be 
more interested in defence questions and would 
sit rather in the WEU Assembly whereas the 
titular members would preferably sit in the 
Council of Europe. An attempt was made to 
promote this proposal through letters from the 
President of our Assembly to the presidents of 
the parliaments of the member countries, but 
these letters had little effect since it is not the 
presidents of the parliaments who in fact 
appoint the delegations and their appointment 
is governed primarily by internal political 
considerations. 
92. There is an additional means of reducing 
the distance separating the two parliamentary 
assemblies, each of which, in accordance with 
their constituent texts, wish to constitute the 
parliamentary side of the future European 
union, and that is through the exchange of 
observers. The idea was brought up by Mr. von 
Hassel in 1980 and by Mr. De Poi in 1981 and 
steps have been taken in this direction although 
it has not yet been possible to institute a 
systematic exchange of observers. Perhaps it 
might be possible to improve this practice. It is 
clearly in the interests of the European 
Parliament, allowing it to maintain contact with 
the European assembly with responsibility in 
defence questions, and in that of the WEU 
Assembly, which must not neglect the European 
dimension of its deliberations. At the present 
time it seems difficult to envisage a stronger 
framework for co-operation between two 
assemblies which are elected in ways which 
correspond to the realities of Europe in the 
areas in which each of them has responsibility. 
93. Regarding the content the Council wishes 
to be given to the work of the Assembly, the 
note of 12th June gives an indication which 
corresponds to a wish expressed several times 
by the governments of member countries in 
recent years: to associate European opinion with 
the necessary effort the nations must make to 
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ensure their security. This corresponds obviously 
to a twofold anxiety stemming on the one hand 
from the magnitude of the demonstrations 
against the application of NATO's dual decision 
taken in 1979 and on the other from the way 
many Euruopean countries are falling behind in 
bringing their conventional weaponry up to date 
because of the economic measures they have 
had to take because of the crisis. 
94. To try to redress a weakening in the 
determination of the European peoples to 
defend themselves by holding an open and 
contradictory discussion in parliament is truly 
the way in which a democratic society must 
react. Such discussion should include an 
assessment of the threat and the need for 
measures to meet it. This your Assembly has 
done and will continue to do. But in this and 
other respects it cannot act without adequate 
response from the executive or without means 
of information and action which are granted it 
only too parcimoniously. It is neither desirable 
nor possible to rely on the Assembly alone to 
debate the requirements of European security 
and it is by reactivating the various aspects of 
the government sector of WEU and by 
improving the dialogue between the executive 
and parliamentary sides that the Council can 
give the Assembly the means of acting in the 
direction it is proposing. The transmission of 
the note of 12th June and the contacts between 
the Council and the Assembly during the 
elaboration of decisions augur well for the 
Council's determination in this respect. 
IV. The Rome ministerial meeting 
95. The ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th 
and 27th October has been prepared by a 
Council working group instructed to work out 
the decisions to be taken by the ministers of the 
seven governments. The Assembly has been 
informed of work in progress not through 
official communications but by several informal 
contacts between the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council and the President of the Assembly, 
accompanied at least once by certain members 
of the Assembly. The informal nature of the 
latter meeting meant that it was improvised 
without allowing sufficient time for fully 
satisfactory participation by political groups and 
national delegations. Your Rapporteur can try 
to assess the state of these negotiations just 
before the Rome meeting on the basis of oral, 
fragmentary information. 
96. At least the Assembly's views were known 
thanks to all the recommendations it has 
adopted on the work and structure of WEU. 
Your Rapporteur has had a collection of these 
texts prepared. Among them, Recommendations 
406 and 407 play an important part since they 
were adopted in June 1984 and relate directly 
to the proposed reactivation of WEU. 
97. They provided a basis for a memorandum 
prepared by Mr. Caro, President of the 
Assembly, expressing his views on the revitali-
sation of WEU, which was handed to Vice-
Chancellor Genscher and then circulated to 
members of the Assembly. This document 
allowed the Assembly to play a positive part in 
the work of the Council and there is no doubt 
that it helped to guide some of its decisions. 
Your Rapporteur is pleased to note that, on the 
whole, this memorandum follows the same lines 
as his own thinking. 
98. Among the Council's statements, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between the true 
guidelines and the first ideas designed to help 
the working group in the next few months in its 
reflections on the role of WEU's technical 
bodies. 
99. For the Council at ministerial level, it is 
planned to have it meet more often and to 
associate the Ministers of Defence, who might 
possibly meet without the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs. In this connection, note may be taken 
of the deliberate adoption of extremely flexible 
procedure, which has the advantage of making 
the WEU Council a more manageable instru-
ment, better able to meet requirements as they 
arise, particularly for the application of Article 
VIII of the treaty. On the other hand, there is 
no guarantee that, should the political will 
which now seems to prevail among governments 
slacken, these non-binding procedures will 
effectively be applied, and the results of the 
Council's work will seem more like declarations 
of intent than firm decisions. 
100. Similarly, measures to strengthen the 
Permanent Council are vague. More frequent 
use of working groups and examination of 
matters which truly relate to co-operation in 
European security are obviously desirable but 
there is no compulsion. Much will of course 
depend on the personality of future 
Secretaries-General and their concept of their 
duties. The Assembly has often asked that this 
post be given to a political personality, not 
because of doubts about the organisation's 
successive Secretaries-General, who have all 
fulfilled their duties remarkably conscientiously, 
but because it believed the revitalisation of 
WEU, for which it had been asking for many 
years, required a Secretary-General able to take 
the political steps necessary for any meaningful 
action by the Permanent Council under his 
chairmanship. 
101. In his relations with the President of the 
Assembly in recent months, Vice-Chancellor 
Genscher has shown that he considered the 
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chairmanship of the Council to be a political 
post. This is the real justification for the 
informal procedure adopted in relations between 
the Council and the Assembly. Such procedure 
is obviously impossible for a Secretariat-General 
run by an official. The Council's choice of 
informal procedure for some of its meetings 
and for its contacts with the Assembly involves 
certain risks. In particular, should certain 
governments lack the will to work effectively in 
the framework of WEU the organisation might 
lapse completely. The only way to take this risk 
with optimum chances of real success is to give 
the Chairmanship of the Permanent Council to 
someone whose past, relationships and ways of 
thinking and working guarantee that he will 
take the steps necessary to revitalise WEU. 
102. With regard to the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments and the Standing Armaments 
Committee, a number of factors are not very 
clear in the terms of reference which the 
Council intends to give to a working group. It 
will be recalled that the Assembly's proposals 
for having these bodies serve the Council by 
providing it with a direct, continuous flow of 
information on disarmament and the control of 
armaments, helping it to define a security and 
defence policy for Europe in the framework of 
the Atlantic Alliance and promoting European 
armaments co-operation mean completely reor-
ganising the Agency. Should it be merged with 
the international secretariat of the SAC to form 
a single body, closely dependent on the Council, 
and designed to provide it with the studies and 
information it needs? Conversely, should the 
present status of the Agency and of the SAC 
be maintained, as this makes them better able, 
with their present structure, to prepare the work 
of the Council on the first and third of these 
aims? This will probably be the subject of the 
forthcoming studies by the working group. 
103. Your Rapporteur does not wish, at this 
juncture, to discuss the purely institutional 
aspects of the reactivation of WEU, but is 
anxious to stress that these aspects are 
important, particularly in cases where there are 
political reasons for the Council's work being 
made more difficult. The Council has faced 
crises during its thirty years' history and has 
been able to overcome them only because the 
modified Brussels Treaty made it responsible 
for organising the control of armaments. The 
deliberate choice of informal procedure or an 
end to controls might make the institution 
wholly dependent on the will of the govern-
ments, which might be neither steady nor 
unanimous. The existence of technical bodies 
with specific responsibilities, like the appoint-
ment of a politician as Secretary-General, are 
essential conditions if WEU is to be sure of 
functioning satisfactorily for long enough after 
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the removal of commitments in respect of the 
control of armaments. 
104. The same is true of relations between the 
Council and the Assembly which the Council 
intends to improve, but mainly on the basis of 
informal procedure, as it has done systemati-
cally in recent months, thereby only accentua-
ting a trend which began many years ago, 
moreover. Confirmation of this trend calls for 
two comments. First, while informal procedure 
allows an infinitely easier dialogue than with 
formal procedure which requires the unanimous 
agreement of the seven governments, it leads 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to speak 
in his own name, certainly taking account of 
the views of his partners, but without the 
Council as a body having to express itself, i.e. 
without really committing the seven countries 
in support of his views. 
105. The second comment is that a parliamen-
tary assembly, particularly when it represents 
the parliaments of seven countries and political 
tendencies which the official groups of the 
Assembly express only partially, finds it difficult 
to delegate its powers to a President, a Bureau 
- even enlarged - or a Presidential Committee 
for its dialogue with the Council. Your 
Rapporteur speaks from experience since, 
having to prepare a report for one of the 
Assembly's committees, he was not asked to 
take part in the talks between the President 
and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
although information was then exchanged which 
he could have turned to greater advantage had 
he been able to take part personally. While the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council is not the 
Council, delegations of whatever kind are not 
the Assembly, and it is most important that the 
development of informal procedure should not 
lead to the relinquishment, even partial, of 
formal procedure, which alone is capable of 
satisfying the Assembly as a body. 
V. The discussion in the General Affairs 
Committee 
106. A discussion was held on the working 
paper submitted by your Rapporteur, which was 
the first outline of this report, at the meeting of 
the General Atf airs Committee on 9th October. 
Statements at that meeting led your Rapporteur 
to stress two points of view which in no way 
differ from his own but which were expressed 
forcefully on that occasion. 
107. First, Europe's security depends not only 
on nuclear deterrence and the balance of armed 
forces in Europe but also on the maintenance 
or restoration of peace in the rest of the world. 
Such peace may be lasting only if it is 
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accompanied by a move towards greater justice 
in the distribution of wealth to the advantage 
of the third world. This means that, in the view 
of certain committee members at least, the 
Council should pay greater attention to the 
problems arising for European security outside 
the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty 
and consider not only the military aspects, but 
also the economic and above all political aspects 
which are in fact at the centre of any real 
reactivation of WEU. 
108. This remark goes hand in hand with the 
fact that disarmament must remain an essential 
aim for Europe and hence for the WEU Council 
because of the need now being felt in Europe to 
invest in productive sectors, the growing 
demands on Europe from the third world 
countries and the advantages inherent in 
negotiated, balanced and controlled disarma-
ment. Yet the European countries go their 
separate ways in these matters. The reactivation 
of WEU should allow Europe to exist. Your 
Rapporteur has described above the role the 
Council might play in working out a European 
disarmament policy and what assistance it 
should receive from WEU's technical bodies, 
particularly the Agency, in fulfilling this role. 
109. Your Rapporteur wholly endorses these 
two points of view, but wishes to point out that 
at the present juncture there seems to be a 
possibility of giving WEU a new, mainly 
political, activity. There is no point in asking 
Europe to pursue a given policy in favour of 
disarmament or the third world, particularly if, 
as noted by certain committee members, such 
a policy does not coincide with that of the 
United States, if Europe fails to afford itself 
the means of defining a collective policy and 
taking action. The purpose of the present report 
being to examine these means, your Rapporteur 
did not feel he should dwell unduly on the aims 
pursued. It would serve no purpose to define the 
aims if the means of taking truly European 
action did not exist. For that reason your 
Rapporteur welcomes the initiatives taken by 
the governments in giving new life to WEU. 
VI. Conclusions 
110. At its June 1984 session our Assembly 
voted on two reports giving its views on the 
direction to be given to the reactivation of 
WEU. The present document, drafted shortly 
after that session and before new information 
has reached the Assembly on the work of the 
Council or of the working group it set up, 
cannot go much further. Your Rapporteur 
hopes to add more details in the weeks to come. 
The main factors may be summed up as follows: 
111. (i) It is necessary to review the require-
ments of European security and this implies 
revising the activities of WEU and of its organs 
so as to allow Europe to play a greater role in 
the defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance and 
in the limitation of armaments. This review 
should allow the main structure of the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be built and 
the defence wing of the future European union 
to be set up, account being taken of the fact 
that for quite some time it would probably not 
be possible for this area to coincide with the 
European Community in a geographical or 
institutional respect. 
112. (ii) The Council must not only meet more 
often, it must incorporate representatives of the 
defence ministries to enable WEU to act in 
matters which occupy such an important place 
in its responsibilities. It must also take greater 
account of NATO meetings and of the questions 
discussed there in order to obtain a better 
hearing for Europe's point of view. In addition 
to the activities of the other organs of WEU, its 
agenda should regularly include consideration 
of the possible threats to European security, 
particularly when they concern matters arising 
outside the area covered by the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
113. (iii) The armaments controls laid down 
by the treaty for all the WEU countries on the 
mainland of Europe must be adapted to present 
realities, particularly by bringing up to date 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill. However, the 
governments of several member countries are 
thought to prefer a complete cancellation of the 
list of conventional weapons in this annex. In 
any event, these controls might usefully be 
completed by using the method of documentary 
controls for assessing the level of forces 
throughout the world with a view to enlightening 
member governments as to the threats to 
international peace and helping them to shape 
their views on disarmament and to guide the 
production of armaments. 
114. (iv) The tasks of the international secre-
tariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
should be spelt out so as to insure better co-
ordination of the joint production and procure-
ment of armaments in Western Europe and 
Europe's access to the most recent technology 
in this area. It might also offer better means of 
communication between the armaments indus-
tries and the various bodies responsible for 
promoting the coproduction of armaments. 
115. (v) The dialogue between the Council and 
the Assembly is important for the work of the 
Assembly and must be pursued and improved, 
not only during the period of re-examination of 
WEU's activities, but also once this re-exami-
nation has been completed. 
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116. (vi) In October 1984 the governments 
were not in a position to take all the decisions 
necessary for adapting WEU to the new 
requirements. This adaptation will have to be 
progressive and nothing that has been gained 
must be abandoned without agreement having 
been reached between the Seven on the various 
aspects of the new balance of commitments. 
117. (vii) The evolution of the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty over thirty years 
raises the question of whether adaptation is 
possible without revising the treaty. This is a 
very controversial question, some fearing that a 
revision might lead to certain obligations which 
are essential for the security of Europe being 
questioned. The Council seems to have excluded 
revising the treaty. 
118. (viii) Only if the Seven reach agreement 
on the other elements of reactivating WEU will 
it be possible to raise meaningfully the question 
of the seat of the organisation, i.e. regrouping 
the Council on the one hand and the other 
ministerial organs and the Assembly on the 
other. 
119. (ix) Revision of the treaty would allow 
the question of the composition of parliamentary 
delegations to be raised. One might usefully 
re-examine the terms of the statute of the 
Council of Europe determining the composition 
of its Parliamentary Assembly to replace Article 
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states 
that the same delegations of the member 
countries of WEU shall constitute the two 
assemblies. 
120. (x) The decisions communicated by the 
Council in October 1984 can be a major step 
towards revitalising WEU, particularly by 
associating the Ministers of Defence with the 
activities of the ministerial Council, by making 
procedure more flexible and by increasing the 
number of meetings. 
121. (xi) Measures to give the Permanent 
Council effective responsibilities should be 
specified. They will be fully credible only if the 
Secretariat-General is placed under a person 
empowered to take political initiatives. 
122. (xii) More informal procedures may 
improve the work of the Council and * 
relations with the Assembly provided the 
governments are truly determined to achieve 
results. Should this determination waver, the 
only guarantee of the institution surviving will 
be the maintenance of formal, compulsory 
procedures. 
123. (xiii) It is essential to adapt the technical 
bodies to WEU's new requirements, particularly 
in order to work out a European policy on 
disarmament and the control of armaments, to 
promote a European concept of Europe's 
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security requirements in strategic questions and 
in its policy outside the North Atlantic Treaty 
area and to develop rational European co-
operation in armaments matters. 
124. (xiv) All in all, the Council is proposing 
a complete upheaval of WEU as it was shaped 
by the 1954 Paris Agreements. Such an 
upheaval was essential because WEU practice 
no longer corresponded to the requirements of 
European security in 1984 and was more a 
hindrance than a help in working out a 
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European defence policy. However, the Council 
is still very vague about the shape it intends to 
give to the organisation for the coming decades. 
If it does not soon manage to convert into 
institutional terms and into effective activities 
the will it has expressed to inject life into WEU, 
fully endorsed by the Assembly, it is to be 
feared that any reforms it advocates will be 
based on quicksands and that "reactivation" 
may merely be the shroud for burying WEU. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
3rd December 1984 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European security and" 
insert "the maintenance of'. 
2. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph: 
"Convinced of the need to have a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city in order 
to facilitate the development of the dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat-General and 
the Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical organs are able to carry out their duties 
of assisting and informing the Council and the Assembly more efficiently,". 
3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"Solve the problem of a single seat for all the WEU organs;". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
I. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment l agreed to; amendment 2 negatived; amendment 3 withdrawn). 
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Amendment 4 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by Mr. Pignion and others 
3rd December 1984 
4. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Considering that, whenever useful, the WEU member countries may consult each other on 
the repercussions for Europe of crisis situations in other regions of the world;". 
Signed: Pignion, Bassinet, Lagorce 
1. See llth sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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AmendmentS 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by Mr. Vecchietti and others 
4th December 1984 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "East-West relations" and insert 
"an active policy for improving relations between East and West". 
Signed: Vecchietti, Ferrari Aggradi, Fiandrotti, Rubbi 
1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 6 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
4tb December 1984 
6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the action those 
countries pursued" and insert "to consultations about security challenges". 
Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel, Hughes 
I. See I Ith sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 7 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 71 
tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Gansel 
4th December 1984 
7. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph: 
"Considering that the reactivation of WEU might jeopardise relations with other NATO 
member states in Europe." 
I. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
77 
Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel 
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Amendment 8 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 81 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
4th December 1984 
8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"Play an active role in disarmament, for example by making an effort- as a first step- in the 
relevant international organisations to reach limited and controlled disarmament which 
contributes to the elimination of the perils of war, thus reinforcing the policy of detente;". 
Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel, Hughes 
I. See IIth sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment 9 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 91 
tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Ganse/ 
4th December 1984 
9. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"Properly consult and inform NATO member states, non-member states of WEU, and clearly 
indicate its intention to take a positive attitude when examining (possible) applications for 
membership of WEU." 
I. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel 
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Amendment 10 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 101 
tabled by Mr. Pignion and others 
4tb December 1984 
10. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "concerning Europe's security 
which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty" and insert "in another area of 
the world which might have an impact on Europe's security". 
Signed: Pignion, Bassinet, Lagorce 
I. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 11 
4th December 1984 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 11 1 
tabled by MM. Masciadri and Michel 
11. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is 
their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit;". 
Signed: Masciadri, Michel 
1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 12 and 13 
WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENTS 12 and 131 
tabled by Mr. Martino and others 
4th December 1984 
12. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph: 
"Welcoming especially the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of 
disarmament into the Council's work;". 
13. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and 
prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein;". 
Signed: Martino, Pignion, Fiandrotti, Ferrari Aggradi, Vecchietti 
I. See IIth sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment 12 amended and agreed to; amendment 13 agreed to). 
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Amendment 14 
WEV, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
AMENDMENT 141 
tabled by Mr. Martino 
4th December 1984 
14. In Amendment 4, leave out "Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation and insert" and insert "After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation insert". 
Signed: Martino 
I. See IIth sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment fell). 
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Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments -
parliamentary action taken on recommendations 
adopted by the WEU Assembly 
on European co-operation in space technology 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
by Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur) 
A. Activities of the committee 
I. The first part of this report on the 
activities of the committee covers the period 
January to October 1984 and completes the 
statistics on interventions in parliaments up to 
1983. 
2. The committee met in Paris on 14th 
March and 20th June 1984 and in the 
Netherlands on 16th and 17th May during a 
visit, when it was addressed by Mr. van 
Eekelen, a former member of the Assembly, on 
the role of WEU in European security and 
other topical political questions. His address 
was followed by a lively discussion. 
3. · In accordance with Rule 42 bis of the 
Rules of Procedure, the committee selected 
from among the texts adopted by the Assembly 
those which it considered should be the subject 
of debates in parliaments. Among the texts 
adopted during the second part of the twenty-
ninth ordinary session, the committee selected 
Recommendation 396 on European security and 
burden-sharing in the alliance and Recommen-
dation 398 on the role and contribution of the 
armed forces in the event of natural or other 
disasters in peacetime. From the texts adopted 
during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary 
session, it selected Recommendation 406 on 
thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the 
Council and Recommendation 408 on the 
control of armaments and disarmament. 
4. These recommendations were transmitted 
officially by the President of the Assembly to 
the Presidents of the parliaments of member 
countries. On 19th December 1983 and 30th 
July 1984, the Chairman of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments wrote to all mem-
bers of the committee sending them draft 
questions relating to the abovementioned recom-
mendations, together with a draft question on 
Recommendation 404 on the state of European 
security. 
5. To date, the Office of the Clerk has 
recorded four questions put in three parliaments 
on Recommendation 396 and three questions 
put in three parliaments on Recommendation 
398. In the case of Recommendations 404, 406 
and 408 adopted at the summer session, Mr. 
Frasca put a question on each of them in the 
Italian Senate but has not yet received an 
answer. 
6. The total number of interventions and 
questions recorded by the Office of the Clerk 
86 
was thirty-three for 1983, a sharp drop as 
compared with the sixty-three interventions and 
questions recorded in 1982. Your Rapporteur 
will refer to the problem later in this report. 
7. It has been specified several times in 
earlier reports of the committee that the French, 
German and Italian Parliaments publish regular 
summaries of Assembly sessions. Several suc-
cessive Rapporteurs have asked that the 
delegations of the other four member countries 
follow this example. It is therefore a source of 
satisfaction that two sessions ago the Nether-
lands Delegation started publishing such sum-
maries and communicating them to the Office 
of the Clerk This is a good opportunity for 
again urging the Belgian, Luxembourg and 
United Kingdom Delegations to follow suit. 
B. Action taken in parliaments on Assembly 
recommendations on European co-operation in 
space technology 
I. Introduction 
8. Two recent events have helped to make 
the public aware of Europe's importance in 
space matters. In a speech on 7th February 
1984, President Mitterrand proposed the crea-
tion of a European space community. On 4th 
August 1984, Europe's Ariane 3 carrying two 
satellites to be placed in earth orbit was 
successfully launched from the French Guiana 
base. 
9. While astronautics is assuming increasing 
importance, it is natural that the matter should 
be widely discussed in European and in national 
parliaments. It would therefore be appropriate 
to analyse relevant debates on WEU Assembly 
recommendations in order to assess interest in 
European space co-operation. 
10. To make it easier to follow the discussion, 
it is worth while first mentioning a few basic 
aspects of space questions. 
11. There are both civil and military aspects 
to space technology and the distinction between 
them is not always clear. Various satellite 
programmes, which have repercussions on the 
development of telecommunications, maritime 
communications, radio and television, meteor-
ology and the detection of earth resources, 
among others, may be exploited for both 
peaceful and military purposes. The same is 
true for the development of orbital systems and 
space laboratories (e.g. Spacelab). 
12. Characteristic of European space co-
operation is the fact that work is conducted at 
different European levels with different national 
staff. Moreover, there are bilateral agreements 
between European countries and also between 
European countries and the United States. This 
leads inevitably to different national interests 
and renders homogeneous supranational devel-
opment more difficult. 
11. The main European space co-operation bodies 
13. In the peaceful use of space, one of the 
most important European bodies is the Euro-
pean Space Agency (ESA), which has its seat 
in Paris. The following eleven European 
countries are members: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Countries 
which are members of WEU are underlined. 
Apart from Luxembourg, all the WEU member 
countries are therefore members of ESA. 
14. Canada, Norway and Austria take part 
in certain programmes, Austria is an associate 
member while Canada and Norway have 
observer status. ESA was created on 31st May 
1975 by merging two organisations, ELDO and 
ESRO. Its task is to ensure and develop, for 
peaceful purposes, co-operation between Euro-
pean states in space research and technology 
for scientific purposes and, in applied technol-
ogy, to develop operational space systems. 
Another aim of ESA is to co-ordinate and 
integrate the various national space pro-
grammes. As a major client of the European 
space industry, one of its tasks is to work out 
an appropriate industrial policy in order to 
increase the competitiveness of the European 
aerospace industry. Furthermore, national space 
bodies should play a closer part in the 
implementation of ESA programmes. 
15. All member states finance the Agency's 
general budget and scientific programmes in 
proportion to their national revenues: these 
payments are called compulsory contributions. 
On the other hand, member states may, if 
interested, take part in optional programmes 
and fix the amount of their contributions 
themselves. Examples of these programmes are 
Spacelab, the Ariane launcher, the ECS and 
Marecs (maritime) communication satellites 
and Meteosat and ERS-1 earth observation 
satellites. Most of these programmes will soon 
be completed. 
16. Arianespace was formed to sell the Ariane 
programme to industry. 
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17. Several major European agreements are 
worth mentioning: {i) In 1973 an agreement 
was signed on the European Centre for 
Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), 
an interstate organisation grouping seventeen 
European countries and based in the United 
Kingdom. Its aim is to make longer-range 
weather forecasts possible by using mathemati-
cal and empirical calculations. {ii) On 14th 
May 1982, an agreement on the European 
telecommunications satellite organisation Eutel-
sat was signed in Paris. This was the outcome 
of a government conference of twenty-four 
states, including all the WEU member coun-
tries. Eutelsat's main aim is to operate and 
extend the European communications satellite 
system (ECS) and, where appropriate, to 
implement new systems of this type with a view 
to improving the telephone and television 
transmission network and to promote the 
development of a European high-speed data-
transmission network. {iii) On 29th April 1980, 
a major bilateral Franco-German agreement 
was signed on industrial co-operation on 
broadcast satellites, which came into force on 
1st December 1980. 
Ill. Activities of the WEU Assembly and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
18. Since 1965, under the responsibility of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, the WEU Assembly has 
followed space technology matters in a number 
of reports and recommendations. In order to be 
topical, the present report will deal only with 
recommendations adopted in the last five years. 
The following list already shows the variety of 
subjects tackled. 
19. On 22nd November 1978, the Assembly 
adopted Recommendation 326 on application 
satellites, on 23rd November 1978 Recommen-
dation 328 on weather forecasting, on 5th June 
1980 Recommendation 353 on a European earth 
resources detection satellite programme and 
Recommendation 354 on the state of European 
aerospace activities - reply to the twenty-fifth 
annual report of the Council, on 17th June 
1981 Recommendation 369 on the future Qf 
European space activities - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, on 
29th November 1983 Recommendation 399 on 
the assessment of advanced technology in Japan 
and on 20th June 1984 Recommendation 410 
on the military use of space. 
20. In a European framework, the work of 
the WEU Assembly has been completed inter 
alia by that of the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. The principal texts adopted by that 
assembly in recent years are: 
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- Order 372 of 2nd October 1978 on 
remote sensing; 
- Recommendation 844 of 2nd October 
1978 on the European Space Agency; 
- Recommendation 845 of 2nd October 
1978 on Europe's needs in the field of 
remote sensing; 
- Recommendation 896 of 3rd July 1980 
on European policy for the design and 
construction of direct broadcasting sat-
ellites; 
- Recommendation 926 of 7th October 
1981 on questions raised by cable 
television and by direct satellite broad-
casts; 
- Resolution 788 of 24th January 1983 
on the future of the European space 
programme; 
- Resolution 789 of 24th January 1983 
on the second United Nations confer-
ence on the exploration and peaceful 
uses of outer space; 
- Recommendation 957 of 24th January 
1983 on the proposal for an interna-
tional satellite monitoring agency. 
21. It is admittedly not always possible to 
avoid parallelism and overlapping of work by 
the two assemblies. But the attention of the 
Presidential Committee might be drawn to the 
need to find ways of co-ordinating and sharing 
work; in this task it might start from the 
principle that the WEU Assembly is primarily 
concerned with military aspects. 
IV. Consideration of WEU Assembly recommendations in 
national parliaments 
Recommendation 326 on application satellites, 
adopted on 22nd November 1978 
22. This recommendation advocated instruct-
ing ESA to carry out specific tasks, e.g.: 
- to establish a global communications 
network in which data gathered by 
satellites could be combined; 
- to build a small prototype solar power 
satellite providing electrical capacity, 
and urged member governments: 
- to indicate which elements of ESA's 
draft Spacelab follow-on development 
programme were to be carried out; 
:..... to define the medium- and long-term 
goals of ESA and to have a draft 
long-term budget drawn up. 
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The Assembly also recommended that in the 
United Nations member states support steps to 
oblige states launching satellites to provide 
information on those which had sources of 
nuclear energy on board. 
23. The reply of the Council, communicated 
on 25th April 1979, stressed the need for 
collaboration between ESA and the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), con-
sidered the proposed prototype solar power 
satellite premature because of its cost and 
recalled that the ESA Council would decide 
whether the draft Spacelab follow-on develop-
ment programme should be carried out. The 
Council welcomed efforts undertaken by mem-
ber states of WEU in the United Nations 
committee on the peaceful uses of outer space 
to ensure the security of satellites having 
sources of nuclear energy on board. 
24. Three representatives- (Belgian, Italian 
and British) asked their governments to explain 
the delay in adopting ESA's budget. The 
difficulties described in the governments' 
answers may, it is true, now seem out of date. 
Similar problems may, however, arise again, 
particularly as ESA's current programmes are 
now nearly completed. The Belgian Govern-
ment's answer in January 1979 to a question 
put by a representative is therefore perhaps still 
pertinent: 
"Many problems face the European Space 
Agency stemming mainly on the one 
hand from the prevailing difficult econ-
omic situation which restricts the sums 
member states can devote to space 
activities and on the other from the need 
to take very important decisions concern-
ing new activities: moving on to the 
operational stage of the communications 
programme, use of Spacelab, direct 
television by satellite, European earth 
resources satellite, subsequent develop-
ment of the Ariane launcher and Space-
lab. 
In addition to the difficulties stemming 
from the economic situation, others result 
from the varying degrees of interest which 
member states have in the different 
programmes." 
25. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Treu referred 
to the recommendation on the construction of 
a solar power satellite and asked tht action be 
taken on the suggestion that the medium- and 
long-term goals of ESA be drawn up and that 
support be given in the United Nations for the 
necessary security measures for nuclear satel-
lites. The Italian Government has not yet 
answered this question. 
26. In the Bundestag on 24th November 
1978, Mr. Scheftler asked the Federal Govern-
ment two questions on communications satel-
lites. The first concerned the progress of 
research and development in Germany in 
respect of communications satellites and what 
success had there been on the international 
market. The Federal Government's answer on 
29th November 1978 gave an overall view of 
the then situation: 
"German research and development have 
gained an international position where 
communications satellites are concerned: 
- The Franco-German Symphonie com-
munications satellite programme on the 
experimental transmission of television 
broadcasts, telephone conversations and 
data, whose two satellites were launched 
in 197 4 and 197 5 and have since pia yed 
a successful part in worldwide tests, has 
demonstrated a capability to develop 
satellites of this type and place them in 
geostationary orbit. 
- The Federal Republic was responsible 
for the major part of the ESA Telecom 
programme, both technically and finan-
cially. In March 1978, work started on 
the ECS communications satellite for 
setting up a European operational satellite 
system to transmit communications on a 
large scale and broadcast television pro-
grammes. The OTS orbital test satellite 
was launched successfully in May 1978. 
A comprehensive test programme is under 
way. 
- The ESA Marots (more recently 
Marecs) maritime satellite programme is 
to form part of the planned worldwide 
Inmarsat system. At the same time, 
maritime stations and radio distress 
installations have been developed in 
Germany. 
- Where direct broadcast satellites are 
concerned, for several years the emphasis 
has been on modular-type operational 
models intended for satellite platforms, 
payloads and receiving installations with 
the result that German industry is now 
well placed to develop and produce 
satellite systems of this type. Thanks to 
the encouragement of the Federal Minis-
try of Research and Technology, German 
industry has recently had considerable 
success on the international market: 
- German industry is developing and 
producing the attitude control system 
and solar panels for the seven new-
generation Intelsat V satellites consti-
tuting the worldwide Intelsat satellite 
system. It has thus obtained the largest 
subcontracting contract outside the 
United States. 
89 
DOCUMENT 991 
- The German electronics industry has 
provided wave propagation tubes, inter 
alia for the American SBS (satellite 
business system), the NASA TDRSS 
(data-transmission satellite system) and 
the Canadian Anic-B communications 
system." 
27. Mr. SchefHer's second question asked for 
an estimate of international demand for com-
munications satellites and Germany's possibili-
ties in that market. The Federal Government 
answered as follows: 
"... recent studies show that in the 
eighties the world market will amount to 
DM 17-30,000 million. An estimate made 
in December 1977 by the Centre for 
Aeronautical and Space Research and 
Tests at the request of the Ministry of 
Research and Technology gave a figure 
of DM 24,000 million, of which 40% for 
satellites and ground installations (anten-
nae) and 20% for launchers. Europe's 
possible share of the world market has 
been estimated at 30% or DM 7,000 
million. Should Germany obtain a share 
of not less than 25% of the European 
market, this would represent a figure of 
about DM 2,000 million for the eighties. 
Large user receiving stations, needed for 
direct broadcasting, are not included in 
these estimates. 
When assessing the openings afforded by 
these market prospects, the strong 
demand for experimental use of Sym-
phonie and the interest shown in direct 
broadcast satellites must be considered 
positive. Conversely, the delay in com-
pleting satellite systems, for political and 
financial reasons, particularly in Brazil, 
Iran and the Arab states, must not be 
overlooked. 
Where conventional broadcast satellites 
are concerned, European industry is 
hardly in a position to compete with 
American industry which practically dom-
inates that market, even if the adoption 
of the ECS operational satellite system in 
Europe consolidates European industry. 
On the other hand, direct broadcast 
satellites have a great future. According 
to estimates by the German Centre for 
Aeronautical and Space Research and 
Tests mentioned above, in the eighties 
broadcast satellites will represent almost 
as high a proportion of the market as 
other communications satellites. German 
industry being well placed at the outset 
because of the extent of its research, 
priority will be given to broadcast satel-
lites. 
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The success of this undertaking will 
depend on industry making strong efforts 
to align its prices with those of the 
Americans and pursue an active sales 
policy." 
Recommendation 328 on weather forecasting, 
adopted on 23rd November 1978 
28. This recommendation stressed the import-
ance of weather forecasting for both civil and 
military purposes and inter alia recommended 
that member governments: 
- place a system of meteorological satel-
lites in polar orbit; 
- promote the foundation of an organi-
sation to start the operational phase of 
a European meteorological satellite 
system; 
- support the study of the establishment 
of a meteorological satellite system for 
defence purposes and test existing 
military meteorological co-ordination; 
and 
- engage their efforts jointly and fully in 
fundamental research. 
29. On the whole, the Council's reply com-
municated to the Assembly on ll th June 1979 
was positive in regard to these proposals and 
recalled the work of the WMO. The Council 
considered that a separate European military 
contribution to placing military meteorological 
satellites in orbit might lead to duplication 
without military satellites being necessarily less 
vulnerable than civil satellites. 
30. There was a response to this recommen-
dation in the parliaments of six member 
countries. Questions put by representatives may 
be grouped as follows. 
31. Four representatives referred to the pro-
posal to place a meteorological satellite system 
in orbit for defence purposes. 
32. On 1st June 1979, Mr. Schefller asked 
the Federal Government whether it considered 
meteorological co-ordination in the alliance 
satisfactory and what it thought of the need to 
set up a European meteorological satellite 
system for defence purposes. 
33. The Federal Government answered as 
follows: 
"1. Military meteorological co-ordination 
is now satisfactory. However, it does not 
concern only the European partners of 
the alliance but NATO as a whole. 
The highest body for co-ordination and 
planning, the Military Committee 
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Meteorological Group (MCMG), super-
vises co-ordination and working groups at 
the level of each major command in 
which countries and NATO commanders 
are represented. 
The interests of the Bundeswehr are 
represented by officials from the Ministry 
of Defence and the Bundeswehr geophys-
ical information service. 
The broad lines of co-ordination and 
planning are set out in NATO documents. 
2. The military meteorological services of 
the European members of NATO at 
present use data and information supplied 
by American meteorological satellites and 
the European meteorological satellite 
Meteosat. In the event of hostilities, it is 
expected that there would be a severe 
limitation of the volume of data supplied 
by these civil meteorological satellites. 
Since 1974, NATO has been asking that 
meteorological data and information sup-
plied by satellite be also, and above all, 
available in case of war, but has stopped 
short of calling for the creation of a 
meteorological satellite system specially 
designed for defence purposes." 
34. On 22nd December 1978, Mr. Delehedde 
drew the attention of the French Government 
to Recommendation 328 and asked whether it 
was prepared to afford its active support to 
examining the establishment of a European 
meteorological satellite system for defence 
purposes, together with a network of mobile 
ground stations. 
35. On 1Oth February 1979, Mr. Fran9ois-
Poncet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered 
as follows: 
"A first meteorological observation satel-
lite, Meteosat, has already been launched 
by the European Space Agency and 
others are planned. The French Govern-
ment is playing an active part in this 
programme, which is producing satisfac-
tory results. But it is obvious that the 
activities of the European Space Agency 
are wholly peaceful and that the satellites 
it launches cannot be used for other 
purposes." 
36. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Treu drew the 
attention of his government to several points in 
Recommendation 328, as follows: 
"To ask the Minister of Defence to give 
his opinion and that of his ministry on 
Recommendation 328 on weather fore-
casting. 
In this recommendation, the WEU 
Assembly, considering the need for a 
defence meteorological satellite pro-
gramme in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance, recommends that member gov-
ernments develop research and co-opera-
tion in respect of meteorological satellites 
by affording appropriate financial support 
and promote the formation of a European 
meteorological satellite system, Euromet-
sat, similar to the Eutelsat of the postal 
authorities. It also recommends increasing 
the number of observation posts covering 
the North Atlantic by organising auto-
mated meteorological data collection by 
specially-equipped aircraft and placing a 
system of meteorological satellites in 
polar orbit. 
To ask the Minister what action, if 
possible early and effective, he intends to 
take on this recommendation." 
37. On 8th February 1979, Mr. Ruffini, 
Minister of Defence, answered as follows: 
"The establishment of a meteorological 
satellite system for defence purposes 
would obviously allow specific meteoro-
logical information to be obtained in 
wartime; the technical operational char-
acteristics of such a system should be 
worked out in a study at European level 
to determine the cost, breakdown of 
responsibilities and management of the 
various elements of infrastructure neces-
sary for the orbiting and operational 
control of the satellites. 
Consequently, participation in a pro-
gramme of such magnitude could be 
considered only once all the technical and 
financial aspects are known. 
It should be pointed out that at present, 
in the field of military meteorological 
satellites, the United States has developed 
a satellite system which operates in the 
European area and whose technical 
characteristics are a military secret; data 
might be made available to NATO 
countries through the establishment of 
appropriate links with receiving stations 
in Germany. 
Automated meteorological data collection 
in the North Atlantic area by specially-
equipped aircraft and meteorological sat-
ellites is being studied by the Military 
Committee. 
It should be pointed out in particular that 
Italy has been assigned no responsibility 
with regard to meteorological observation 
and/or reconnaissance flights in the North 
Atlantic area." 
91 
DOCUMENT 991 
38. On 15th December 1978, Mr. Kershaw 
put the following two questions in the House of 
Commons on Recommendation 328: 
"1. To ask the Secretary of State for 
Defence, what steps he has taken to 
establish a European meteorological sat-
ellite system for defence purposes together 
with a network of mobile ground stations. 
2. To ask the Secretary of State for 
Defence, whether he will propose the 
formation of an organisation by the 
European meteorological services of insti-
tutes to start the operational phase of a 
European meteorological satellite system 
Eurometsat similar to the Eutelsat of the 
European postal authorities." 
39. On 15th January 1979, Mr. Wellbeloved, 
Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the 
Royal Air Force, answered as follows: 
"I. None. Existing weather satellites are 
fully utilised for defence purposes as are 
more conventional observational systems. 
These arrangements are kept under 
continuous review by the NATO Military 
Committee Meteorological Group, of 
which the United Kingdom is a member. 
2. The European geostationary satellite 
(Meteosat 1) is at present operated as a 
research system. Should the system prove 
to be cost-effective in competition with 
conventional ground-based systems a con-
tinuing operational programme will be 
contemplated. Meteosat 2 is currently 
being discussed by the appropriate Euro-
pean institutions and it is possible that it 
will function as an operational system. 
The United Kingdom is keeping in close 
touch with developments." 
40. Two representatives (Mr. Cavaliere, Italy, 
and Mr. Cornelissen, Netherlands) put ques-
tions on the evolution of weather forecasting in 
general. Since the answers of the governments 
concerned were connected only indirectly with 
Recommendation 328 and described above all 
their respective national positions, there is no 
need to study them in detail. 
41. On 13th December 1978, Mr. Hengel put 
the following question in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies: · 
"Is the government prepared to promote 
the formation of an organisation by the 
European meteorological services or insti-
tutes to start the operational phase of a 
European meteorological satellite system, 
Eurometsat, similar to the Eutelsat of the 
European postal authorities ?" 
42. On 26th January 1979, Mr. Thorn, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered as 
follows: 
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"The aims of the European meteorological 
satellite programme (Meteosat) are to 
design, develop, place in orbit, manage 
and control a preoperational meteorologi-
cal satellite and to develop and set up the 
relevant ground stations. The European 
Space Agency (ESA) is carrying out the 
programme on behalf of participating 
member states, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 
The first meteorological satellite, 
Meteosat-1, was launched successfully on 
23rd November 1977 and at the begin-
ning of December was in geostationary 
orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km at the 
intersection of the Greenwich meridian 
and the Equator. From this position over 
the Gulf of Guinea it photographs Europe, 
Africa and South America every half an 
hour and transmits the raw images to the 
central ground station, the European 
Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt 
(Federal Republic of Germany). Once 
processed the sectorised images are trans-
mitted by Meteosat-1 from Darmstadt to 
stations using the data, currently some 
twenty-five meteorological centres at air-
ports and elsewhere. Processing the 
images includes extraction of wind vectors 
and will in future provide other elements, 
including the surface temperature of the 
sea, objective analyses of cloud cover and 
relative humidity in the upper atmos-
phere, data on radiation and maps 
showing the height of cloud summits. 
Meteosat-1 is also used to collect data 
and anybody wishing to integrate a 
platform or system must negotiate with 
the European Space Agency. Images 
emanating from Meteosat can be seen on 
German television every evening at about 
7 o'clock. 
Since the Meteorological and Hydrologi-
cal Service is aware of no meteorological 
satellite programme other than the one 
described, it has been agreed that the 
development phase of the preoperational 
meteorological satellite Meteosat should 
lead to the operational phase of the 
European meteorological satellite system 
Eurometsat. 
Direct Luxembourg participation in the 
development of this system appears diffi-
cult in view of the high technical level 
required. Consideration might be given to 
installing a user station at Luxembourg-
Findel airport but this would be very 
expensive: the station at the Belgian 
Royal Meteorological Institute cost about 
25 million Luxembourg francs." 
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43. This subject, i.e. the creation of an 
organisation to start the operational phase of a 
European meteorological satellite system, Euro-
metsat, similar to the Eutelsat of the European 
postal authorities, was also referred to in the 
second part of Mr. Kershaw's question and 
partially in Mr. Treu's question. The answers of 
the Luxembourg and United Kingdom Govern-
ments both recognise that ESA, which handled 
the development phase of the meteorological 
satellites, would also assume responsibility for 
the operational phase. The Italian Government 
did not mention this matter. 
Recommendation 353 on a European earth 
resources detection satellite programme, adopted 
on 5th June 1980 
44. In this text, the Assembly recommends 
that the Council: 
"Urge the member states: 
I. To put greater political emphasis on 
the final definition and initiation of an 
agreed earth resources satellite pro-
gramme and on the continuation of the 
Meteosat meteorological programme; 
2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote 
sensing by satellite through the European 
Space Agency, for which they should 
evolve a European space policy and a 
more closely involved political direction 
of the Agency, and invite the Italian 
Minister in charge of space questions, 
Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Minister-
ial Council, to prepare and convene a 
Council meeting in the near future to 
establish that European policy since ESA 
is at a crossroad for its new programmes; 
3. To build on existing national pro-
grammes such as the French Spot system, 
either by a renewed effort at their 
Europeanisation or by integrating such 
programmes with an approved ESA 
schedule of compatible earth resources 
satellite launches; 
4. To devote adequate funding for a 
worthwhile European earth resources 
satellite programme through the Euro-
pean Space Agency as being the most 
cost-effective instrument for its develop-
ment so as to be able to exploit the 
industrial, technical, environmental and 
strategic benefits of a substantial and 
carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite 
programme; 
5. To evolve the most appropriate mech-
anisms both for the practical application 
of remote-sensing satellite observations 
and the commercial exploitation of such 
satellite systems; 
6. To encourage within the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG) the 
concerted study of the military require-
ments for remote-sensing satellites on a 
European basis, the definition of any 
resulting satellite projects and their 
economic and efficient procurement; 
7. To urge the Councils of the European 
Communities and the Council of Europe 
to co-ordinate the possible application of 
European earth resources satellite pro-
grammes to the benefit of European 
overseas aid programmes and the econ-
omic development of poorer countries of 
the third world." 
45. The reply of the Council, communicated 
to the Assembly on 21st November 1980, 
adopted an attitude which was on the whole 
positive towards these proposals, although 
stressing that there was no link between ESA 
(civil) and the IEPG (military). 
46. Two questions were put in the Italian 
Senate on this recommendation. To the question 
by Mr. Maravalle on paragraphs 1, 2 and 7, 
Mr. Tesini, Minister without Portfolio respon-
sible for co-ordinating scientific research and 
technology, answered on 9th March 1982 that: 
"Italy is keenly interested in Europe's 
future remote-sensing activities and, in 
view of the importance of the recommen-
dation in question, it asked the WEU 
Permanent Council at its meeting in 
London on 18th June 1980 to prepare a 
reply, and this was done. 
Following this initiative, as Chairman-in-
Office of the Council of Ministers, I 
proposed in ESA that a meeting of 
member countries' ministers be convened 
with the specific purpose of defining 
European space policy. With particular 
regard to the European satellite pro-
gramme, our country is following atten-
tively the earth resources remote-sensing 
satellite programme through my deputy's 
active participation in the ESA committee 
which is managing the programme. In 
this framework, Italy is at present helping 
to define the second stage of this 
programme, which includes the research, 
development and construction of the first 
European remote-sensing satellite, 
ERS-1; Italy is now prepared to consider 
playing a major part in the definition 
phase of the ERS-1 system, known as 
phase B. The first part of this programme 
is the Meteosat programme, including the 
meteorological satellite successfully devel-
oped by ESA thanks, inter alia, to the 
Italian contribution. 
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The second flight unit of this satellite 
(Meteosat 2), which has now been 
successfully placed in orbit, was carried 
out by ESA with a significant Italian 
contribution. Finally, it should be recalled 
that our country is also taking part in the 
management and operational phase of 
Meteosat 2 with a contribution of some 
Lire 4,000 million." 
47. As far as your Rapporteur knows, no 
answer has been given to a similar question put 
by Mr. Talamona in the Italian Senate. 
48. In the French Senate, Mr. Jeambrun put 
a question on 11th June 1980, laying particular 
stress on paragraph 3 of the recommendation 
(Europeanisation of the French Spot pro-
gramme). 
49. On lOth September 1980, Mr. Giraud, 
Minister of Industry, answered as follows: 
"Recommendation 353, recently adopted 
by the Assembly of Western European 
Union, advocates the implementation of 
a European remote-sensing satellite pro-
gramme. To this end, it recommends 
better co-ordination between member 
governments through the intermediary of 
the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
convening a meeting of the ESA Minis-
terial Council to define a European policy 
in this field. It suggests defining the 
European programme either by the inte-
gration of national programmes with an 
approved ESA schedule of compatible 
earth resources satellite launches or by a 
renewed effort to Europeanise Spot. The 
latter proposal hardly seems realistic. It 
should in fact be recalled that France's 
offer made in 1977 to carry out the Spot 
programme in the framework of ESA was 
rejected by all our partners with the 
exception of Sweden and Belgium, who 
became associated through bilateral 
agreements. Conversely, a European 
remote-sensing satellite programme is 
now being considered and has been 
discussed in ESA since the beginning of 
this year. The first stage might include a 
maritime and meteorological monitoring 
satellite using the Spot platform and new 
instruments in the field of ultra high 
frequencies. The detailed definition of the 
tasks of this satellite and technical studies 
on the instruments on board are in the 
process of being carried out. They should 
lead ESA to submit a proposal to member 
states at the end of this year. France's 
position towards this proposal will depend 
on the scientific, technological and econ-
omic value of such a satellite. In any 
event, it could not agree to take part in 
a programme which did not use the 
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technical know-how already acquired 
from the Spot programme, particularly 
where the platform is concerned, or whose 
aims were too close to, and hence in 
competition with, those of Spot. In this 
respect, France is in favour of the present 
trend towards a predominantly scientific 
and experimental programme designed to 
verify and measure possibilities of mari-
time monitoring and detection by satel-
lite." 
50. This statement clearly illustrates the 
problems involved in co-ordinating national and 
European satellite programmes. 
Recommendation 354 on the state of European 
aerospace activities - reply to the twenty-fifth 
annual report of the Council, adopted on 5th 
June 1980 
51. This recommendation deals inter alia with 
space matters and recommends that the 
Council: 
"2. Invite the governments of the member 
states of the European Space Agency to 
take appropriate steps to ensure a close 
link between the French and German 
national programmes for direct broad-
casting spacecraft and the ESA L-Sat 
programme so that European space inter-
ests will not be divided on the world scene 
and in the world market; 
3. Invite the governments of the member 
states of ESA to consider the political 
importance of space co-operation for 
Europe and the need to take decisions 
concerning the future of the Agency at 
an appropriate political level;" 
52. Two questions were put in the Bundestag 
on these matters. 
53. On 22nd July 1980, Mr. Scheftler asked 
the Federal Government whether it intended to 
take steps to ensure a close link between the 
national programme for direct broadcast satel-
lites and the ESA programme, inter alia for 
financial and commercial reasons concerning 
the world market. 
54. Through Mr. Haunschild, then Secretary 
of State for Research and Technology, the 
Federal Government answered as follows: 
"The joint development of television 
broadcasting satellites decided upon in 
the framework of the international pro-
gramme with France is limited, in 
accordance with the provisions of W ARC 
77, to operations in the two countries. 
The organisations responsible - Bundes-
post and Telediffusion de France - will 
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carry out the planned launching at the 
end of 1983 or in May 1984 for 
operational tests of at least two years' 
duration. 
The joint implementation of this project 
was started after the signing of the 
government agreement on 29th April 
1980. Various European states have 
expressed the wish for their industries to 
take part as subcontractors. 
The L-Sat concept, on the other hand, is 
based on the idea of a universal satellite 
platform which must prove its worth for 
a wide range of planned uses. The L-Sat 
programme makes provision for various 
radio and television broadcasting tests. It 
is still in the study stage. Negotiations on 
the implementation and financing of the 
project are under way. 
France and Germany do not intend to 
take part in the L-Sat programme, whose 
technological development and aims are 
different. The two projects may subse-
quently compete with each other at the 
marketing stage. Co-operation in the 
procurement of components might how-
ever be possible." 
55. On 23rd July 1980, Mr. Flamig put the 
following question to the Federal Government: 
"Is the Federal Government prepared to 
take part in a meeting of the ESA 
Council in 1980 or 1981 to determine 
political guidelines for the work of that 
organisation, since the time has come to 
decide on its future programmes?" 
56. Mr. Haunschild answered as follows: 
"The ESA Council meets regularly every 
two or three months at the level of 
delegates to discuss and take decisions on 
all essential matters of concern to the 
organisation. For some time, it has also 
been examining guidelines for the Agency 
for the 1980s. Proposals for new scientific 
programmes and their financial implica-
tions for the Agency are now being 
studied. 
As soon as major fundamental political 
questions so require, the Federal Govern-
ment will call for a meeting of the ESA 
Council at ministerial level. However, the 
new Director-General, who took office on 
16th May 1980, must be allowed time to 
become acquainted with what is being 
done." 
Recommendation 369 on the future of European 
space activities - reply to the twenty-sixth 
annual report of. the Council, adopted on 
17th June 1981 
57. This recommendation advocated: 
- the elaboration of long-term European 
space planning; 
- full utilisation of Spacelab's potential 
and pursuit of the further development 
of the Ariane programme; 
- agreement on an earth resources satel-
lite programme; 
- promotion of European military satel-
lites; 
- mobilisation of public opinion for a 
European space programme. 
58. The Council's reply, communicated to the 
Assembly on 26th November 1981, gave an 
overall picture of the state of European space 
programmes at that time, without referring to 
the need for European military communications 
and observation satellites or answering the 
invitation to promote the investigation of the 
military implications of space technology. 
59. It was precisely the military aspect that 
was raised by various representatives. 
60. On 7th August 1981, Mr. Dejardin, a 
Belgian representative, put the following ques-
tion to his government: 
"The development of space technology is 
unfortunately not limited to the scientific 
field and to civil applications. The 
collective delirium into which the immoral 
arms race is leading us includes military 
applications in its murderous folly. 
What measures have been taken in 
Belgium to promote investigation of the 
military implications of space technology? 
What is the concrete outcome for Euro-
pean industries of the consultations which 
have been held in this respect between 
members of the Atlantic Alliance? In 
view of their present capabilities, will 
they be called upon in the near future to 
provide NATO with observation or com-
munications satellites or are they once 
again relying on American supplies?" 
61. On 15th September 1981, Mr. Swaelen, 
Belgian Minister of Defence, answered as 
follows: 
"Together with its allies in the alliance, 
the Ministry of Defence takes part in the 
research, development and implementa-
tion of programmes for the military use 
of communications and navigation satel-
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lites but has no national space technology 
programmes. 
Together with other departments, the 
Ministry of Defence takes part in some 
or all of the activities of groups such as 
the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace 
Research and Development, the NATO 
Defence Research Group and the NATO 
global positioning Navstar and Telstar 
programmes. 
The question of the participation of 
Belgian industries in these programmes, 
to which should be added Ariane, etc., is 
the responsibility of the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs." 
62. Answering a similar question put by Mr. 
Jeambrun in the French Senate on 24th July 
1981, Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, 
answered as follows on 9th December 1981: 
"The military aspect of space technology 
was taken into account as from 1962. 
Thus, the Ministry of Defence contributed 
to the development of the Diamant 
launcher in the National Centre for Space 
Studies. Since then, the Ministry of 
Defence has continuously participated in 
the financing of various programmes of 
the National Centre for Space Studies 
intended for civil purposes. In the United 
Nations committee on the peaceful uses 
of outer space, France is trying actively 
to prevent space becoming a potential 
battlefield. No offensive military project 
intended for a hypothetical space war is 
currently being studied. Conversely, gen-
eral studies are being conducted on 
various aspects of space technology which 
may affect defence. Such technology may 
concern non-offensive tasks such as com-
munications or earth observation. As 
France is not a member of the NATO 
integrated military organisation, it plays 
no part in activities relating to military 
communications specific to the fourteen 
states which belong to that structure. It 
is therefore present only as an observer at 
work on communications satellites." 
63. Answering a question put by Mrs. Knight 
on the same subject in the House of Commons 
on 28th October 1981, Mr. Pattie, Parliamen-
tary Under-Secretary of State for Defence 
Procurement, speaking on behalf of the govern-
ment, said: 
"The military implications of space tech-
nology are under study in the defence 
research programme and there is a 
continuing dialogue between the scientific 
and military staffs of NATO member 
countries. The principal applications are 
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seen to be in the field of communications 
and navigational satellites, on which there 
has been a substantial degree of co-
operation within NATO." 
64. On 29th June 1981, Mr. Atkinson asked 
the United Kingdom Government about the 
level of expenditure on space industries in the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. 
In its answer, the government gave the following 
figures: 
"1980 budget expenditure on ESA and 
national civil space programmes - that is 
excluding PTT and military programmes 
for which only United Kingdom figures 
are available - was: 
£ million 
United Kingdom 61 
France 224 
West Germany 162 
Italy 61 
Additional budgeted United Kingdom 
expenditure on PTT and military pro-
grammes for 1980 was £28 million. No 
information is available on the level of 
expenditure by the private sector." 
Recommendation 399 on the assessment of 
advanced technology in Japan, adopted on 
29th November 1983 
65. Inter alia, this recommendation proposed 
the appointment of a permanent ESA represen-
tative in Japan. 
66. While the Council refrained from adopt-
ing a clear position, various governments 
expressed opinions in their answers to questions 
put by representatives. Whereas the French, 
German and Netherlands Governments all 
declared in February and April 1984 that such 
an appointment was not essential for the time 
being, the Luxembourg Government merely 
indicated in its answer of 7th March 1984 that 
it was not a member of ESA and therefore 
could not intervene. 
Recommendation 410 on the military use of 
space, adopted on 21st June 1984 
67. Since this recommendation was adopted 
only this summer, your Rapporteur has so far 
been notified of only one question in parliament, 
put by Mr. Frasca to the Italian Government 
on 24th July 1984, in which he laid special 
stress on the fact that member governments 
were urged to do all in their power to secure 
negotiations between the superpowers so as to 
prevent the military use of space and called for 
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a larger European industrial involvement in 
alliance satellite programmes. 
68. The Italian Government's position is not 
yet known. 
69. Without referring explicitly to Recom-
mendation 410, Mr. Noir, speaking in the 
National Assembly on 2nd July 1984, took up 
parts of paragraph 8 when he asked the French 
Government about plans for European countries 
to participate in building an American manned 
space station. 
70. On 24th September 1984, the French 
Government answered as follows: 
"The American offer of participation in 
the manned space station was made to 
the Europeans, Canadians and Japanese 
in January 1984 in President Reagan's 
speech on the state of the union. Since 
then, the European states have been 
examining their answer to this proposal 
in the framework of the European Space 
Agency. Germany and Italy are the two 
countries the most interested in the offer, 
which might succeed the Spacelab pro-
gramme. Studies, still at a preliminary 
stage, led to the Columbus programme 
for an accommodation module, an auto-
matic platform and service modules. 
These elements would be attached to the 
American station and in the early stages 
transported by the shuttle. However, 
France has ensured that compatibility 
with future European launching vehicles 
should be included in the specifications 
for the project. Discussions between the 
European partners advanced significantly 
on 28th June with the Council of the 
European Space Agency's adoption of a 
resolution expressing the will of member 
states in the long term to have an 
independent manned system and to this 
end to start the Columbus programme 
within the Agency. Ways of carrying out 
this programme and of sharing the 
financial burden will be worked out 
shortly. Furthermore, a working group 
has just been set up to prepare a meeting 
of the Council of the European Space 
Agency at ministerial level, which might 
be held at the end of 1984 or the very 
beginning of 1985. The main purpose of 
this exceptional meeting will be to prepare 
an answer to the American offer within 
the overall prospects of space develop-
ments to be defined by Europe for the 
next ten years. NASA has also introduced 
procedure for consultations which should 
be continued throughout the detailed 
study stage. France is taking part in these 
consultations, together with Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Japan and the European Space Agency." 
V. To sum up 
71. In accordance with Rule 42 bis of the 
Rules of Procedure, a task of the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments is to make all 
necessary arrangements for drawing the atten-
tion of parliaments to the work of the Assembly 
and inviting them to follow up this work. One 
of the committee's options is to select from 
among the texts adopted by the Assembly those 
which in its opinion should be debated in 
parliaments. 
72. In regard to space, the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments simply selected 
Recommendation 328 in November 1978 for it 
to be debated in parliaments. However, this 
does not mean no action must be taken on the 
other recommendations, for the general rule 
laid down in Rule 40.2 of the Rules of 
Procedure stipulates that all committees shall 
examine the action taken on recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly. 
73. The greatest response was to Recommen-
dation 328 since questions were put in six 
parliaments. Recommendation 326 also 
achieved a good score, with several questions 
put in four parliaments. The results obtained by 
other recommendations were far more meagre: 
- 353: three questions in two parliaments; 
- 354: two questions in one parliament; 
- 369: four questions in three parlia-
ments, 
- 399: three questions in three parlia-
ments, 
- 410: one question in one parliament. 
74. Without claiming to be exhaustive, a 
total of twenty-eight questions or interventions 
relating to the seven recommendations examined 
were therefore recorded which is in point of 
fact not a very good result. Moreover, in view 
of the fall in the number of interventions and 
questions in 1983, the committee should again 
consider how to intensify and improve co-
ordination of activities in parliaments. 
75. In this connection, it is worth recalling 
that in earlier reports (e.g. Mr. Stoffelen's 
reports in June and November 1982) proposals 
were made on procedure for selecting recom-
mendations for examination in national parlia-
ments. For instance, it was suggested that 
closer examination should be given in committee 
to the choice of recommendations and a joint 
tactic agreed upon for use in parliaments. While 
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endorsing these proposals, your Rapporteur 
wishes to add the following. 
76. Although the Assembly adopts its recom-
mendations only at plenary sessions, the Office 
of the Clerk should be instructed to propose to 
the committee a choice of texts well before they 
are adopted so that the committee might discuss 
them in the course of the session. Draft 
questions to be put in parliaments might also 
be prepared for examination at this stage too. 
In substance, priority should be given to 
recommendations which are particularly contro-
versial at national level since a contribution 
might thus be made to accelerating the process 
of clarification and decision within the different 
countries. 
77. Before tackling the basic conclusions, 
your Raporteur wishes to add a summary of 
other debates on space questions in the various 
parliaments. 
VI. Other parliamentary debates on space questions 
78. Apart from WEU initiatives, space ques-
tions arouse considerable interest in parliaments 
since, having consulted the data banks in the 
various national parliaments, your Rapporteur 
has recorded, without claiming to be exhaustive, 
more than seventy questions and interventions. 
In some cases, only the last two years have 
been taken into account. 
1. Belgium 
(a) ES4 
79. In annual budget debates in Belgium, 
space research and technology and, in particu-
lar, Belgium's contribution to ESA programmes 
are discussed in detail each year. For instance, 
the Secretary of State for Scientific Policy said 
in the Senate on 18th July 1979: 
"The European Space Agency has how-
ever reached a new stage in its develop-
ment. There is a clear trend towards 
national initiatives. Redefinition of ESA's 
role and long-term reflection on this 
matter have become necessary." 
80. During the debate in the Senate on 1 Ofh 
May 1984, a member asked whether it was 
possible, and to what extent, to compel private 
industry to return to the state in one way or 
another the subsidies it had been granted for 
participating in European space research. In its 
statement, the government underlined that 
public investment was the basic contribution 
needed to allow industries to reach an adequate 
threshold of competitivity at international level. 
If industry were asked to make a direct 
reimbursement, the increase in costs would 
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make it less competitive in other space projects 
(e.g. the American space shuttle). However, 
some supervision of investment was always 
possible. 
81. On 22nd May 1984, several senators also 
raised the question of Belgium's contribution to 
ESA programmes. The minister concerned 
(Minister of the Budget, Scientific Policy and 
Planning) made a detailed statement on this 
occasion, specifying inter alia that after the 
successes of recent years a turning point had 
been reached. Programmes for the next ten or 
fifteen years now had to be defined. The 
question of the space station raised problems 
since it was a major programme and other 
programmes which seemed to follow logically 
from what ESA had done so far could not be 
changed. 
82. Moreover, the minister specified that a 
joint European answer would be given to the 
American offer of participation in the manned 
station and there would be no bilateral 
agreements with the United States. 
83. This last point meets one of the requests 
made in Recommendation 410. 
84. Questions on ESA were also put by 
parliamentarians on 23rd July 1980, 13th 
September 1982 and 26th January 1983. 
(b) Use of satellites for military purposes 
85. On 30th April 1981, answering a question 
put by Mr. Radoux in the Senate on possible 
action to be taken to complete the treaty 
banning the use of space for military purposes, 
the Belgian Government said: 
"The question put by Mr. Radoux on a 
possible Belgian initiative to complete the 
treaty banning the use of satellites for 
military purposes calls for the following 
remarks on my part. 
First, I wish to specify that the treaty 
referred to by the honourable member 
does not strictly speaking ban the use of 
satellites for military purposes. 
Indeed, the treaty on principles governing 
the activities of states in the exploration 
and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies of 27th 
January 1967, which is the fundamental 
law in this connection, does not ban all 
military activity in outer space 
What is expressly banned is laid down in 
Article IV of the treaty, which I quote: 
'States parties to the treaty undertake 
not to place in orbit around the earth 
any objects carrying nuclear weapons 
or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
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destruction, install such weapons on 
celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any ocher 
manner. 
The moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be used by all states parties to 
the treaty exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. The establishment of mili-
tary bases, installations and fortifica-
tions, the testing of any type of 
weapons and the conduct of military 
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall 
be forbidden. The use of military 
personnel for scientific research or for 
any other peaceful purposes shall not 
be prohibited. The use of any equip-
ment or facility necessary for peaceful 
exploration of the moon and other 
celestial bodies shall also not be 
prohibited.' 
Thus, several satellites have already been 
placed in orbit to accomplish certain 
military objectives which have no hostile 
purpose. I am thinking here of military 
communications satellites or control and 
surveillance satellites. 
Use of these satellites in no way contra-
dicts the treaty provisions and is in my 
opinion perfectly acceptable or even 
necessary at the present stage of technol-
ogy. 
Certain newspapers have reported on the 
existence of so-called anti-satellite or 
destructive satellites. Although this has 
not been officially proved, it is clear that 
the use of such a device, carrying 
destructive weapons or having non-peace-
ful aims, would be in contradiction with 
the spirit of the treaty. 
I therefore think it inexpedient for 
Belgium to take the initiative of urging 
completion of the treaty on the explora-
tion and use of outer space to cover all 
space vehicles and devices with the aim 
of banning their use for military purposes. 
This might give the impression that we 
doubt the sincerity of the space states 
parties to the treaty as regards their loyal 
application of the relevant provisions of 
the treaty or that we consider they are 
not respecting the spirit of the treaty in 
their space activities. 
The Belgian Government will naturally 
follow attentively, together with its Euro-
pean partners, all future developments in 
this complex problem of the peaceful use 
of outer space.'' 
2. Federal Republic of Germany 
86. In the Bundestag, debates held in the last 
few years may be grouped as follows. 
(a) General definition of space policy 
87. On 30th March 1982, the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group tabled a motion for a 
resolution on space policy which was debated in 
depth in plenary sitting of the Bundestag on 
16th June 1982. This motion urged the then 
Federal Government to work out a long-term 
space programme with accent on the contribu-
tion of the Federal Republic of Germany to the 
solution of certain problems which might arise 
in the future and guaranteeing that the Federal 
Republic might assume its due responsibilities 
in the future in consideration of its major 
scientific and technological potential. 
88. The motion referred to the peaceful use 
of space. During the debate in the Bundestag, 
everyone conceded that in the Federal Republic 
the military space sector was not encouraged 
and that space research was directed exclusively 
towards peaceful uses. 
89. It should be pointed out that in the 
various speeches on this motion nearly all 
general and specific problems and nearly all 
national and European programmes were men-
tioned, but at no point did speakers make the 
slightest reference to the relevant activities and 
recommendations of WEU or the Council of 
Europe. No account was taken of either of these 
organisations in the debates. 
90. Answering a question put by Mr. Warri-
koff on the definition of its space policy, the 
Federal Government stated on 23rd August 
1983: 
"The aim of the Federal Government's 
space policy is: to encourage basic 
research; to contribute to the development 
of space technology whose results will 
allow innovations to be introduced into 
the economy and administration; to 
strengthen the competitivity of the space 
industry; to encourage international co-
operation; to assist third world countries. 
The main points of the space programme 
are: the pursuit of extraterrestrial 
research, particularly the exploration of 
our solar system, astronomy and astro-
physics, as well as biology and medicine 
in space; the acquisition of new knowledge 
through research into observation of the 
earth, the soil, the atmosphere, oceans 
and the ice-covered areas of the world. 
Fields of application include mapping of 
unexplored areas, prospecting for mineral 
deposits, keeping a watch on the environ-
ment, studying the climate and forecast-
99 
DOCUMENT 991 
ing earthquakes; passage from the Euro-
pean experimental meteorological satellite 
programme, Meteosat, to the European 
operational meteorological satellite sys-
tem, Eumetsat; the development of tele-
vision satellites (TV -Sat) and communi-
cations satellites until they have a proven 
application capability. The introduction 
of commercial systems by users: the 
European postal authorities' ECS com-
munications satellite system and the 
proposed national communications satel-
lite for the German postal authorities; the 
implementation of an exploratory stage 
during which space will be used as a 
laboratory for testing materials and 
techniques used in medicine and biology, 
with the assistance of the manned space 
laboratory and recoverable platforms; the 
study of possible European participation 
in the construction of a future American 
space station. European contributions 
which might be integrated in this orbital 
system are platforms and space laborator-
ies which Europe is developing also for its 
own requirements; the improvement of 
European launcher technology for relia-
bility, performance and cost." 
(b) German participation in ES4 programmes 
and the development of European astron-
autics 
91. Answering a question put by Mr. Warri-
koff, the Federal Government made the follow-
ing statement on 23rd August 1983: 
"Participation in European Space Agency 
programmes is included in the German 
space programme. More than half the 
sums allocated to space research and 
technology by the Ministry of Research 
and Technology are taken up by the 
contribution to ESA; in addition, scientific 
experiments are prepared for ESA space 
missions. The fact that the seat of the 
European Space Operations Centre 
(ESOC) is in the Federal Republic of 
Germany is tangible proof of the import-
ance of our participation in the Agency. 
With a budget of more than DM 1,600 
million, ESA is the largest European 
organisation for research and technology. 
With its successful satellite and launcher 
programmes and the Spacelab pro-
gramme, ESA has won itself a leading 
place after the major space powers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
ESA is above all an organisation for 
research and development. 
Its most important programme is the 
scientific one. However, Germany con-
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siders it should be further strengthened 
in the long term. 
An earth observadon programme is being 
implemented. An ocean surface observa-
tion satellite is now being studied whose 
development would be passed to a 
German firm as prime contractor. It 
should be followed by other satellites for 
the observation of non-submerged land 
masses. Germany hopes to exploit the 
climatological possibilities thus offered. 
ESA also encourages the development of 
space technology. Unlike the two pro-
grammes mentioned above, experimental 
application programmes can be under-
taken in principle only at the request and 
according to the requirements of future 
users and once the operational stage has 
been reached they have to be placed 
progressively under the responsibility of 
the latter. Implementation of purely 
commercial programmes reverts solely to 
industry. 
However, at the request of third parties, 
ESA may also carry out work for 
payment, e.g. the acquisition of a new 
Spacelab by NASA and three improved 
versions of the Meteosat satellite, includ-
ing launchings made by Ariane on behalf 
of the future European meteorological 
commercial services organisation, Eumet-
sat. In this context, too, should be 
included the rdle of ESA in developing 
the first European operational communi-
cations system, ECS, which is managed 
by the European postal authorities, 
through their commercial organisation, 
Eutelsat, and which remains closely 
linked with the ESA development pro-
gramme which preceded it. 
The experimental satellite L-Sat is in an 
ambiguous position. While certain mem-
ber states still consider it solely as a 
development project, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and France consider it has 
already reached 8 suitable technical level 
for early conside1~tion to be given to the 
commercial use of such systems by the 
authorities concerned. 
ESA played a vital rdle in developing 
Europe's own launching system. In the 
meantime, the Ariane launcher has passed 
its qualifying tests and the Arianespace 
European industrial consortium has been 
set up to produce and market it. ESA is 
nevertheless continuing to try to improve 
Ariane's performance. For what are now 
current practical and commercial appli-
cations, a European launcher above all 
guarantees Europe's independence, poss-
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ibly in competition with the United 
States. 
Finally, ESA, with substantial backing 
from the Federal Government and under 
the direction of German industry, has 
developed the European space laboratory, 
Spacelab, which is an integral part of the 
new NASA space transportation system. 
The first flight is planned for the end of 
October. Continuing along the course it 
followed in developing the space shuttle 
and Spacelab, Germany is particularly 
interested in the development in Europe 
of retrievable platforms and the subse-
quent appropriate development of Space-
lab. The pursuit of European co-operation 
with the United States in basic research 
and technologically-oriented space activi-
ties will in this respect be of primordial 
importance, mainly with a view to the 
construction of a manned space station in 
transatlantic co-operation." 
92. On 24th August 1984, a group of SPD 
members of parliament tabled a motion for a 
resolution in the Bundestag on the development 
of European astronautics, expressing the fear 
that its hitherto solely peaceful applications 
might become increasingly associated with 
military research and development. Its authors 
considered that all European space nations 
should oppose this trend and in future undertake 
to carry out research and applications for 
peaceful purposes only. A request should also 
be made in NATO for the conclusion of a 
global, binding international agreement banning 
the military use of space. 
93. Inter alia, this motion for a resolution 
invites the Federal Government to negotiate 
with the United States Government - in 
agreement with the principal European space 
nations - for European participation in a 
manned space station to be on the sole condition 
that it be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, 
and that this be verifiable. 
94. The motion for a resolution deals with a 
matter which was examined in great detail in 
our Assembly's Recommendation 410 on the 
military use of space, but it is highly doubtful 
that account was taken of the recommendation's 
proposals when the motion was drafted. 
95. A question put by the Die Giiinen Group 
on 1Oth August 1984 tackles a similar matter 
and asks the Federal Government: 
- what stage has been reached in regard 
to participation in a European space 
station further to President Mitter-
rand's proposal; 
- for its opinion on the European space 
community proposed as a "response to 
the military realities of tomorrow"; 
- what is the position with regard to 
participation in a joint observation 
satellite system agreed upon at the 
European summit meeting in Ram-
bouillet and also intended for the 
French strike force; 
- what financial support is granted to the 
European space institutions, including 
WEU working groups, and what con-
tacts there are with NASA. 
(c) Bilateral co-operation 
96. The main topics tackled are as follows. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the Franco-German 
agreement of 29th April 1980 on industrial co-
operation and the launching of the TV-Sat 
television satellite were the subject of at least 
eight questions by parliamentarians, including 
a question by the SPD and FDP parliamentary 
groups of 7th September 1981. Most recently, 
on 14th March 1984 the Federal Government 
announced that the direct television satellite 
(TV-Sat) was being built in connection with 
the proposed Franco-German satellite and that 
it was to be launched by Ariane in the second 
half of 1985. 
97. In this connection it should be noted that 
Recommendation 354 of the WEU Assembly 
laid strong emphasis on the need for close co-
ordination between the Franco-German project 
and ESA's L-Sat programme. This matter was 
mentioned in the Bundestag by only one 
member of parliament, in July 1980. 
98. On President Mitterrand's proposal to 
build a space station for joint use, the Federal 
Government said on 12th June 1984, in answer 
to a question put by Mr. Reents, that the 
Franco-German dialogue was only just starting 
and that experts from the two countries were 
holding preliminary talks on the subject; it was 
not yet possible to indicate the outcome of these 
discussions. 
99. In April 1982, Mr. Steger put a question 
in the Bundestag on the state of bilateral co-
operation with the United States. On 26th 
August 1983, the Federal Government answered 
a question put by Mr. Bugl on the scientific 
and technical co-operation agreement now in 
force between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United States. 
100. On 4th June 1983, the Federal Govern-
ment answered a question put by the SPD 
parliamentary group on launcher technology 
co-operation with Brazil. 
(d) The possibility of radio and television 
broadcasts by indirect broadcast satellites 
101. On 29th October 1981, answering ques-
tions put by four members of parliament, the 
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Federal Government said it was not aware that 
other countries were using so-called indirect 
broadcast satellites for the direct reception of 
radio programmes by the public. Only the 
European orbital test satellite (OTS) was being 
used experimentally for the point-to-point 
broadcasting of television programmes between 
France and Tunisia and between the United 
Kingdom and Malta. In the Netherlands, these 
programmes were being intercepted and distri-
buted without authorisation. Under interna-
tional regulations, the OTS could not be used 
for direct broadcasting. 
102. Because of its importance for the Euro-
pean media, this subject might also be studied 
in a European framework. 
(e) Other questions 
103. In 1981 and 1982, the Federal Govern-
ment also answered various questions on the 
construction of a national communications 
satellite and on the development in Europe of 
meteorological and remote-sensing satellites. 
104. At the beginning of August 1984, the 
press reported that the Federal Government 
intended to submit a long-term space pro-
gramme in the autumn. 
3. France 
105. The following questions seem to have 
been to the forefront recently. 
(a) France's general space policy 
106. In the National Assembly, Mr. Debre 
addressed the government several times. Thus, 
on 2nd December 1983, he invited it to make 
a statement in the National Assembly. After 
asking whether the government was determined 
to maintain and pursue France's space policy, 
he let it be understood that the present 
government was not active enough in this area. 
He then put five questions, i.e.: 
- whether the Ariane 5 programme 
would be pursued, whether there was 
European co-operation in this matter 
and what was the planned timetable; 
- whether the government was consider-
ing an independently-launched manned 
flight; 
- what stage had been reached in the 
various satellite programmes; 
- what progress had been made with the 
military observation and communica-
tion satellite essential for the deterrent 
force; 
- what stage had been reached in 
research programmes on electronic 
DOCUMENT 991 
material and components for observa-
tion satellites. 
107. The Secretary of State concerned empha-
sised in his answer that the broad lines of space 
policy had been laid down on 15th October 
1981: 
- consolidation of the French position in 
the principal fields of application: 
communications, television and earth 
observation; 
- development of a space industry in 
order to increase penetration of the 
international market for launchers, 
satellites and ground stations; 
- strengthening basic technological 
research; 
- participation in the world scientific 
research effort in sectors likely to lead 
to new applications; 
- firm programmes: implementation of 
Ariane 4, placing in orbit of the second 
Spot observation satellite, creation of 
the Spot-Image commercial firm and 
participation in the Spacelab pro-
gramme. 
108. This last point caused keen controversy. 
109. Finally, on 28th May 1984 Mr. Debre 
asked the government whether it was prepared 
to hold a debate on civil and military space 
policy. The French Government has not yet 
answered. 
110. On 2nd April 1984, the French Govern-
ment answered a question put by Mr. Debre on 
19th December 1983 as follows: 
"Space programmes continue to be among 
the government's main priorities ... (The 
government has proposed to its ESA 
partners) that in 1984 they start prepa-
ratory studies for a high-thrust engine, 
the HM-60, and a new-generation 
launcher, Ariane 5. It has also been 
decided to participate in the European 
radar observation satellite, ERS-1, which 
will allow a programme of research on 
oceanography and the climate to be 
implemented." 
(b) Co-ordination of national and European 
programmes in ESA 
111. Several members of parliament have 
shown their interest in these matters in 
questions put to their governments in the last 
two years. 
112. On 2nd July 1984, Mr. Noir, after 
recalling that the ESA programme, launched 
about ten years ago, was almost completed, 
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asked for the government's views on ESA's 
future tasks and what priorities it was consider-
ing proposing to its partners. 
113. The government has not yet answered. 
(c) Definition of international regulations for 
satellites in orbit 
114. Among the many questions put in the 
National Assembly, mention should be made of 
one by Mr. Miossec on 25th July 1983. He 
asked what prospects the American space 
shuttle could offer Ariane. He also asked 
whether France intended to play an active part 
in the definition of international regulations for 
satellites in orbit. 
115. The government adopted the following 
position on this latter point: 
"In view of the specific nature of satellites, 
international regulations on their move-
ments such as apply to aircraft are out of 
the question. However, there is a series of 
international regulations relating to the 
status of and activities in space. Most of 
these regulations are contained in several 
international conventions worked out in 
the committee on the peaceful uses of 
outer space, a subsidiary body of the 
United Nations General Assembly. These 
texts govern a system of freedom to 
explore and use space, subject to the 
principle of non-appropriation and the 
possible commitment of the launching 
state's international responsibility whether 
it is acting on its own behalf or through 
the intermediary of other public or private 
bodies. In addition to these principal legal 
instruments, there are the provisions 
worked out by the International Telecom-
munications Union, which are included in 
the periodically-revised radiocommunica-
tions regulations. Moreover, at present 
the question of using the orbit of 
geostationary satellites, as for earth 
observation, space-mapping or the use of 
nuclear energy sources, are being dis-
cussed in the United Nations space 
committee. The results of these negotia-
tions, which have been continuing for 
several years, will apparently not be 
known for a long time. France is doing its 
utmost to facilitate an outcome to these 
very difficult discussions, as it did in the 
framework of the negotiations on the five 
conventions." 
116. The definition of international space 
regulations might open new areas of activity for 
WEU. 
(d) Bilateral co-operation in television satel-
lites 
117. On 30th May 1984, a debate was held in 
the National Assembly on the Luxembourg 
decision to place a television satellite in orbit 
with American participation and not with its 
French partners as initially planned. 
(e) Military satellites 
118. On 6th February 1984, in answer to 
various questions, the French Government said 
that the programme for 1984-88 provided for 
the possibility of carrying out studies on an 
observation satellite for specifically military 
purposes. 
119. On 23rd April 1984, the government gave 
further details, as follows: 
"At a press conference in The Hague, the 
President of the Republic recently under-
lined the importance of the conquest of 
space for France's security, thus confirm-
ing the military value of satellites. Apart 
from a communications capability with 
the civil satellite Telecom l as from 1984 
and the possibility of using the images 
from a second civil satellite which it is 
planned to launch in 1985, if France is to 
remain in space in the long term this will 
require studies on countermeasures and 
on the various types of attack to which 
satellites might be subject. The research 
provided for in the 1984-88 programme 
law will thus lead to very complex 
developments which do not allow a 
detailed timetable to be drawn up for the 
time being." 
(fl President Mitterrand's proposal for a 
European space community 
120. On 23rd April 1984, Mr. Couste put two 
questions on this subject to the government to 
which no answer has yet been given. 
4. United Kingdom 
(a) ESA 
121. In many cases, it is mainly the financial 
aspects that have been of concern to those 
putting questions. 
122. Answering a question put by Mr. Atkin-
son on 29th June 1981, the government said 
the United Kingdom's contribution to ESA was 
16.7%, France's 28.8%, the Federal Republic's 
25.9% and Italy's 11.7%. 
123. In 1982, Mr. Wrigglesworth and Lord 
Ironside also asked about ESA's budget and 
the size of the United Kingdom's contribution. 
124. On 14th March 1984, a member of 
parliament asked how much the government 
had spent on the British space programme in 
the last four years and whether the government 
intended to increase this budget in 1983-84. 
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125. On 12th July 1982, Mr. Atkinson asked 
why the ESA Council of Ministers met so 
infrequently. He also put a question on the 
success of the American space shuttle pro-
gramme, underlining the need for co-operation 
between the members of ESA instead of 
independent national initiatives. 
126. On 16th May 1982, a question was put 
on the progress of discussions in ESA on the 
development of earth observation satellites. 
(b) British space industry 
127. Here too financial considerations were of 
importance, particularly in two questions put 
by Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Wilkinson on 7th 
December 1981. 
128. An early day motion dated 2nd April 
1984, considering the government's minimal 
commitment to space technology and the British 
industry compared with France and Germany, 
urged the creation of an organisation equivalent 
to NASA or ESA to ensure that the United 
Kingdom plays a leading role in space projects 
and to develop this industry for peaceful 
purposes. 
(c) Military space questions 
129. Answering various questions about a 
British military satellite, the government said 
on 5th April 1984: 
"Strategic and tactical communications 
will be provided by two Skynet 4 military 
satellites. These are being procured from 
the British Aerospace dynamics group in 
association with its principal subcontrac-
tor Marconi Space and Defence Systems 
Ltd. It is intended they will be launched 
into geostationary orbit by the United 
States space transportation system - the 
shuttle. 
All operational major warships are to be 
fitted with military satellite communica-
tion terminals by the end of the decade." 
130. On Anglo-American co-operation in space 
defence, on lOth April1984 Mr. Atkinson asked 
in the House of Commons what consultations 
the government had had with the United States 
Government on space defence systems. The 
ensuing debate was as follows: 
"Mr. HESELTINE (Secretary of State for 
Defence). - I enjoy satisfactory and 
frequent consultations with Mr. Weinber-
ger on all matters of common defence 
interest, including space. 
Mr. ATKINSON.-Given Britain's know-
ledge and expertise in satellite technology, 
is there not here an opportunity for 
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the closest possible collaboration with the 
United States on anti-satellite and anti-
missile technology from the point of view 
of space defence systems? 
Mr. HESELTINE. - My hon. Friend will 
appreciate that our speciality is much 
more in communication satellites than in 
any other activity. It is important to 
remember that at this stage the Ameri-
cans are considering a very long-term 
research programme. It is, therefore, 
much too early to anticipate any possible 
developments that could come at a later 
stage. 
Mr. STRANG. - Do the British Govern-
ment support President Reagan's decision 
to develop the capability to fight a nuclear 
war in space? 
Mr. HESELTINE. - The President is 
considering the possibilities of ensuring 
that there are no threats to the United 
States or to its allies from space develop-
ments. It is a long-term research project, 
and it is understandable, given the 
capability of the Soviet Union, that he 
should undertake such a research consi-
deration. 
Mr. MARSHALL.- Whatever consultations 
may proceed with the United States, 
particularly in the context of NASA and 
perhaps in relation to civil applications 
spreading to military use, may I ask my 
right hon. Friend whether he agrees that 
the European option might also be 
explored because we may want to consider 
a situation which is simply not left to the 
Russians and the Americans? 
Mr. HESELTINE. - My hon. Friend is as 
aware as I am of the history of European 
collaboration on space projects. I believe 
that there is an argument for continuing 
to keep in close touch on these matters 
through the European Space Agency. 
Mr. McNAMARA.- Rather than supporting 
the United States President's policy of 
research into space systems, should not 
Her Majesty's Government be urging the 
United States to have discussions with 
the Soviet Union to prevent a further 
escalation of the arms race in space? 
Mr. HESELTINE.- The hon. Gentleman is 
as aware as I am that the United States 
is pursuing the opportunities for arms 
control in a whole range of forums, and 
we support that. But in this instance, 
where it is considering a research pro-
gramme, it has made it clear that at this 
stage it does not see any means of 
verification." 
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131. On 22nd March 1984, the House of 
Lords held a debate on the compatibility 
between American proposals for an anti-ballistic 
missile defence system in space and the 
provisions of the ABM treaty concluded between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in 
1972. 
132. On satellite verification methods, Mr. 
Thomas put the following question on 20th 
February 1984: 
"Mr. THOMAS asked the Secretary of 
State for Defence if satellite verification 
methods adopted in the strategic arms 
limitation talks treaty can be effectively 
used to verify the deployment of sea-
launched cruise missiles; and if he will 
make a statement. 
Mr. STANLEY. - All forms of shipborne 
nuclear missiles, whether ballistic or 
cruise, present distinctive requirements in 
terms of their verification. The United 
States Government are ready to look 
where necessary for means of verification 
extending beyond the national technical 
means used to verify SALT agreements." 
5. Luxembourg 
133. Although Luxembourg is not a member 
of ESA, a lively debate was held in the 
Luxembourg Parliament on space questions, as 
mentioned in Chapter IV. Furthermore, the 
question of broadcasting radio and television 
programmes by satellite is arousing intense 
discussion. 
134. In particular, Luxembourg's choice of an 
American television satellite played a large part 
in these discussions. On 29th May 1984, Mr. 
Werner, Prime Minister, made a statement on 
this matter on behalf of the government 
followed by a detailed debate. 
6. Netherlands 
135. Similarly, Netherlands members of par-
liament put many questions, particularly about 
television satellites. European space co-operation 
has been referred to in statements and various 
memoranda addressed by the government to the 
Chamber, and in reports of debates. 
VII. Conclusions 
136. A quantitative analysis of Chapter IV 
shows that about twenty-five questions or 
interventions were directly or indirectly related 
to WEU Assembly recommendations. In addi-
tion, with the assistance of the staff of national 
parliaments, your Rapporteur obtained a list of 
more than seventy other questions or interven-
tions dealing with space technology, a selection 
of which is given in Chapter VI. 
137. It emerges from a general comparison of 
Chapters IV and VI that simultaneous debates 
were held in several parliaments on more or 
less identical subjects. The basic discussion, at 
least in countries with an active space policy, 
seems to have had no visible connection with 
relevant action taken by the WEU Assembly 
and its work was not discussed. This was 
particularly clear in parliamentary debates in 
France, the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, where space problems 
were considered and dealt with mainly as 
national policy matters. Only very few of the 
members of parliament who took part in these 
debates were members of a European assembly 
and they do not seem to have been aware of or 
to have used the many recommendations of the 
WEU or Council of Europe Assemblies. This is 
true of most government statements. 
138. There are various reasons for this. At the 
time, the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments had chosen only Recommendation 328 
on meteorological satellites as a matter for 
debates in national parliaments. This question 
was therefore followed up on quite a broad 
front in six parliaments. The action taken on 
other recommendations at national level depen-
ded more or less on the interest and personal 
initiative of members of parliament. 
139. In view of the absence of co-ordination, 
it is not surprising that only isolated questions 
were put in a few parliaments. Since their 
content varied considerably, it is impossible to 
classify them by subject. This is also due to the 
fact that recommendations adopted by the 
Assembly in the last five years have sometimes 
been on general space questions and sometimes 
on very specific issues. The Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments therefore recom-
mends that the Assembly set very clear 
priorities. It might even draw up a list of 
priorities. The present report might be helpful 
in this respect by initiating a discussion on the 
matter. 
140. Apart from requests for a long-term space 
programme (Recommendations 326, 353 and 
369), specific proposals relating to various 
application satellites were made on the co-
ordination of national and European satellite 
programmes, the development of Spacelab and 
the Ariane programme and the appointment of 
an ESA representative in Japan. 
141. The general problem of the military use 
of space was tackled in Recommendation 410, 
adopted this summer. The matters it dealt with 
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will remain highly topical for a long time to 
come. 
142. Several times representatives have put 
questions on ESA medium- and long-term plans 
and on the adoption of its budget. There were 
questions on the co-ordination of European and 
national satellite programmes, European coun-
tries' expenditure on the space industry and the 
problem of security measures for nuclear 
satellites. Several members of parliament were 
interested in the proposal to appoint an ESA 
representative in Japan. 
143. Because of the particularly topical nature 
of the question, it is instructive to study more 
closely statements made on the military aspects 
of space technology (e.g. Recommendations 
328, 369 and 410). 
144. Statements by the Council and govern-
ments are far from being as clear and 
harmonised as they should be. 
145. With regard to military meteorological 
satellites, the Council expressed doubt in its 
reply to Recommendation 328 about the 
usefulness of such satellites in addition to civil 
meteorological satellites. 
146. The Federal Government on the contrary 
believed that in the event of hostilities it was to 
be expected that data supplied by present civil 
satellites would be very limited. The French 
Government emphasised that satellites launched 
by ESA could be used for peaceful purposes 
only. The Italian Government was generally 
speaking in favour of a system of military 
meteorological satellites, provided the technical 
and financial aspects were settled first. Conver-
sely, the United Kingdom Government consi-
dered that the use of present meteorological 
satellites for military purposes was adequate. 
147. Government answers to the question of 
promoting European military satellites (Recom-
mendation 369) were just as divided. While the 
Council did not refer to the matter in its reply, 
the Belgian Government said that in general it 
took part in research, development and appli-
cations undertaken by the alliance in this field. 
The United Kingdom Government referred to 
co-ordination in NATO. The French Govern-
ment said it did not belong to the NATO 
military structure and was therefore merely an 
observer in this framework. Moreover, it 
recalled the various national programmes, 
underlining that it endeavoured, in the United 
Nations committee concerned, to participate in 
initiatives to prevent the use of space for 
military purposes. It considered that present 
research related solely to communications 
satellites of a non-offensive type. 
148. Recommendation 410, adopted this sum-
mer, covered all problems relating to the 
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military use of space, taking up in part earlier 
requests by the Assembly, e.g. for the construc-
tion of a satellite system for (defensive) military 
purposes. 
149. Debates in parliaments on military ques-
tions (see Chapter VI) independently of WEU 
recommendations give further indications of the 
trend of public opinion in Europe. It therefore 
seems even clearer that there is as yet no 
convergence between views and aims, which is 
moreover not surprising in view of the magni-
tude of the decisions to be taken. 
150. There is unanimity on one point only, i.e. 
that space must not be used for stationing 
offensive weapons systems. This idea was also 
expressed in Recommendation 410. However, 
there is still the question of the military use of 
space for defensive purposes. Here opinions 
obviously diverge considerably. 
151. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
SPD parliamentary group tabled a motion for 
a resolution in the Bundestag at the end of 
August 1984 calling for a worldwide ban on the 
military use of space (Recommendation 410 
was not mentioned in this resolution). 
152. With regard to the cancellation of WEU's 
last restrictions on the Federal Republic of 
Germany in conventional weaPQns, members of 
parliament - particularly Die Griinen - put 
various questions in the Bundestag on the 
consequences of military co-operation, and more 
especially with France. However the SPD 
motion and the intentions of Die Griinen have 
not yet been debated in the Bundestag. 
Consequently it is not yet possible to make a 
firm statement on the position of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
153. In France and the United Kingdom, on 
the other hand, there have been several requests 
to build national military observation and 
data-transmitting satellites. The French Govern-
ment announced that research would be 
conducted in this sense, while the United 
Kingdom Government has already made a firm 
declaration that two Skynet-type military relay 
satellites were planned. Bilateral co-operation 
with the United States on space defence was 
also prominent in debates in the United 
Kingdom. 
154. The examples we have just quoted show 
that there is still much to be done to achieve a 
joint European position in these matters. The 
debate has only just begun. WEU parliamen-
tarians must now therefore take the opportunity 
of joining in the national discussion and 
recalling that the WEU Assembly has already 
carried out detailed, well-documented prelimi-
nary work. 
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155. President Mitterrand's proposals for the 
creation of a European space community and 
those by the United States Government for 
Europe to participate in a manned space station 
have been referred to in only a few parliaments 
(e.g. Belgium, France and Germany) without 
governments yet adopting a definite position on 
these matters. This too would be a further 
opportunity for WEU representatives to take a 
more active part in debates by quoting 
Recommendation 410. 
156. Even in the case of purely civil aspects of 
space technology, it can be seen that in many 
parliaments the work of the European parlia-
mentary assemblies seems to have no influence 
on debates. Sometimes these debates may bring 
out ideas which might be studied at European 
level, for example: 
- in Belgium, a question raised was what 
became of state subsidies to industry 
for its participation in European space 
research; 
- in Germany, the possibility of radio 
and television broadcasts by indirect 
broadcast satellites was mentioned in 
the Bundestag several times; 
- in France, the question of working out 
international regulations for satellites 
in orbit was raised; 
- in France and Luxembourg, there were 
discussions in parliament on bilateral 
co-operation on television satellites, 
following which Luxembourg opted for 
an American system. 
157. In Chapter III.B your Rapporteur stressed 
that the Council of Europe also took a regular 
interest in European space questions. For work 
to be divided judiciously, it might be useful for 
WEU to transmit concrete suggestions to the 
Council of Europe or the European Community. 
* 
* * 
158. With regard to the report on the 
committee's activities (Section A), it is regret-
table that the number of interventions by WEU 
representatives should on the whole have 
diminished considerably between 1982 and 
1983. 
159. As for the proposals on improving our 
work mentioned in Chapter V, your Rapporteur 
considers that all earlier suggestions in this 
sense should be taken up again, completed and 
included in a further committee report. As a 
definite proposal, your Rapporteur suggests that 
the recommendations selected by the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments in December for 
transmission to national parliaments should 
include any texts adopted on space. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
Recommendations Federal 
adopted in Belgium France Republic Italy Luxem- Netherlands United Total 
of bourg Kingdom 
Germany 
1956 0 •••••••••• 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
1957 ........... 4 0 1 0 0 5 2 12 
1958 ••••••••• 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 4 3 12 
1959 •• 0. 0 ••• 0 •• 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 9 
1960 ••• 0 ••••••• 3 12 2 8 0 3 1 29 
1961 ••• 0 •• 0. 0 0. 0 2 0 3 0 6 0 11 
1962 • 0. 0. 0 ••••• 2 4 4 6 2 3 10 31 
1963 •• 0. 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 13 22 1 2 3 41 
1964 •••••••• 0 •• 4 14 9 11 1 5 2 46 
1965 ........ 0. 0. 0 11 12 24 0 5 28 80 
1966 0 0 •• 0 •••••• 2 12 12 49 1 4 18 98 
1967 •••••• 0 0 ••• 14 9 22 29 2 6 16 98 
1968 ........... 6 14 20 22 1 16 47 126 
1969 0 0. 0 ••••• 0. 11 15 17 8 0 4 36 91 
1970 •••••• 0 •• 0. 3 15 15 7 2 3 10 55 
1971 •••••• 0 0 ••• 0 4 19 9 0 6 10 48 
1972 ••••• 0. 0 ••• 0 6 2 1 0 1 0 10 
1973 0 •••••••••• 0 4 2 6 1 0 0 13 
1974 ........... 0 1 3 13 2 0 0 19 
1975 ........... 10 28 8 19 3 11 3 82 
1976 •• 0 ••• 0 •••• 16 40 13 14 2 3 8 96 
1977 ••••••• 0 0. 0 4 18 4 15 1 1 14 57 
1978 ••• 0 ••••••• 20 26 12 21 4 8 14 105 
1979 0 0 ••••••••• 16 15 16 10 12 1 4 74 
1980 •••• 0 0. 0 0 •• 0 34 24 15 14 0 10 97 
1981 •••••••• 0 0. 15 42 14 4 16 5 38 134 
1982 0 0 ••••••••• 0 25 11 6 2 6 13 63 
1983 0 0. 0 •••••• 0 9 8 8 3 1 2 2 33 
Total •• 0 •••••••• 141 159 278 325 68 110 292 1,573 
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Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1980 
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(i) Considering this report to be a follow-up of earlier reports on United States-European co-
operation in advanced technology and especially Documents 773 of May 1978 and 889 of October 
1981; 
(ii) Considering that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly on 7th April 1982 to 
Recommendation 376 stated that the WEU member governments were well aware of the need to 
contain equipment costs and that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is the 
central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and is actively engaged in 
identifying opportunities of this type; 
(iii) Aware that, in 1985, the United States will order the development of a new advanced tactical 
fighter aircraft and that five countries in Europe - plus the Netherlands which has applied to join 
- are co-operating in a new European fighter aircraft project with an estimated development cost of 
$4 billion; 
(iv) Considering American willingness to share its nuclear power plant experience with European 
countries· 
(v) Considering that the space station was one of the subjects on the agenda of the economic 
summit conference in London in June 1984 but that no endorsement of European collaboration in 
the United States space station was given; 
(vi) Considering that an international co-operative space station programme is in the interests of 
both the United States and Europe and would strengthen Atlantic ties considerably during the 
research and development phase as well as during the operational activities of the station; 
(vii) Conscious of the need to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many fields 
of high technology, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Inform the Assembly of the achievements of the Independent European Programme Group 
since 1978 in multinational European equipment co-operation, specifying which opportunities for 
savings in weapon supplies have been identified and which two-way street programmes with the 
United States have been concluded or might be concluded in the near future; 
11. Invite member governments: 
1. To submit a plan to the United States Government for discussion on how to collaborate in new 
military programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system platforms and under 
water weapon systems about to be developed so as to stop the spiral of ever-increasing costs within 
military budgets; 
2. To promote a common policy on the first space station project, taking into account the need 
for Europe to receive definite guarantees, such as: 
(a) information access to the entire space station system; 
(b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and 
manufacturing facilities on the space station; 
(c) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it; 
(d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station 
hardware; 
3. To foster a common European programme for exchanging information with the United States 
on future nuclear energy plants, drawing on individual up-to-date experience in Europe and the 
United States; 
4. To invite the United States and other governments to reconsider their attitude with regard to 
the draft convention on the law of the sea. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur is grateful to the 
committee for having appointed him again 
Rapporteur for this report on United States-
European co-operation in advanced technology. 
He believes that a certain continuity in this 
type of activity is of great importance and could 
be valuable for the committee as well as the 
Assembly. 
2. He wishes to start his report by expressing 
his appreciation and that of the committee to 
the staff of the United States Embassy in Paris, 
the Departments of Defence, State and Energy 
and NASA in Washington and to the eminent 
leaders of the aerospace industries the commit-
tee met during its visit from 9th to 22nd July 
1984. 
3. In preparing for this visit the committee 
had worked out a number of questions for use 
as guidelines in its discussions with the official 
authorities and industrial leaders. For the 
programme of the visit your Rapporteur refers 
you to Appendix I; for the list of questions to 
Appendix 11. 
11. General policy discussions 
Defence Department 
4. During briefings at the Pentagon on lOth 
July 1984, a certain number of policy questions 
were discussed. Mr. Lindstrom, Deputy 
Under-Secretary for International Programmes 
and Technology, drew the attention of the 
committee to the emerging technologies initia-
tive of the Pentagon. The new technologies are 
revolutionising the conventional battlefield and 
offer the alliance a vastly increased perform-
ance. NATO has now embarked on this 
initiative which, if supported politically, will 
enable it to introduce major conventional force 
improvements in this decade. 
5. All NATO governments agreed in general 
at the last meeting of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors to give priority 
to a list of conventional armaments systems 
earmarked for co-operative development and 
production. Further work is being undertaken 
by the conference to polish up this list and to 
start work on the introduction of these select 
force multiplying systems. Within the alliance, 
through the conference, the military agency for 
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standardisation, the NATO commonly funded 
programmes and the NATO Air Defence 
Committee, the United States Defence Depart-
ment will continue its efforts to achieve more 
alliance standardisation. 
6. One of the political questions resulting 
from the emerging technologies initiative is that 
of protecting these technologies which we must 
share from being transferred outside NATO 
countries. A United States objective is to reach 
agreement with its allies on which technologies 
should be especially protected on account of 
their military criticality and which are shared 
pursuant to co-operative armaments pro-
grammes. 
7. Furthermore, the United States has 
shared with its NATO allies in Europe the 
recently completed Defence Science Board 
study of industry-to-industry international 
armaments co-operation. This study made a 
number of important recommendations which 
should be implemented in the years to come. 
One of the board's key conclusions was that, 
while the basic structure for co-operation exists 
and many contacts between industries have 
been established, unambiguous American 
executive and congressional supporting policies 
and objectives are needed. 
8. The Independent European Programme 
Group is studying the Defence Science Board's 
report at the same time as the United States 
papers on emerging technologies and plans a 
collective response from the European arma-
ments directors. The common reply might 
reduce waste, duplication and inefficiency 
attendant on the separate efforts of the thirteen 
European nations. Such rationalisation would 
permit Europe to invest far more in defence 
procurement and reverse the downward trend 
in defence expenditure. 
9. New rules on exports of high technology 
products are to come into force in January 
1985. The most important of these!roducts are 
semi-conductors, computers an advanced 
machine-tool builders. The new guidelines are 
received favourably by NATO governments and 
by the business community. Moreover, govern-
ments and companies had warned that they 
might refuse to acknowledge the extra-territorial 
authority that was being asserted by the United 
States. Licence applications will be given out 
by the United States Department of Commerce 
but the Department of Defence has the 
authority to review these applications. While 
liberalising the regulations, the new proposals 
call for additional high technology products to 
be excluded from multiple licensing procedures. 
Current electronic eavesdropping equipment, 
aircraft replacement parts, crime s~ppressi.on 
equipment and some nuclear processmg equtp-
ment are barred from multiple licensing which 
means that every export order has to be 
individually approved. 
American-European collaboration 
10. The Under-Secretary of Defence for 
Research and Engineering, Dr. Richard D. 
DeLauer, also pointed to the findings and 
recommendations submitted by the Defence 
Science Board Task Force and the need to 
enhance direct industry-to-industry arms collab-
oration within the alliance. He said that from 
the moment he entered government four years 
ago he was disturbed about the .lac~ of co-
ordination among NATO countnes m arms 
production and research and development 
programmes which had led to a great deal of 
duplication. This was the more regrettable as 
alliance research spending exceeded that of the 
Warsaw Pact. Europe needs to make a greater 
investment in military technology to achieve a 
better balance and more effective technological 
partnership. This does not ~ean massive 
financial investment but rather mvestment of 
high quality in basic technologies applicable to 
military systems. Eventually we should be ab!e 
to think in terms of a two-way street m 
technology between the United States and its 
European allies which is based on balanced 
technological capabilites at an advanced level 
and which would provide the most powerful 
form of natural incentive for alliance-wide 
industry-to-industry co-operative initiatives. 
11. We should be aware that we had the 
same requirements and that these requirements 
might generate a useful job programme. Here 
we could learn some lessons from the Soviet 
Union which had attained a high degree of 
standardisation and of long-term planning 
covering every stage of a programme. Moreover, 
its materiel remained with the forces for a 
much longer time than in Europe. In NATO 
we also should think of, for instance, re-
engineering existing aircraft ~nstead of. build!ng 
new aircraft. We should thmk of remforcmg 
aircraft and missile shelters as this would 
strongly enhance the effectiveness of the defence 
effort in these fields. 
Technology and security 
12. Emerging technologies should. now be 
included in the weapons system whtch would 
become operational by the end of the decade 
and which could much improve the alliance's 
ability to withstand attack. 
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13. The Assistant Secretary for International 
Security Policy, Mr. Perle, spoke about the 
microelectronics which the Soviet Union was 
trying to introduce into its forces, acquired 
through copying them from the European and 
Japanese as well as American firms. The 
Department of Defence had established a 
technology security centre to focus .and co-
ordinate its export control process. Thts centre 
served as the focal point for co-ordination with 
industry, the armed services and other Depa~­
ment of Defence and governmental agenctes 
involved in case processing. 
14. A computerised information syst~m, 
called the foreign disclosure and techmcal 
information system, was a computer network 
and data base that included United States and 
Cocom1 export cases, technological data and 
other relevant information. The network linked 
the technology security centre with sim~lar 
functions in the services and defence agenctes. 
This network would soon be extended to the 
United States Cocom delegation in Paris and 
other departments in the Washington area. 
Cocom, consisting of representatives from Japan 
and the NATO countries, except Iceland and 
Spain, had developed an agreed list of restricted 
items to control the transfer of products and 
technology to the Warsaw Pact. The United 
States provided most of the technical support 
for the Cocom export group. Many areas which 
were previously uncontrolled were now submit-
ted to the expert group in Paris. Although the 
Department of Defence was aware of the 
rapidly increasing worldwide importance of 
trade in technology, it was also keenly aware of 
the need to maintain the West's technological 
lead. By maintaining that lead the West could 
offset the significantly superior numbers of 
weapons and troops available to potential 
adversaries. 
15. Industrial espionage was one of the 
greatest problems o.f our tim~s ~nd the S~viet 
Union had a masstve orgamsatton of tramed 
professionals who did nothing. but sample 
blueprints of all sorts of new htgh-technology 
developments. Should not security chect<;s be 
made on descriptions in technical magazmes? 
In this field only a multilateral effort could 
make any impact. For a .long time .Japan did 
not wish to collaborate wtth the Umted States 
in this field and it had, for instance, often sold 
computer material to countries like Hungary or 
Bulgaria which then, of course, passed it on to 
the Soviet Union. 
16. American subsidiaries in Europe were 
also under control from the United States 
1. Co-ordinating Committee for multilateral export 
controls. 
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agencies. The defence programme in export 
control and technology transfer had enhanced 
policies and procedures so that export licence 
applications were now being processed more 
expeditiously, consistently and systematically. 
Research activities 
17. Dr. Edith Martin, Deputy Under-Secre-
tary for Research and Advanced Technology, 
stated that the Defence Department was very 
much aware of the need to rely on superior 
technology and applications in order to compete 
with the growing Soviet competence, research 
and technology in military matters. The Soviet 
Union increased its defence capabilities twice 
as fast as the United States. It had some 
300,000 scientists and engineers compared with 
60,000 to 80,000 in the United States. The 
technological leadership could only be kept 
through commercial and industrial high-tech-
nology enterprises. Only through acquisition of 
western technology could the Soviet Union 
overcome the lack of advancement in some 
high-technology products. United States indus-
try's competitive system of free enterprise was 
necessary to give the United States its edge 
over the Soviet Union. In order to promote 
industrial research and development, the 
Defence Department was spending some $4.4 
billion a year which would be increased to $6.5 
billion for fiscal year 1985. Part of this money 
was used to revitalise American university 
research and efforts. In the past year the 
universities had made more than 2,700 offers to 
help to develop research and development. 
18. Computers have the highest priority. 
Research and development is being conducted 
first in very high-speed integrated circuits which 
provide the capability for massive and fast data 
processing, second, in stealth aircraft, third in 
advanced software and fourth in microproces-
sors. 
19. For software technology, $9 billion is 
earmarked for development and maintenance. 
Up until the year 1990, $13 billion will be 
spent on several software programmes with the 
help of a software engineering institute. The 
software technology for adaptable reliable 
systems (STARS) programme will improve the 
United States ability to develop and support 
software for mission critical systems. This tri-
service effort, built up on the Defence Depart-
ment's ADA computer language programme, 
will deal with critical problems in the cost 
transportability, reliability and survivability of 
computer software in weapons systems. 
20. The advanced materials programme con-
tinues to make a significant contribution by 
reducing the weight of weapons systems and 
improving their performance. 
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21. Composite materials will be used in all 
types of systems, such as turbo engines, 
shipboard antennae, tank track components, 
long-life submarine batteries, aircraft wings and 
helicopter transmission cases. They will also be 
used for large space structures in order to 
enhance the survivability of spacecraft. 
Strategic defence initiative 
22. At the Pentagon the committee was 
briefed finally by Brigadier General Rankine, 
Assistant for Directed Energy Weapons. He 
spoke on the policy implications of defence 
against ballistic missiles. However, your Rap-
porteur will not go into details of this subject 
which is to be examined in the second part of 
the report by Mr. Wilkinson on the military use 
of space 1• He will discuss the technology for 
defence against ballistic missiles, the character-
istics of such defence, the new technologies 
involved and the consequences this will have for 
the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the strategic 
arms limitation talks agreements. 
The State Department 
23. At the State Department the committee 
was briefed by the Director of Policy Planning, 
Mr. Peter Rodman, who pointed out that the 
President had restored the American position 
on the long term. First of all, the United States 
had neglected its defence and there had been 
an anti-military mood throughout the country. 
Now the military balance was more or less 
restored. Secondly, the President had achieved 
an economic recovery in a relatively short 
period which would also have a great impact on 
the world economy. Thirdly, psychologically 
America had lost part of its self-confidence and 
this self-confidence has now been restored. This 
is not an end in itself but a political problem 
which will have repercussions on all aspects of 
United States foreign policy. 
24. There are still many contacts with the 
Soviet Union, such as the installation of hot-
line conversations and many other contacts 
which are not publicised but which may be 
conducted behind closed doors. 
25. The new American self-confidence has 
also been of advantage for the Atlantic Alliance 
and allied unity has been greatly enhanced. On 
the outside there are events in Poland and the 
contradictions of socialism which have caused 
great frustration in many states. There is an 
important consensus on the need for defence 
spending and a debate has been held on the 
Central American situation. 
1. Military use of space, part 11, Rapporteur Mr. 
Wilkinson, Document 993. 
26. The peace movements in Europe have 
considerably weakened the global security 
offered by the Atlantic Alliance and one should 
be aware of the global implications of any 
further weakening of the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
WEU 
27. Greater European coherence and a 
strengthening of Western European Union, 
which is not directed against the Atlantic 
Alliance, has the public support of the United 
States. It encourages a strengthening of the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. A 
partial American withdrawal from Europe, as 
proposed by Senator Nunn, is not very likely. 
Moreover, Senator Nunn's intention was not to 
weaken but to strengthen NATO by·forcing the 
European countries to live up to their commit-
ments. 
Law of the sea 
28. Mr. Otho Eskine, Director, Office of 
Advanced Technology, gave the committee a 
briefing on the law of the sea issue. The United 
States has decided to attend the conference no 
longer nor will it sign the agreement of 9th 
December 1982. It rejected the convention 
because of the deep-sea mining issue. The rest 
of the treaty can be considered on balance 
acceptable as it has qualified emerging inter-
national law. The deep-sea mining arrangement 
is not acceptable to any potential deep-sea 
mining country and is regarded as impossible to 
implement. Nine countries so far have ratified 
the convention, whereas sixty countries are 
needed for it to enter into force. The European 
countries are very concerned about providing 
the best possible organisational arrangements 
to improve the sea-bed mining regime. However, 
the Eastern bloc and the uncommitted countries 
will not accept important changes in the rules 
of the deep-sea mining organisation. 
29. For freedoms of the high sea, the law of 
the sea convention is not a necessity. The 200-
mile common economic zone has been accepted 
more or less everywhere. 
30. International consortia, in which partici-
pate Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States as well 
as the French consortium, do not think there 
will be deep-sea mining exploration and exploi-
tation for another ten to twenty years. The 
United States will have a national law which 
will ensure environmental protection and allow 
other countries to play a role. Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom are also planning to introduce 
national laws and to ensure that licences by 
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other countries are not being issued for the 
same plots. Licences will be recognised recipro-
cally. An intergovernmental agreement would 
ensure the proper application. 
31. The United States will have an oceano-
graphy budget of some $185 million for 1985. 
From January 1985 onwards the Glomar 
Challenger, a research vessel with fifty-two 
personnel and some fifty scientists, will start a 
new drilling and research campaign. 
The space station's international aspects 
32. The Office of Advanced Technology also 
handles the manned space station. International 
participation is, of course, of the greatest 
importance and early contacts have already 
been made with Canada, Japan and ESA. The 
United States hopes that ESA will participate 
effectively in the early planning. The manned 
space station will be of importance far into the 
next century and Mr. Eskine was optimistic 
that a broad spectrum of countries could and 
would work together. ESA has already adopted 
a $30 million budget to carry out preliminary 
studies for the next two years. It is considering 
participating with a more or less autonomous 
module and therefore leaving open the possibil-
ity of an independent European space station in 
the future. 
Ill. Space developments 
33. After a welcome by Mr. John D. Hodge, 
Director, Space Station Task Force of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, Mr. Robert F. Freitag, Deputy Director, 
Space Station Task Force, briefed the commit-
tee on space station developments. He gave a 
general outline of the policy of the Reagan 
administration on these developments as follows: 
The space station 
34. The NASA budget for 1985 is just under 
$7.5 billion and the five-year projections laid 
down in the budget include a real growth in 
NASA activity of approximately 1% per year 
over the 1986-89 period. While the overall 
projected growth is modest, it will allow NASA 
nevertheless to undertake and accomplish the 
space station effort. The space station initiative 
announced by the President in his 1984 state of 
the union message to Congress reflects Ameri-
ca's commitment to research technology and 
the peaceful development of space. It gives a 
clear direction to the civil space policy. The 
most important reason for starting a space 
station at this time is that the space shuttle is 
approaching full operational status. To maxim-
DOCUMENT 992 
ise this transportation system a space station is 
necessary. The second reason is that the 
operations which have heen conducted with the 
space shuttle have stimulated great interest in 
the private sector to look towards investment in 
future space activities. The construction of a 
space station is necessary to create the facilities 
that will encourage such investment and 
stimulate new technology that will spin off into 
the United States economy. The space station 
will therefore provide a threshold for significant 
commercial exploitation of the space environ-
ment. An example of this is the McDonnell 
Douglas/ Johnson and Johnson - pharmaceuti-
cal industry - joint venture to monitor an 
electrophoresis experiment in the gravity-free 
environment on board the shuttle Discovery 
which could create a new hormone which could 
be used for manufacturing superinsulin. Finally, 
the shuttle has also stimulated wide interna-
tional interest in the United States space 
programme. 
35. Making the space shuttle fully operational 
and cost-effective is one of NASA's main 
priorities. The major achievement of 1983 was 
the first flight of spacelab which was funded 
and built by ESA. It demonstrated that people 
in space could perform very complex experi-
ments and that real time corrections and fixes 
to experiments could greatly enhance the ability 
to obtain important scientific results. 
36. Eight shuttle flights are scheduled in 
1984 and eleven in 1985, including three in 
which spacelab missions will be completed. The 
shuttle will also be used regularly by the 
Department of Defence. It is certain that, 
whatever future space developments may be, 
the space station will become an essential part 
of space capability. 
37. The space station will have both a 
manned element and unmanned elements eo-
orbiting so that they have access to each other. 
The manned base would have living quarters as 
well as working space and the cockpit from 
which the station is operated. It will be 
necessary to commute between the manned and 
the unmanned element and this calls for a sort 
of mini-transportation system. Later on, a large 
high-energy upper stage will be necessary to 
allow man to go from that transportation base 
to the higher energy orbits such as a synchron-
ous orbit or back to the moon, or Mars or 
elsewhere. 
38. The final configuration of the space 
station will be worked out in 1985. However, of 
the greatest importance is a proper combination 
of manned and unmanned elements allowing 
the human factor to do what it is best able to 
do, leaving the unmanned system to be fully 
robotised. It therefore has to be built as a 
multi-functioning facility with the ability to do 
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laboratory-type work for science and applica-
tions for technology and for advanced develop-
ment. 
39. The space station should also be a 
jumping-off point for missions beyond low earth 
orbit. There are significant economic benefits in 
having space-based reusable upper stages and 
using the space station as the base from which 
to go forward into planetary exploration. 
40. For fiscal year 1985 NASA is requesting 
$150 million for the space station study 
programme. These funds are enough to begin 
an endeavour of this importance and scope and 
necessary to assure an efficient, well-conceived 
space station programme. 
41. A space station could serve a variety of 
useful functions and purposes, including: 
(i) a permanent observatory for looking 
down at the earth and out at the 
universe; 
(ii) a transportation mode where payloads 
and vehicles are stationed, processed 
and propelled to their destinations; 
(iii) a servicing facility where these pay-
loads and vehicles are serviced, main-
tained or repaired; 
(iv) an assembly facility where, due to 
ample time and orbit and the presence 
of appropriate equipment, large struc-
tures are put together and checked 
out; 
(v) a manufacturing facility where human 
intelligence and the servicing capa-
bility of the station combine to 
enhance commercial opportunities 
which can be solved only or less 
expensively in space; and 
(vi) a storage depot where payloads and 
parts are kept on orbit for subsequent 
deployment. 
There will also be many other uses and benefits 
as time progresses. 
42. The President indicated that the perma-
nently manned space station should be ready 
within the decade. The international aspects of 
the space station development are focused 
mainly on the roles of potential users of the 
space station. User requirements have been 
studied but no formal agreements have been 
concluded. This is not possible because NASA 
has not even reached the point of designing the 
space station. It would not know what kind of 
commitment it could make with respect to any 
part of the space station. 
43. NASA's traditional partners in space, 
principally Canada and the European Space 
Agency, are now spending a fair amount of 
their own funds on independent space station 
mission analysis and planning studies. France, 
Germany and Italy have also undertaken 
independent analyses and national studies. 
44. Japan is motivated by a number of things. 
One, of course, might well be that when the 
space shuttle was conceived and international 
involvement in the shuttle was ultimately 
narrowed down to the spacelab with a Canadian 
manipulating arm, Japan chose not to be 
involved. Now, in this case they wish to be sure 
that a Japanese option will be available so that 
they may take a fully-informed decision. 
45. All these studies indicate that the event-
ual missions will be compatible with the current 
space station concept. A further dialogue is, of 
course, necessary. 
46. One of the major studies was undertaken 
by ESA which believes that a human presence, 
the possibility of a manned space station, offers 
certain special benefits, especially in material 
science and life science and technology devel-
opment. A space station appears to be compati-
ble with spacelab 2 and the Eureca unmanned 
platform that is currently under development. 
They might in the long run give Europe an 
increased operational commercial space poten-
tial for the commercial use of space. Whether 
Europe alone could develop an equivalent space 
station is an open question. Moreover, a manned 
space station need not be competitive with 
unmanned systems available in Europe. Canada 
already has a formal relationship with the 
European Space Agency and it may also be 
interested in a European unmanned space 
station. At the same time it wishes to participate 
in the United States manned space station. 
Canada, of course, is very interested in 
remote-sensing is extremely important technol-
ogy for such a large country which is very 
sparsely populated in a number of areas. They 
are also interested in robotics and materials 
processing. 
European participation 
47. From a European point of view, it has 
always been considered that to become a viable 
partner in the space station developments ESA 
would have to pay at least 10% of the budget. 
Based on NASA's $8 billion figure for an 
eight-year period, this would mean that Europe 
would have to pay about $1 billion for the same 
period. In negotiating a European share in the 
programme, a number of considerations would 
have to be taken into account by ESA: 
(i) The European share should provide a 
stimulus to European technology. 
117 
DOCUMENT 992 
(ii) European participation should be vis-
ible - in other words, Europe should 
be responsible for one or more key 
elements of the station over which 
Europe would exercise full responsi-
bility in the development phase. 
(iii) ESA should also have a clearly 
defined role in the operational phase 
of the space station and this would 
include ground operations and flight 
crew. 
(iv) On the basis of its collaboration in 
the programme, ESA should have 
complete information on the research 
and engineering of the entire space 
station and not just the element or 
elements which ESA developed. 
48. NASA has therefore proposed the devel-
opment of a space station complex consisting of 
a manned station core and unmanned platforms. 
Automation will be applied to the maximum 
extent possible but man remains an essential 
part of the NASA space station concept 
providing the link between basic research and 
the development of fully automated space-based 
production processes. Man and machine are 
complementary to each other. For the space 
station, automation of routine tasks and house-
keeping functions is necessary to free the crew 
for useful tasks that cannot be automated. 
Computers, robots and artificial intelligence will 
all be used to extend human capabilities in 
space but they can never be substitutes for 
man. 
49. Space station missions can be divided into 
three major categories: micro-gravity research, 
observation missions and space operations. 
50. The space station will make more efficient 
use of the existing shuttle fleet. Instrument 
testing and experiments now carried out on the 
shuttle could be carried out on the space 
station. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre 
51. On Monday, 16th July 1984, the com-
mittee visited the Lyndon B. Johnson Space 
Centre in Houston where it was received by 
Mr. Charles Biggs who briefed the committee 
on the purpose and responsibilities of this 
centre. 
52. The centre was established in September 
1963 in order to allow NASA to take 
responsibility for the design, development and 
testing of spacecraft. The centre also houses 
associated systems for manned flight, selection 
and training of astronauts, planning and 
conducting manned missions and extensive 
participation in vehicle engineering and scien-
tific experiments. 
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53. The budget of the centre for fiscal year 
1984 is $1.6 billion. 
54. The centre is di;ided into a number of 
directorates which, however, are frequently 
realigned to keep pace with the changing 
directions and dimensions of manned space 
flight. 
55. The facilities include approximately 100 
different buildings of sizes and uses ranging 
from the nine-storey project management build-
ing to small traffic control pools at each 
entrance. Many structures are devoted to office 
space and others are solely designed to 
accomplish special tasks. 
56. The committee had a specially-arranged 
guided tour of several buildings. One of the 
main buildings is the mission control centre 
where the flight controllers study the data that 
enable them to make decisions for each manned 
flight. 
57. One special facility at the centre is the 
space environment simulation laboratory. This 
contains two vacuum chambers and a complete 
spacecraft or individual components can be 
subjected not only to a space-like vacuum but 
also to temperature extremes which may be 
encountered in space. 
58. The training of astronauts takes place in 
special buildings w·here simulators incorporate 
projections onto screens where the spacecraft 
windows would be, showing scenes which the 
crew will see during a real mission. The crews 
and flight controllers can practise the entire 
mission many times before the actual flight. 
59. One very important function of NASA is 
the management and assembling of spacecraft. 
Hundreds of contracting companies are working 
on a space programme. These companies are 
located throughout the United States and might 
employ just a few people or tens of thousands. 
The task of managing these efforts is very 
important. The largest contribution the centre 
makes to this programme management is in the 
design and construction of manned spacecraft. 
60. The centre is responsible, for instance, for 
the shuttle orbiter which will carry astronauts, 
scientists and engineers into earth orbit and 
return them to earth with an aircraft-type 
landing. 
61. The programme management defines and 
controls the many interfaces between the 
systems to ensure compatibility of crew, 
spacecraft and launch vehicle. It also establishes 
quality control and reliability standards together 
with the appropriate checkout and test proce-
dures. 
62. The centre's prime responsibility is the 
space shuttle programme. The shuttle flight 
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system consists of the abovementioned reusable 
orbiter, a large expendable liquid propellant 
tank and two recoverable and reusable solid 
propellant rocket boosters. 
63. The primary shuttle landing facilities are 
located at Kennedy Space Centre and Vanden-
berg Airforce Base. However, several alternative 
landing sites are available for contingencies. 
64. Scientists and engineers from this centre 
are now studying the feasibility of using space 
technology for the construction of a space 
operations centre and of placing a satellite in 
space that could relay energy from the sun 
directly to earth and aid in the energy crisis. 
Such a space operations centre would allow 
on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery and servic-
ing of manned and unmanned spacecraft. 
65. As more and more shuttle flights are 
being planned, the centre is constantly occupied 
with managing this programme as well as its 
responsibilities for the development, production 
and delivery of the orbiter. The centre has also 
made a special study of space benefits. 
According to the Johnson Space Centre, 
applications of space technology to meet earth-
bound needs fall into three main categories: 
health, earth resources and safety. 
66. Health-care, for example, is using much 
of the technology which was developed for the 
medical monitoring of astronauts during space 
flight. Crew equipment, such as space suits and 
space food, is also being adapted to rehabilita-
tion and nutrition applications. 
67. The earth observation programmes of 
NASA started in the 1960s with the earth 
resources aircraft programme initiated by the 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre. Landsat 1 
has been in orbit since 1972 and has been 
transmitting data to produce tens of thousands 
of photographs which are being used by 
government agencies, private industry, and 
university researchers, to use and understand 
natural resources. Landsat 2, which is now 
circling the earth, is producing many beneficial 
results in agriculture, forestry, land use and 
land mapping, water quality and resources, 
minerals and land resources, marine resources 
and the environment. The Landsat 2 system 
will be combined with meteorological data from 
the NOAA satellites and from ground stations 
to relate weather conditions and to make 
production forecasts. 
68. The space shuttle, which is being flown 
regularly, will provide possibilities for all types 
of experiments and will provide scientists with 
the ability to exchange experiences, look at 
different targets and generally use the shuttle's 
possibilities to the full. In the end, spaceborne 
studies of the earth will have worldwide 
economic benefits in land use planning, agricul-
ture, forestry, inland water resources, mineral 
resources, etc. 
69. In safety improvement, the Johnson Space 
Centre engineers have been finding ways of 
using space-developed materials in making 
firemen's protective equipment and clothing 
more efficient and fire-resistant. New breathing 
systems are being developed. 
IV. Energy policy 
70. On 11th July 1984 the committee met at 
the German Embassy and was briefed by Mr. 
Bryan Hampton, Energy Counsellor of the 
British Embassy, on the energy policy of the 
American Government. 
General remarks 
71. The approach to energy policy is based 
on a free market philosophy. It involves 
reducing the role of the federal or state 
government wherever possible and placing 
increased reliance on the free market system to 
allocate resources in the energy sector. 
72. This was the big change after Mr. 
Carter's presidency. 
73. The main items on the energy agenda 
have been: (i) to remove price and other controls 
wherever possible; (ii) to continue support for 
longer-term, high-risk energy research and 
development which the private sector cannot be 
expected to undertake, but to reduce govern-
ment expenditure in near-term research and 
development and commercialisation pro-
grammes; (iii) to reduce fuel use and other 
regulations that constrain market forces, and to 
reduce restraints on oil and gas findings thereby 
curtailing the power of the environment lobbies; 
(iv) to avoid government involvement in allocat-
ing oil supplies, even in times of emergency. 
74. This policy is reinforced - particularly in 
the desire to reduce research and development 
expenditure - by the severe budgetary pressures 
on the administration. But it is also tempered 
by national security considerations. A major 
national preoccupation with security of energy, 
particularly oil supplies, has led, despite the 
deficit problem, to a continuing rapid build-up 
of the strategic petroleum reserve. 
75. Two points are extremely important: (i) 
the conservation and energy, including nuclear, 
research and development programmes; (ii) the 
significance of energy as a factor in national 
security planning in the United States. 
76. When it took office, the Reagan admin-
istration sought to reduce the Federal Govern-
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ment's research and development spending 
across the board, with the exception of the 
nuclear fission budget. In FY 1982 for example 
it sought to reduce the research and develop-
ment budget (leaving aside nuclear fission and 
magnetic fusion) to $1.5 billion, about $2.5 
billion lower than the Carter administration 
levels. The aim was to cut out state and local 
conservation grant programmes and to make 
the heaviest cuts of all in the fossil, particularly 
coal programmes where it was believed that 
high energy prices coupled with federal tax 
credits would be sufficient to promote desirable 
projects. 
77. But Congress, and this includes the 
Republican controlled Senate, remained com-
mitted to higher levels of government involve-
ment in the energy industry than the adminis-
tration would like, and has continued to provide 
higher levels of energy research and develop-
ment appropriations than requested. In 1984, 
bowing to the inevitable, Secretary Hodel 
presented a budget for FY 1985, which, instead 
of containing requests substantially lower than 
the FY 1984 appropriations, is roughly in line 
with the levels set last year, with energy 
research and development at around $3 billion. 
Nuclear is down compared with the FY 1984 
appropriation, largely because the Clinch River 
breeder programme has been discarded, but 
programmes concentrating most heavily on 
long-term basic and applied research, e.g. 
general science and magnetic fusion, were 
increased. Apart from the longer-term work, 
coal has collected by far the lion's share of the 
increased fossil budget, with major increases 
for the programmes that the administration can 
link to its announced doubling of acid rain 
research money. Thus coal preparation technol-
ogy has been given a 24% increase for such 
things as fine grinding technology, organic 
sulphur removal and chemical cleaning and 
there has been a 74% increase in the budget for 
coal combustion systems. 
78. But while the direct combustion of coal 
is getting much attention, the administration 
has progressively sought to run down the 
synthetic fuels programme administered by the 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The SFC was 
originally established in 1980 to create a major 
synthetic fuel industry in the United States. In 
the changed energy market conditions of today, 
the objectives of that programme have by 
general consent shifted to the establishment of 
a basic capability in the synfuels area, rather 
than a large volume industry, with widespread 
acceptance that the SFC might commit the 
first slice of $20 billion in loan guarantees and 
price supports, but not the full $80 billion 
legislated for in 1980. The administration has 
responded to management problems and the 
departure of SFC board members to seek a 
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major reduction in funding consistent with its 
view that the nation will not need synthetic 
fuels before the turn of the century, so research 
should focus on laboratory-scale work. 
79. Nuclear energy research and development 
continues to be a major element of federal 
policy based on a conviction that it is needed to 
provide safe and economic alternatives to finite 
fossil energy resources and requires resources 
and capabilities normally outside the realm of 
the private sector. But it goes beyond this to a 
recognition that, for example, fusion as an 
energy source, if successful, will result from the 
work of several generations of scientists and 
engineers and of a very large financial effort. 
For this reason, the United States believes that 
international co-operation is particularly desir-
able. Following the Versailles summit, meetings 
have been held among the summit countries 
and the European Communities to review the 
possibilities of collaborative or complementary 
and sequential programmes in the fields of 
fusion and high energy physics. Even a country 
as large and wealthy as the United States 
acknowledges that the investments required in 
the future have grown so large that it is 
ridiculous to have actual duplication of facilities 
and unproductive competition to achieve the 
same scientific or technical results. 
80. The federal programme that bears most 
directly on energy security is, of course, the 
strategic petroleum reserve, which now stands 
at well over 400 million barrels, or three 
months' United States imports, and the part it 
would play, both domestically and internation-
ally in responding to any interruption of oil 
supplies. 
81. This has provided the most interesting 
change of posture in the energy policy in the 
last three years. Until 1984, the Reagan 
administration, while agnostic about the possi-
bility of a new supply interruption, has argued 
that the most effective action, should an 
interruption occur, would be to avoid govern-
ment intervention - at the international as well 
as national level - and permit prices to rise by 
enough to clear the market at the reduced level 
of supply. This approach, it was claimed, would 
minimise efficiency losses and set in motion 
forces of adjustment that would reverse the 
price run-up. Not surprisingly this caused 
considerable credibility problems for the admin-
istration in Congress, and criticism increased 
sharply when it became known last year that 
the fourth test of the lEA emergency arrange-
ments had prod.uced $98 per barrel of oil in the 
United States market. The policy review which 
the then newly appointed Energy Secretary, 
Mr. Hodel, immediately set in hand coincided 
with growing concern about the course of the 
Iran-Iraq conflict, and led at the turn of the 
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year to the establishment of two inter-agency 
committees to examine international energy 
preparedness and domestic energy security. This 
review focused on the strategic petroleum 
reserve as the centrepiece of the administration's 
oil contingency plans. It concluded that oil 
should be released from the strategic petroleum 
reserve early in any crisis in order to forestall 
panic buying and calm the market, and led to 
the decision to press other countries to increase 
their strategic oil reserves and to agree on early 
mobilisation of stocks in an international supply 
crisis. 
82. It is perhaps surprising that it has taken 
so long for minds in Washington to change on 
this issue since the growth of strategic stocks 
provides an opportunity to create a supply-
orientated response to an oil disruption, and to 
move away from lEA programmes which are 
directed at controlling demand in a supply 
crisis. It should have been attractive to the 
"supply-siders" in the Reagan administration 
from the outset in 1981. In fact at that time 
many of the European countries were lobbying 
for new measures, including stock drawdown, in 
response to "sub-trigger" disruptions and as a 
means of preventing small and even medium-
sized disruptions in oil supply having large 
effects on prices. Now, with a major push 
coming from the Americans the lEA is involved 
in the creation of a new art-science in the oil 
policy area which one commentator has 
described as "drawdown-nomics"- the study of 
when and how to use emergency petroleum 
reserves. The objective will be to design a 
programme that is perceived to be effective and 
equitable, and it is a process that seems likely 
to keep the lEA fully occupied for the next 
decade of its existence. 
Nuclear energy policy 
83. On 12th July 1984, Mr. Frank Goldner 
of the Energy Department briefed the commit-
tee about nuclear power in the United States. 
84. At this very moment eighty-three nuclear 
plants are in operation and sixty-seven are 
under construction. The electricity generated by 
nuclear plants is now 10% and will be some 
20% in the more distant future. The first signs 
of trouble for the United States nuclear industry 
came in the mid-1970s. Eleven nuclear projects 
were cancelled in 1975 and another thirty-two 
from 1976 to 1979. During this period only 
thirteen nuclear plants were ordered. The early 
1980s have again witnessed a massive trimming 
of nuclear power programmes by most of the 
country's utilities. Sixteen plants were cancelled 
in 1980, six were cancelled in 1981 and eighteen 
in 1982. Only two nuclear plants ordered in the 
last nine years have not been subsequently 
cancelled. The total bill for discontinued plants 
is some $10,000 million. 
85. Fundamental changes in the economic 
condition of the United States utility industry 
has been behind these cancellations. Electricity 
growth demand has fallen from 7% per year a 
decade ago to 3% today, greatly reduci.ng the 
need for additional power plants. Revtval of 
nuclear orders in the United States does not 
appear imminent. In the la~t few years the 
utilities have attempted to adJust thetr nuclear 
construction programmes to changing conditions 
but economics have been so confused that many 
decision-makers have intervened too late. 
86. One of the chief lessons of the nuclear 
power experience so far is that existing 
technologies cannot provide sufficient guaran-
tees on safety at a reasonable enough cost. 
Many of the strongest advocates of nuclear 
power now argue that engineers and physicis~s 
will need to design new plants. Some steps m 
this direction have been taken in Japan but 
nuclear power's economic problems w.ill not 
disappear in the near. future. <;ost~ contmue to 
increase in all countnes and htgh mterest rates 
and tied capital markets will be likely to 
remain even with a vigorous economic recovery. 
It will ~ot be long before a definite decision will 
have to be taken as to whether nuclear power 
programmes should be considered money-losi!lg 
enterprises and s~o~ld .not therefore be co~t~n­
ued if more promtsmg mvestment opportumttes 
are available. 
87. Nevertheless, while electricity growth has 
been very slow over the last decade, there is no 
assurance that this trend will continue. Even 
quite modest growth would require new plants 
to come on line in the 1990s. Replacement of 
aging plants will require new . generating 
capacity. Oil is not a realistic optton for n~w 
electricity-generating plants ~~ause ?f tts 
already high cost and vulnerabthty to tmport 
disruption. Natural gas ~ay also be too. ~ostly 
or unavailable for generatmg large quanttttes of 
electricity. The use of coal, of course, can and 
will be expanded considera~ly. However,. the 
continued combustion of fosstl fuels, espectally 
coal, has the potential to release enough carbon 
dioxide to cause serious climatic changes. 
88. The possible alternatives to coal cannot 
generate enough electricity to replace it. Various 
forms of solar and geothermal energy may 
appear promising but uncertainties of. economics 
and applicability of these technologtes are too 
great to demonstrate that they will replace the 
need for nuclear power over the next seve~al 
decades. There might therefore be good pol~cy 
reasons for wanting to see the nuclear opt10n 
preserved. 
89. The United States is striving to become 
eventually completely self-sufficient in oil and 
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achieve energy independence. As the United 
States Congress withdrew government fu~din.g 
for the Clinch River breeder reactor, nothmg ts 
planned of a similar nature. H?wever: a 
research breeder reactor programme ts contmu-
ing. The United States is working with ot~er 
countries, including France and Japan, shanng 
research and the use of components and 
facilities. The technology base will have to be 
preserved in order to pick up the breeder 
technology and use it if it turns out to be an 
economical choice for the future. The budget 
for 1983 was $346.5 million. Research and 
development on other types of reactor - gas-
cooled - converters on fuel cycle processes are 
still going on. In th~ meanti.me, coal is the 
alternative to nuclear m electnc power genera-
tion. 
F os si/ energy 
90. Mr. Marvin Singer, on behalf of Mr. Bill 
Vaughan, Assistant Secretary for Fo~sil Energy, 
then briefed the committee on Umted States 
fossil energy policies and also on the. intern~­
tional co-operative research effort m fosstl 
energy. 
91. The United States participates in both 
multilateral efforts, through such organisations 
as the International Energy Agency, and 
bilateral projects with individual governments 
and institutions in other countries. 
92. The fossil energy division has three major 
functions: (i) conducting a research and devel-
opment programme foc~sed ?n coal, oil, gas 
and oil shale; (ii) producmg otl from the naval 
petroleum reserve located in California; and (iii) 
managing the strategic petroleum reserve 
located in Southern Louisiana and Texas. 
93. Fossil energy's strategic objectives are: (i) 
to increase the contribution of coal by improve-
ments in environmental, technical, and econ-
omic performance of coa~-based systems; and 
(ii) to increase the effective resource base for 
premium gas and liquid fuels through enhanced 
resource recovery and processing techniques 
from coal, shale, tar sands and unconventional 
oil and gas sources. 
94. The United States pursues these objec-
tives through a programme of research in coal, 
petroleum and gas. The performers of this 
research include fossil energy laboratories 
located in Pittsburgh and Morgantown. These 
laboratories have the responsibility for day-to-
day management of the research programme. 
Other research performers include national 
laboratories, such as Oak Ridge, Argonne and 
Sandia National Laboratories, universities and 
industry and non-profit-making organisations. It 
spends: on coal $178 million, or about 65% of 
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the total fossil energy budget; on petroleum 
$37.8 million, or about 14% of the total; and on 
gas $8.55 million, or about 3% of the total. 
About $57.4 million, or about one-third of the 
coal research budget, can be considered as acid 
rain related. 
95. The events of the last ten years - when 
the United States suffered a five-month cut off 
of Arab oil - have resulted in changes in its 
energy consumption patterns. As a percentage 
of its total energy use, from 1973 to 1983, coal 
has increased from about 17% to 22%, oil has 
decreased from about 47% to 17% and gas has 
increased from about 30% to 50%. 
96. With regard to petroleum imports, today 
the United States imports less than 4% of its oil 
from the Persian Gulf. Mexico is the largest oil 
supplier, followed by Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Venezuela, Saudi Arabia is fifth 
or sixth. There are more than 400 million 
barrels of oil in the strategic petroleum reserve 
- enough to tide the United States over for at 
least three months should all imports be cut 
off. 
97. The United States has diversified its 
energy supplies. Coal now supplies more than 
half of the electricity and 90% of the energy 
used is now supplied by domestic energy 
resources. 
98. George Keyworth, the President's Science 
Advisor, put it this way: 
"Perhaps the most important element of 
policy that emerged from the reassess-
ment of the responsibilities of government 
and the private sector was a renewed and 
considerably strengthened commitment to 
federal support for basic research. Not 
only is basic research an essential invest-
ment in the nation's long-term welfare, 
but it is largely a federal responsibility 
because its benefits are so broadly 
distributed. 
Quite simply, basic research is a vital 
underpinning for our national wellbeing." 
99. The fossil energy programme underlines 
wholeheartedly this statement. Basic, as well as 
applied, research within the fossil energy 
programme have increased both in priority and 
funding. 
100. Basic research seeks to develop funda-
mental scientific knowledge, including a funda-
mental understanding of unconventional energy 
systems and fuels and of their physical and 
chemical properties, leading to the definition of 
new energy research and development concepts. 
Applied research includes activities to resolve 
broad engineering and physical science problems 
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in specific fossil technologies and related areas. 
However, practical utility may not be proven at 
this stage. Proof-of-concept is the stage at 
which enough has been learned to resolve 
specific problems to determine the technical and 
environmental feasibility of the integrated 
process. Data are generated to evaluate critical 
scale-up parameters, characterise sub-systems, 
processes, and products, and to permit prelimi-
nary economic projections to be made. Process 
development is directed at increasingly larger-
scale engineering design, construction and 
operation of energy systems with the objective 
of reducing technical risks and improving the 
process operability, reliability, economics and 
environmental impact. Commercialisation con-
sists of a wide variety of efforts to eliminate 
technical, economic and institutional barriers 
required for acceptance of a new energy 
technology into the market place. 
101. In 1980, the office of fossil energy funded 
essentially no basic or fundamental research. 
Nearly 90% of its budget was focused on 
proof-of-concept engineering units and large-
scale pilot and demonstration efforts. In 1981, 
basic research accounted for less than one-tenth 
of 1% of the fossil energy programme's $1 
billion-plus budget. 
102. This budget was, in part, a response to 
international events and was heavily focused on 
the commercialisation of synthetic fuels pro-
cesses. Today that has changed. 
103. Basic and fundamental research in the 
proposed FY 1985 fossil energy budget will 
receive $33 million if Congress approves the 
budget request. This would be the fossil energy's 
advanced coal research programme. 
104. The fossil energy division has a vigorous 
international programme. Its international 
research projects cover the entire spectrum of 
fossil-fuel activities - extraction, preparation, 
processing, conversion and utilisation. Almost 
half of the active projects are related to coal; 
the rest are oil-related. 
105. Authorisation for individual projects 
results from bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments. All active multilateral projects are being 
conducted under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (lEA). 
106. There are currently seventeen active 
bilateral fossil energy projects under way 
between the United States and six other 
countries. The other six countries involved are 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and Venezuela. 
Two active projects are with the Netherlands 
and four with Canada. Venezuela is participat-
ing with the United States in eight active 
projects under a single general agreement. The 
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and 
Mexico are participating with the United States 
in one project each. 
107. Active bilateral projects promote technol-
ogy development and information exchange. 
The projects with Canada, Mexico and Vene-
zuela stress oil recovery techniques, while most 
of the remaining activities seek to develop 
improved coal utilisation and conversion pro-
cesses. 
V. Activities of aircraft companies visited 
Grumman Corporation 
Aircraft development 
108. On 9th July 1984, the committee visited 
the Grumman Aerospace Company at Beths-
page, New York, where it was received by the 
President and Chairman of the Board, Mr. 
George Skurla. He gave a general briefing on 
Grumman Corporation which produces a great 
variety of products: military aircraft, trucks for 
the commercial market place, yachts and boats 
for leisure activities, solar systems for heat and 
hot water, computer systems, software and 
services to commercial customers. It has some 
28,000 employees working in more than 110 
manufacturing plants and its annual sales 
exceed $2 billion. Its business strategy has been 
to make Grumman the first integrator of 
airborne electronics systems. Its naval aircraft 
have been greatly improved through these new 
systems. To enhance the performance of its 
aircraft at a minimum cost the emphasis is not 
on building new aircraft but on new avionics, 
electronics, etc. to be integrated in existing 
aircraft. 
109. Its speciality is naval aircraft, such as the 
F-14, the E-2C Hawkeye, the A-6E Intruder, 
its derivative, the EA-6P Prowler and the new 
EF-111A, which are the free world's only flying 
electronic fighter aircraft. They are equipped 
with extensive electronic countermeasure sys-
tems and could jam the most advanced enemy 
radar. 
110. Mr. M. Pelehach, President of Grumman 
International, pointed out that Grumman and 
other aircraft factories have now reached a 
point in aircraft building where one has to 
decide which way to go in the near future. 
Should existing aircraft be re-equipped and 
should their operational flying life be prolonged 
or should new aircraft be built. The problem is 
that the governments cannot afford to pay for 
the planes which the aircraft industry is able to 
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produce. New electronic equipment will enable 
existing aircraft to fly well into the 1990s. 
111. Grumman knows that Europe is consider-
ing building a new fighter aircraft. However, 
with the technology now available, these aircraft 
would become extremely expensive. They would 
consist of new composite materials, have stealth 
possibilities, should be able to fly sideways, have 
new weapons systems, new communications and 
new propulsion systems. However, with all these 
new features, would it be possible to build 
aircraft which governments could pay for? For 
instance, the new B-1, when it comes off the 
line, will cost some $250 million. The F-14 cost, 
some years ago, $10 million. Now, however, it 
might come to $30 million per aircraft. The 
total cost of the Tornado does not fall far short 
of this sum. It can be seen that everywhere in 
the industry techology is not making aircraft 
any cheaper. The requirements for new aircraft 
are not written in Washington but in Moscow 
and high cost weapons and requirements for 
aircraft might become unsurmountable. Again, 
in many cases planes are not being built 
because they are needed but because industries 
need the work to continue their existence and 
therefore build new and better aircraft. This 
will mean that an aircraft which used to be in 
service for about twenty years might now have 
a lifetime of nearly forty to fifty years, albeit 
with new engines, new electronics etc. 
112. This new development can also be seen in 
numbers of aircraft. If the United States air 
force has 500 B-51s they will now be replaced 
by a hundred B-1 s equipped with cruise missiles. 
Another result will be less and less aircraft 
manufacturers. 
Space station research 
113. Mr. J. Mockovciak, Deputy Director, 
shuttle applications and space station pro-
grammes of Grumman, indicated that in 1985 
Grumman would be spending $150 million on 
space station research and development. It is 
building prototypes of work stations which will 
eventually fit inside the space shuttle cargo bay 
and enable astronauts to work in space. The 
space station will operate some 250 miles out in 
orbit and the command centr:e and living 
quarters module will provide room for six to 
nine people. Grumman is also building a 
manipulator prototype to serve the satellite 
after it is retrieved. 
114. It is considered that there will be a crew 
rotation for the space station every three mouths 
and the module structure has therefore to be a 
habitat as well as a command centre. The 
initial flight-off might be in the early 1990s. 
Reusable orbital transport vehicles will travel 
short distances from the space station and then 
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return to be refuelled and refitted. NASA will 
indicate firm definitions of the system in 1985. 
115. There is no doubt whatsoever that 
industrial development in space is going to take 
place. Some forty to fifty large companies have 
requested NASA to participate in space station 
operations to carry out research and develop-
ment. They are mainly concerned with drug 
companies and material processing. As soon as 
industry knows definitely that the overall facility 
will be there and that the shuttle will regularly 
serve it, industry will certainly seek the 
opportunity to manufacture products which 
cannot be produced on earth. At a later period 
the space station might be used as a stepping-
stone to the moon. 
116. Grumman is convinced that sooner or 
later the Soviet Union will also try to build a 
space shuttle, as this is the only logical 
development of the space transportation system. 
117. Once a permanently manned space station 
is operational, a permanently manned station 
on the moon becomes feasible. This might be 
established in the year 2020. 
118. As far as Grumman knows, the Defence 
Department is not involved in the space station 
and is not ready to fund it. This will be a 
completely civil activity. 
119. The space station will be of great 
importance as a repair station for satellites. 
Their cost might be as much as $250 million 
and it would be worth while to repair them 
from a space station, either by robot or by an 
astronaut. Another important point will be. the 
refuelling of satellites and lastly the space 
station will allow large antenna systems to be 
built to follow and direct satellites. 
E-2C Hawkeye 
120. After these briefings the committee went 
to see the production halls of the E-2C 
Hawkeye. This system has benefited from the 
development and production of three genera-
tions of Grumman airborne early warning 
systems and it has established itself through 
years of successful use as an effective command 
and control system. In 1975 the Government of 
Israel selected this plane for its early warning 
and co-ordination system. The aircraft is now 
in service in Israel and Japan and might be 
bought by Egypt, Pakistan and Singapour. 
121. For Israel the Hawkeyes supplement 
ground-based air defence radars, providing 
information on the movement of equipment and 
troops and helping to tie together the nation's 
entire defence network. The compact size of the 
E-2C makes it an ideal system for a small 
country with long exposed borders. 
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122. For Japan, the E-2C provides an early 
warning coverage against low- or high-flying 
intruders. 
123. For Australia, with its huge coastline to 
defend, the E-2C can be used to control 
smuggling, protect its offshore resources and 
fishing rights and co-ordinate far-flung research 
and rescue operations. 
124. The turbo-prop Hawkeye, though smaller, 
is also considerably less expensive than AWACS 
and Nimrod; it offers a most advanced early 
warning system with proven capabilities in 
maritime surveillance plus the advantage of its 
passive detection system. 
X-29A 
125. During the visit of the plant, the 
committee saw a prototype of the X-29A, a 
technology demonstrator aircraft meant to prove 
the value of forward-swept wings for tactical 
aircraft. Grumman's research budget is some 
$70 million for 1984, of which an important 
part will be used to support the X-29A 
forward-swept wing programme. 
Sperry Corporation 
Electronic developments 
126. Sperry Corporation is one of the world's 
largest suppliers of total integrated simulation 
and training systems for military and commer-
cial applications. It deals with avionic, ship 
control, weapons control and data-processing 
technologies. It is a leading supplier of advanced 
sensor, guidance and control systems. 
127. The committee was briefed by Mr. Robert 
Wendt, President of Electronics Systems, on 
Sperry as a high technology industry. 
128. Sperry Corporation is one of the lOO 
largest corporations in the United States, with 
annual revenues of almost $5,000 million and 
more than 71,000 employees worldwide. The 
company is primarily involved in the design, 
development and production of high technology 
electronic products and systems for both the 
commercial sector and the military. It is also a 
major manufacturer of specialised farm equip-
ment. 
129. Sperry has four major business units: the 
computer systems unit is responsible for the 
design and manufacture of computers and 
information-processing systems for both com-
mercial and defence markets. The electronic 
systems unit, with headquarters in New York, 
develops and produces defence systems and 
commercial maritime electronic systems. The 
flight systems unit designs and produces avionic 
systems for commercial and military aviation 
and space flight operations; while Sperry's New 
Holland unit is a leading supplier of specialised 
farm machinery. 
130. Technology has been the focus since the 
company was started by Elmer Sperry in 1910. 
Its long line of technological innovations 
include: the first reliable gyrocompass for ship 
navigation; the first aircraft autopilot; the first 
aircraft artificial horizon; the first guided 
missile; the first gyro-stabilised bombsight for 
aircraft and the first automatic radio-controlled 
navigation system. The tradition of technologi-
cal leadership continues today at Sperry, 
especially in the defence area. 
131. Sperry is the twentieth largest defence 
contractor in the United States. That is no 
small accomplishment, since it does not make 
ships, aircraft, tanks or other "vehicles". It is, 
for the most part, strictly a high-technology 
electronics firm that has increasingly applied its 
skills to system design, integration and support. 
132. First will be discussed some of Sperry's 
United States aerospace projects, as well as 
some of its other areas of expertise. 
133. It develops and produces avionic systems 
through its flight systems operation. It provides 
a number of electronic systems for aircraft as 
diverse as the United States air force's new B-
1 B strategic bomber and the United States 
army's Apache attack helicopter. It recently 
delivered the first full colour airborne displays 
for the air force F-15 and is producing advanced 
control and display equipment for the Bell 
Aerospace Improved Scout Helicopter. 
134. In addition, its flight systems group is 
producing advanced digital flight management 
systems for Airbus A-310, as well as for Boeing 
757 and 767 aircraft. It recently formed a new 
space operations division within flight systems 
to handle the growing volume of work on the 
space shuttle and on defence and scientific 
satellite programmes. 
MATE 
135. The electronic systems unit, which is the 
largest part of Sperry's defence operations, is 
active in many fields. For example, as the 
second largest manufacturer of simulation 
systems in the United States, it has designed 
and produced simulators for the EA-6B, the 
F-18, the EF-111, the A-6 and the A-4 aircraft, 
as well as the CH-53 helicopter, among others. 
Sperry also won a contract to produce the 
simulators for the new T-45 jet trainer for the 
United States navy. This programme to train 
undergraduate pilots to fly advanced jets uses 
a modified version of the British Aerospace 
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Hawk aircraft and will require a total of 
thirty-two simulators. 
136. Sperry is working on a major programme 
for the United States air force called the 
modular automatic test equipment programme, 
or MATE. This project has established stan-
dards for both hardware and software modules 
and their interfaces, so that a wide range of 
digitally programmed test equipment can be 
readily adapted and deployed to meet the needs 
of new avionic systems. These new standards 
have been designed as mandatory for all new 
test equipment for future United States air 
force systems and offer great potential as a 
world standard for aircraft electronics testing. 
137. Sperry is also involved in the development 
and production of low-cost, high-powered elec-
tronic jamming pods for aircraft and is a leader 
in the development of fast-switching frequency 
synthesisers for both transmitters and receivers. 
Radar systems 
138. As a leader in the development of air 
defence radars, Sperry is involved in the design 
of the United States air force's advanced 
tactical radar, expected to be deployed in the 
1990s as a replacement for current battlefield 
surveillance radars that are inadequate in most 
projected military scenarios. Sperry is also 
competing for the north warning system, a new 
network of short-range, unattended radars 
which will be used to upgrade the distant early 
warning, or DEW, line system stretching across 
Canada and Alaska. 
139. Sperry is a world leader in navigation 
and guidance equipment and systems for naval 
applications. At one extreme, it designed, 
developed and produced the navigation systems 
for the Polaris, Poseidon and Trident submar-
ines and is currently working on an $800 
million contract for the navigation systems for 
the Trident 11 submarines. At the other end of 
the spectrum, tens of thousands of commercial 
ships of all sizes depend on Sperry gyrocom-
passes and a wide range of related navigation 
and control products for safe passages. 
140. Sperry pioneered in developing an inte-
grated approach to combat systems design for 
the United States navy, with the development 
of the FFG-7 class guided-missile frigates, using 
sophisticated computer networks and advanced 
programming techniques to provide significantly 
improved reaction times for combat crews. 
141. Sperry has also developed and produced 
some of the most advanced electronic warfare 
systems for both signal and electronic intelli-
gence ever developed, and recently delivered 
electronic warfare training systems to NATO 
for use during fleet exercises. 
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Computers 
142. The third element of Sperry's defence 
operations, in computer systems, has for the 
past decade provided the standard computers 
that are used on board every United States 
navy ship, and in the navies of several NATO 
countries. Last year, Sperry received a contract 
to provide the next generation of standard navy 
computers. 
143. The computer systems unit has also 
designed and developed the computerised air 
traffic control systems for many of the United 
States Federal Aviation Administration's air 
traffic control centres, including the one in New 
York. 
144. In non-military areas, the electronic 
systems unit is also now competing for the 
contract to develop a next generation weather 
radar system for the United States called 
NEXRAD, which will improve the detection of 
severe weather conditions, and which offers 
great potential for application in Europe and 
around the world. This new technique will 
greatly enhance the safety of airline operations. 
145. Sperry is a source of high-technology 
systems in a wide variety of fields. While its 
product lines are diverse, its underlying strength 
is its consistently innovative and forward-looking 
systems approach to solving customers' prob-
lems. 
European-American collaborative projects 
146. Mr. Spencer Ross, Vice-President of 
marketing for the electronic systems operations 
of Sperry, spoke on European-American colla-
borative projects. 
14 7. As opposed to thirty years ago, there are 
now competent companies throughout Europe 
capable of producing the latest in high-technol-
ogy equipment. 
148. eo-development and eo-production pro-
grammes, a clear objective of the United States 
Department of Defence, nevertheless are becom-
ing more difficult to achieve, in part due to 
more rigid United States export licensing 
procedures and in part due to the difficulties of 
harmonising European and United States prac-
tices and legal systems. 
149. The traditional means of technology 
transfer in the past - licensed production - has 
lost some of its popularity, in part because of 
the restrictions on re-export which normally 
accompany such agreements. 
150. Yet in a historical sense, the licensing of 
United States technology has had a decided 
effect upon the growth of important electronics 
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and aerospace industries in Europe, dating back 
to such major aircraft programmes as the F-
104, which was a catalyst to the establishment 
of many aircraft-related capabilities in Europe. 
151. One of the unique aspects of high-
technology manufacturing industries is that 
most of them require a worldwide market in 
order to survive. To establish a specialised 
manufacturing facility with the concept of 
serving only a home market is to invite financial 
failure. 
152. Further, if a company's competitors serve 
larger world market needs, those worldwide 
companies will develop an economy of scale 
which will be superior to that of the purely 
local industry. 
15 3. Another aspect to be considered are the 
protectionist interests at work on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Despite the desirability of 
industry-to-industry co-operation within WEU 
and between WEU and the United States, the 
process of reaching agreement on sharing of 
costs, technology and production is not simple. 
Additionally, the defence procurement process 
differs in the United States from that followed 
in Europe. 
154. Meetings such as this can be helpful 
factors in removing the barriers to industrial 
co-operation. Sperry supports with enthusiasm 
the policy of the government which recognises 
the need for effective co-operation among 
NATO allies in armaments production. To· 
quote from a recent report of the Defence 
Science Board of the United States: " ... 
industrial co-operation affords better utilisation 
of technology and resources, decreases the 
likelihood of research and development dupli-
cation and fosters greater interoperability and 
standardisation". 
Miscellaneous 
155. After these introductions, a number of 
questions were asked and Mr. Ross answered 
them as follows. 
156. Important partners of Sperry in Europe 
are Selenia, in Italy, and Holland Signal, in the 
Netherlands. There is also a close collaboration 
with firms in Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
Canada. Sperry has some sixty locations in 
Europe and employs some 250 people there. 
157. On the Trident weapons system, Sperry 
agreed that, because of United States security 
systems, it was extremely difficult to arrive at 
a satisfactory two-way street. 
158. As a result of its research and develop-
ment effort, Sperry won a very large commercial 
computer contract from the United States air 
force and one from the Canadian Defence 
Department for the Canadian frigate pro-
gramme. It was also awarded contracts totalling 
$1.2 billion by the United States navy for 
shipborne computers and for the Trident 11 
submarine navigation system. 
159. Sperry is also in line for the next 
generation weather radar system which is being 
developed by the national weather service so 
that the future quality of weather prediction 
will be improved, particularly the prediction of 
life-threatening hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards 
and super-storms. The production award for 
this system is scheduled for 1986. The system 
will be used for civil as well as for military 
purposes. 
lkfartin lkfarietta 
The NASA lkfichoud Assembly Facility 
160. On Friday, 13th July 1984, the committee 
was received at the NASA Michoud Assembly 
Facility by Dr. Mathias Siebel, Manager, Mr. 
Kenneth P. Timmons, Vice-President and 
General Manager, Michoud Division of the 
Martin Marietta Corporation, and Mr. Charles 
Richardson, Director, International Marketing, 
Martin Marietta Corporation. 
161. Dr. Siebel pointed out that since 1961 
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration had acquired the Michoud Facility from 
the Department of Defence to manufacture 
large space launch vehicles requiring water 
transportation to launch sites. In 1973, Martin 
Marietta Aerospace was awarded a contract to 
design, develop and manufacture nine external 
propellant tanks for the space shuttle system. 
The external tank is the only component of the 
space shuttle system that is not recovered for 
reuse. The space shuttle is further composed of 
the arbiter and two solid rocket boosters which 
are both reusable. 
162. The Michoud Facility contains one of the 
largest production buildings in the country, a 
vertical assembly building for stacking external 
tank components, pneumostatic and system test 
buildings, a deep-water port for shipment, 
manufacturing support buildings and adminis-
trative offices. 
163. Some 4,600 Martin Marietta employees 
work at the Michoud Assembly Facility along-
side some 400 employees of federal agencies 
which share the Michoud facilities. 
The shuttle's external tank 
164. The external tank has two major roles in 
the space shuttle programme: first, to contain 
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and deliver quality propellants, liquid hydrogen 
and liquid oxygen to the engines; second, to 
serve as the structural backbone of the space 
shuttle during launch operations. The tank is 
composed of two tanks, a large hydrogen tank 
and a smaller oxygen tank joined together by 
a collar-like intertank to form one large 
propellant storage container which is 46.89 
metres long and 8.4 metres in diameter. The 
intertank joins the two tanks and provides a 
protective compartment to house some of the 
instrumentation components in the space 
between the two propellant tanks. 
165. The external tank is manufactured, 
assembled and given final acceptance testing at 
the Michoud Assembly Facility. The tanks 
themselves are built at Michoud by the Denver 
Division of Martin Marietta Aerospace. 
166. Mr. Timmons, Vice-President and Gen-
eral Manager of the Michoud Division of the 
Martin Marietta Corporation, stated that the 
corporation has its headquarters in Bethesda, 
Maryland. It is involved in designing, producing, 
integrating and managing systems in aerospace 
and defence, electronics, communications, infor-
mation management, energy and materials. The 
Michoud Division is part of Martin Marietta 
Aerospace. 
167. In 1983, corporation sales reached an 
all-time high of $3.9 billion compared with $3.5 
billion the previous year. Aerospace continued 
to be the major source of sales and operating 
earnings. 
168. In 1983, four space shuttle flights relied 
on the Martin Marietta-built external fuel tank 
and seven more of the giant tanks were 
delivered to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. Nine more space shuttle 
external tanks are scheduled for delivery in 
1984. Martin Marietta is ahead of schedule 
and has already eight external tanks ready. 
Fifteen are in the process of production or 
assemblage. Production rates will be increased 
to twenty-four tanks a year by 1988. The 
production costs have remained stable for the 
last ten years. 
169. In 1983, two manned manoeuvring units 
were delivered to NASA and were flown from 
the space shuttle early in 1984, providing 
astronauts with the ability to carry out tasks in 
space with the backpack propulsion device 
which in effect transforms the astronaut who 
wields it into a one-man satellite capable of 
precision tasks which were hitherto unattaina-
ble. 
lkfcDonnell Douglas Corporation 
General remarks 
170. On 17th July 1984, the committee was 
received at the McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
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in St. Louis by Mr. James S. McDonnell Ill, 
Corporate Vice-President, Aerospace Market-
ing. Mr. McDonnell gave a short review of the 
origins of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. 
171. A total of about 80,000 people are 
employed by McDonnell Douglas and sales 
totalled $8.11 billion in 1983 - some 10% 
higher than in 1982. Most of the increase 
occurred in the combat aircraft line of business, 
especially in the F f A-18 Hornet programme. 
The net earnings were some $270 million and 
the net worth of the company was $2 billion. 
172. Some 25,000 employees work in the 
aircraft section and are mainly concerned with 
fighter aircraft production. The Douglas com-
mercial aircraft company employs some 15,000 
people and the astronautics company employs 
some 6,000 people who are mainly concerned 
with tactical missiles. In 1984, Hughes Helicop-
ters was purchased from the estate of the late 
Mr. Edward R. Hughes. This is a new line of 
business for McDonnell Douglas but the already 
strong position of Hughes Helicopters will be 
enhanced by McDonnell Douglas capabilities in 
cockpit technology, systems integration and 
other areas. Hughes Helicopters has about 
5,800 employees and its major facilities are in 
Culver City, California, and Mesa, Arizona. It 
manufactures military and commercial helicop-
ters. 
Military aircraft programmes 
173. Mr. Marshall and his colleagues briefed 
the committee on military aircraft programmes. 
They mentioned the F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft 
which is one of a series of strike fighters in 
which McDonnell Douglas has been engaged 
since 1945. They built the Phantom 1, the 
Banshee, Demon, Voodoo, the Phantom 2 and 
are now producing the F-15 Eagle. 
F-15 Eagle 
174. The Eagle can operate in any environ-
ment, day or night, and undertake air-to-air 
and air-to-ground missions penetrating deep 
into enemy territory. The dual rdle fighter is 
required to operate in any environment and to 
have the high performance and capability 
necessary to counter improved threat air-to-air 
and ground-to-air weapons systems and fly long 
range with a substantial payload to attack a 
wide variety of potential targets, including 
mobile armour. It has thirteen armaments 
stations for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons 
and can fire conventional ammunition as well 
as nuclear warheads. Its development is con-
tinuing with the multi-stage improvement 
programme and will continue in the years to 
come. 
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175. The F-15 is in service with the United 
States tactical air command, United States air 
force Europe, Pacific air force and with the air 
forces of Israel, Japan and Saudi Arabia. 
F-18 Hornet 
176. The Hornet is a multi-rdle, high perform-
ance, tactical aircraft which can perform 
fighter, strike or intercept missions. The twin-
engined multi-mission aircraft is capable of 
operating from both aircraft-carriers and shore 
bases. The aircraft is in service with the United 
States navy, United States Marine Corps, the 
Canadian forces and in several international air 
forces. It has a very high manoeuvring 
performance and multi-mission versatility. It 
was the first tactical aircraft to have a digital 
fly-by-wire flight control system. Two indepen-
dent computers control and monitor the four 
general flight control systems, offering a high 
degree of flexibility in flight control systems. 
The Hornet can carry a great variety of 
weapons systems, such as the Sidewinder 
missiles, multi-barrel cannons, the advanced 
medium-range air-to-air missile, AMRAAM, 
etc. It can also carry conventional or laser-
guided bombs, rockets and other weapon 
systems. 
Harrier 11 
177. The Harrier 11 is an international 
V fSTOL tactical aircraft involving the United 
States and British Governments as well as their 
military forces and industries. It was first 
ordered by the United States Marine Corps 
and the Royal Air Force and is designated 
AV-8B in the United States Marine Corps 
service and GRMk-5 with the RAF. The 
weapons system development and production 
team is headed by McDonnell Douglas Corpor-
ation which acts as programme prime contractor 
for the aircraft delivered to the United States 
Marine Corps, with British Aerospace as 
principal sub-contractor. For the RAF's 
GRMk-5s, the rdles of the two companies are 
reversed with British Aerospace as prime 
contractor undertaking final assembly and tests. 
Internationally the Harrier 11 will be marketed 
jointly by the two companies. The Harrier 11 
can land and take off vertically in places with 
no runways and can hover motionlessly in 
mid-air, move sideways and back up. The 
Harrier 11 is equipped with an integrated 
computer-controlled navigation attack system. 
It can carry a wide variety of arms, including 
conventional general-purpose bombs, cluster 
munitions, laser-guided weapons, air-to-ground 
guided missiles, such as the Maverick missile, 
and self-defence air-to-air missiles, such as the 
Sidewinder. The Harrier is powered by the 
latest version of the Rolls-Royce Pegasus 11 
engine. 
AV-8B 
178. The first production of the AV-8B was 
delivered to the United States Marine Corps in 
late 1983. Future improvements to the basic 
design will be possible as well as the weapons 
system performance which can also be substan-
tially improved with the addition of an airborne 
air-to-air, air-to-surface radar. 
KC-10 
179. Mr. Bollick spoke to the committee about 
airlifters, tankers and trainers. In developing 
the DC-10 jetliner, McDonnell Douglas built a 
modified version called the advanced tanker-
cargo aircraft. This was designated by the air 
force as KC-10. It can do two jobs. It carries 
350,000 lbs of fuel and in its wide cabin 
fuselage it carries a huge amount of cargo. 
With this double-barrelled capability, it can 
escort squadrons of combat planes to distant 
bases, carry the support equipment which the 
squadrons need and eliminate the need for stops 
along the way. Using it as a tanker aircraft, it 
has a boom of 45 ft. The United States air 
force needs some sixty planes and up until now 
twenty-three have been delivered. 
180. The C-17 is an advanced cargo aircraft. 
It is expected to be a key element in the future 
mobility of United States ground forces. It can 
use small, little-equipped airfields in sustained 
operations and can provide possible forward 
area airlift support. Full-scale engineering 
development of the C-17 will start in 1985 and 
the first squadron will be in service in the air 
force in late 1991. 
Space systems and missiles 
181. Mr. John F. Yardley briefed the commit-
tee on space systems and missiles. McDonnell 
Douglas has been designing and building 
rockets and missiles since as long ago as world 
war 11. Later they built the Mercury spacecraft, 
the Gemini spacecraft and the Skylab. They 
are now deeply involved in the space shuttle 
pro~ramme and in the preparation of the space 
station programme. 
Harpoon 
182. For the navy, McDonnell Douglas is 
building the Harpoon which is used as an 
anti-ship missile. This missile was o~rational 
on 223 ships and submarines and 209 aeroplanes 
in 1983. Twelve allied nations are also deploying 
the Harpoon. Of the 3,440 Harpoons which 
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have been ordered, more than 2,800 have been 
delivered. 
Tomahawk 
183. The Tomahawk cruise missile is a weapon 
capable of following the contours of the earth 
or sea beneath it on a low fast flight to its 
target and it is therefore extremely difficult to 
detect and intercept. One of the strengths of 
the cruise missile is its extraordinary accuracy. 
Production of the first complete Tomahawk will 
be in 1984 and the navy plans to initiate a 
limited competition for full production contracts 
in fiscal year 1985. Several versions will be 
manufactured: (i) anti-ship Tomahawk; (ii) for 
nuclear land attack; (iii) for conventional land 
attack; (iv) ground launchers. 
The EOS project 
184. Mr. Yardley mentioned especially the 
EOS project, the electrophoresis operations in 
space project, based on a device that separates 
biological materials for use as pharmaceuticals. 
Research and development was carried out 
during three flight tests on the space shuttle in 
1983. In space the device achieved more than 
four times the purity levels and more than 700 
times the quantity possible from similar opera-
tions on earth. In addition, the device demon-
strated that it can separate live cells. This 
makes it possible for researchers to obtain 
purified living cells. 
185. A McDonnell Douglas engineer was 
selected to become the first industry-sponsored 
astronaut to fly on a shuttle mission. As payload 
specialist, he operated the device for a hundred 
hours during a seven-day mission in August 
1984. 
186. McDonnell Douglas has a contract for 
refurbishment of the space shuttle's reusable 
solid rocket booster structures. 
187. In 1983, McDonnell Douglas completed 
a space station mission analysis study for 
NASA. The study examines possible payloads 
and uses for a permanent orbiting manned 
space station. If developed, the station could 
serve as a base for a variety of scientific an.d 
~ommercial. functions i~cludin~ the EOS pro-
Ject. In this field, proJects will be submitted 
also by Grumman, Martin Marietta, Rockwell 
and Boeing. 
Hughes Aircraft Company 
General remarks 
188. On 19th July 1984, the committee was 
received by Mr. Malcolm Currie of Hughes 
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Aircraft in El Segundo, Los Angeles. In El 
Segundo Hughes is constructing the corporate 
offices and the electro-optical and data systems 
group. Surrounding Los Angeles international 
airport are the development and production 
facilities for the radar systems group and the 
space and communications group. 
189. Hughes has become one of the world's 
largest and most diversified developers and 
producers of advanced electronics, missiles and 
space systems. Although the name reflects the 
fact that it once made aircraft, the company 
now makes a wide range of products, all more 
or less related to electronics. As of late 1981, 
it had almost 60,000 employees, 18,000 of 
whom are on the scientific and engineering 
technical staff. The company is divided into a 
number of operating groups. 
190. The ground systems group specialises in 
command and control systems, radars, comput-
ers, computer programming, displays, com-
munications, information management systems, 
electronic warfare systems, sonar systems for 
both surface ships and submarines, torpedo 
guidance control, fire control and mine electron-
ics. 
191. The missile systems group designs and 
develops advanced missile systems, such as the 
Phoenix and the Maverick. The radar systems 
group specialises in airborne systems and the 
electro-optical and data systems group produces 
electro-optical systems. The space and com-
munications group is responsible for all space 
systems including international and domestic 
communications satellite systems and satellites 
for scientific investigation. The industrial elec-
tronics group builds advanced components and 
industrial equipment, including microelectron-
ics, micro-wave tubes, connectors, multiplexing 
systems, gas lasers, welding and soldering 
equipment and industrial automation equip-
ment. Advanced research is carried out at the 
research laboratory. 
192. During fiscal year 1983, Hughes Aircraft 
Corporation sales increased by 13% to $4 
billion; 80% of these sales were to the United 
States Government. Hughes is the nation's 
second largest defence contractor and the 
Department of Defence number one contractor 
for defence electronics. Capital expenditure 
during the five-year period from 1978 onwards 
totalled $1.1 billion or 7.6% of sales. From 
1983 to 1987 more than $2 billion will be 
invested in capital improvements. The long-term 
objectives are to (i) design low-cost production, 
(ii) apply technology to the process of design 
and manufacturing, (iii) make total quality a 
way of life, (iv) encourage people to develop 
and use their full capabilities and talents, and 
(v) involve suppliers in reducing the cost of 
Hughes systems. 
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193. The mission of the ground systems group 
is to produce systems for tactical air defence, 
command and control, communication radar, 
electronic warfare, sonar, torpedo guidance, 
mine warfare, data processing and display. The 
United States air force started operating the 
Hughes joint surveillance system in 1983. This 
new system protects the air space of continental 
United States, Canada, Alaska and Hawaii. It 
is expected to save the air force more than 
$100 million in annual operating and mainten-
ance costs. In Europe the first two sites for a 
new air defence system of the Federal Republic 
of Germany began operating as did the first of 
forty-two sites for AEGIS, the computerised 
command and control network which Hughes is 
building for NATO. 
194. The joint tactical information distribution 
system will integrate the radar data system 
from the AWACS aircraft with the NATO 
ground-based air defence network. 
Missiles 
195. The missile systems group has as its 
mission advanced tactical guided-missile sys-
tems, including missile guidance and propulsion 
systems, missile launch control equipment and 
ancillary sub-systems and components. In 1983, 
the main effort was the development of the 
advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, 
AMRAAM, and the transition to a high-rate 
production of four other programmes which are: 
the improved Phoenix, the imaging infrared 
Maverick, TOW 2, and the Angle-rate bombing 
set. For AMRAAM there will be an extensive 
flight test programme in 1984 and 1985 and 
fabrication of parts for more than a hundred 
test missiles has begun. The Phoenix is a naval 
missile and will be delivered in 1984. It covers 
a distance of some 160 kilometres and has been 
92% successful. 
Maverick 
196. The Maverick is an air-to-ground missile 
designed for the United States air force and 
later on for the United States Marine Corps 
and navy, which versions are now being 
developed. It is designed for launching from 
tactical aircraft against hard point targets, such 
as field fortifications, bunkers, tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers, parked aircraft and radar or 
missile sites. More than 11,000 Mavericks have 
now been launched at distances ranging from a 
few thousand feet to many miles and from high 
altitude down to treetop level. 
TOW 
197. The TOW is a tube-launched, optically-
tracked, wire-guided missile developed for the 
United States army. It is a low-cost high-
reliability anti-tank missile system now also in 
use by the Unites States Marine Corps and_ by 
the armies or marine corps of more than thtrty 
other nations. The wire-guided missile is capable 
of destroying such targets as tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers, bunkers and small boats. 
Since its initial development, improvement 
programmes have led to heavier warheads w~th 
greater armour-piercing capacity as well as wtth 
an improved engine and guidance system. The 
modifications will not require any change in 
launcher or guidance hardware. Hughes has 
delivered more than 270,000 TOW missiles and 
over 1,000 airborne TOW systems. 
AMR4AM 
198. The AMRAAM is the advanced 
medium-range air-to-air missile under full-scale 
development by Hughes for the air force and 
the navy. It is intended to i~l'rove significa~tly 
the air-to-air combat capabthty of the Umted 
States fighter pilots. The AMRAAM is the 
leading project initiated by a memorandum of 
understanding, signed by the defence depart-
ments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, which 
is intended to avoid duplicated development 
costs in Atlantic Alliance countries. In carrying 
out this intention, AMRAAM will be compati-
ble with selected NATO aircraft. Hughes will 
produce ninety-four test missiles. Test firing will 
be conducted from the F-14, F-15, F-16 and 
F-18 at different air force bases. 
Radar systems 
199. Hughes Aircraft Company is a pioneer in 
the development of electronic scanning radars. 
These radars have dramatically improved the 
surveillance ability of the United States and 
many NATO and third countries. H_u~~es is 
developing radar for self-defence capabdttles for 
the army as well as for the navy, for short-
range as well as long-range projectiles. Many 
radars can be utilised in fixed or mobile 
configurations and many versions are being sold 
to NATO and other foreign countries. 
200. Hughes's long-term business base is 
anchored in three major airborne radar pro-
grammes: the weapons control system for the 
navy F-14 Tomcat, the radar systems for ~he 
air force F-15 Eagle and the navy and marme 
F-18 Hornet. These products will be diversified 
by the production of the advance~ synthe~ic 
aperture radar system for reconnatssance au-
craft the establishment of electronic counter-
mea;ures development programmes and addi-
tional orders for the weapon guidance data link. 
201. The mission of the Santa Barbara 
Research Centre is infrared systems, compo-
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nents and materials for ground, air and space 
applications, electro-optical instrumentation for 
military and space systems. Of the 71 ,000 
personnel working at Hughes Aircraft Corpor-
ation, some 20,000 are engaged in research and 
development and they handle about 2,000 
research projects. 
Technology transfer 
202. Finally, Mr. Malcolm Currie briefed the 
committee on American policy on technology 
transfer. He indicated that some 165 agree-
ments have been concluded with many Euro-
pean countries, for instance, five with France, 
five with the Netherlands and Belgium, sixty-
one with Italy, twenty-eight with the United 
Kingdom and forty-one with Germany. Accord-
ing to the new rules, technology transfer is now 
being very much controlled by the Defence and 
State Departments. For the flow of civil 
products which can be used for military 
purposes, the Department of Commerce will 
consult the Department of Defence. Cocom in 
Paris will be strengthened and there will be a 
narrow link between the Washington offices and 
those in Europe. A top priority task is to 
determine how effective controls can be main-
tained with increased industry-to-industry con-
tacts. On this question your Rapporteur refers 
to what has been said earlier in this report. 
TRW 
General remarks 
203. On 20th July 1984, the committee was 
received by Dr. Gerald Czaika and by Mr. Jan 
Roos, Vice-President, at TRW Company, 1 
Space Park, Redondo Beach, California. 
204. Mr. Roos gave a general overview of 
TRW, its origin and its future. It is a diversified 
company that provides high technology prod-
ucts, electronics and space systems and serves 
industrial and energy markets worldwide. They 
are developing communications satellites to link 
commercial, scientific and military systems 
worldwide; microelectronic chips to speed the 
flow of information, alternative energy resources 
and electronic systems to improve fuel efficiency 
in tomorrow's cars, trucks, fire vehicles and 
construction equipment. It is based on a two-
tier system: the growth of hardware and system 
growth. Since 1953 it was been involved in the 
development of ballistic missiles. The three 
most important segments are: electronics and 
defence, which cover about 50%, industrial and 
energy 20% and the automotive department 
30%. In Europe TR W has some 20,000 
personnel in thirty countries and in 1984 it has 
sales of $6 billion. 
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205. The industrial and energy division is 
concerned with oil and gas drilling equipment, 
components that keep aircraft flying and 
bearings, tools and fasteners that help raise 
productivity levels worldwide. TRW submergi-
ble pumps produce oil in the North Sea, 
Indonesia and the Middle East. The centrifugal 
pumps have helped set new drilling depth 
records. TRW operates facilities in thirteen 
locations worldwide. New sources of energy are 
also developed. TR W is conducting research in 
the uranium enrichment and fusion energy, is 
developing coal combustion and coal gasification 
systems. It is helping to create a technology to 
unlock oil-shale, heavy oil and tar sands and 
natural gas. 
206. TR W has been working now for nearly 
thirty years in electronics and space systems. 
Large-scale integrated circuits help television 
broadcasters create special effects. TRW build 
the S-band space-to-ground communications 
systems for the space shuttle. The tracking and 
data relay satellite system (TDRSS) is one of 
the first in communications satellite technology. 
It will be used to transmit data between earth 
orbiting spacecraft, earth-based users and a 
single highly-automated ground station at 
White Sands, New Mexico, for which TRW 
did the engineering. 
Chips 
207. Of great importance is the computer 
maintenance programme servicing more than 
700,000 units. TR W is making chips used 
widely by the television industry and producing 
circuits with 200,000 transistors mounted on a 
quarter-inch chip. The microelectronic circuitry 
is only a part of TR W's role in the nation's 
defence. 
208. The defence satellite communications 
system built by TR W is the backbone of the 
United States military worldwide communica-
tions system. TRW has launched five satellites 
under a fleet satellite communications pro-
gramme for the air force and the navy and is 
now working on the next generation of military 
communications satellites. 
Space station 
209. Because· of its extensive experience of 
spacecraft, TR W has been chosen for space 
platform studies and space station architectural 
studies. The space platform was intended to be 
a cost-effective long-term host vehicle for 
scientific and applications payloads. The services 
it would provide to multiple payloads include 
electrical power, heat rejection, attitude control 
and higher-rate data-handling communications 
through the tracking and data relay satellite 
system (TDRSS). 
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210. The platform is intended to become the 
core of a future space station. It had to be 
adaptable for manned occupancy without the 
need for major technological or operational 
breakthroughs. The platform modules are 
therefore designed to be highly redundant and 
fault tolerant. The platform is designed to have 
an on-orbit life of five years but it has also 
repair and replacement opportunities provided 
by shuttle-delivered parts, equipment and 
personnel. 
211. The space station can serve as a staging 
point for scientific missions, house a permanent 
laboratory for life sciences and materials 
research and act as a servicing facility for 
orbiting space platforms. For satellite com-
munications the space station can be used to 
assemble and test very large antennas prior to 
being placed in geosynchronous orbit and can 
reduce launch costs for comsats. For materials 
processing in space, the space station can 
provide a manned research laboratory and at 
some future time serve as a free-flying 
automated materials processing factory. 
212. A significant market for remote sensing 
also exists and, as the industry develops, the 
willingness of the private sector to invest in 
space resources might increase. For remote 
sensing from the space station, there are several 
areas that could benefit, among them ocean 
windjwave forecasting, sea ice forecasting, 
ocean monitoring for fisheries management, 
crop condition assessment and mineral resource 
discovery. The space station's use would be 
mainly to provide maintenance and servicing of 
a remote-sensing platform. 
213. The space station could reduce the cost 
of flights to geosynchronous orbit as well as 
permit the servicing and repair of satellites. 
Repairs could be performed by a reusable 
orbital transfer vehicle using the space station 
as a base for operations. These benefits together 
could amount to some $10 billion by the year 
2000. 
214. The space station is extendable and can 
be maintained in orbit incorporating new 
technology as it becomes available. A manned 
space station could also generate many econ-
omic benefits. Most significant is its ability to 
serve as a warehouse for parts, orbital replace-
ment units and fuels thereby increasing the 
shuttle load factor. The space station will also 
open the door to zero gravity manufacturing. 
From now on, space activities should be directed 
towards revenue-producing benefits as well as 
technological advances. 
215. TRW has had a rewarding twenty-year 
relationship with European countries. One of 
the great problems in Europe is that the 
reservoir of know-how is not big enough, 
especially in the large electronics materials 
field. TRW has a good relationship with Matra 
in France but their number of engineering staff 
is relatively small. Matra, for instance, has 
1,000 whereas TRW has 10,000 engineers. One 
of their management problems is therefore that 
they have to hire out staff from TRW to 
European firms. 
High energy lasers 
216. Finally, the committee was briefed on 
high energy lasers which will become highly 
effective weapons in the future: lasers as 
directed-energy weapons, lasers to communicate 
with submarines travelling at great depths, 
lasers in cruise missiles with intercontinental 
range and lasers with autonomous terminal 
homing guidance systems resistant to enemy 
countermeasures. They may have the potential 
for reshaping military strategy. No other 
weapons system can deliver intense thermal 
energies at the speed of light to distant targets. 
Research on laser uses and development started 
in 1961. In the 1970s, the research and 
development of high energy lasers took place. 
TR W combines a range of science and 
engineering disciplines to develop the high 
energy lasers. The physics studies include 
atomic and molecular chemistry, laser kinetics 
and particle behaviour in accelerators for 
particle beams or free electron-lasers. In the 
weapon field, they can be either ship-based or 
air-based. 
VI. Conclusions 
21 7. Ever since the committee was formed in 
1965, it has been convinced of the need to 
assert Europe's role in high technology and to 
establish close links with the United States. It 
realised that the Atlantic Alliance had to be 
steadily strengthened and that a large percent-
age of taxpayers' money could be saved by 
avoiding the research and development process 
of items already in production on the other side 
of the Atlantic. As indicated on 25th September 
1984 in the Council's reply to written question 
240 put by Mr. Bassinet, this meant the 
transfer of technology among European coun-
tries and between the United States and 
Europe. Co-operation on technology and com-
ponents, as affirmed by the Council, would be 
the only means of achieving increased collab-
oration on weapons systems in the future. 
21~. Close political attention has always been 
paid to the NATO military alliance. Since the 
1980s, however, a NATO industrial alliance 
has grown up within the military alliance and 
Europe having more or less caught up with the 
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United States in several high technology fields 
it sought to increase its share of the NATO 
market. 
219. Your Rapporteur is convinced that a 
certain balance is required and that this would 
be . advantageous for both Europe and the 
Umted States. In order to achieve this balance 
sincere efforts should be made on both sides of 
the. Atlan~ic to establish what is widely referred 
to m the mdustry as a two-way street in arms 
trade. For the United States, this would involve 
transferring highly-sophisticated United States 
technology to the European arms industry to 
produce new equi\'~ent in Europe while buying 
new European mihtary technology and equip-
ment. 
220. The aerospace companies which the 
committee visited in the United States all 
declared that they were willing to seek this 
kind of co-operation. All were also aware that 
the high cost of new equipment required a 
broad-based market. However, the administra-
ti?n and Congress keep the civilian and military 
aircraft market closed to European imports. 
There are certain exceptions, of course, such as 
the European Roland missile system which the 
United States bought to improve its air defences 
in Central Europe. If the governments wish to 
change the attitude of the United States 
Congress and administration, they will have to 
operate at a political level to achieve an 
acceptable two-way street. 
221. Much is at stake for the major European 
aerospace companies which have all had to cut 
back employment levels because of stagnation 
in orders at ~ome a~d in such key export 
markets as Latm Amenca and the Middle East. 
222. ~n the other hand, within Europe, co-
operation among European aerospace companies 
should be intensified and much might depend 
on collaborative efforts on the tactical combat 
aircraft. Your Rapporteur is convinced that if 
the six countries - the Netherlands wishes' to 
participate with France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom - are not able to 
agree on the new tactical fighter, it will be a 
heavy blow to Europe's ability to produce such 
an aircraft. At the same time, it will jeopardise 
European-American collaboration as none of 
the individual countries concerned can be a 
valid partner for the United States. 
223. Ultimately, these collaborative problems 
can be solved only by the political leaders of 
the c_ountries concerned. Co-operation cannot be 
restncted to the new tactical fighter but will be 
ex_t~nded also, for instance, to new helicopters, 
mihtary transport planes and missiles for the 
1990s. 
224. The Council should inform the Assembly 
of the results of major multinational weapon 
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projects in which the WEU countries are 
currently engaged and draw its conclusions 
from past experiences. Following-up on this 
information, the Council should indicate which 
two-way street programmes with the United 
States could be concluded and might be 
concluded in the near future. It should be fully 
realised that a sound European aerospace 
industry with some 500,000 employees is not 
only advantageous to Europe but essential for 
the well-being of the Atlantic Alliance, includ-
ing the United States. 
225. Less difficult might be future co-operation 
on the space station. NASA and ESA have a 
long collaborative experience and, on the 
European side, there is an international agency 
which can act for Europe. At the summit 
conference in London in June 1984, the heads 
of state and government declared that manned 
space stations are the kind of programme that 
provides a stimulus for technological develop-
ment leading to strengthened economy and 
improved quality of life. The European countries 
should consider carefully the United States 
invitation to participate in the development of 
such a station. 
226. Of course, participation, which would 
amount to some $1 billion, cannot be agreed to 
without certain conditions. Experience with 
spacelab was not considered wholly satisfactory 
for Europe; it received inadequate returns on its 
investment in spacelab. 
227. On the other hand, Europe should 
recognise that, while fund-sharing with the 
United States would be useful, it is not essential 
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and NASA could work alone, benefiting in the 
years to come from its research and the new 
products produced on the space station. Your 
Rapporteur has indicated a number of condi-
tions which should be negotiated and which are 
mentioned in the recommendation. The most 
difficult problem will certainly be to obtain 
management concessions necessary for a co-
operative space station. 
228. With regard to energy problems, the 
committee has the impression that the nuclear 
industry in the United States is at a turning 
point. At the same time, in Europe, apart from 
France, the nuclear industry is stagnating and 
new more economic and more secure ways have 
to be found for building nuclear energy plants 
with the necessary safeguards for the complete 
fuel cycle and radioactive waste. Here again, 
European-American collaboration would be in 
the interests of both the United States and 
Europe. 
229. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to 
express his regret that, after so many efforts 
and such a long period of negotiations between 
some 150 countries, the conference on the law 
of the sea has not reached a successful 
conclusion. Europe is divided and the present 
United States Government has a fairly negative 
attitude. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that 
one day or another the threads will be taken up 
again and that a modified convention will 
emerge. Your Rapporteur hopes the issue will 
remain a regular subject of consideration and 
consultation on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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APPENDIX I 
(a) Programme of the visit to the United States by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions1 
Sunday, 8th July 1984 
1.40 p.m. 
Monday, 9th July 1984 
9.30 a.m.-12.30 p.m. 
2.30 p.m.-5 p.m. 
7.11 p.m. 
Tuesday, lOth July 1984 
9 a.m. 
8th-22nd July 1984 
Arrival at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York. 
Hotel: Long Island Marriott 
101 James Doolittle Blvd. 
Uniondale, New York 
Grumman Aerospace Company 
1111 Stewart Avenue 
Bethpage, N.Y. 11714 
Introduction: 
Mr. George M. Skurla, President and 
Chairman of the Board 
Aircraft developments: 
Mr. M. Pelehach, President, Grumman 
International 
Grumman space programmes: 
Mr. J. Mockovciak, Director, Grumman 
Aerospace Corporation 
Sperry Corporation Electronic Systems 
Great Neck 
N.Y. 11020 
Electronic developments: 
Mr. Robert L. Wendt, President 
European-American collaborative projects: 
Mr. Spencer Ross, Vice-President Marketing, 
Electronic Systems 
Arrival at Washington National Airport. 
Hotel: Key Bridge Marriott 
401 Lee Highway 
Department of Defence 
The Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 20301 
Welcome: 
Colonel Phil Pryor, Contact 
Emerging technologies initiative: 
Mr. Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary for 
International Programmes and Technology 
I. Due to the need for a concise report, your Rapporteur has only been able to mention the most politically relevant 
briefings. The programme of the visit has been set out accordingly. 
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Wednesday, 11th July 1984 
10 a.m. 
2.30 p.m 
Thursday, 12th July 1984 
9.25 a.m. 
2.30 p.m. 
American-European collaboration: 
Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Under-Secretary of 
Defence for Research and Engineering 
Technology and security: 
Mr. Perle, Assistant Secretary for 
International Security Policy 
Research activities: 
Dr. Edith Martin, Deputy Under-Secretary 
for Research and Advanced Technology 
Strategic defence initiative: 
NASA 
Brigadier General Rankine, Assistant for 
Directed Energy Weapons 
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
Introduction: 
Mr. John D. Hodge, Director, Space Station 
Task Force 
{i) Space station developments; 
{ii) European participation: 
Mr. Robert F. Freitag, Deputy Director, 
Space Station Task Force 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
4645, Reservoir Road 
Washington, D.C. 20007 
General introduction: 
Mr. D. von Kyaw, Minister Plenipotentiary 
Energy policy: 
APPENDIX I 
Mr. Bryan Hampton, Energy Counsellor at the 
United Kingdom Embassy 
European participation in the space station: 
Mr. Ian Pryke, Head of the Washington 
Office of the European Space Agency 
Department of State 
2201 "C" Street 
Washington, D.C. 20520 
Welcome: 
Mr. John Hamilton, Contact 
General policy: 
Mr. Peter Rodman, Director of Policy 
Planning 
Law of the sea policy: 
Mr. Otho Eskine, Director, Office of 
Advanced Technology 
Department of Energy 
James Forrestal Building 
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20585 
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8.07 p.m. 
Friday, 13th July 1984 
9 a.m. 
Weekend free 
Sunday, 15th July 1984 
6.45 p.m. 
Monday, 16th July 1984 
9. a.m. 
6.55 p.m. 
Tuesday, 17th July 1984 
8.30 a.m. 
Welcome and international co-operative 
activities: 
Mr. John Dugger, Director, Office of 
International Affairs 
Nuclear energy policy: 
Mr. Frank Goldner, Assistant Director, 
Office of nuclear energy 
Fossil energy: 
Mr. Marvin Singer, Director, Office of 
Fossil Energy 
Arrival in New Orleans 
Martin Marietta Aerospace 
Michoud (external tanks) 
Denver Aerospace 
P.O. Box 29304 
New Orleans 
Louisiana 7 0 18 9 
General remarks: 
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Dr. Mathias Siebel, Manager, NASA Michoud 
Assembly Facility 
The shuttle's external tank: 
Mr. Kenneth Timmons, Vice-President and 
General Manager, Martin Marietta, Michoud 
Division 
Arrival in Houston 
Hotel: Houston Marriott Greenspoint 
255 North Belt Drive 
Houston, TX 77060 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre 
Houston, TX 77058 
Activities of the Centre: 
Mr. Charles Biggs, Public Relations 
Arrival in St. Louis 
Hotel: St. Louis Marriott 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
Box 516 
St. Louis MO 63106 
General remarks: 
Mr. James S. McDonnell, Corporate Vice-
President 
Military aircraft programmes: 
Mr. A. Marshall and collaborators 
Space systems and missiles: 
Mr. John F. Yardley 
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Wednesday, 18th July 1984 
8.25 p.m. Arrival in Los Angeles 
Hotel: Marriott Airport Hotel 
5855 West Century Road 
Thursday, 19th July 1984 
1.55 p.m. Hughes Aircraft Company 
P.O. Box 902 
Friday, 20th July 1984 
9 a.m. 
El Segundo CA 90245 
General remarks: 
Mr. Malcolm R. Currie, Executive Vice-
President 
TR W Systems and Energy 
One Space Park 
Redondo Beach 
California 90278 
General remarks: 
Mr. Jan Roos, Vice-President 
(b) List of participants in the committee's visit to the United States 
MM. AARTS (Netherlands) 
BASSINET (France) 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom) 
MM. BIEFNOT (Belgium) 
BOEHM (Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
CAVALIERE (Italy) 
COLAJANNI (Italy) 
FouRRE (France) 
GARRETT (United Kingdom) 
GIANOTTI (Italy) 
HILL (United Kingdom) 
LENZER (Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
McGuiRE (United Kingdom) 
MASCIADRI (Italy) 
MEZZAPESA {Italy) 
MUELLER (Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
Sir John 0SBORN (United Kingdom) 
MM. SCHMIDT (Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
VALLEIX (France) 
WILKINSON (United Kingdom) 
WoRRELL (Netherlands) 
Mrs. SAROGNI (Italian Delegation) 
Mr. HUIGENS (Counsellor to the Committee) 
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APPENDIX 11 
Questions for discussion during the committee's 
visit to the United States 
8th to 22nd July 1984 
State Department 
General policy 
1. What are the general policy guidelines 
with regard to science and technology in 
preparation for the 1990s? 
2. How can the international political aims 
of the American scientific and technological 
programme be defined? 
3. What is the government's position on 
collaboration with Western European countries 
in the scientific and technological field in the 
medium term? 
4. What is the government's position on 
collaboration with Japan and other countries of 
South-East Asia in the scientific and techno-
logical field? 
5. What is the relationship of the United 
States with the Latin-American countries and 
especially Brazil? 
6. How will it be ensured that the inter-
change with the NATO allies covers the full 
spectrum of western security aspects and can a 
new consensus on requirements for the alliance 
be defined? 
7. Do we need new consultative mechanisms 
outside the NATO framework including non-
NATO countries such as Japan? 
8. Should we aim for a security policy of a 
global nature? 
9. The committee is particularly interested 
in questions on space and aviation research but 
also in energy problems, new sources of energy 
and marine science development. What are the 
United States policy trends for the 1990s? 
10. To which of the above sectors did your 
government give priority during the 1960s, the 
1970s and the 1980s? 
11. What are the budget trends and could 
global figures be given? 
Space activities 
12. What should be the role of the United 
Nations in space? 
13. Could it play a role by using satellites to 
verify the execution of disarmaments plans? 
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14. Would it be possible for the United 
Nations to have its own reconnaissance satel-
lites? 
15. Should the United Nations committee on 
the peaceful uses of outer space discuss this 
matter and, if so, what action might it be able 
to take? 
16. What roles should Intelsat and Inmarsat 
play and what is the American policy towards 
other international space-oriented organisa-
tions? What should be the role of private 
industries? 
17. Which countries have agreements with 
the United States for receiving and processing 
Landsat data? 
18. What is the Department of State's opinion 
on the results of and follow-up to the 1958 
Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Moscow Test Ban 
Treaty, the 1966 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 
Non-proliferation Treaty, the Convention on 
international liability for damage caused by 
space objects of March 1972, the 197 5 
Convention on the registration of objects 
launched into outer space and the draft treaty 
submitted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on banning the stationing of any 
weapons in outer space? 
19. What are the space implications of the 
SALT I and SALT 11 agreements? 
20. Is it correct to say that celestial bodies 
are in part demilitarised but that outer space is 
not? 
21. Do you consider it possible to prevent the 
military use of space through the deployment of 
offensive space weapons systems by promoting 
new international treaties and related verifica-
tion procedures as well as through the imple-
mentation of existing accords to limit the 
military use of space. 
22. Would negotiations also be necessary 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
or between other powers? 
Law of the sea 
23. On its last visit the committee discussed 
extensively the consequences of the American 
position on the law of the sea treaty. What is 
the present situation and what is American 
policy with regard to this convention? 
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24. Will the United States authorise private 
companies to start mining during the next 
decade without adhering to the convention? 
25. Will the United States initiate interna-
tional negotlatlons to establish reciprocal 
interim arrangements co-ordinating regulation 
of deep seabed mining operations? 
26. With which countries would the United 
States wish to establish such interim arrange-
ments? 
27. Is research and development still continu-
ing and is this being carried out by government 
agencies such as the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration? 
Defence Department 
NATO activities 
28. How is the transatlantic two-way street 
between North America and Europe develop-
ing? 
29. Which specific programme in the area of 
co-operation between the United States and the 
NATO allies can be considered a success? 
30. How is the development of family of 
weapons systems progressing? 
31. What has been the result of the initiative 
taken by Mr. Delauer on the subject of 
international industry-to-industry armaments 
co-operation? 
32. What have been the main difficulties up 
until now? 
33. Could a view be given on the relative 
merits of international industry-to-industry co-
operation versus government-to-government co-
operation on armaments? 
34. Have there been concrete results of the 
October 1982 meeting with the national 
armaments directors of the European countries 
in Brussels? 
35. What conclusions has the United States 
Government drawn from this experiment? 
36. What is the opinion of the United States 
administration with regard to the NATO 
infrastructure programme which started in 
1950? 
37. What are the benefits for the United 
States of this programme? 
38. What is percentage of the United States 
budget contribution to NATO is set aside for 
the infrastructure programme? 
39. What is the total United States defence 
expenditure for all the common funding pro-
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grammes - infrastructure, military budget, civil 
budget and the NATO airborne early warning 
system? 
40. How does the United States view this 
integrated NATO AWACS system? 
41. What is the budget of the Defence 
Department research and development pro-
gramme? 
42. How much is allotted to industry and to 
defence establishments? 
43. What are the main items for research: 
very high speed integrated circuits, high energy 
lasers, a new composite material, chemical 
agents, etc.? 
44. Would it be possible to improve co-
ordination of American-European research and 
development 
45. Would it be possible for NATO to 
promote joint American-European aircraft 
developments for the year 2000 and beyond 
with regard to fighter, bombardment and 
transport aircraft? 
46. Could collaborative ventures be set up in 
the field of air-, land- and sea-based missiles? 
Space activities 
47. In his report 976, Mr. Wilkinson 
described long-term United States space strat-
egy and indicated that a low-altitude defence 
system is being designed to intercept incoming 
re-entry vehicles.What is the American policy 
in this field? 
48. What would be the consequence of a 
further-developed ballistic missile defence sys-
tem and the existing nuclear strategy? 
49. How should the recommendations of the 
High Frontier team be regarded? 
50. Is the space segment becoming increas-
ingly important for the deployment of military 
forces? In which fields is this especially true? 
51. What would be the military use if a space 
station or space platform was assembled in 
orbit? 
52. Would such a platform play only a 
secondary role with regard to science or civil 
space applications? 
NASA 
53. What specific guidelines has the govern-
ment drawn up for long-range space activities? 
54. What is the budget trend for space 
development? 
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55. What percentage of the space budget is 
assigned to the space station, the shuttle and 
the tug? 
56. What percentage of the budget is set 
aside for scientific purposes and what goals have 
been set for scientific work and research in 
outer space? 
57. How many shuttles will be built over the 
coming decade and how many flights will take 
place a year when the system becomes 
operational? 
58. Could the shuttle put modules into orbit 
for the construction of large platforms in space? 
59. What has been industry's reply to the 
request to promote industrial development in 
space, new metals, new medicines, etc.? 
60. Could an indication be given of the 
results of the space telescope mission? 
61. What are the developments with regard 
to the transferring of NASA tasks to operational 
systems of the private sector? Is this taking 
place in the fields of communications, remote-
sensing, meteorological satellites, etc.? 
62. Although there is competition between 
Europe and American industry, for example in 
satellite communications, there are still many 
areas where co-operation is essential. Which are 
considered to be of most importance? 
63. Europe has expressed her interest to study 
President Reagan's offer regarding a space 
station provided: 
- the participation in the United States 
station is coherent with Europe's own 
long-term planning, one goal of which 
is Europe's autonomy; 
- the participation is situated in a 
technologically innovative field; 
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- the participation takes account of 
Europe's experience gained over ten 
years of co-operation for the develop-
ment of spacelab. 
What is NASA's reaction to Europe's objectives 
as outlined above? 
64. Is NASA willing to recognise the very 
specific relations with Europe stemming from 
the spacelab co-operation? 
65. Is NASA, for example, prepared not to 
duplicate all phase B activities undertaken by 
Europe thus recognising the experience existing 
in Europe? 
66. Will it be possible for Europe to contrib-
ute a technologically innovative element of the 
initial core station? 
67. Would Europe have a more active role in 
the management during the various phases of 
the programme than in the case of spacelab 
where ESA could not but accept the changes 
decided by NASA (delays and cost overrun)? 
68. How does NASA view the potential 
problem of surplus capacity if NASA, Europe 
and Japan develop laboratory modules? What 
solution does NASA envisage? 
69. Would Europe have preferential access 
and use of the entire space station? 
70. Although it is understood that exact 
figures on the operation cost are still unknown, 
it would be interesting to learn NASA's ideas 
on what could be the leading principle for the 
repartition of operation cost amongst the 
different partners and whether there will be 
mechanisms for off-setting them by providing 
hardwarejservicesjaccess to facilities or data, 
etc. 
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Status of the Hubble Space Telescope Programme 
NASA currently plans to launch the 
Hubble space telescope in the second half of 
1986. The Hubble space telescope consists of 
three major hardware elements: the optical 
telescope assembly, the support systems module 
and five science instruments. The European 
Space Agency (ESA) is developing one of those 
instruments, the faint object camera, and the 
solar arrays. 
All of the major structural components of 
the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), includ-
ing the primary mirror, have been manufactured 
and are in the process of final assembly and 
checkout. The OTA is currently planned to be 
delivered to Lockheed Missiles and Space 
Company, the prime contractor, in November 
1984. This schedule will accommodate the 
completion of the integration with the science 
instruments and support systems module in 
time for a launch in the second half of 1986. 
The support systems module (SSM) is 
the primary structural element that will accom-
modate the assembly of all systems into the 
complete spacecraft and will provide the basic 
spacecraft services including pointing control, 
electrical power, data management and thermal 
control. Lockheed began the integration and 
checkout of the SSM on 1st May 1984, an 
important step towards an integrated, fully-
proven space system. 
The five scientific instruments, including 
the faint object camera, have recently completed 
a very crucial testing and verification pro-
gramme that required nearly a year to complete. 
Now that this testing has been concluded, the 
instruments have been released back to their 
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manufacturing groups and ESA to perform the 
necessary rework, recalibrations and retest prior 
to their delivery to Lockheed. 
The ESA solar array system is nearing 
completion. Several of the electronic assemblies 
have been delivered by ESA to Lockheed to 
support the verification programme, and the 
solar arrays are expected to be delivered to 
Lockheed in time to support a launch in the 
second half of 1986. 
Finally, NASA has established a Space 
Telescope Science Institute (STScl) to manage 
the space telescope research programme through 
selection of ST users, conduct science operations 
of the space telescope observatory and provide 
staff and facilities to serve the user community. 
ESA is also providing staff to the STScl. 
The STScl has made good progress since 
its establishment. It is currently developing the 
capability to operate the science aspects of the 
Hubble space telescope observatory and its 
versatile scientific instruments. The mechanism 
to solicit and evaluate observing proposals from 
the science community is under development. 
Furthermore, many of the supporting capabili-
ties and services needed to operate the Hubble 
space telescope are being developed by the 
STScl. 
As the NASA administrator has stated, 
the Hubble space telescope is the centrepiece 
for the NASA space science and applications 
programme and we expect that it will prove to 
be the most important scientific instrument ever 
flown. We are pleased that Europe, through 
ESA, is co-operating with us on this programme. 
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Information given in Aviation Week 
on the United States defence budget 
1st October 1984 
Congress last week authorised a 6.9% real 
increase in defence spending in fiscal year 1985 
and backed restrictions on MX missile funding 
and on anti-satellite weapons tests previously 
agreed to by congressional leaders. 
Congress approved a $297 billion defence 
authorisation bill for the new fiscal year that 
began on 1st October. The 6.9% increase after 
inflation is just over half the 13% increase 
originally requested by the White House. 
The authorisation bill contains, inter alia, 
these provisions: 
- The $99.5 billion conference compro-
mise contains $2.5 billion of procure-
ment funding for 21 MX strategic 
missiles. However, $1.5 billion of that 
is frozen. 
- $8.2 billion in procurement and 
research, development, test and evalu-
ation (RDT &E) funds for 34 
USAF JRockwell International B-1 B 
bombers. 
- $3.5 billion for 150 USAFJGeneral 
Dynamics F -16 fighters, the quantity 
requested by the administration. 
- $2.8 billion for 84 Navy JMcDonnell 
Douglas F J A-18s, the number 
requested by the administration. 
- Approximately $2.3 billion for 42 
USAF JMcDonnell Douglas F-15s, six 
fewer than sought by the administra-
tion. 
- Nearly $1.9 billion for eight 
USAF JLockheed C-5Bs, 10 of which 
had been requested by the administra-
tion. 
- Just under $1.5 billion for 144 
Army JHughes· Helicopters AH-64 
attack helicopters, the quantity sought 
by the administration. 
- Nearly $1.3 billion for 24 
NavyJGrumman F-14s, the number 
requested by the administration. 
- $984.1 million for 32 
MarineJMcDonnell Douglas AV-8B 
Harriers, the number requested by the 
administration. 
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- $800.3 million to re-engine 43 
USAF JBoeing KC-135s. 
- $580.7 million for 117 Divad division 
air defense guns. 
- $625 million for 1,571 Texas Instru-
ments HARM air-to-surface missiles. 
- No more than two "successful" tests 
(defined as intercepts) of an anti-
satellite missile (Asat) against an 
object in space may be conducted in 
fiscal year 1985. No tests whatever 
may be undertaken until 15 days after 
the President certifies that four condi-
tions have been met: the tests are 
consistent with the 1972 United 
States/Soviet Union anti-ballistic mis-
sile (ABM) treaty; the United States 
is trying to negotiate the strictest 
possible limits on Asat, consistent with 
national security; pending completion 
of the negotiations, testing Asat against 
an object in space is necessary to the 
national security, and such testing will 
not impair Asat negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. The conferees approved 
the full $143.3 million requested for 
Asat research and development. Pro-
curement funding was not an issue, but 
the research and development funds 
are limited to no more than the two 
successful tests of the F-15 miniature 
homing vehicle Asat weapon. 
- Approved funding includes $81.5 mil-
lion for research and development and 
$532.1 million for procurement of 180 
General Dynamics Tomahawk sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in 
fiscal year 1985. 
Other provisions of the bill include: 
- A Senate proposal to develop the C-18, 
a used Boeing 707, for the joint 
surveillance and target attack radar 
system (JSTARS). Conferees author-
ised $94.9 million for the air force 
research and development account and 
$60 million for the army's. The system 
is intended to give United States 
conventional forces the ability to detect 
enemy units more than 100 km. ( 62.1 
mi.) beyond the forward edge of the 
battle area. 
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- Reduced funding for the Hughes 
advanced medium-range air-to-air mis-
sile (AMRAAM) because of congres-
sional concerns about programme cost 
cna schedule growth. The reduced 
authorisation of 50 missiles at a cost of 
$115 million plus $35 million for 
advanced procurement will "prohibit 
the premature production of a large 
number of missiles", the House Armed 
Services Committee said. The admin-
istration asked for 174 missiles at a 
cost of $377.5 million and $64.9 million 
for advanced procurement. 
- Six Grumman A-6E attack aircraft 
were authorised for the navy and 
provided $15.1 million in advance 
procurement for continued production 
in fiscal year 1986. Also approved were 
Senate recommendations of $69.6 mil-
lion for A-6E modernisation and $278.9 
million for improvements to the F-14, 
including new avionics and engines. 
- Authorisation of $188 million for 
development of the Marine tilt-rotor 
JVX aircraft. 
- Just over $1.7 billion was authorised 
for procurement of a Trident ballistic 
missile submarine in fiscal year' 1985. 
In addition $2 billion in research and 
development and $133 million for 
advanced procurement were authorised 
for the Trident 2 (D-5) missile system. 
"The conferees also expressed their 
support for penetration aids research in 
view of Soviet efforts to expand 
significantly their anti-ballistic missile 
capability", a Senate Armed Services 
Committee statement said. 
- The greater operating range of the 
Trident missile system has imposed a 
heavier communications load on the 
navy's Tacamo fleet of 16 Lockheed 
EC-130Qs, the conferees said, and they 
authorised $60 million for research and 
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development of a new or improved 
aircraft. More than $99 million was 
authorised for navy strategic communi-
cations. 
- Purchase of nine Lockheed P-3 Orion 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol 
aircraft, 24 Sikorsky Lamps Mk. 3 
SH-60B ASW helicopters and six 
Kaman Lamps Mk. 1 SH-2F ASW 
helicopters. 
- Procurement of eight McDonnell 
Douglas KC-1 OA tanker aircraft and 
eight Lockheed C-5B strategic airlift 
aircraft. For tactical airlift, the confer-
ees authorised 16 Lockheed C-130H 
aircraft. Eight are to be assigned to the 
Air Force Reserve, four to the Air 
National Guard and four to the active 
force. Also authorised was modification 
of two General Dynamics C-131 mis-
sion support aircraft operated by the 
Air National Guard. 
- $129.3 million for research and devel-
opment on C-5A aircraft capabilities. 
- A House recommendation of $150 
million for the very high speed inte-
grated circuits (VHSIC) programme 
"in recognition of the need to improve 
weapon system reliability and capa-
bility". The conferees ordered the 
Secretary of Defence to develop a plan 
to ensure that VHSIC technology is 
shared with weapon system developers 
as it becomes available. 
- $20.4 million for the space booster 
programme. The conferees believe, the 
House Armed Services Committee said, 
"that although the space shuttle has 
demonstrated its effectiveness as a 
space-launch system, the Department 
of Defence should not rely only on that 
system for the deployment of crucial 
military payloads". 
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Amendment 1 
3rd December 1984 
United States-European co-operation in advanced technology 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. van der Werff 
1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed: van der Werff 
1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 2 
3rd December 1984 
United States-European co-operation in advanced technology 
AMENDMENT 21 
tabled by Mr. Fourre and others 
2. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
.. Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to 
harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European 
armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-
operative work in the various multilateral forums;". 
Signed: Fourre, Bassinet, Lagorce 
I. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Military use of space 
Part II 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
8th November 1984 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFf RECOMMENDATION 
on the military use of space, Part II 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. United States military involvement in space - a summary 
Ill. The politics of vulnerability 
IV. High Frontier 
V. The strategic defence initiative 
VI. Implications for arms control of the strategic defence initiative 
VII. The United States space station - a challenge for Europe 
VIII. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Policy implications of defences against ballistic missiles 
II. President Reagan's strategic defence initiative (SDI) 
1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Adriaensens, BOhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fourre, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: Hill), MM. Hengel, McGuire, 
Mezzapesa (Alternate: Cavaliere), Rizzi, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Biillesheim (Alternate: Kittelmann), Mrs. Staels-Dompas, 
MM. Valleix (Alternate: Galley), Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the military use of space 
Part ll 
(i) Determined to pursue its consistent interests in the strategic implications for Western Europe 
of present and future applications of space technology; 
(ii) Eager to exploit the specialist expertise of the revitalised organs of WEU, namely the Standing 
Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, to concert industrial 
collaboration in the military space field and to evolve a Western European policy on arms control 
that takes into account current and projected developments in military space technology; 
(iii) Noting the Soviet Union's persistent refusal to engage in a fruitful dialogue with the United 
States over reductions in offensive ballistic missiles but eagerness to halt American development of 
defensive space-based systems; 
(iv) Welcoming the steady progress of the European space effort under the aegis of the European 
Space Agency and in particular the validation of Spacelab and the Ariane launcher and success in 
the fields of telecommunications and remote sensing; 
(v) Appreciating the French Government's commitment as expressed by President Mitterrand to 
a full realisation of Europe's strategic potential in space and its publicly stated concern that the 
consequent deductions for European security policy should be drawn and acted upon; 
(vi) Confident that WEU can offer the best forum for parliamentary debate and analysis about the 
United States Government's strategic defence initiative and the prospects for an effective space-based 
defence against ballistic missiles; 
(vii) Supporting efforts through the European Space Agency and through national governments to 
make a co-ordinated and cost-effective Western European contribution to the NASA space station, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Act as the primary political instrument for intergovernmental concertation of a unified 
Western European policy towards the military use of space; 
2. Commission the restructured and more appropriately staffed Standing Armaments Committee 
and Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide expert advice on the defence and industrial 
aspects and implications, for arms control and confidence-building measures between states, of 
current developments in military space technology; 
3. Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government to prevent divergencies of view 
between the American and Western European partners of the Atlantic Alliance about the benefits 
of the strategic defence initiative, and suggest a space planning group be established within NATO 
to that end; 
4. Support for industrial, technological and strategic reasons an expanded European space 
programme and promote enhanced dialogue on related policies and objectives both with the European 
Space Agency and national governments; 
5. Give impetus to a joint European response to the NASA space station proposals which builds 
on existing European capabilities, is complementary to the modules, elements and systems of the 
space station as a whole and enhances Europe's technical capacity for autonomous developments in 
this field including manned space missions; 
6. Provide a clear lead and direction to parliamentary and public opinion in favour of a major 
European effort to meet the challenge of the space age in the fullest sense through increased 
scientific space experimentation, commercial applications and security-enhancing space developments; 
7. Ensure that the reorganised office of the Council of Ministers of WEU can draw on adequate 
specialist space expertise to inform its consideration of the increasingly important implications for 
Western European security policy of developments in space technology. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. This report follows the visit of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions to the United States in 
July 19841• During that visit your Rapporteur 
and members of the committee were briefed 
and informed by representatives of the United 
States administration, Departments of State 
and Defence, NASA and industry. This report 
will be more descriptive than prescriptive. It 
will seek to analyse current developments in the 
military application of space technology in the 
United States and their potential strategic 
implications for the Western Alliance as a 
whole and for Western European strategy in 
particular. The purpose of this report is to 
stimulate interest and debate rather than to lay 
down dogmatically firm proposals. 
2. Europe, through a combination of disin-
terest and lack of collective will has allowed the 
United States and the Soviet Union to assume 
a leading and dominating position in the space 
field. This failure on the part of the European 
nations represents a denial of Europe's technical 
potential which is in striking contrast to earlier 
European achievements in pioneering jet pro-
pulsion, supersonic flight, vertical take-off 
aircraft and nuclear power. Indeed the work of 
German scientists on the V 1 flying bomb (the 
first operational cruise missile) and on the V2 
rocket (the first operational ballistic missile) 
formed the basis of the subsequent American 
and Soviet ballistic missile and space pro-
grammes. Indeed, without the help of former 
German scientists, like Dr. Werner von Braun, 
it is unlikely that the Soviets would have 
launched Sputnik I by 1957 and that the 
American Apollo programme would have landed 
man on the moon by 1969. 
3. Until the foundation of the European 
Space Agency, the Eur~pean spa~ effo~t ~as 
poorly co-ordinated and 1ts results d1sappomtmg. 
The decision of the British Government not to 
pursue the development of Blue Streak a.s a 
ballistic missile component of the Umted 
Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent meant 
that the United Kingdom would no longer have 
the capability to put big payloads into sp~ce 
although it continued to produce small soundmg 
rockets. When ELDO also finally cancelled 
Europa I, Europe was left without a launcher 
1. United States-European co-operation in advanced 
technology, Rapporteur Mr. Hill, Document 992. 
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until the Ariane rocket was built. The mainten-
ance of an independent national nuclear 
deterrent on the part of France with a sizeable 
ballistic missile element ensured that launcher 
technology was retained by Europe. 
4. Today, Europe has a useful space pro-
gramme for a tenth of the annual financial 
outlay of the United States thanks largely to 
the co-ordination of the European Space 
Agency. Ariane has proved itself fully competi-
tive with the shuttle for the insertion of 
satellites into geostationary orbit. ESA has a 
full and varied scientific programme and its 
applications programme is evolving well with 
the forthcoming launch of the ERS-1 remote 
sensing satellite system in addition to the 
already successful Meteosat satellite. In com-
munications satellites Europe can technically 
match the United States and this is the area in 
which for sound commercial reasons the United 
Kingdom has concentrated its expertise. Lastly, 
the successful flight of Spacelab - primarily a 
German achievement - on the United States 
shuttle showed that ESA can be a reliable 
partner with NASA and the experience gained 
will be invaluable for later co-operation on a 
space station. 
5. In spite of all these undoubted successes, 
Europe has failed to respond adequately to the 
challenge of the space age. There has been a 
lack of political leadership to match the 
dimensions of the challenge with the notable 
exception of France. France's President Mitter-
rand has called for the establishment of a 
European space community to build a Europe 
space station. In his speech at The Hague, 
President Mitterrand set Europe a clear goal in 
the space field and he has demonstrated in 
subsequent speeches that the French Govern-
ment appreciates the strategic significance of 
current space developments. 
6. The United Kingdom has, of course, 
deployed Skynet military telecommunications 
satellites and its own experience during the 
Falklands war of 1982 demonstrated the key 
role which space-based communications satel-
lites can play in modern military operations. 
More recently, United States reconnaissance 
satellites played an important part in the arrest 
by the British navy of a trawler running guns 
and explosives to the IRA. Even so, the general 
Western European reaction to the full exploi-
tation of the potential of modern space 
technology to enhance our security and defence 
is cautious and lukewarm. Anxiety about cost 
is allied to emotive and ill-considered judgments 
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about "star wars". These superficial views owe 
more to fanciful imagination than they do to 
serious analytical study of today's space 
technologies and their likely effect on the global 
balance of power, deterrence, the prevention of 
war and the conduct of military operations were 
deterrence ever to fail. 
7. The Assembly of Western European 
Union and its Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions in particular 
has taken a consistent and serious interest in 
the strategic implications of space technology. 
Institutionally the Council of Ministers of 
Western European Union is the body best-fitted 
to concert a European policy for the utilisation 
of military space technology since the European 
Space Agency is statutorily limited to the civil 
space field. The Standing Armaments Commit-
tee could examine possible joint requirements 
for military space-based systems and how they 
could be met industrially. The Agency for the 
Control of Armaments could study the impli-
cations of technical developments in the space 
field and their potential impact upon disarma-
ment and arms control. If appropriately staffed 
by suitably qualified experts, the Agency could 
monitor surveillance satellite data on behalf of 
the member countries and by thus processing 
and transmitting reconnaissance information 
from remote sensing satellites build confidence 
in Western Europe· against the risk of surprise 
attack and unexpected aggression. The Agency 
for the Control of Armaments of WEU could 
in this new form provide data from a European 
regional satellite monitoring system either to 
international clients or just to WEU member 
countries. 
8. In short, it is time for the member nations 
of WEU to make a cool and well-informed 
appraisal of the likely effects for the security of 
Western Europe of the continued Soviet space 
challenge and of the United States strategic 
defence initiative (SDI), whereby the practica-
bility of a space-based defence against ballistic 
missile attack is being investigated. For a 
generation, the virtually unstoppable capacity 
of the ballistic missile to wreak nuclear 
devastation has represented the principal and 
most dramatic exploitation of space technology 
for military purposes. The negligible effective-
ness of anti-ballistic missile systems and the 
strict numerical limitation placed on them 
under the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty 
have enabled the destruction of the superpowers' 
main centres of population in any nuclear 
exchange to be mutually assured. The greatly 
improved accuracy of modern ballistic missiles 
has put a premium on the effectiveness of a 
first strike against land-based systems and 
emphasised the necessity of maintaining a triad 
of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles between 
land-based, submarine and air-launched sys-
150 
terns. The present technical feasibility of a 
counter-force strategy has not, however, in any 
way reassured public opinion. Many people in 
Western Europe are understandably deeply 
concerned by the build-up of nuclear stockpiles 
and what they view as massively assured mutual 
destruction if deterrence fails whether by 
malign and fatal design, miscalculation, esca-
lation from conventional conflict or simply by 
accident. 
9. There must be a better way of preserving 
the peace than the threat of mutual annihilation. 
Hitherto, the chief contribution of space 
technology has been to ensure that the balance 
of terror has been maintained by a proliferation 
of nuclear ballistic missiles, the provision of 
satellite communications for nuclear-armed 
submarines and aircraft and of remote-sensing 
satellite-derived mapping data for the guidance 
of nuclear warhead cruise missiles. The offence 
has almost totally dominated defence. The 
consequence has been the awesome paradox 
that the perfection of the space-related offensive 
technologies of mass nuclear destruction has 
rendered war incredible as a rational instrument 
of political and strategic policy between the 
superpowers. As a consequence, our continent 
has enjoyed peace for a longer period than any 
during the last hundred years. However, it has 
been an uneasy peace and little progress has 
been made to resolve potential sources of 
conflict in our continent, such as the artificial 
division of Germany and the denial of the right 
of self-determination to the peoples of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
10. This paper will examine whether current 
and projected developments in the field of space 
technology could redress the balance between 
offence and defence in favour of defence and 
whether as a result our security could be 
enhanced and the process of mutual, balanced 
and verifiable disarmament accelerated. Fur-
thermore, the potential role and involvement of 
Europe in this process will be analysed. Lastly, 
the WEU nations must decide whether they 
can afford, on strategic, industrial and commer-
cial grounds, to maintain only a minimal 
presence in space or whether they will rise to 
the opportunities and challenge of the last and 
ultimate frontier whose conquest will, for good 
or ill, undoubtedly transform man's potentiali-
ties and way of life more profoundly than any 
challenge of modern history. 
11. United States military involvement in space 
-a summary 
11. As explained in the introduction, the 
militarisation of outer space has massively 
gathered momentum since the first V2 ballistic 
missiles fell upon London in late 1944, although 
to date no weapons of mass destruction have 
actually been deployed in space. Satellites are 
used as integral components of earth-based 
armed forces and weapons which can be aimed 
at satellites (Asat) weapons have been intro-
duced into the Soviet armed forces and are in 
an advanced state of development in the United 
States. From 1958 to 1983, 2,114 military-
orientated satellites have been launched which 
constitutes about three-quarters of all satellites 
put into orbit. About half of the United States' 
expenditure on space is funded by the Depart-
ment of Defence. 
12. The position of the American Government 
with regard to space development has been laid 
down in several directives. It could be summar-
ised by saying that the United States will 
conduct those activities in space that it deems 
necessary to its national security. National 
security space programmes support su~h f!-lnc-
tions as command and control, commumcattons, 
navigation, environmental monitoring, warning, 
surveillance and space defence. The following 
policies will govern the conduct of the national 
security programme: 
(i) survivability and endurance of space 
systems; 
(ii) development of an anti-satellite capa-
bility with operational deployment as 
a goal (the primary purposes of a 
United States Asat capability are to 
deter threats to space systems of the 
United States and its allies); 
(iii) development and maintenance of an 
integrated attack warning, verification 
and contingency reaction capability 
which can effectively detect and react 
to threats to United States space 
systems. Security, including dissemi-
nation of data, is to be conducted 
under the exclusive control of the 
government. 
13. The United States Defence Department 
operates a military sa~ellite co~munic~~ions 
system in support of tts worldwtde mthtary 
forces. This is called the Milsatcom. The air 
force satellite communications system, Msat-
com is specially designed for the air force nucl~ar capable forces. The fleet sate!lite 
communications system, Fleetsatcom, provtdes 
a worldwide communication system for the 
navy. The navy also has its own navigation 
system, called Tr~nsit, . w~ich . i~ specially 
designed for strategtc balhsttc mtsstle submar-
ines and many other military and commercial 
users. The Navstar global positioning pro-
gramme is a space-based radio-positioning 
navigation and time dissemination system that 
will improve weapon delivery, worldwide rapid 
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deployment and intelligence and reconnaissance 
capabilities. It will be definitively operational in 
1988. 
14. The Landsat 4 satellite, launched in July 
1982, is used mainly for earth imagery and for 
mapping, although its applications are primarily 
civil. 
15. The defence meteorological satellite pro-
gramme provides high resolution visibility and 
infrared cloud imagery, atmospheric sounders 
for moisture content and temperature and 
ionospheric monitoring to support the Depart-
ment of Defence strategic and tactical weather 
requirements. A surveillance and warning 
satellite system provides the national command 
authorites with early warning data on missiles. 
The space surveillance research and develop-
ment programme adopted by the defence 
advanced research projects agency (DARPA) 
is of great importance. It includes advanced 
microwave technology, naval space surveillance 
systems and also. the anti-satellite progra~me 
in response to Sovtet development of operational 
Asats. 
Ill. The politics of vulnerability 
16. When President Reagan was elected to 
office in 1980, the growth in Soviet military 
power and the heightened threat pos~d by 
Soviet nuclear forces were a theme m hts 
election campaign. Governor Reagan came to 
the White House committed to redressing the 
balance of military power in the United States' 
favour. 
17. However, the accuracy and effectiveness 
of the latest Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles, 
such as the SS-18, SS-19 and SS-20, were so 
formidable that it was clear that the United 
States and its European allies were potentially 
vulnerable to a Soviet first strike as never 
before. In Europe some balance was restored 
through the modernisation of NATO's 
intermediate-range nuclear forces and the 
introduction to service of Pershing 11 ballistic 
missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles (ICBM). 
In the United States it had become clear during 
the Carter years that the deployment of a new 
strategic ballistic missile was essential. When 
Mr. Reagan came to office, President Carter's 
plans to procure MX ballistic missiles to be 
based in multiple protective shelters were 
replaced by new proposals which would be 
supposedly more popular, to base the new ~X 
missiles in closely-spaced and hardened stlos, 
known in Pentagon jargon as "dense pack". 
Even this basing mode proved unacceptable to 
Congress. 
18. The President, therefore, requested Lieu-
tenant General Brent Scowcroft (USAF retired) 
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to form a commission to study the options for 
the future modernisation of the United States 
ICBM forces, consult with Congress and report. 
The outcome was the recommendation that 
limited MX deployment in existing Minuteman 
silos should proceed and that a new small single 
warhead strategic nuclear missile should be 
developed. This view prevailed. However, in 
spite of the success of the Scowcroft commission 
in removing from the arena of political 
controversy the question of the basing of the 
new generation of United States strategic 
nuclear missiles, Soviet intransigence over arms 
control and a lobby of increasing influence 
calling for the United States to use its vast 
technical resources and economic strength to 
develop new space-related technologies to 
reduce American vulnerability to Soviet surprise 
nuclear attack, led to a novel defence initiative. 
Instead of building stockpiles of offensive 
nuclear missiles of increasing deadliness and 
accuracy, the United States should build 
space-based defences against ballistic missile 
attack. This would have the merit of appealing 
to the ever-growing constituency of nuclear 
freeze supporters, enhance deterrence and 
provide an incentive for the Soviets to resume 
the arms control process, since any attempt on 
their part to swamp the defences numerically or 
to outsmart them with new penetration devices 
would be prohibitively costly. 
IV. High Frontier 
19. In the words of Lieutenant General 
Daniel 0. Graham, former Deputy Director of 
the CIA: 
"High Frontier is a privately funded 
effort conducted under the aegis of the 
Heritage Foundation. Its purpose is to 
seek ~nswers in United States technology, 
especially space technology, to the stra-
tegic problems that plague the United 
States and the free world. 
The origins of the effort lie back in the 
days when I was a military adviser to the 
then candidate Ronald Reagan. Early in 
the campaign I was among those insisting 
that the only viable approach for a new 
administration to cope with growing 
military imbalances was to implement a 
basic change in United States ground 
strategy and make 'a technological end 
run on the Soviets'. 
As far as I could determine, all advisers 
to Mr. Reagan agreed with this conclusion 
at least in principle at the time .... The 
fundamental strategy change required 
was the replacement of the mutual 
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assured destruction (MAD) doctrine 
which had shaped- rather warped- our 
strategic force posture and had ungirded 
the United States approach to arms 
control. The MAD doctrine postulates 
that strategic defensive systems are des-
tabilising and provocative, a theory that 
has led to a free world seriously vulnerable 
to nuclear attack and blackmail .... 
A search for technology which would 
provide the basis for an end-run on the 
Soviets led inexorably to space. The 
United States advantage in space is 
demonstrated in its most dramatic form 
by the space shuttle. More fundamentally, 
the ability of the United States to 
miniaturise components gives us great 
advantages in space where transport costs 
per pound are critical. Today, a pound of 
United States space machinery can do 
much more than a pound of Soviet space 
machinery. 
It also happens that the technologies 
immediately available for military sys-
tems in space - beyond intelligence, 
communication and navigation aid satel-
lites- are primarily applicable to ballistic 
missile defence systems. This fact raised 
a strong expectation that space held the 
key to a technological end-run which 
would offset current Soviet strategic 
nuclear advantages and at the same time 
provide an escape from the balance of 
terror doctrine of MAD." 1 
20. In the course of his researches, your 
Rapporteur was briefed by the two leading 
exponents of the High Frontier theses: Lt. 
General Daniel Graham and Brigadier General 
Robert Richardson. At the conclusion of the 
study visit, Brigadier Richardson wrote to the 
clerk of the committee summarising the points 
previously made and updating them. Brigadier 
Richardson's summary is worth quoting in 
extenso: 
"As was pointed out in our presentations, 
High Frontier, star wars, and the United 
States strategic defence initiative (SDI), 
are different names for the same defence 
plan. All three call for abandoning the 
current strategic concept of mutual 
assured destruction (MAD) and develop-
ing and deploying active defences against 
Soviet ballistic missiles. MAD would be 
replaced by a strategy we call assured 
survival that would provide for protection, 
l. Forward: High Frontier: A New National Strategy, 
Lt. Gen. D.O. Graham (USA Ret.)- Heritage Foundation 
1982. 
in the event of a war, and improve the 
prospects of deterrence. 
Assured survival's defence elements will 
consist of four intercept layers, three of 
which would be space-based. This makes 
it a truly "global" ballistic missile defence 
since the first intercept layer will destroy 
the Soviet missiles in their boost phase, 
that is regardless of their destination and 
before this can even be determined in 
most cases. 
The new strategy does NOT call for 
substituting defence for offence. It merely 
seeks to establish an optimum balance 
between defensive and retaliatory capa-
bilities. The protection it can provide for 
retaliatory forces should, however, allow 
for some reduction in these and will 
definitely reduce the potential for any 
effective Soviet first strike. 
In 1982 High Frontier determined the 
technological feasibility, military sound-
ness, political acceptability (in the United 
States), and economic viability of the 
plan. Based largely on these findings 
President Reagan announced, on 23rd 
March 1983, the United States strategic 
defence initiative (SDI) programme. The 
task of SDI to date has been to undertake 
the technological and policy research that 
obviously must be completed before any 
decision can be made to proceed with 
actual development and deployment of 
the necessary space-based and point 
defence weapon systems. 
Last October ( 1983) task forces, estab-
lished within our Defence Department, 
reported favourably to the President on 
the technical feasibility and policy issues. 
Early this year ( 1984 ), a special manage-
ment team headed by Lt. General 
Abrahamson, then manager of the shuttle 
vehicle programme in NASA, was estab-
lished to implement the SDI research 
programme. In the defence budget sub-
mitted to our Congress for 1985 approx-
imately $2 billion are programmed for 
SDI related research. 
Following the adoption by our government 
of the High Frontier concept, and the 
assumption of responsibility for research-
ing the technology and major policy issues 
by General Abrahamson's SDI office, we 
reoriented our High Frontier efforts 
primarily towards obtaining additional 
United States and allied public under-
standing and support for the plan. We 
are also working to bring about an early 
( 1985) decision to move from mere 
research into actual development and 
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deployment of promising defence systems, 
and have assumed a 'watch-dog' role in 
exposing resistance to the President's plan 
by vested interests that either inherently 
resist change or seek to protect pro-
grammes whose funding may be jeopar-
dised by it. 
Status of programme 
The SDI programme is at present in what 
might be called the 'homework' phase. 
Obviously a decision to change the free 
world's strategic strategy, and to build 
defences against Soviet ballistic missiles, 
will have momentous implications. These 
must be identified and carefully con-
sidered before implementing decisions can 
be properly made. 
To date we have established: 
(1) Technological feasibility. Effective 
(95% or better), first generation, space 
and point defences can be built and 
deployed using existing technology. 
(2) Political acceptability. Polls, in the 
United States, have established that four 
out of five Americans want their govern-
ment to defend them against any acts of 
aggression (not just avenge them as under 
MAD). There is massive public support 
for the President's strategic defence 
initiative (SDI), not only for the protec-
tion it would provide but also because it 
will reduce dependence on nuclear 
weapons and essentially eliminate the 
threat of a Soviet 'first strike' and with it 
the so-called balance of terror. 
(3) Economic viability. Costs will vary 
with both the effectiveness goals adopted 
and the time required to build and deploy 
the new weapon systems (each year added 
to research and development adds about 
30% to all up systems costs). High 
Frontier studies showed that 87% effective 
point and boost phase space-based 
defences could be deployed within six 
years for $15 to $20 billion, given suitable 
priorities and special management for the 
programme. A business as usual acquisi-
tion programme of ten to twelve years 
would run somewhat over $50 billion. The 
elimination of ongoing or planned defence 
procurement made unnecessary by SDI 
could more than offset either total. 
(4) Military soundness. The proper role 
of the military of all nations has always 
been to defend the country from acts of 
aggression, not merely to be able to 
avenge these. From a military point of 
view the optimum defence posture should 
include the best possible balance between 
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offensive and defensive capabilities that 
can be achieved with existing technology. 
MAD has always been immoral and its 
indiscriminate, revenge only, characteris-
tics violate the terms of the Geneva 
Convention on warfare. MAD never 
provided any ability to protect the free 
world's people and assets in wartime. If 
a deterrent-only strategy ever made any 
sense it was when the West enjoyed 
decisive strategic nuclear superiority 
which is no longer the case now that the 
strategic balance has shifted in favour of 
the Soviets. 
Having established the above facts, we 
are now seeking the answers to other 
pertinent questions such as: the impact of 
SDI on NATO and allied national forces 
and defences; the impact of SDI on arms 
control policies and negotiations (which, 
incidentally look very favourable); the 
best initial technologies to pursue and 
their time and cost impliations (SDI 
triggered off many new industry proposals 
that must now be evaluated); the impli-
cations of the new strategy and defences 
on other force and weapon programmes; 
etc. 
Studies of these and related questions are 
under way. We would hope to have some 
answers early in 1985. Until this 'home-
work' has been completed, however, 
decisions cannot be logtcally made with 
respect to WHAT to develop and WHEN 
to deploy it. 
As I indicated above, our High Frontier 
would like to see a presidential decision 
to proceed with the development of a first 
generation capability early in 1985. This 
should be accompanied by a target date 
for initial system deployments (the end of 
this decade?). This is essential in order to 
focus the technological effort and min-
imise its costs. There is also an urgent 
need to counter the growing Soviet 
military threat, re-establish the military 
balance, and preclude or close any 
'windows of vulnerability'. The High 
Frontier/star wars solution is the way we 
must go about achieving these goals for 
the only alternatives are: 
(a) to accept increasing military inferior-
ity, or 
(b) to pursue a MAD arms race in 
existing types of offensive weapons as 
necessary to maintain military equiv-
alence. 
Inferiority, (a) above, is obviously inac-
ceptable. Maintaining military equiva-
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lence, (b) above, would require roughly 
matching whatever nuclear or other 
build-up in existing offensive forces the 
Soviets choose to undertake. This would 
entail political and economic costs that 
democracies are not prepared to pay. 
1984 is an election year in the United 
States. While the star wars proposal has 
been made an issue by some Reagan 
opponents, their opposition has been 
tempered somewhat by general recogni-
tion that, when challenged, they have to 
choose their national security solution 
between the above two alternatives. 
Neither more atomic weapons and more 
defence spending nor acceptance of 
United States inferiority are attractive 
positions to run for office on, especially in 
light of the public poll results I previously 
mentioned. 
Although some have tried to argue that 
security through arms control treaties was 
a fourth option, this would be true only 
if both sides agreed. Since this is not the 
case, such agreements would obviously 
continue to be pursued under any posture 
selected and the question then is only: 
Which posture offers the best prospects? 
Negotiations from: Inferiority?, Equiva-
lence sustained by a massive atomic 
build-up and ever more spending?, or 
from the proposed po~ure of assured 
survival? 
Allied support and activities 
Obviously, consultation with United 
States allies is a prerequisite to any 
decisions that might be made by President 
Reagan to proceed with the development 
and deployment of defensive systems, 
especially in space. This has been going 
on at various levels, in and out of 
government, since the President's speech 
on 23rd March 1984. 
In connection with this, High Frontier has 
been trying to enlist the support of 
strategists, defence analysts, and writers 
in major NATO countries and Japan. We 
believe that official consultations will be 
more productive and less likely to gener-
ate opposition through lack of understand-
ing of the United States motives, goals 
and alternatives, if influential experts in 
each country have debated the plan in 
their press and professional journals. To 
this end we plan to keep as many of you 
as possible informed on this subject. We 
also consider that we are in a good 
position to do this since we, in High 
Frontier, can go into details and suggest 
goals and considerations, without these 
being automatically construed as official 
United States positions. 
Where we need your help 
As I pointed out earlier in this letter, our 
proposed change in strategy and the 
related building of a layered anti-missile 
defence system is in the 'homework' or 
study phase. Neither we in High Frontier 
nor our colleagues in government claim 
to have answers to all the consequences 
and implications of a free world security 
policy change of this magnitude. 
We know that a change along the lines 
proposed makes technical, military, econ-
omic and political sense and that it is 
feasible. We also know that no one has 
been able to propose any practical, 
affordable or militarily effective alterna-
tive way of providing for the security of 
the free world in today's threat environ-
ment. 
What we do not yet know is how the 
change will undoubtedly effect many 
other aspects of western security, or how 
it should be presented to the Soviets, 
what the best timing and associated 
technology approaches should be, what 
nations might participate, and so forth. 
Obviously we, in the United States, are 
studying these questions. We would more 
than welcome your help. Many of you 
are far better qualified to determine the 
implications of the new strategy on your 
national forces and security than we are. 
Most major western nations have techni-
cal and engineering capabilities that can 
complement United States efforts in 
developing military space systems as well 
as point defences. All free world countries 
will, at minimum, derive security benefits 
from the global ballistic missile defences 
we plan to build. To some these should 
also offer technical and economic oppor-
tunities. 
Our early High Frontier studies showed 
that we can expect an explosion of space 
activities in the 21st Century and that 
the trunk technologies for civil and 
military space activities are essentially 
the same. One will benefit from the other. 
Churchill and de Gaulle foresaw in the 
1950s that their nations would not long 
retain major power status in the atomic 
age unless they participated actively in 
atomic technology. The same is true in 
the case of space activities in the 1980s. 
Nations that fail to move out briskly to 
explore and exploit this new, 'High', 
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Frontier whether, individually or collec-
tively, cannot hope to retain major power 
status in the years to come. 
So, while we welcome criticisms of the 
United States star wars programme, 
especially where these help us anticipate 
pitfalls and problem areas, we would also 
like to receive constructive inputs from 
our overseas colleagues. We need your 
views on how you think that the proposed 
new strategy will effect your country, 
your forces, your security, alliance strat-
egy, etc., on the assumption that it will 
eventually be implemented. 
We would also very much welcome your 
views on your country's possible interest 
in participating in research, development, 
production, deployment, financing and 
future management of such systems. We, 
in High Frontier, do not believe that we 
should study these matters unilaterally in 
the United States and then present you 
with conclusions to accept or reject. 
Instead, we would hope to see as many 
findings as possible the product of 
collective study efforts and debates sup-
ported by a consensus in each country." 
V. The strategic defence initiative 
21. The writings of the High Frontier team 
could be easily dismissed as the work of retired 
military ideologues with too much time on their 
hands, sponsored by a right wing think tank 
and encouraged by the military-industrial 
complex. To do so would be facile and foolish. 
Their counsels and those of highly placed well-
qualified officials expert in space science and 
military technology clearly influenced the Presi-
dent of the United States for good reason. 
22. On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan 
delivered a televised speech to the nation in 
which he initiated a potentially radical depar-
ture in United States strategic policy. The 
President suggested that the policy of nuclear 
deterrence through the threat of strategic 
nuclear retaliation is inadequate, and called 
upon the vast American technological commun-
ity to examine the potential for effective defence 
against ballistic missiles: 
"Would it not be better to save lives than 
to avenge them? Are we not capable of 
demonstrating our peaceful intentions by 
applying all our abilities and our ingenuity 
to achieving a truly lasting stability? I 
think we are - indeed we must. 
Mter careful consultation with my advis-
ers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I 
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believe there is a way ... It is that we 
embark on a programme to counter the 
awesome Soviet missile threat with meas-
ures that are defensive. Let us turn to the 
very strengths in technology that spawned 
our great industrial base ... I know this is 
a formidable technical task, one that may 
not be accomplished before the end of the 
century. Yet, current technology has 
attained a level of sophistication where it 
is reasonable for us to begin this effort." 
23. Following the President's speech, national 
security study directive 6-83 mandated an 
examination of the technology that could 
eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic 
missiles to the security of the United States 
and its allies. Accordingly, between June and 
October 1983, two studies assessed the technical 
and policy issues of a national commitment to 
ballistic missile defence (BMD). 
24. James Fletcher, former administrator of 
NASA, headed a defensive technologies study 
team and Fred Hoffman, Director of Pan 
Heuristics (a policy analysis organisation based 
in Los Angeles) led an extra-governmental 
future security strategy study. A senior inter-
agency group integrated the two studies and on 
behalf of the Secretary for Defence recom-
mended a technology development plan to the 
President. Such is the importance of this 
document "Defence against ballistic missiles -
an assessment of technologies and policy 
implications - United States Department of 
Defence, April 1984" that is reproduced 
verbatim in Appendix I. 
25. The interagency group advised that a 
vigorous research programme be undertaken to 
make possible an early decision whether to 
initiate the development, construction and 
deployment of ballistic missile defences (BMD). 
On 6th January 1984, President Reagan signed 
national security decision directive 119 which 
authorised the SDI research programme to 
evaluate the technical feasibility of intercepting 
attacking missiles. Funding for the SDI requires 
$2 billion in financial year 1985 and $26 billion 
through to financial year 1989. For a technical 
summary of current developments in ballistic 
missile defence, see Appendix 11. 
26. The impetus behind the BMD is undoubt-
edly in part directly responsive. The Soviet 
Union is upgrading its own anti-missile defences 
round Moscow and has built a large phased 
array radar. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has 
accepted no arms control measures whatever. 
The Soviets are certainly engaged in high-
energy laser development. Moreover, verifica-
tion of new technological developments is 
virtually impossible. When Strategic Air Com-
mand's manned bombers provided the western 
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alliance's strategic nuclear guarantee, the whole 
of NATO believed it essential and unquestion-
able that the United States should maintain an 
effective air defence. Ballistic missile defence 
would undoubtedly strengthen the cohesion of 
the alliance today since the less the vulnerability 
of the United States to Soviet nuclear bom-
bardment the greater the "linkage" or sense of 
United States commitment to the defence of 
Europe. BMD would clearly enhance deterrence 
and thereby diminish the risk of war. The cost 
could only be calculated when the SDI is 
concluded at the end of this decade. Against 
the cost of BMD, however, would have to be 
set the cost of new offensive nuclear systems 
which might be foregone particularly if the 
institution of BMD on the part of the United 
States made the Soviets realise the futility of 
the continuing build-up of new weapons of mass 
destruction - i.e. offensive nuclear systems. 
VI. Implications for arms control of the 
strategic defence initiative (SDI) 
27. The United States administration believes 
that the President's strategic defence initiative 
is consistent with current United States treaty 
obligations under the ABM, outer space and 
limited test ban treaties. The initiative contem-
plates only research on a broad range of 
defensive technologies. Should a decision be 
made in the future to deploy an effective 
advanced defence capability, such defences 
would complement the United States' goal of 
significant reductions in offensive nuclear arma-
ments. Advanced defences would reduce the 
potential of ballistic missiles thus providing an 
incentive for negotiated reductions of them. The 
United States commitment to the START and 
INF negotiations is unchanged. 
28. The ABM treaty obligation: 
- limits each side to one deployment area 
with 100 launchers/interceptors. It also 
limits radars; 
- bans deployment of systems that do not 
consist of radars, launchers and inter-
ceptors, but permits development and 
testing of fixed land-based ones; 
- bans development, testing and deploy-
ment of mobile systems and compo-
nents (i.e. space-based, air-based, sea-
based and mobile land-based); 
- bans rapid reload and multiple warhead 
components; 
- permits research- short of field testing 
a prototype of a prohibited system or 
component; 
- provides for amendments. 
The outer space treaty bans nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction in space. 
The limited test ban treaty bans tests of nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in 
space, in the atmosphere and under water. 
29. The United States administration has 
stated that the strategic defence initiative's 
implications for foreign policy are as follows: 
- the United States will take no actions 
which will reduce the security of its 
allies; 
- research into multi-layered defence 
against theatre and strategic ballistic 
missiles will continue; 
- missile defences have potential for 
strengthening deterrence, but they will 
not eliminate nuclear weapons; 
- the United States commitment to 
defence of its allies will not change; 
- the United States will consult them 
fully. 
30. The President's Science Adviser, Dr. 
George Keyworth, in an article in the Air Force 
Times of 31st October 1983 entitled "Space-
based defence possible" observed: 
"We can now project the technology -
even though it has not been demonstrated 
yet - to develop a defence system that 
could drastically reduce the threat of 
attack by nuclear weapons, not only today 
but those that could reasonably be 
expected to be developed to counter such 
a defence system." 
31. That belief was echoed by Dr. Colin Gray 
in Foreign Affairs of spring 1984: 
"All of recorded history has shown swings 
in the pendulum of technical advantage 
between offence and defence. For the 
strategic defence to achieve a very marked 
superiority over the offence over the next 
several decades would be an extraordinary 
trend in the light of the last thirty years, 
but not of the last hundred or thousand 
years. History is replete with examples of 
defensive technology and tactics dominat-
ing the offence." 
32. Interestingly, the former national security 
advisers who are perhaps the leading academic 
experts in the field of international relations, 
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, have 
commented separately in favour of space-based 
defence against ballistic missile attack for the 
arms control perspective. First, to quote Henry 
Kissinger, in his article of 24th September 1984 
in the Herald Tribune entitled "Limited star 
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wars - Defence may help deter an attack, 
encourage arms control": 
"Perhaps the most compelling argument 
is the possible beneficial effect of some 
missile defence on arms control. Arms 
control theory is now at a dead end; the 
stalemate in negotiations reflects an 
impasse in thought. The reductions pro-
posed by the Reagan administration 
would add little to stability; the freeze 
which is its alternative would perpetuate 
what needs correction. 
A breakthrough requires reductions of 
the numbers of warheads on a scale 
inconceivable so long as the strategic 
balance depends entirely on offensive 
weapons. 
Under present conditions, the reductions 
that can be verified are relatively small. 
They are either dangerous because they 
simplify an attacker's calculations or they 
are irrelevant because they leave large 
residual numbers of warheads. 
If, however, the strategic warheads of 
both sides were reduced to a few hundred 
- a number astronomically below any so 
far envisaged - the side capable of hiding 
a thousand warheads might be able to 
disarm its opponent with a surprise attack 
or blackmail him into submission by 
revealing the secret weapons. But with a 
properly designed defence, much larger 
numbers would be needed for a strategi-
cally decisive evasion, and those numbers 
could be detected. 
I consider these arguments compelling 
with respect to three propositions: 
- We should not commit ourselves at this 
point to the demilitarisation of space. 
- We should proceed actively with 
research and development and forgo 
moratoriums. 
- We should be prepared to negotiate 
over control of all defensive weapons. 
Before committing ourselves to actual 
deployment, an answer to ·the following 
questions is needed: 
- Is it possible to design a ballistic missile 
defence that is primarily useful for the 
defence of the retaliatory forces or 
against maverick smaller nuclear coun-
tries? 
- If such a limited defence were to 
become part of an arms control 
agreement, how would the limitation 
be expressed and verified? 
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- Could we avoid loopholes that would 
allow further expansion to a full-scale 
defence? 
- Would such a defence be destabilising 
by tempting a first strike and relying 
on the defence to absorb the counter-
blow? (In theory this should not be, if 
both sides have relatively limited 
defences.) 
- What, in such a context, would be the 
appropriate low level of offensive forces 
to bring about the breakthrough toward 
real arms control that has eluded us 
for a decade? 
- Would strategic defence at any level 
destroy all hopes for an equilibrium? 
The real debate will be joined after the 
United States election in November. 
Theoretically, both superpowers should 
have an interest to prevent both war by 
miscalculation and nuclear blackmail by 
irresponsible smaller powers. Neither side 
can gain from seeking unilateral advan-
tage. 
Thus, a renewal of negotiations will be a 
test less of ingenuity than of political 
maturity. There seems to be general 
concern with the precariousness, both 
physical and psychological, of a balance 
based on large unopposed offensive sys-
tems. 
This article argues that some limited 
defence, yet to be analysed, coupled with 
a revolutionary approach to reduction of 
offensive forces by agreement may 
advance us toward the elusive goal of 
stability." 
33. Secondly, to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
in an article in the Wall Street Journal of lOth 
July 1984 entitled "From arms control to 
controlled security": 
"The advent of increasingly numerous 
and accurate systems is making it possible 
for planners of a strategic attack to 
envisage a first strike that leaves the 
opponent strategically crippled, capable 
of only a spasmodic, disorganised and 
strategically aimless response - or none 
at all. This still does not make a first 
strike attractive from a moral or even 
political point of view, given the stakes, 
but the point is that gradually the 
military attractiveness of this option is 
again increasing. 
Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms 
control, the enhanced cap<tcity of strategic 
offence must be offset - and it is likely to 
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be offset by greater reliance on the part 
of both sides on defensive strategic 
systems. The Times of London put it 
correctly when it stated editorially on 
13th June: 'The Soviet Union is now 
naturally worried about the consequences 
of. ~ burst in American spending on 
mtsstle defence. It casts doubt on Soviet 
plans for offensive systems since the 
possibility of any missile defence - even 
an incomplete one - would radically alter 
the cost calculation of offensive systems. 
In the long run a defensive programme 
would enhance arms control by reducing 
the potential gains from building offensive 
weapons ... It is ironic and paradoxical 
that the age of deterrence has so confused 
the strategic mentality of many commen-
tators that their reaction to a purely 
defensive system is to suggest that it 
increases danger.' 
The fact is that strategic defence has 
become feasible not in the sense that it 
can safeguard society but because it can 
increasingly complicate the planning and 
execution of an effective first strike. In 
other words, strategic defence can some-
what negate the offensive advantages of 
increa.singly sophisticated strike systems, 
restonng the element of deterrence simply 
by creating again greater uncertainty as 
to the consequences of a first strike. 
Respective vulnerability 
For the United States, it is an especially 
attractive option for it permits us to 
exploit the advantages of high technology, 
an area of United States superiority. This 
provides us with genuine potential for 
offsetting the military advantages gained 
in recent years by the Soviet Union, and 
would put pressure on the Soviet Union 
to. return to serious arms control negoti-
ations. 
But even with such negotiations, the 
development of some defensive strategic 
capability will remain desirable. It is 
often said that an imbalance might arise 
when one side sees the other side 
acquiring a relatively invulnerable shield 
while itself remaining vulnerable. Pre-
emption might therefore become tempt-
ing. In fact, that is not likely to happen. 
The acquisition of a defensive strategic 
capability is not like purchasing an 
umbrella, which one can unfold against 
the rain upon leaving the store. It is 
bound to be a protracted trial-and-error 
piecemeal process, with both sides exper-
imenting, deploying partially, and adjust-
ing their capabilities, with neither one at 
any point in the next fifteen to twenty 
years feeling it is truly invulnerable to 
the other side, even though over time the 
respective vulnerability of each side to a 
first strike by the other will gradually be 
declining. 
Through such a process, a measure of 
reciprocal stability will be acquired and 
security of both sides will gradually be 
enhanced, though the process will not 
yield the kind of restraint in defence 
expenditures that many have associated 
with the hoped-for arms control. But the 
time has come to lay to rest the 
expectation that arms control is the secret 
key to a more amicable American-Soviet 
relationship or even to the enhancement 
of mutual security. The maintenance of 
such security will remain an ambiguous 
and protracted process requiring unilat-
eral actions by both sides, and increas-
ingly so in the area of strategic defence." 
Arms control and anti-satellite weapons 
34. It often seems that the Soviet Union is 
keen to secure treaty limitation in those areas 
of capability in which the United States has a 
technical lead, and is unwilling to do so in 
those areas where the technical advantage lies 
with the USSR. So it is in the debate about 
verification and the possibility of achieving a 
treaty controlling anti-satellite weapons between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 
35. Understanding the debate depends, in 
part, on some knowledge of the progress the 
United States and the Soviet Union have made 
in the development of these weapons and their 
long-range goals. 
36. United States officials detected twenty 
tests of a Soviet ground-launched anti-satellite 
weapon system between 1968 and 1982. 
American officials believe that 45% of these 
tests were successful. However, the more 
advanced modifications in the system that 
would make it more difficult to foil with 
American countermeasures have failed. The 
Soviet weapon is launched from the ground by 
a 150 ft. intercontinental ballistic missile and, 
in its only successful configuration, must make 
two earth orbits to approach its target, an 
undesirable system militarily. 
37. The United States is now developing a 
more advanced weapon that permits direct 
ascent to the target within a matter of minutes. 
It consists of a small, 18 ft. rocket launched 
from an F-15 fighter plane. There was a test of 
the rockets in January, but it will not be tested 
against a space target until late this year. Both 
nations' weapons can now reach only low earth 
159 
DOCUMENT 993 
orbit targets, which makes many valuable 
satellites immune. 
38. The warhead of the American weapon is 
a cylinder only about eleven inches in length. 
The warhead of the Soviet weapon, discounting 
the 150 ft. booster rocket, is slightly more than 
18 ft. long and weighs about 4,500 lb. 
39. The United States reportedly plans to 
build 112 anti-satellite weapons to be stationed 
at two F-15 wings near Washington, D.C., and 
in Washington State. However, a special 
modification kit would permit any F-15 to be 
converted to a launcher within six hours and 
any jet airfield could become a base. 
40. Advocates of a treaty counter arguments 
about verification problems by saying that if 
the United States weapon is fully developed, 
Soviet verification of United States treaty 
compliance would become impossible because 
of the relatively small size of the rocket and 
almost minute size of the warhead, as well as 
its potential deployment on any airfield. 
Problems of concealment 
41. But such advocates tend to agree that the 
4,500 lb Soviet warhead could probably be 
concealed also. Such figures as Richard L. 
Garwin and Kurt Gottfried, two physicists who 
recommend a treaty, say that a treaty that 
prohibited space testing and ground deployment 
would work to the United States' advantage. 
They say that satellites could readily identify 
the deployment of the 150 ft. Soviet launchers 
and other sensors could catch any test against 
a target in space. 
42. These and other figures argue that the 
present Soviet weapon is not really capable and 
could not be used in a conflict without further 
testing. 
43. Administration officials, on the other 
hand, have consistently described the Soviet 
weapon as already "operational". 
44. As for motives, they have made clear that 
they want no treaty that would halt the 
development of a promising, probably superior, 
United States weapon. One suggestion is that 
they might recommend to President Reagan a 
treaty limiting the altitude of anti-satellite 
weapons to low orbit targets, but no more. 
VII. The United States space station - a 
challenge for Europe 
45. Such is the strategic and commercial 
significance of the United States space station 
project that your Rapporteur makes no apology 
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for giving the full description of it. Space 
stations, although not primarily of military 
significance will be the key building blocks for 
space exploitation, the placing of large payloads 
in outer earth orbit and the exploration of deep 
space. Participation in the United States space 
station is for ESA a natural follow-on to the 
Spacelab programme1• 
46. During the state of the union address, the 
President announced that he has directed 
NASA to take the nation's next bold step in 
space - to begin the development of a 
permanently based, manned space station. The 
President's goal for the space station programme 
is to have Americans living and working in 
space, permanently, within a decade. 
Programme description 
47. The idea of a space station has been 
under consideration for years. NASA has 
conducted preliminary planning efforts over the 
past few years - seeking the best design to 
satisfy the requirements of commercial and 
scientific users. Over the next two years, NASA 
will be conducting an extended definition effort 
in order to minimise programme risk and to 
maximise space station capabilities. NASA will 
involve United States industry in the system 
design process, develop advanced technologies, 
and establish test facilities to check space 
station concepts and technologies. By the end 
of this two-year period, NASA expects to have 
a firm and responsive space station design and 
be in a position to proceed toward hardware 
development. 
48. The space station concept provides for a 
manned base in a low inclination orbit. NASA 
is looking towards providing for a crew of six to 
eight. In addition to living quarters, the manned 
base will need to provide utilities (electrical 
power, thermal control, attitude control and 
data processing), work space, and a docking 
hub to allow tending by the shuttle. The space 
shuttle will be used to launch and provide 
transportation to the station. The shuttle will 
permit crew rotation and resupply at three to 
six-month intervals. The work of the space 
station will be conducted both in attached 
pressurised operations modules and also on 
unpressurised free-flying platforms. The opera-
tions modules will be able to support scientific 
research and technology development requiring 
crew interaction. The unmanned platforms will 
be able to provide changeable payload accom-
modations for activities requiring minimum 
disturbance and protection from contamination 
from base activities. 
I. Report by Mr. Hill, Document 992. 
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Capabilities 
49. The space station will enable extensive 
commercial use of space by providing capabili-
ties that are not currently available to the 
private sector. These capabilities are possible 
because the space station will couple manned 
presence with unlimited stay-time in orbit and 
advanced automated systems. 
50. The space station will enable the com-
mercial production, in quantity, of critical 
materials not obtainable on earth, such as 
extremely pure pharmaceuticals. Frequent crew 
intervention is required in the development 
phases for such production processes. The space 
station also will provide a system allowing 
changeable payload accommodations for com-
mercial remote sensing instruments. 
51. The space station will serve as a perma-
nent base for the efficient tending, servicing and 
repair of unmanned platforms and satellites, 
thereby increasing the lifetime of these expen-
sive space assets and offering the flexibility to 
upgrade space systems as technology advances. 
This efficiency derives in part from the fact that 
the servicing equipment is stored on the station 
and will not have to be brought up on the 
shuttle for each individual servicing mission. 
The space station also will enable the on-orbit 
assembly and check-out of large space struc-
tures such as antennas, astronomical telescopes 
and satellites prior to their deployment. 
52. The space station will provide the capa-
bility to conduct space-based scientific research 
in fields such as astrophysics, solar system 
exploration, earth science and applications, life 
sciences, materials processing and communica-
tions. 
53. Space station research focused on extend-
ing human stay-time in space will contribute to 
future manned exploration and exploitation of 
space. Thus, in the longer term, the space 
station could provide the necessary first step for 
major future manned advances in space, such 
as a permanent lunar base, a manned mission 
to Mars, a manned survey of the asteroids, a 
manned scientific and communications facility 
in geosychronous orbit, or a complex of 
advanced scientific and industrial facilities in 
low earth orbit. Also, the space station could 
enable the staging of future unmanned missions, 
such as planetary probes including the possibil-
ity of sample returns. 
International participation 
54. In order to deepen the United States 
commitment to work with all nations in the 
peaceful exploration and use of space, the 
President has invited America's friends and 
allies to participate in the United States space 
station programme. This participation could 
range from use of the completed facility to co-
operation in the development of the space 
station. Participation by Europe on the NASA 
station is a prerequisite for Europe's eventually 
building its own space station. 
55. The subject was discussed at the economic 
summit of western leaders in London on 9th 
June 1984 and the following communique 
issued: 
"We believe that manned space stations 
are the kind of programme that provides 
a stimulus for technological development 
leading to strengthened economies and 
improved quality of life ... In that context, 
each of our countries will consider 
carefully the generous and thoughtful 
invitation received from the President of 
the United States to other summit 
countries to participate in the develop-
ment of such a station by the United 
States. We welcome the intention of the 
United States to report at the next 
summit on international participation in 
their programme." 
NASA space station programme (SSP) 
56. President Reagan announced on 25th 
January 1984 that he was instructing the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to develop a permanent, manned 
orbiting space station within a decade. He 
subsequently invited the heads of government 
of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and Canada to participate in the 
project and NASA officials have subsequently 
contacted Western European states bilaterally 
and through the European Space Agency. 
NASA sees it as the next logical step in the 
beneficial exploitation of space. They also 
regard it as a symbol of the linkage between 
the western democracies and an opportunity to 
display international co-operation in high tech-
nology. 
57. The space station will be assembled in 
orbit from shuttle-launched modules and com-
prise laboratories (both within and outside a 
shirtsleeve environment), living quarters, a 
logistics module (for supplies, particularly 
propellants) and a resource module (to provide 
power, thermal, propulsion and communications 
functions. It will orbit at 28.5 degrees inclination 
to the equator and have 75 kW power. The 
basic project also includes at least one eo-
orbiting platform, a polar orbiting platform 
serviced from the shuttle, internally and 
externally attached payloads, arrangements for 
servicing satellites and orbital manoeuvring 
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vehicles and arrangements for assembly of 
payloads and large structures. 
58. By the year 2000, NASA envisages a 
complex costing $20 billion, but their proposal 
for the initial programme described above is $8 
billion (1982 prices) not including launch, 
utilisation or operation costs. The NASA 
administrator has suggested that a European 
contribution should amount to 20-25% of 
NASA's investment, i.e. up to $2 billion over 
eight years, while Canada and Japan should 
each contribute 10%. These contributions would 
be additional to the American $8 billion and so 
enhance the programme beyond what the 
United States can immediately afford. 
59. Initial uses of a manned station fall into 
four classes: 
(i) those which would exploit the micro-
gravity and vacuum environment, for 
experimental or commercial purposes; 
(ii) those which would utilise the station 
or a eo-orbiting platform as a per-
manent satellite; 
(iii) those which would use the station to 
test technologies designed for incor-
poration in other satellites; and 
(iv) those which would use the station to 
refurbish and maintain satellites or to 
undertake check-out andjor final 
assembly for satellites before they are 
boosted to their final orbits. 
60. The first encompasses space processing 
and life sciences. It is impossible to recreate on 
earth for any length of time the low gravity 
environment achieved in orbit. Space could 
become an important resource for the ultra-
high purification of drugs or production of high 
value crystals and metal alloys and, whereas 
the shuttle and Spacelab can sustain these 
conditions for several days, a station will do so 
for months or years. 
61. As a permanent satellite, the station will 
not have direct telecommunications applications. 
For remote sensing, the polar-orbiting platform 
planned as part of the core manned space 
station could have a far-reaching impact. 
62. After several years of in-house NASA 
study and some external support contracts, the 
space station has been formally approved and 
an amount of $155 million earmarked from the 
NASA budget in financial year 1984. A 250-
man team, drawn from all NASA establish-
ments, produced on 20th August 1984, a draft 
request for proposal (RFP) for the space 
definition and preliminary design. After three 
weeks for comments both from United States 
industry and from potential international par-
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ticipants, the definitive RFP will have been 
issued to industry on 14th September 1984. 
63. The following description of the space 
station is based on the draft RFP and 
presentations made by senior NASA staff on 
the occasion of the Banks Committee summer 
study on the scientific uses of the space station, 
held at Stanford University from 13th to 19th 
August 1984. 
64. For the first time in a NASA programme 
since Apollo, there will be no industrial prime 
contractor; this function will be fulfilled by 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre. The RFP is 
thus for four separate "work packages", for 
each of which two contractors will be chosen to 
work in parallel, each supervised by a NASA 
centre. 
65. Contractors are instructed to develop a 
configuration which would meet estimated needs 
around the year 2010, and then scale down to 
an initial operating configuration (IOC) which 
could be operational in "the early 1990s" within 
the approved budget envelope of $8 billion. In 
this way NASA hopes to arrive at a configur-
ation capable of considerable expansion without 
major design changes. 
66. As a reference configuration for the 
manned core, NASA has given a gravity 
gradient stabilised concept which has come to 
be known as the "Power Tower". 
67. The space station will comprise various 
space station programme elements (SSPEs) as 
follows: 
(i) Modules 
68. Marshall Spaceftight Centre, under Work 
Package 01, is responsible for the definition of 
a common module which - so long as this 
proves practicable - is to be the basis for all 
modules developed by NASA. In the initial 
configuration it is proposed to provide: 
- a logistics module; 
- a living quarters module; and 
- two laboratory modules. 
(ii) Platforms 
69. The original intention was to include 
possibly only one eo-orbiting platform in the 
initial orbiting configuration. But the need for 
a polar-orbiting platform is being hotly can-
vassed by potential users, and NASA has now 
had the benefit both of internal studies 
(particularly by Goddard Spaceftight Centre 
and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and the 
recent meetings with scientific and other users. 
The RFP therefore contains a great deal of 
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flexibility and the call is for a single, multi-
purpose platform capable of modular growth, 
and allowing in-orbit interchange of instruments 
or the processing of module payloads at a 
standardised interface. 
70. If the money stretches to it, NASA would 
wish to include initially two polar orbiting 
platforms (where there is more call for 
accommodating several instruments on the same 
platform) and a modular family of eo-orbiting 
platforms. Goddard Spaceftight Centre appears 
to favour six to eight small platforms each 
supplying 5 kW of power. 
(iii) OTV and OMB 
71. The orbital transfer vehicle ( OHV) does 
not form part of the space station, only its 
accommodation and interfacing. The develop-
ment of the OTV itself is the responsibility of 
Marshall Spaceftight Centre and parallel study 
contracts have been awarded to Martin 
Marietta Aerospace and Boeing Aerospace. The 
orbital manoeuvring vehicle (OMV) is similarly 
a separate development, also under the responsi-
bility of Marshall Spaceftight Centre. The 
status of these vehicles with regard to interna-
tional co-operation is unclear, but they are not 
thought to be included in the present invitation. 
NASA timetable 
72. The key milestones announced by NASA 
for the SSP are as follows: distribution of RFP 
to industry: 14th September 1984; receipt of 
industrial proposals: No~ember 1984; selection 
of contractors and authority to proceed: 1st 
April 1985; fixing of final configuration: Octo-
ber /December 1985; evaluation of development 
proposals: September 1986-March 1987; start 
phase CJD: April 1987. 
Congress approval 
73. It is important to note the conditions 
imposed by Congress when the space station 
financial year 1984 budget was approved. The 
commitment of the $155.5 million was blocked 
until 1st April 1985, and its release is subject 
to NASA giving satisfaction on two issues: 
(i) NASA is required to study an option 
under which the space station would 
initially be man-tended with the 
permanent manning being phased in 
at a later date. NASA is under an 
obligation to spend 10-15% of the 
definition funds in having this trade-
off study made; and 
(ii) a space station advanced technology 
committee is to be established to 
identify systems that would advance 
the technologies of robotics and auto-
mation of use, not only in the space 
station, but also in ground-based 
industries. A programme equal to 
10% of development costs is to be 
defined. 
74. NASA has responded promptly to both 
these requirements. The SSP Phase B contrac-
tors are instructed to undertake a meaningful 
study of the man-tended option, and in-house 
work is also planned in this area. To meet the 
second point, the California Space Institute 
(CSI) will lead a university /industry team to 
guide a comparative effort on systems design 
and systems technology. The Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI) will perform technology evalu-
ation and forecasting, and some aerospace 
companies are to examine the design implica-
tions of the Stanford analysis. To pull the work 
together and to assist NASA in formulating an 
automation/robotics programme, a high-level 
advisory and overseeing group has been 
appointed, chaired by Dr. Frosch, the former 
NASA administrator. 
75. NASA is due to present to congress by 
15th December 1984 a report on space station 
"management plans and acquisition strategies". 
United States invitation for international partici-
pation 
76. The invitation was first made in President 
Reagan's last state of the union message when 
he invited America's friends and allies to 
participate and explained that this participation 
could range from use of the completed facility 
to co-operation in the development of the space 
station. In order to underline the political 
nature of the invitation, Mr. Beggs, administra-
tor of NASA, was sent to Europe in April 
1984, as the United States President's personal 
representative, to encourage European countries 
to respond positively. The subject figured on the 
agenda of the June 1984 economic summit 
meeting and the communique provided for a 
report to the next summit in 1985. 
77. The draft RFP to industry also addresses 
this aspect and speaks of an invitation to 
international friends to become "builders, users 
and operators" of the space station, warning 
United States contractors that work package 
allocation could very well be altered as a result 
of international participation. 
78. NASA has in fact indicated that a reply 
in principle is looked for from international 
participants by the end of 1984, and that they 
would like all formalities to have been concluded 
by the end of 1985, i.e. at the time the space 
station configuration is frozen. 
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79. Before considering the situation in 
Europe, a word about reaction in Canada and 
Japan. 
80. The Canadians have indicated to NASA 
that they are in principle interested in partici-
pating in the space station and that they are 
presently concluding national studies to define 
the nature and extent of this participation. 
Canada has also informed the European Space 
Agency that Canadian co-operation in the 
programme through the Agency is not excluded. 
A further development of the remote manipu-
lator system (RMS) developed for use with the 
shuttle is certain to be one, and perhaps the 
main, Canadian proposal. 
81. The Japanese industry has from the start 
been enthusiastic about participating in the 
programme. Four industrial consortia have been 
formed and internal studies are being carried 
out, in some cases in association with United 
States firms. The draft proposals are far-ranging 
and are estimated to cost around $1.3 billion. 
The Japanese governmental position has not yet 
been announced, but it is known that the Diet 
will be asked in April 1985 to approve the 
necessary funding. 
82. NASA invited potential international 
participants to attend a workshop in Washington 
on 20th-21st September 1984 at which the 
latest state of the United States programme 
was described and foreign participants encour-
aged to discuss the form their contribution 
might take. 
Space/ab follow-on programme 
83. Eight ESA member states agreed to 
participate in an optional programme "Eureca" 
at a cost of 155.9 MAU. This is a reusable 
autonomous carrier designed to be launched 
into space, operated in a free-flying mode for 
up ·to six months and retrieved by the space 
shuttle. The first flight is due for mid-1987. The 
reference orbit is 270 NMi altitude and an 
inclination of 28.5 degrees. 
European space station programme 
84. In January 1983, nine ESA member 
states agreed to contribute to a 13 million 
accounting unit "space transportation systems 
(STS) long-term preparatory programme 
(LTPP)". The object of the programme was to 
analyse options open to Europe for STS 
activities beyond Ariane 4 and Spacelab 
follow-on development (FOD), and to prepare 
decisions on a long-term policy and on the start 
of new programmes by 1985-86 within the 
following three areas: 
- Theme 1: Future European launcher; 
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- Theme 2: European space in-orbit 
infrastructure (101); 
- Theme 3: Manned space station and 
continued co-operation with United 
States. 
85. The United Kingdom contributed to the 
preparatory plan at the rate of 4%, the average 
of its share in previous ESA ArianefSpacelab 
programmes. However, the response to the RFP 
on the part of British industry will be vigorous. 
For example, British Aerospace will be propos-
ing its space platform design. 
86. The existence of the plan enabled ESA to 
reach an agreement with NASA whereby the 
two agencies keep each other informed on the 
progress of their studies and permits the 
participation of United States and European 
industry in all relevant inter-agency conferences. 
87. The ESA Council, meeting in June 1984, 
agreed on two enabling resolutions approving 
the execution of two new optional programmes; 
this means the Agency can examine relevant 
details and make proposals to the member 
states who, before work can start, must formally 
agree the technical details and funding of these 
programmes. These new programmes are for: 
- the development of the large cryogenic 
engines (HM60); and 
- a space station-related programme, 
Columbus, based on a proposal by the 
German and Italian Delegations; this 
programme will be defined with a view 
to ensure progressively the European 
autonomy in the field of the manned 
space station mutually compatible with 
the future European launching systems. 
88. The second resolution also approved "in 
the process of this preparatory programme the 
consideration of the invitation received from the 
President of the United States ... ". 
89. The space station resolution envisages a 
funding of 80 MAU (35 MAU for definition 
contracts and 45 MAU for a supporting 
technology programme). For the space station 
Phase B study, ESA hopes to have all the 
formalities completed in time to allow industry 
to start work in April 1985 (the same date as 
for the NASA Phase B start) 
90. Meanwhile 1.1 MAU of the long-term 
preparatory programme will be used to provide 
two bridging contracts which will be awarded 
to MBB/ERNO and Aeritalia with instructions 
to arrange a "reasonable" geographical distri-
bution of the work. The time before 1985 is 
intended to be spent mainly on refining cost 
analyses, examining maintenance and opera-
tions costs and attempting to define the elements 
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in NASA's space station programme available 
for international participation. The first meeting 
of the potential participants was arranged for 
28th September 1984. 
Columbus programme 
91. The German/Italian proposal referred to 
in the ESA space station resolution is the so-
called Columbus programme. 
92. The Columbus programme is funded by 
the German BMFT (the Ministry of Research 
and Technology) and the Italian MRST (the 
Ministry of Scientific and Technological 
Research) as a "joint effort for the continuation 
of European space activities based on the 
exploitation of Spacelab and Eureca technolo-
gies and results obtained". The industrial 
studies were carried out from April 1983 to 
July 1984 by MBB/ERNO and Aeritalia, 
supervised by DFVLR (the German federation 
for aeronautical and space industries) and the 
Italian CNR (national research agency and 
location of the Italian National Space Plan). 
The studies also took account of considerable 
in-house DFVLR work which had been done 
under the name of Orbitas. 
93. As presented to the ESA Council in June 
1984, for "Europeanisation", the Columbus 
programme consists of: 
(i) pressurised modules (PM), a further 
development of Spacelab, and 
intended to be either manned or 
man-tended; 
(ii) payload carriers (PC), a further 
development of European hardware, 
designed to carry experiments, mate-
rial production facilities, etc.; and 
(iii) resource module (RM) providing 
power, communications, data manage-
ment and other housekeeping facilities 
for the PM and PC. 
94. The programme also provides for pay-
loads, ground segment and some demonstration 
missions in orbit due to commence around 
1993, the launching of this initial configuration 
would depend on the United States shuttle, but 
Ariane "could be considered as an option for 
manned launches". The programme is intended 
to be "compatible" with the NASA space 
station "as a general policy", and the pressurised 
module is seen as being initially attached to 
and serviced by the space station. But a 
prominent feature of the programme is the 
possibility of the Columbus elements separating 
from the United States space station and 
constituting an independent system serviced by 
European launches. 
VIII. Conclusions 
95. The purpose of this report has been to 
open up the debate about the implications of 
military space technology for the member 
countries ?f WEU and Western Europe as a 
whole. It IS understandable that in individual 
European countries there should be disinterest 
verging on apathy about the military develop-
ments of the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the space field. Individually even the 
largest, most powerful and technically capable 
Western European countries, like France, Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom, are so 
totally. incapable of matc~ing the military 
potential of the superpowers m space that minds 
can be too easily closed and a vital subject 
ignored. 
96. Collectively, however, the WEU member 
countries have a formidable space potential. 
Certainly, if their policies are concerted - and 
the WEU Council is the ideal body to fulfil 
that process - they could considerably influence 
~he. NATO decision-making process. Likewise, 
1t 1s very necessary for the WEU member 
countries, which are the European nations 
probably most threatened by the deployment of 
SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 
the Soviet Union and of SS-22 and SS-23 
missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, 
to be able to evaluate any possible defence 
against these threats on the part of the western 
alliance and to evaluate also the effectiveness of 
British and French retaliatory nuclear forces 
against those threats. The possible inclusion of 
the British and French independent nuclear 
deterrents and of Soviet intermediate- and 
short-range nuclear forces in the arms control 
process is a subject that merits urgent consider-
ation and specialist advice from the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments of WEU. 
97. There has been much loose talk of 
decoupling from Western Europe resulting from 
the deployment of space-based defence on the 
part of the United States. It is strange that the 
proliferation of offensive nuclear systems on the 
part of the Soviets is so readily accepted by the 
Western Europeans, whereas the construction 
of a space-based defence by the United States 
that would diminish the vulnerability of Western 
Europe to all but short-range ballistic missile 
attack is so often criticised. 
98. It does not mean that the United States 
would be prepared to unleash a pre-emptive 
nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union 
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believing that its own heartland was relatively 
sec~re and leaving .w.estern Europe open to 
Sov1et nuclear retahatton. First, NATO is a 
purely defensive alliance and the United States 
would not attack first. Second even the most 
futuristic space-based triple-l~yered ballistic 
missile defence system will never be 100% 
effective. Some ballistic missiles would still get 
through thus ensuring that mutual deterrence 
~as~d on the continued capacity of each side to 
mfhct unacceptable damage on the other would 
continue. 
99. What would be diminished is the risk of 
a Soviet nuclear first strike upon the United 
States. The Soviet Union has been building up 
a strategic ballistic missile arsenal of great 
pr~cision and destructive power. The Soviet 
dnve to strategic (and intermediate-range) 
nuclear superiority would be nullified. Western 
Europe would be less subject to Soviet nuclear 
intimidation and blackmail because a space-
based . defensive system would be global in 
operatiOn. Furthermore, our United States allies 
would regard as more credible the NATO 
~octrine of ~raduated flexible nuclear response 
smce escalation to the strategic level to ensure 
th~ national survival of the Western European 
alhes could be contemplated without risking the 
total nuclear devastation of mainland United 
States. Deterrence would therefore be 
heightened and the risk of war diminished 
Unable ~o ga~n an advant~ge over NATO by 
the prohferat10n of offens1ve nuclear ballistic 
missiles except at inordinate cost the Soviet 
Union would be more likely to ~egotiate an 
agreement to reduce such offensive systems. 
100. Lastly, there is the reassurance that a 
global space-based defence would protect the 
f~ee world from nuclear attack by miscalcula-
tion, error, the act of a madman or from a 
proliferation of ballistic missile systems to 
nations other than the five present nuclear 
powers. 
101. Mankind has expended almost immeasur-
able resources in the development, construction 
and de~loyment of awesome engines of mass 
destruction. If only a modest fraction of that 
expenditure were devoted to research into 
def~ns~ve ~y~tems, we ~ould judge whether a 
balhsttc m1sstle defence IS feasible at reasonable 
cost. If man can be landed on the moon and 
permanent space stations assembled in orbit 
the likelihood is that such a defence is practicai 
~nd not the science fiction that people believe 
1t to be. 
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Policy implications of defences 
against ballistic missiles 
During the 1950s, the United States 
maintained substantial programmes for defence 
against possible attack by Soviet bombers. But 
in the 1960s, in light of the growing threat 
from Soviet missiles, the United States Govern-
ment concluded that an effective missile defence 
would be most difficult to achieve. Moreover, it 
was thought that deployment would not be 
desirable because it might provide an incentive 
for the Soviets to further increase their offensive 
strategic forces to overwhelm our missile 
defences, and that they could do so at a cost 
much lower than our cost for missile defences. 
And once our increasing vulnerability to Soviet 
missile attacks was accepted, it did not seem 
warranted to continue a major effort for defence 
against Soviet bombers. As a result, we largely 
disbanded our air defences in the 1960s. 
At the same time, a strategic theory 
gained currency in the United States that held 
that deterrence of nuclear attack could best be 
maintained if both the United States and the 
Soviet Union were vulnerable to attack. This 
theory found expression in the anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) treaty, which was designed to 
foreclose widespread deployment of ballistic 
missile defences, and in the anticipation that 
we could reach agreements first to limit and 
then to reduce strategic offensive forces. 
Unfortunately, neither the United States 
abandonment of the attempt to defend against 
nuclear attack in the 1960s nor the ABM treaty 
and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT 
I and 11) agreements have led to a levelling off 
in the growth of offensive systems - much less 
to reductions. Moreover, unlike the United 
States, the Soviet Union has continued to 
maintain and modernise both a large nationwide 
air defence system and ballistic missile defences 
around its capital (as permitted by the ABM 
treaty). In addition, as the President recently 
reported to the Congress, the Soviet Union has 
now deployed a large radar in central Siberia 
that almost certainly constitutes a violation of 
legal obligations under the ABM treaty since 
its associated siting, orientation and capability 
are prohibited by this treaty. The Soviets have 
also been conducting research in technologies 
that would be required for more effective missile 
defences. 
The continual growing Soviet offensive 
threat to the United States and our allies plus 
the ongoing Soviet research and deployment of 
defensive systems offers a powerful motive for 
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reassessing the potential role of defensive 
systems in our security strategy. At the same 
time, advances in relevant technologies require 
us to reassess the feasibility of useful defences. 
The conjunction of these issues prompted the 
President to call for a new assessment of the 
possibilities for increasing the role of defensive 
systems in our deterrent posture. 
It is to be expected that the technological 
approaches proposed would vary widely in 
technical risk and strategic uncertainty. For the 
first time in history, we have the possibility of 
developing a multi-tiered system. Such a system 
could defend against enemy ballistic missiles in 
all phases of their flight, not only in the 
terminal phase, where decoys and multiple re-
entry vehicles (MIRVs) constitute a large 
number of objects that the defence must cope 
with. The current technology addresses only the 
final re-entry phase. A capability to intercept 
missiles in the boost and post-boost phases 
could defend against a missile attack before the 
deployment of a multiplicity of re-entry vehicles 
and decoys. 
We do not yet have enough information 
for estimating the entire cost of a full research 
and development programme for a multi-tiered 
missile defence. The costs of actual development 
of various possible systems will, of course, 
depend on the characteristics of the systems. 
Clearly, costs of defences and the trade-offs 
with offensive forces they will permit and 
require are among the most critical issues. The 
costs will, however, be spread over many years, 
and decisions on the desired magnitude of the 
effort can - and should - be taken at various 
stages in the programme. At this time one 
cannot prejudge the extent to which costs of 
increasingly more effective defence deployments 
will be warranted by the resultant security 
benefits and defence savings in other areas. 
The role of ballistic missile defences must 
be viewed in the context of the overall military 
and political requirements of the United States. 
A decision to pursue ballistic missile defences 
would have major implications for nuclear 
strategy, the prevention of nuclear war, deter-
rence of aggression and arms reduction. It is 
with this broad context in mind that our policy 
on missile defences must be shaped. To permit 
informed decisions we have to conduct research 
on many aspects of the relevant technology and 
develop a range of specific choices. 
It is likely that components of a multi-
layered defence, or less than fully effective 
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versions of such a defence, could become 
deployed earlier than a complete system. Such 
intermediate versions of a ballistic missile 
defence system, while unable to provide the 
protection available from a multi-tiered system, 
may neverthless offer useful capabilities. The 
development of options to deploy such inter-
mediate capabilities would be an important 
hedge against an acceleration in the Soviet 
strategic build-up. If such intermediate systems 
were actually deployed, they could play a useful 
role in defeating limited nuclear attacks and in 
enhancing deterrence against large attacks. 
Intermediate defence capabilities would 
reduce the confidence of Soviet planners in their 
ability to destroy the high-priority military 
targets that would probably be the primary 
objective of a contemplated Soviet attack. The 
planners' decreased confidence in a successful-
outcome of their attacks against military 
targets, war-supporting resources with the 
United States, or United States and allied 
forces overseas would strengthen deterrence of 
Soviet use of nuclear arms. 
An effective, fully deployed United States 
ballistic missile defence could significantly 
reduce the military utility of Soviet pre-emptive 
attacks, thereby potentially increasing both 
deterrence and strategic stability. But such a 
defence could remain effective only if the Soviet 
Union could not negate it with countermeasures 
more cheaply than the United States could 
maintain the viability of the system or if the 
two sides agreed to limit offensive missile forces 
while protecting defensive systems. Effective 
defences strengthen deterrence by increasing an 
attacker's uncertainty and undermining his 
confidence in his ability to achieve a predictable, 
successful outcome. By constraining or elimi-
nating the effectiveness of both limited and 
major attack options against key United States 
military targets and thus leaving only options 
for attacking urban areas - which would be of 
highly questionable credibility - defences could 
significantly reduce the utility of strategic and 
theatre nuclear forces and raise the threshold 
of nuclear conflict. 
It must be recognised, however, that there 
are uncertainties that will not be resolved until 
more is known about the technical characteris-
tics of defensive systems, the future arms 
policies of the Soviet Union, the prospects for 
arms reduction agreements, and the Soviet 
response to United States initiatives. Important 
questions to be addressed are: 
- the absolute and relative effectiveness 
of future United States and Soviet 
defensive systems and how this effec-
tiveness is perceived by each side; 
- the vulnerabilities of the defensive 
systems (both real and perceived); 
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- the size, composition and vulnerability 
of each side's offensive forces; 
- the overall United States-Soviet mili-
tary balance. 
While these uncertainties cannot be fully 
resolved, we will learn more about them with 
the passage of time. Our assessment of these 
issues will affect design and deployment 
decisions. 
These uncertainties notwithstanding, a 
vigorous research and development programme 
is essential to assess and provide options for 
future ballistic missile defences. At a minimum, 
such a programme is necessary to ensure that 
the United States will not be faced in the future 
with a one-sided Soviet deployment of highly 
effective ballistic missile defences to which the 
only United States answer would be a further 
expansion of our offensive forces (penetration 
aids, more launchers, etc.). Such a situation 
would be fraught with extremely grave conse-
quences for our security and that of our allies. 
There is no basis for the assumption that 
decisions on the deployment of defensive 
systems rest solely with the United States. On 
the contrary, Soviet history, doctrine and 
programmes (including an active programme to 
modernise the existing Moscow defence - the 
only operational ballistic missile defence in 
existence) all indicate that the Soviets are more 
likely (and better prepared) than we to initiate 
such a deployment whenever they deem it to 
their advantage. For the near future, in 
particular, they are better prepared than we to 
deploy traditional (conventional) terminal 
defences. United States work on ballistic missile 
defence technology in the 1960s and early 
1970s appears to have been an important factor 
in Soviet willingness to agree to the deployment 
limits imposed by the ABM treaty; similar 
considerations can be expected to play a role in 
future Soviet decisions on the deployment of 
ballistic missile defences. 
If United States research efforts on 
defensive technologies prove successful, and are 
so perceived by the Soviet Union, such 
technologies could fundamentally alter the 
nature of the strategic relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Advanced 
ballistic missile defences have the potential for 
reducing the military value of ballistic missiles 
and lessening the importance of their role in 
the strategic balance. In reducing the value of 
these weapons, defensive technologies could 
substantially increase Soviet incentives to reach 
agreements reducing nuclear arms. In conjunc-
tion with air defence and effective, agreed 
constraints on all types of offensive nuclear 
forces, highly effective ballistic missile defences 
could drastically diminish the threat of massive 
nuclear destruction. 
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Nevertheless, the immediate response of 
the Soviet Union to a United States effort to 
develop ballistic missile defences is likely to be 
a continuation of its current political and 
diplomatic campaign to discredit such defences. 
At the same time, the Soviet Union will 
continue its own efforts on air defences and on 
both existing and advanced ballistic missile 
defences. The Soviets can also be expected to 
press ahead with further expansion and moder-
nisation of their offensive systems. The Soviets 
may change their pattern of behaviour if they 
become convinced that the American commit-
ment to the deployment of defences is serious, 
that there are good prospects for eventual 
success in the development of ballistic missile 
defences and that such deployments present 
opportunities for a safer United States-Soviet 
nuclear relationship. 
Since long-term Soviet behaviour cannot 
reliably be predicted, we must be prepared to 
respond flexibly. A research and development 
programme on ballistic missile defence that 
provides a variety of deployment options will 
help resolve the many uncertainties we now 
confront and over time offers the United States 
flexibility to respond to new opportunities. By 
contrast, without the research and development 
programme, we condemn future United States 
presidents and congresses to remain locked into 
the present exclusive emphasis on deterrence 
through offensive systems alone. 
If, for example, the Soviets persisted in 
attempts to expand their massive offensive 
forces, a flexible research and development 
programme would force Soviet planners to 
adopt countermeasures, increasing the costs of 
their offensive build-up and reducing their 
flexibility in designing new forces in a manner 
that they would prefer. Over time, our research 
and development on ballistic missile defence 
might induce a shift in Soviet emphasis from 
ballistic missiles, with the problems they pose 
for stability, in favour of air-breathing forces 
with slower flight times. By constraining Soviet 
efforts to maintain offensive forces and making 
them more costly, United States options to 
deploy ballistic missile defences might increase 
our leverage in inducing the Soviets to agree to 
mutual reductions in offensive nuclear forces. 
In turn, such reductions could reinforce the 
potential of defensive systems to stabilise 
deterrence. Reductions of the magnitude pro-
posed by the United States in the strategic 
arms reduction talks (START) would be very 
effective in this regard. 
In its initial stages, a United States 
ballistic missile defence research and develop-
ment programme would be consistent with 
existing United States treaty obligations. Were 
we to decide on deployment of a widespread 
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defence of the United States, the ABM treaty 
would have to be revised. If the results of the 
research and development programme war-
ranted such a decision in the future, it would 
be appropriate to address it in the context of a 
joint consideration of offensive and defensive 
systems. This was the context contemplated at 
the outset of the SALT negotiations; but while 
we reached an agreement limiting defences, our 
anticipations of associated limitations on offen-
sive forces have not yet been realised. 
Both the Soviet national interest and 
traditional themes in Soviet strategic thought 
give reason to expect that the Soviets will 
respond with increased dependence on defensive 
forces relative to offensive forces. The nature of 
a co-operative transition to defensive forces 
would depend on many factors, including the 
technical aspects of each side's defensive 
systems, their degree of similarity or dissimilar-
ity, and whether United States and Soviet 
systems would be ready for deployment in the 
same period. Because of the uncertainties 
associated with these factors, no detailed 
blueprint for arms control in the transition 
period can be drawn at this time. A list of arms 
control measures might include agreed sched-
ules for introducing the defensive systems of 
both sides, and associated schedules for reduc-
tions in ballistic missiles and other nuclear 
forces. Confidence-building measures and con-
trols on devices designed specifically to attack 
or degrade the other side's defensive systems 
are other potential arms control provisions. 
If both the United States and the Soviet 
Union deployed defensive systems against a 
range of nuclear threats, it would not diminish 
the need to strengthen United States and allied 
conventional military capabilities. Moreover, to 
realise the protection offered by a fully effective 
strategic defence, we would require air defences 
so that the ballistic missile defence could not be 
circumvented by increased deployments of 
bombers and cruise missiles. The integration of 
defences against air-breathing vehicles with 
defences against ballistic missiles requires 
further study. 
Defence against ballistic missiles offers 
new possibilities for enhanced deterrence of 
deliberate attack, greater safety against acci-
dental use of nuclear weapons or unintended 
nuclear escalation, and new opportunities and 
scope for arms control. The extent to which 
these possibilities can be realised will depend on 
how our present uncertainties about technical 
feasibility, costs and Soviet response are 
resolved. Clearly, the pursuit of defensive 
systems should not build only on our present 
policies of maintaining peace; it should also 
seek to strengthen the effectiveness of our 
strategic policy in the face of a growing Soviet 
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threat. The essential objective of the United 
States strategic defence initiative is to diminish 
the risk of nuclear destruction - contrasted with 
continued, sole reliance on the threat of nuclear 
retaliation - to provide for a safer, less 
menacing way of preventing nuclear war in the 
decades to come. 
Technologies for defence against ballistic 
missiles 
Six broad areas were addressed by the 
technologies study team: 
- surveillance of Soviet missile forces and 
acquisition and tracking of missile 
attacks; 
- directed energy weapons for missile 
defence; 
- more-conventional weapons for missile 
defence; 
- control and co-ordination of the battle 
between the offensive missile forces and 
our defences, together with its require-
ments for communications and data 
processing; 
- concepts for an integrated defensive 
system; 
- possible Soviet countermeasures and 
tactics. 
The goal of the study was to provide 
guidance for research and development pro-
grammes, in particular for the development of 
technologies that could make possible a defence 
against ballistic missiles. As a first step, the 
research and development programme should 
further informed decisions on subsequent engi-
neering programmes seeking to test the tech-
nologies. 
In addition, the study identified demon-
strations of key components of a missile defence 
that could be conducted by the end of this 
decade. These demonstrations can provide a 
basis for choosing specific, partial missile 
defence systems to be deployed by the early 
1990s. Such partial systems could defend 
perhaps a few critical targets, especially against 
smaller attacks. In the event of a large missile 
attack, however, many missiles would reach 
their targets. Yet even the limited effectiveness 
of a partial system could make a significant 
contribution to deterrence by depriving the 
enemy planner of reliable military results of his 
attack. 
This study dealt only with defences 
against ballistic missiles; defences against 
bombers and cruise missiles have been evaluated 
in other studies. 
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The principal conclusions of this study 
were that: 
- new technologies for ballistic missile 
defence hold promise that warrants a 
major research and development effort 
to provide specific options for defensive 
systems; 
- through demonstration projects, evi-
dence and measurement of progress on 
the required technical capabilities can 
be provided within the next ten years; 
- development of all the technologies 
essential for a comprehensive ballistic 
missile defence will require effective 
co-ordination through central manage-
ment for the research and development 
efforts; 
- the most effective defensive systems 
have multiple layers, or tiers; 
- a combination of technologies and 
special tactics needs to be developed to 
protect vulnerable components of the 
future defence system. 
A. The ballistic missile attack 
Advances in Soviet and United States 
technology warrant a re-evaluation of ballistic 
missile defences. Over the past twenty years, 
the Soviet threat from ballistic missiles has 
increased steadily. For .purposes of analysis, this 
study assessed a vanety of potential future 
threats, ranging from an attack with fewer than 
100 ballistic missiles and a few hundred 
warheads to an attack with thousands of 
missiles launched simultaneously with tens of 
thousands of warheads. The study focused on 
the most demanding case - a ballistic missile 
attack, unconstrained by arms limitations that 
would impose the greatest stress on a def~nsive 
system. 
In seeking to determine the best defence, 
the study team analysed the characteristics of 
a ballistic missile throughout all four phases of 
a typical trajectory. In the boost phase, the 
first- and second-stage engines of the missile 
are burning, producing intense infrared radia-
tion that is unique. A post-boost, or bus 
depl~yment, phase occurs next, during which 
multiple warheads and enemy penetration aids 
are released from a missile. (Penetration aids 
are objects that accompany a missile attack 
designed to saturate defences.) Next in th~ 
mid-course phase, warheads and pe~etration 
aids travel on ballistic trajectories above the 
atmosphere. In the final phase, the warheads 
and penetration aids re-enter the atmosphere, 
where they are affected by atmospheric drag. 
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B. Characteristics of an effective defence 
against ballistic missiles 
1. Defence in depth. For many years now, 
ballistic missile defence studies and experiments 
have continued to support the conclusion that 
an efficient defence against large missile attacks 
would need to be multi-tiered. Some missiles 
(or other objects that are part of the attack) 
will be able to penetrate any one defensive tier; 
those that have not been intercepted at one 
phase will move on to the next phase. For 
example, a 10% leakage in each of three tiers 
would amount to an overall leakage of only 
0.1 %. A single layer that can achieve 90% 
effectiveness is many times less costly than a 
single layer of 99.9% effectiveness. It is thus 
reasonable to construct a three- or four-layer 
defence with 99.9% effectiveness at far less cost 
than that of the equivalent single-layer defence. 
Finally, a multi-tiered defence complicates an 
attacker's planning because any single method 
an attacker used to circumvent the defensive 
system would not be equally effective for each 
tier. This compounds the uncertainty of Soviet 
planners about the effectiveness of a missile 
attack that they might contemplate. 
2. Defence at each tier. The effective reach 
of a terminal-defence interceptor is determined 
by how fast it can fly and how early it can be 
launched. Terminal-defence interceptors fly 
within the atmosphere. The precise timing of 
their launching is linked to discrimination of 
their real targets from penetration aids and 
accompanying debris. Terminal defence must 
be complemented by area defences that inter-
cept incoming warheads at long ranges. Inter-
cepts outside the atmosphere, designed to 
eliminate threatening warheads while they are 
still in the mid-course trajectory, offer such a 
complement. New technologies make it possible 
to perform these intercepts with non-nuclear 
warheads. 
Mid-course intercept requires the defence 
to identify decoys designed precisely to attract 
interceptors and exhaust the defending force 
prematurely. Fortunately, in this phase there is 
more time available than at later stages to 
engage objects in trajectory. The mid-course 
defensive system must provide both early 
filtering, or discrimination, of non-threatening 
objects and continuing warhead attrition to 
minimise the demand placed on the terminal 
system. Placing a layer of defence intercept 
before mid-course is an attractive option. To 
delay the start of the defensive effort until 
mid-course would accept the risk of a large 
increase in the number of objects the defence 
must cope with because multiple independently 
targeted re-entry decoys would have been 
deployed. 
In the post-boost phase, the defence must 
cope with an increasing number of objects in 
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the enemy attack, as decoys and re-entry 
vehicles are deployed. On the other hand, the 
post-boost phase offers additional time for 
interception and an opportunity to discriminate 
between warheads and deception objects as they 
are deployed. 
Consequently, an ability to defend effec-
tively against large Soviet missile attacks would 
be strongly dependent on the effectiveness of a 
boost-phase intercept system. For every booster 
destroyed, the number of objects to be identified 
and sorted out by the remaining elements of a 
layered ballistic missile defence system is 
reduced sharply. Because each booster is 
capable of deploying tens of re-entry vehicles 
and hundreds of decoys, the defence, by 
destroying the boosters, has to destroy 1% or 
fewer of the objects it would have to cope with 
in subsequent phases of the missile trajectory 
- truly substantial leverage. Yet a boost-phase 
system is itself constrained by the very short 
time during which the target can be engaged 
and the potentially large number of targets. 
Because of these constraints, and because of 
the need to obtain the maximum leverage from 
all tiers of the strategic defensive system, we 
need an effective system for surveillance and 
for commanding and allocating the defences 
against a missile attack (battle management). 
Each phase in the layered defensive 
system presents different technical challenges. 
But in each phase a defensive system must 
perform three basic functions: first, surveillance, 
acquisition and tracking; second, intercept and 
target destruction; and third, battle manage-
ment. 
C. Key functions of a ballistic missile defence 
A ballistic missile defence capable of 
engaging the missile attack all along its flight 
path must perform certain functions: 
- Promptly and reliably warn of an attack 
and initiate the defence. Global, full-
time surveillance of ballistic missile 
launch areas is required to detect an 
attack, define its destination and inten-
sity, and provide data to guide boost-
phase intercept and post-boost tracking 
systems. 
- Continuously track all threatening 
objects from the beginning to the end of 
their trajectories. This objective would 
allow accurate and timely data transfer 
from tracking systems to intercept 
systems, permitting the assignment of 
intercepts to attacking re-entry vehi-
cles. 
- Efficiently intercept and destroy the 
booster or post-boost vehicle. The 
defence must be capable of dealing 
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with attacks ranging from a few dozen 
missiles to a massive, simultaneous 
launch. An early attack on post-boost 
vehicles will minimise the number of 
penetration aids deployed. 
- Efficiently discriminate between enemy 
warheads and decoys through filtering 
of lightweight penetration aids. The 
system must be capable of rapidly and 
effectively discriminating decoys or 
penetration aids from re-entry vehicles 
(warheads). The more effective such 
discrimination, the greater the cost to 
the offence in providing the necessary 
mass and volume for decoys that 
cannot be filtered out. 
- Low-cost intercept and destruction in 
mid-course. Accurate recognition of the 
enemy warheads (re-entry vehicles) in 
this phase and a capability to intercept 
them cheaply will increase the enemy's 
difficulty and cost in mounting an 
effective attack. To discourage the 
Soviet Union from increasing the 
number of warheads, the cost to the 
United States defence for interceptors 
should be less than the cost to the 
Soviet offence for warheads. 
- Terminal intercept at the outer reaches 
of the atmosphere and destruction. The 
final phase involves the relatively 
short-range intercept of each re-enter-
ing warhead. 
- Battle management, communications, 
and data processing. These are the 
connecting elements that co-ordinate 
all system components to gain effec-
tiveness and economy of force. 
D. The effect of advances in defence techno-
logies 
Because of recent advances in technology, 
it is now possible to specify how these key 
functions of an effective ballistic missile defence 
could be met. For example, two decades ago no 
reliable means for boost-phase intercept were 
known. Now, several approaches are becoming 
feasible for boost-phase defences, based on 
directed energy concepts (such as particle 
beams and lasers) and methods for destroying 
enemy missiles based on kinetic energy (includ-
ing non-nuclear rocket-propelled projectiles and 
hypervelocity guns). 
Twenty years ago, mid-course intercept 
was difficult. No credible concepts for decoy 
discrimination existed, the intercept cost was 
high, and the unintended. damage caused by 
nuclear weapons then necessary for the inter-
ceptor warheads was unacceptable. Today, 
multispectral sensing of incoming objects with 
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laser imaging and millimetre-wave radar, track-
ing through all phases of the trajectory, and 
inexpensive direct-impact projectiles give prom-
ise of overcoming the difficulties of mid-course 
intercept. 
A few years ago, it was not yet possible 
to design a method to differentiate between 
penetration aids and warheads at high altitudes. 
This shortcoming, combined with limited inter-
eceptor performance, meant that an effective 
defence would have required too many intercep-
tors. Now, technological advances provide new 
ways to discriminate among multiple incoming 
objects, as well as to intercept missiles at high 
altitudes. Coupled with an ability to intercept 
enemy missiles and warheads in boost phase 
and mid-course and to disrupt co-ordinated 
enemy attacks, these improvements would 
greatly increase the effectiveness of terminal 
defences. 
But it is not sufficient to develop the 
capability to destroy incoming targets without 
also developing the capability to manage the 
allocation of interceptors and their integration 
with other portions of a multi-tiered defence 
system. Computer hardware and software and 
signal processing in the 1960s was incapable of 
supporting such a multi-tiered defence battle 
management. Today, technological advances 
permit the development of effective command, 
control, and communications facilities. 
New technology also offers more effective 
solutions to the problem of discriminating 
between a warhead and a decoy or debris. By 
using both active and passive sensors, a ballistic 
missile can be observed during its trajectory to 
determine the presence of a warhead. An active 
sensor determines the location and motion of 
the object by measuring radiation that has been 
directed from the sensor to the object and 
reflected from the object back to the sensor; a 
passive sensor relies on radiation emanating 
from the object. Active techniques, such as 
creating an observable thermal response by an 
object to a continuous-wave laser, and passive 
techniques, such as observing with infrared 
sensors, are possible ways to improve surveil-
lance, acquisition, and tracking of missiles. 
Both active and passive surveillance techniques 
are being developed to image an object in order 
to determine by its appearance what it is. It is 
important to understand that any one sensor 
can be defeated, but it is far more difficult to 
defeat several operating simultaneously. 
E. The new technologies 
1. Surveillance, acquisition and tracking. As 
each potential re-entry vehicle begins ballistic 
mid-course flight accompanied by deployment 
hardware (or "space junk") and possibly by 
decoys, every object must be evaluated and 
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accounted for from the beginning to the end of 
the trajectory, even if the price is many wasted 
evaluations about what are, in effect, decoys. 
Defending interceptor vehicles must also be 
tracked to maintain a complete and accurate 
status of the engagement. 
Mid-course sensors must be able to 
discriminate between warheads that survive 
through the post-boost deployment phase and 
non-threatening objects such as decoys and 
debris. They must also provide warhead position 
and trajectory data to permit timely and 
accurate employment of interceptors and to 
assess target destruction. The minimum require-
ments are to track all objects designated as re-
entry vehicles and also to track other objects 
that might be confusing in later tiers. 
Space-based, passive infrared sensors 
could provide the means to meet these tracking 
requirements. They could permit long-range 
detection of warheads (or cold objects) against 
the space background and the elimination of 
simple, lightweight objects, leading to determi-
nation of the full trajectories of threatening 
objects. Laser trackers could also provide 
validation to determine if targets had been 
destroyed, as well as precision tracking of 
objects as they continue through mid-course. 
As the objects proceeded along their trajectories, 
data would be handed off from sensor to sensor 
and the computerised tracking files progressively 
improved. 
For the final line of the defence, the 
surveillance and tracking would be based, where 
possible on the data collected from the mid-
course engagement. This task would consist of 
sorting all objects that have leaded through the 
early defence layers to identify the remaining 
enemy re-entry vehicles. Objects to be tracked 
would include re-entry vehicles shot at but not 
destroyed, re-entry vehicles hitherto undetected, 
and decoys and other objects that were neither 
identified nor destroyed. These possible 
threatening objects must be assigned to final-
phase interceptors. 
One innovative concept for that phase 
involves an airborne optical adjunct- a platform 
put into position on warning of attack - that 
would help detect arriving re-entry vehicles 
using infrared sensors (much as space-based 
sensors had done in mid-course), tracking those 
not previously selected. Airborne sensors could 
also provide data necessary for additional 
discrimination. They could acquire and track 
objects as they were about to re-enter the 
atmosphere and observe interactions of those 
objects with the atmosphere from the beginning 
of re-entry. At that point, a laser or radar 
would precisely measure the position of each 
object and refine its track before interceptors 
would be committed. 
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2. Intercept and destruction of threatening 
objects. A variety of mechanisms, including 
directed energy, can destroy an object at any 
point along its trajectory. The study identified 
several promising possibilities. A laser relying 
on advanced technology can be designed to 
produce a single giant pulse that delivers a 
shock wave to a target. The shock causes 
structural collapse. A continuous-wave or repeti-
tively pulsed laser delivers radiant thermal 
energy to the target. Contact is maintained 
until a hole is burned through the target or the 
temperature of the entire target is raised to a 
damaging level. Examples of such lasers are 
free-electron lasers, chemical lasers (hydrogen 
fluoride or deuterium fluoride), and repetitively 
pulsed excimer lasers. 
There are other possible means of destroy-
ing incoming warheads. A neutral-particle beam 
could deposit sufficient energy within a missile 
or warhead to destroy its internal components. 
In conventional warfare, guns and missiles 
destroy their targets through kinetic-energy 
impact supplemented with a chemical explosive 
in some cases. In defending against ballistic 
missiles, homing projectiles propelled by chem-
ical rockets or by hypervelocity guns, such as 
the electromagnetic gun based on the idea of 
an open solenoid, could destroy warheads in all 
phases. 
3. Battle management. The tasks of battle 
management are to: 
- monitor the global situation; 
- allocate all available defence weapons 
(interceptors, etc.); 
- determine their best use; 
- report results. 
A layered battle-management system 
would correspond to the different layers of the 
ballistic missile defence system, each layer 
being semi-autonomous, with its own processing 
resources, rules of engagement, sensor inputs, 
and weapons. During an engagement, data 
would be passed from one phase to the next. 
The exact system architecture would be highly 
dependent on the mix of sensors and weapons, 
and the geographical scope of the defence to be 
managed would determine the structure of the 
battle-management system. 
As sensors survey the field of battle, raw 
data are filtered to reduce the volume. Later 
processes organise these data according to (l) 
the size of the object, (2) orbital parameters 
and positions as a function of time, and (3) 
listings of other data that help identify and 
assess the threat inherent in the object that is 
being tracked. In principle, all objects in the 
field of view of the sensors are candidates for 
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tracking, and all objects that cannot readily l?e 
rejected as non-threatening would appear m 
the file - the representation of the total battle 
situation. 
Defence system resources include sensors 
and weapons, the data-processing and com-
munication equipment, and the platforms (or 
stations) on which these and other components 
are emplaced. The assignment of these resources 
- both sensor and weapon - is a dynamic 
process requiring re-examination throughout an 
engagement. For example, sensors. must be 
assigned to sectors or to targets of mterest. at 
appropriate times to acquire necessary targetmg 
and tracking data. Weapons must then be 
assigned to targets as determined by rules of 
engagement. Defensive resources must extra-
polate the present situation into the future to 
determine the most likely development of the 
attack and to select a course of action that 
maximises the effectiveness of the defence. 
F. Meeting the challenge 
The technologies study concentr~t~d on 
the most difficult aspects of a multl-tlered, 
four-phase ballistic missile defence system 
capable of defending against a massive threat 
- the technologies that pose the greatest 
challenge. The study team was pri~~r~ly 
concerned with technologies whose feasibility 
would determine whether an effective defence 
is indeed possible. 
1. Critical technologies. Several critical tech-
nologies will probably require research and 
development programmes of ten to twenty years 
to be ready for deployment as part of such a 
ballistic missile defence: 
- Boost- and post-boost-phase intercept. 
As mentioned earlier, the ability to 
respond effectively to a very large 
missile attack is strongly dependent on 
countering it during the boost or post-
boost phases. 
- Discrimination. Dense concentrations of 
re-entry vehicles, decoys, and debris 
must be identified and sorted out 
during the mid-course and high re-
entry phase. 
- Survivability. A combination of tac~ics 
and mechanisms to ensure the survival 
of the system's space-based components 
must be developed. 
- Interceptors. By using inexpensive inter-
ceptors in the mid-course and early 
re-entry phase, intercept can be suffi-
ciently economical to permit attacks on 
objects that may not be warheads. 
- Battle management. Tools are needed 
for developing battle-management soft-
ware. 
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There is much still to be done. For 
example, the management of large computer 
systems will pose important challenges. Devel-
oping hardware will not be as difficult as 
developing appropriate software. Large pack-
ages of software (on the order of 10 million 
lines of code) for reliable, safe, and predictable 
operation would have to be deployed. Fault-
tolerant, high-performance computing would be 
necessary. Not only must it be maintenance-
free for many years, but it must also be 
radiation-hardened, able to withstand substan-
tial shock, and designed to avoid a sudden 
failure of the entire computer system. The 
management of interlocking networks of 
space-, air- and ground-based resources would 
require the development of an accurate means 
of transferring data between computer systems 
rapidly and accurately, through system-gener-
ated protocols. There must also be a. mean~ to 
reconstitute all or part of the system If portions 
of it are damaged or made inoperable. In 
addition, specific ballistic missile defence algo-
rithms will have to be developed for target 
assignment and a simulation environment for 
evaluating potential system architectures. 
The problem of survivability is particu-
larly serious for space-based components. The 
most likely threats to the components of a 
defence system are dir~ct-ascent anti-satel~ite 
weapons; ground- or air-based lasers; ?rbital 
anti-satellites, both conventional and directed 
energy weapons; space mines; and fragment 
clouds. On the ground, traditional methods to 
enhance survivability can be effective, such as 
hardening, evasion, proliferation, deception, and 
active defence. But to protect space-based 
systems, these methods must be employed in 
combination. Ideally, the defence system should 
be designed to withstand an attack meant to 
saturate the system. At the very least, the 
system's most critical points must be protected. 
The history of warfare in general and the 
interactions of weapons technologies in particu-
lar indicate that for many potentially successful 
defences counters have been developed. It is 
essential therefore, to consider possible coun-termeas~res to the development of a ballistic 
missile defence. But countermeasures are likely 
to compete with other military pt:ogrammes f?r 
available resources and thus may result m 
diminished offensive capability. For example, 
hardening of booster rockets of missiles (to 
withstand a boost-phase missile defence) results 
in either a reduced payload or a shorter range 
of the offensive missiles. 
2. Logistical support. The study al.so 
described research programmes on space logis-
tics that would take five to ten years to 
complete. In order of priority, the requirements 
are: 
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(1) development of a heavy-lift launch 
vehicle for space-based platforms of 
up to 100 metric tons (220,000 
pounds one-time payload); 
(2) ability to service the space compo-
nents; 
(3) ability to make available, or to orbit, 
sufficient materials for space-com-
ponent shielding against attack; 
( 4) ability to transfer items from one 
orbit to another; 
(5) multi-megawatt power sources for 
space applications. 
Based on the defensive technologies study, 
the Department of Defence, along with the 
Department of Energy, has established a new 
programme for the President's strategic defence 
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initiative (SDI). Existing programmes relating 
to the SDI have been focused in five technology 
areas, and additional funding will be sought to 
pursue them aggressively. In recognition of its 
importance, the strategic defence initiative will 
be centrally managed and will report directly to 
the Secretary of Defence. 
The strategic defence initiative represents 
one of the most important technological pro-
grammes the nation has ever embarked upon-
a great hope for the future - but it does not 
represent a deployment attempt, nor is it a 
substitute for current strategic and conventional 
force modernisation or for arms control. Rather, 
it will create the technological base for sound 
deployment decisions. SDI will use America's 
greatest assets, our creativity and our ingenuity, 
to lessen the awesome threat of nuclear 
weapons. 
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President Reagan's strategic defence initiative (SDI) 
The basic purpose of the SDI research 
programme is to sponsor the necessary research 
to be able to ascertain which of the many 
proposed various hypothetical weapon systems 
can actually be considered for realisation. Even 
groups opposed to a ballistic missile defence 
(BMD) such as the Union of Concerned 
Scientists have stated that they are not opposed 
to a research effort. The proposed five-year, $25 
billion programme in no way appropriates funds 
for the development and stationing of a BMD 
system in space. Exactly such a research 
programme, well funded, could provide the 
basis to decide whether the administration or 
its critics are correct in their assessment of the 
viability of any future BMD system. The actual 
development and stationing of a system pro-
posed as a result of this research programme 
would still have to be approved and funding 
authorised by the Congress. 
In any case any research programme 
undertaken must be exhaustive and conclusive 
in its results to avoid further heated debates 
between opponents and proponents of a BMD. 
It is crucial to have a solid basis of scientific 
facts to address the question of the viability of 
any BMD system. 
The goals of a BMD 
The current controversy revolving around 
a possible BMD systctm has served to show how 
nebulous the concept is in the eyes of many 
people. In the press, Defence Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger has been quoted as calling for a 
100% effective system, whereas the President's 
Science Adviser G. Keyworth has stated that a 
completely leakproof system is not foreseen. 
The latter is in agreement with many of the 
critics who state that a completely leakproof 
system is impossible. 
The seemingly contradictory statements 
can be reconciled if one examines the basic 
goals of any proposed BMD. One must ask the 
question "What do I wish to defend with a 
BMD?". One must differentiate between three 
possible missions. 
ICBM silo defence 
In this case the primary role of the BMD 
is to intercept and destroy as many as possible 
of the enemy rockets targeted against the 
United States missile silos. This would be 
basically a system orientated toward point 
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defence. The basic aim is to guarantee the 
survival of as many missiles as possible during 
an enemy first strike. 
C3jOMT 
A further possibility is the defence of the 
command, control and communication (C3) as 
well as other military targets (OMT). Here the 
number of targets to be defended is larger, they 
cover a larger area, and their geographic 
distribution is broad. 
Cities 
Here the aim is to defend population 
centres against an enemy's nuclear attack. 
Since cities are, relatively, very soft targets, the 
requirements for a BMD in this case are the 
most stringent. Any intercept occurring at low 
altitudes would still pose grave consequences in 
terms of blast, heat damage and radioactive 
fallout. The BMD system must, in this case, 
interdict the RV s much sooner than in the 
situation of missile silo defence. Here an 
efficiency of less than 100% could still imply 
unacceptable levels of destruction. 
With these three possible goals in mind, 
one can see that when Defence Secretary 
Weinberger discusses BMD he means the goal 
of eventually finding a system which could 
successfully defend even cities. Dr. Keyworth 
addresses the shorter-term goal of significantly 
reducing the vulnerability of the present United 
States missile arsenal. 
BMD and its technologies 
A multi-layered BMD has already been 
presented in a previous article (MT number 8, 
August 1983). Even though several proposals 
have been made for systems of between two 
and five layers, we still feel that the original 
four layers proposed in that article is valid. A 
brief look at the table shows that the proposed 
SDI budget encompasses three main techno-
logical categories. The lion-share of the effort 
will go toward finding solutions for the problems 
of tracking and acquisition. Next, the complex 
of the directed energy weapons (DEW), 
followed by the family of kinetic energy 
weapons (KEW). 
The problems or the first category are 
neither simple nor completely solved. Various 
DOCUMENT 993 
programmes anywhere from Talon Gold to the 
development of very sensitive infrared sensors 
and laser radars demonstrate the complexity of 
the areas which require a solution. Besides these 
hardware systems, there will be various software 
systems of increasingly critical importance. 
Since any spaceborne system will be required to 
be fairly autonomous, a new technology such as 
artificial intelligence {AI) may play a decisive 
role in an eventual BMD. 
Directed energy systems 
A careful and detailed analysis of every 
proposed DEW is outside the scope of this 
article. Since most of these systems have been 
discussed in our article in MT8 /83, we restrict 
ourselves to describing the developments of the 
last two years which are critical to this 
discussion. 
Lasers 
Space-based battle stations have come 
into much criticism, since such stations would 
of necessity be large and thereby quite 
vulnerable. Proponents, quite rightly, note that 
such a station could defend itself; yet can a 
station defend itself effectively and still simul-
taneously destroy enemy ICBMs? 
When one has a laser, one needs the 
accompanying optics (i.e. mirrors) to be able to 
direct and focus the beam on the target. Present 
plans call for mirrors of several metres in 
diameter. Yet, if the number of battle stations 
is to be reduced through increasing the range 
of each laster - which implies an upgrading of 
the laser energy- it becomes necessary to have 
mirrors of several tens of metres in diameter to 
obtain tolerable beam divergences in the order 
of microradians. 
Free electron lasers (FEL) 
This type of laser has come into the 
discussion as a possible ground-based laser that, 
with the help of auxiliary mirrors in orbit, could 
be used to defend against ICBMs. It is hoped 
that with the use of adaptive optics and other 
means, the laser light can be beamed into space 
without dramatic losses of energy as the light 
traverses through the atmosphere. Since the 
system is ground based, the difficulties of fuel 
supplies and laser efficiency play, in this case, 
only a very minor role. 
Much more critical in this case (besides 
whether the adaptive optics scheme works) is 
how one stations or transports the relay and 
battle mirrors in space. Furthermore how one 
goes about constructing mirrors with a diameter 
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of 10 metres or more and still having a laser 
beam divergence of perhaps less than a 
microradian. These parameters are necessary to 
ensure a long range for the laser beam. The 
technology required to solve the problems of 
these dimensional parameters have not yet been 
fully demonstrated. Again, in an actual crisis 
situation or under battle conditions, these 
mirrors themselves would be very easy targets. 
X-ray lasers 
This laser type is perhaps one of the most 
controversial weapons discussed in connection 
with SDI. The principle has been tested in a 
series of underground tests in Nevada in recent 
years. The information about the results of 
these tests is still very sparse and questions of 
scalability have arisen. 
At this point it may be worth noting that, 
in a presentation at the BMD forum at the 
Brookings Institute, Dr. G. Keyworth mentioned 
that there was no important role for nuclear 
weapons in the SDI. From this one could infer 
that the X-ray laser is not considered one of 
the main components of a possible BMD. 
Additionally, in FY 1984 the initial budget was 
cut from $22 to $8 million. 
Particle beams 
The situation of the PBWs has not 
changed greatly in the last two years. The ATA 
(advanced test accelerator) tests continue at 
Lawrence Livermore National Labs. using a 
10 kA beam at 50 Me V. These tests will decide 
whether a CPBW will be viable. In the case of 
the NPBWs, the main problems of finding a 
high density source of negative hydrogen ions 
and the question of the neutralisation of the 
beam as it leaves the accelerator are still 
barriers for the realisation of a NPBW. 
Plasmoids 
Plasma guns have been able to produce 
intense puffs of high-speed plasma. By produc-
ing very high density rings of plasma, where 
the magnetic field induced in the plasma ring 
is strong enough to keep the plasma contained 
for an appreciable time-span (e.g. several 
msec.), a weapon application comparable to the 
NPBW could possibly be achieved. Some 
plasma guns have succeeded in accelerating 
such plasmoids up to velocities in excess of 
many 1000s of km/sec. 
The plasma gun is an accelerator which 
is much simpler to build and operate than that 
required for an equivalent NPBW, and is 
probably much more efficient to boot. This type 
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of space-based system would be much smaller 
and compacter than a NPBW. 
Microwaves 
Recently, several different types of 
extremely powerful microwave sources have 
been built and tested in various laboratories of 
the United States and USSR. These might be 
used to interrupt or jam satellite communica-
tions to earth, etc. Exact details are not well 
known. The possibility would require thorough 
testing. 
Kinetic energy weapons 
This group with its non-nuclear kill 
(NNK) has also been previously discussed. The 
area has seen quite a bit of progress in the last 
few years. 
Vought-ALMV 
This system has had several names, 
ALMV (air-launched miniature homing vehicle) 
being the latest. This Asat (anti-satellite) is a 
two-stage rocket using a SRAM (short-range 
attack missile) with an Altair-III stage. An F-
15 climbs to high altitude and fires the ALMV, 
thus the plane is in effect the booster stage for 
this system. The warhead of this system is a 
small miniature homing vehicle (MHV) with 
an infrared sensor which tracks the target. With 
the help of more than fifty small steering 
rockets, the MHV manoeuvres close to its 
target. The MHV destroys the target by either 
impacting directly or scattering a shrapnel 
cloud, much like ftak. 
A version of this system was recently 
tested in the Pacific. With the infrared sensor 
and vehicle mounted on a Minuteman rocket, 
this system intercepted a RV using a netlike 
aluminium structure with iron weights attached. 
The kill occurred through direct impact with 
the target. The system could be deployed within 
the next few years and is thus a candidate for 
the first system of a multi-tiered BMD to be 
deployed. 
Electromagnetic launchers (EML) 
In a recent article (MILTECH June 
1984), we attempted to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the Railgun. Even as this article 
went into print, great progress in the EML area 
was being made. EMLs are now seen as a very 
concrete possibility not only for a ground-based 
terminal defence, but also as a v~ry good 
space-based condidate. The EML could be used 
to propel either a simple metal slug or even an 
"intelligent" warhead such as an MHV men-
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tioned in the ALMV case. Since progress has 
been made in raising the efficiency of the 
Railgun, the space platforms for EMLs would 
be lighter in weight and compacter in size when 
compared to the rival PBWs. 
Alternates 
Several further systems using rockets and 
other gun types to achieve hypervelocities are 
in the discussion. The High Frontier suggestion 
of Swarmjet is one in which hypervelocity 
rockets form a shrapnel curtain which destroys 
the incoming RV s. A further possibility is the 
Tround open-chamber gun which fires a burst 
of small pellets, producing an up to 4,000 ft 
long cloud containing up to 1 ,000,000 pellets. 
Finally, an upgraded version of the Sprint 
rocket - the Sentry - could be used to propel 
an MHV into the upper atmosphere. 
A m11lti-layered BMD 
The basic system has already been 
presented, yet we wish to very briefly underline 
and add some of the critical factors in a 
multi-layered BMD such as the SDI proposed 
to investigate. 
Tier 1: This is the boost phase of the 
ICBMs, which generally lasts only about 200 to 
300 sec. Any defensive system would need to 
react inside this time frame, making political 
decisions in this situation also impossible. Some 
sort of automation of the decision to intercept 
would be necessary. 
Tier 11: Here it is planned to use the 
ground-based FEL as an addition to the 
space-based DEW platforms. The problem of 
the space-based mirrors, critical for the mission 
of the FEL, has already been discussed 
elsewhere in this article. Additionally, the use 
of EMLs and the Plasmoid weapon for this tier 
is possible. 
Tier Ill: Among the weapons available 
for this tier could be a laser firing from the 
ground yet the brunt of the assignment will 
probably fall on a system like the F-15-launched 
ALMV. A Sentry-type (i.e. fast boost) rocket 
armed with an MHV could supplement or 
enhance the effectivity of this tier. 
Tier IV: The main reason for dividing up 
the terminal defence layer involves the so-called 
"keep out" region. The "keep out" can be 
defined as that volume of atmosphere immedi-
ately above the target inside which a nuclear 
explosion would cause serious damage even 
though it does not actually strike the target. 
In light of this fact, the fourth tier is 
meaningless in the case of a city defence. Even 
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a nuclear burst a few kilometres above a city 
could still cause heat and blast damage 
accompanied by some fallout. Especially if the 
RVs are salvage fused, i.e. they detonate in any 
case if intercepted, this kind of defence of the 
last resort would not save the city, only possibly 
limit the damage. 
For the case of point-like hardened 
targets, such as silos and C-cubedjOMT 
facilities, a detonation occurring close, but not 
too close could mean survival of the facilities. 
Their basic "keep out" region is greatly reduced. 
For these types of targets a low-altitude defence 
system is reasonable. 
BMD - the technological debate 
At this point we wish to separate the 
objections to a BMD based on scientific, 
technological arguments from those of a mainly 
political and strategic nature which are con-
sidered in the next section. 
The more technological aspects of the 
BMD debate can be divided into three main 
categories: 
( 1) Effectiveness: can the claims of 99% 
be trusted or not? 
(2) How much will it cost, or does one 
need hundreds or tens of space-
based satellites? 
(3) The system is much too vulnerable 
and the countermeasures the enemy 
can undertake are much cheaper. 
We attempt to briefly address each of 
these points, but only a thorough research 
programme, such as SDI proposes, can provide 
a conclusive answer. 
Effectiveness 
We are not going to quote in this article 
a set of numbers predicting that a yet-to-be-
realised BMD is a nearly leakproof system and 
allows only one in 10,000 warheads to penetrate 
it. If one's primary aim is to revalidate the 
deterrent capacity of his own ICBM fleet, then 
even a system only 50% effective can be 
valuable. The effectiveness must be measured 
against the goal one sets for a BMD. Besides 
this very basic consideration, which is all too 
often lost in the public discussion, the additional 
considerations to be weighted are: 
- One must assume that to some degree 
the enemy will directly attack the 
BMD, especially the spaceborne com-
ponents with their high vulnerability. 
Even if these systems can effectively 
defend themselves against such attacks, 
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their ability to fulfil their primary 
mission will be impaired. Each defen-
sive action requires scarce fuel and, 
even more scarce, the time available to 
intercept and destroy ICBMs. 
- Not all tiers are necessarily indepen-
dent of each other, thus the same kind 
of countermeasure (e.g. decoys) might 
be effective against more than one tier. 
This implies that computing the effec-
tiveness of a BMD, using the usual 
arithmetic, naively assumes the best 
possible case, which seldom, if ever, 
occurs. A definite and pragmatic range 
of efficiency values can only be realist-
ically obtained when the research for 
SDI has been completed and a concrete 
system is studied, with weight given to 
the military-logistical and operational 
difficulties. 
System dimensions 
The figure demonstrates how critically 
the range of a system and the number of 
platforms required to provide coverage at any 
given time are coupled. Obviously no one 
proposed to deploy a fleet of hundreds of very 
costly and complicated platforms. The solution 
to the problem is to see whether one could 
increase the power levels of a laser, the size of 
its mirrors, and decrease the beam divergence, 
such that the increase in range permits one to 
deploy relatively few satellites. Once again, the 
function of SDI research is to ascertain whether 
such solutions are viable. 
In any case, a well-designed BMD should 
have a pyramid look to it, in the sense that the 
number of units deployed should increase for 
each succeeding tier of the BMD. This ensures 
a high degree of reliability and effectiveness. 
The last two tiers should consist of relatively 
cheap weapons (when compared to the DEW 
space platforms) that can be deployed in much 
larger numbers. 
The estimates of what the final combined 
system could cost vary, but price tags of 
between $500 billion and $1 trillion have been 
mentioned. 
Countermeasures 
A full catalogue of all the possible 
countermeasures would be beyond the scope of 
this article, yet, several selected examples are 
worth examining in more detail. 
One main criticism is that the space-
based platforms will be very vulnerable. They 
will in fact be quite vulnerable. Space mines 
and even simple debris have in the past, and 
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will continue to be in the future a constant 
hazard to such satellites, even in peacetime. 
Even for systems well equipped with defensive 
measures, one must consider that a relative 
proportion of them will be destroyed, reducing 
the effectiveness of the first two tiers. 
Many countermeasures have been pro-
posed, such as having the missiles rotate during 
flight to avoid having a laser burn through the 
outer skin. Values for the laser energy density 
on the target and J or the hardening of the 
missile in this discussion have reached 10,000 
J jsq.cm. The most effective yet simplest 
countermeasure for the post-boost phase will be 
that of decoys - in some cases, simply inflated 
balloons that imitate RVs. In space, sensors 
will find it difficult to always reliably discern 
between these decoys and the actual warheads. 
In the case of balloons, the decoys are 
lightweight and very compact. A great many of 
them can be deployed by the enemy without 
paying too high a payload penalty. Each decoy 
or similar countermeasure, reduces the number 
of RVs that can be carried on the missile. 
Once the RV s begin to enter the 
atmosphere, these dcoys will be filtered out 
(they will burn up). Thus the decoy counter-
measure will be very effective only against the 
defensive measures of space-based tiers. Tiers 
Ill and IV could be foiled by a different type of 
measure, that of the introduction of MARV 
warheads. These manoeuvrable RVs could, up 
to a point, evade the pure kinetic kill systems. 
This threat could be met by increasing the 
number of such systems and using an area 
defence where one effectively blocks whole 
access windows to the target. 
MARV warheads will be no threat to the 
Tier 11 systems. Any system which manoeuvres 
in space to evade defences requires extra 
quantities of fuel to do so. This requirement, in 
turn, decreases either the weight of the warhead 
or allows the deployment of fewer warheads per 
missile by constant throw-weight. Thus, even 
though their velocity will be much less than 
that of light, EML systems can still be an 
effective part of Tier 11. 
The other notable class of countermea-
sures involves the missile's booster phase and 
its ballistic trajectories. With "fast" boosters, 
boosters that burn out before having left the 
atmosphere, one might foil laser attacks against 
the rocket motor. This can only be achieved 
through paying a penalty in throw-weight, i.e. 
less warheads. A further possibility is using a 
"depressed trajectory", a very low ballistic 
trajectory that never really leaves the upper 
atmosphere and thereby, in part, circumvents 
the first two tiers of the BMD. 
Another factor is that such a BMD might 
have difficulties defending against alternate 
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attack systems, i.e. non-ICBMs such as SLBMs, 
cruise missiles, strategic bombers. 
Thus a total defence would involve not 
just a BMD but also a strong air defence. 
Many of the terminal Tier IV weapons could 
also be utilised in defensive systems of this 
type. 
BMD - the strategic policy debate 
The debate whether one should build a 
BMD or not, centres upon the argument 
whether the BMD is destablising or not in light 
of the prevailing principle of MAD (mutually 
assured destruction). To discuss this type of 
question one must return to the first part of this 
article and select a specific goal for the BMD. 
If one wishes only to defend his land-
based retaliatory forces, and not rely solely on 
the SLBMs, then a BMD to defend the ICBM 
fields not only would not be destabilising but 
would in fact reinforce MAD. It makes the 
outcome of a first strike doubtful enough that 
no one would risk it. The counter argument to 
this goes as follows: a leaky BMD is much 
more effective against a ragged (perhaps unco-
ordinated) retaliatory strike than against a 
massive first strike. This reasoning then sees an 
advantage in making a pre-emptive first strike 
and using one's own BMD to ward off the 
retaliatory strike on the other side. 
On the other hand, a BMD that can 
protect cities, i.e. an effectively leakproof system 
that cannot be easily saturated, would in effect 
do away with MAD, and in this sense can be 
, thought of as destablising for MAD. At this 
point one can ask the question: How meaningful 
is MAD? This is left for the reader to decide 
for himself. 
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The most dangerous time frame is without 
a doubt that period in which one side 
unilaterally deploys a BMD. In this case, if the 
other side is not in the position of being able to 
field its own BMD - a BMD that is at least as 
effective - then a very unstable situation would 
arise. The disadvantaged side might be tempted 
to unleash a first strike before the other side 
has completed deployment of its BMD. 
Thus, either a bilateral arms agreement 
banning the deployment of any meaningful 
BMD system - thus preserving MAD - or a 
bilateral agreement on the simultaneous deploy-
ment of both systems - abolishing the MAD -
seem to be the only two reasonable courses for 
both sides and the preservation of world peace. 
The European question 
In this section we discuss very briefly 
three factors important for Europe in the BMD 
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debate. The first is that the deployment of a 
United States BMD system could lead to the 
decoupling of Europrean defence from the 
United States. Some see this as a threat to 
NATO. If a BMD will actually lead to this or 
not depends mainly on the United States and 
its allies. President Reagan and his advisers 
have stated publicly more than once that the 
protective shield of a BMD would be extended 
to allies in Europe. 
Next, though not completely independent 
of the first, is the initiative taken by President 
Mitterrand of France, that in any case there 
should be some sort of European effort in 
parallel to that undertaken in the United States. 
The main threat against Europe is not so much 
ICBMs as that of IRBMs such as the SS-20 
and the tactical nuclear weaheads of the 
Warsaw Pact. Thus the development of an 
ATBMD (anti-tactical ballistic missile defence) 
system would be an answer to this threat. Those 
weapons systems and technologies planned or 
under consideration for the Tiers Ill and IV of 
the United States system would lend themselves 
to being used as an A TBMD in Europe. 
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Lastly, one must consider a point made 
in one of the previous sections. A leaky BMD 
can still be a very effective defence against a 
ragged or small attack. This implies that if the 
Warsaw Pact has a BMD system the deterrence 
value of the British or French arsenal is put in 
question. A system which could not stand up to 
a massive American retaliatory strike might be 
able to deal effectively with a retaliatory strike 
of one of the European nations, limiting severely 
their deterrence capacity. In light of this factor, 
the suggestion of President Mitterrand is quite 
appropriate. 
Co~~t:l11sion 
Too many still unknown or nebulous 
variables are contained in the debate centring 
around the BMD. A far-reaching and exhaus-
tive research programme is called for. If nothing 
else, it can then answer the question of whether 
any technology is capable of being adequate for 
use in a BMD, which they are, how such a 
complete system might look, and finally how 
effective it might be. In this sense SDI is on the 
right road. 
Document 993 4th December 1984 
Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and S 
Military use of space- Part 11 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 51 
tabled by MM. Fourre and Pignion 
1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Noting the difficulty of resuming negotiations between the two superpowers, due in particular 
to the link between space problems and the START and INF negotiations, and considering 
that under the pressure of opinion at home and among its allies the United States must adopt 
a position towards the Soviet Union in which the reaffirmation of American power is 
accompanied by a more marked preparedness for dialogue, particularly on space questions;". 
2. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph: 
"Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communique issued 
by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on 
all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons;". 
3. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "governments" 
to the end of the paragraph and insert: · · 
"to ob.tain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full 
guarantees regarding the conditions of this co~operation, thus leaving open the possibility of 
developing an independent European space station,". 
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "Alliance" to the end of 
the paragraph. · 
5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in 
Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to 
commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard 
to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the 
launching of objects into space." 
Signed: Fourre, Pignion 
I. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment I withdrawn; amendment 2 amended and agreed to; amendments 3, 4 
and 5 agreed to). 
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Consequences of the Gulf war 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the consequences of the Gulf war 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to peace throughout the 
Middle East; 
(ii) Considering that a decisive victory by one or other of the belligerents would involve serious 
dangers for the stability of the area; 
(iii) Noting that no individual power outside the area seems in a position to exert decisive influence 
in favour of peace; 
(iv) Considering however that the supply of arms to the belligerents by some of these powers is 
liable to prolong the war; 
(v) Noting that both belligerents have already gravely violated the laws of war several times; 
(vi) Fearing that the war may be accompanied or followed by renewed and aggravated international 
terrorism; 
(vii) Considering that while Europe's supplies are not yet seriously threatened by the war, an 
intensification of hostilities might disturb the oil market and hence the security of Western Europe, 
as would the internationalisation of the conflict, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations and by Middle Eastern countries 
to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his power to 
foster such an initiative; 
2. Seek agreement between member countries and all other arms-exporting countries on curtailing 
arms supplies to the belligerents; 
3. Afford its support to all humanitarian organisations concerned with the conditions of prisoners 
of war, particularly the ICRC; 
4. Gather the maximum information on possible violations of the laws of war by the belligerents 
and object in the strongest terms whenever such violations are proved; 
5. Plan the measures to be taken jointly by member countries in the event of an extension of 
terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe; 
6. Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf 
war; 
7. Encourage member countries to keep large stocks of oil and continue the efforts they started 
in 19 7 3 to diversify their sources of energy. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Blfllluw, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It is obviously no easy task to analyse the 
consequences of an international conflict still 
being waged and whose outcome is still very 
largely unpredictable. Which side will win? 
Will there be a winner or will a compromise be 
reached? What other powers will become 
in~olved in the conflict? How far will it spread? 
Wtll the great powers stay on the side-lines 
much longer? Depending on the answers to 
such questions in the next few months, the 
c<;msequences of the present war will be very 
dtfferent and today it would be walking on thin 
ice to argue one way or the other. 
2. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to 
start by analysing events so far and the situation 
as it is today. He will then mention a number 
of emerging problems, but without trying to 
forecast a future which is still terribly uncertain. 
However, examination of the various aspects of 
the present crisis in the Gulf area makes it 
necessary to look at the consequences in very 
man_Y fields including the economy, with 
particular regard to energy and oil, the pursuit 
?f a lo_ng war without the nuclear powers 
mtervemng and the balance of a variety of 
forces at both local and world level. 
3. These consequences do not all concern 
Western European security to the same extent. 
Naturally, when the war broke out in 1980, it 
was first the fear of an oil shortage which 
stirred Europe, still reeling from the aftermath 
of the 1973 oil crisis. This fear was fanned by 
the blockade of the Kharg terminal, the attack 
on oi~ tankers in the Gulf and the appearance 
of mmes in the Red Sea in conditions which 
have still not been clarified. However, although 
these f~ars have not been dispelled, the 
progressiOn of the war has shown that they had 
been exaggerated, but there were other reasons 
why Europe should be concerned with the 
international and local repercussions of the 
conflict, insofar as the stability of the Middle 
East is of increasing concern to Europe's 
security. 
11. The war in September 1984 
A. The aim of the war 
4. It is clear that the Iraqi Government 
assumed heavy responsibility by initiating 
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widespread military operations against Iran on 
22nd September 1980. However, the roots of 
the war which flared up that day go back 
throughout the ages during which the mountains 
and rivers separating the two countries have 
always been a disputed frontier between states 
with very different ethnic, religious, cultural 
and political foundations. 
5. In the course of its history, Iran has often 
been the nucleus of vast empires extending far 
beyond its present frontiers. It is still a 
composite state in which 75% of the population 
speak languages derived from Persian and 93% 
are Shiite Moslems. There is a strong national 
feeling of long standing. However, this popula-
tion of 42 million is very unequally distributed 
round a central region which is almost a desert 
and national unity is weakened by the existence 
of many minorities, particularly Turkish-speak-
ing people (22%), Sunni Arabs (2%) in 
Khuzestan in the south-east of the country, and 
Kurds (5.5%) in the north-east, all of whom are 
to be found on both sides of the frontier 
between Iran and Iraq. The country's northern 
and eastern frontiers with the Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are not ethnic or 
religious frontiers either, particularly in Azer-
baijan (where 0.6% of the population is 
Armenian) and Baluchistan (where 2.3% of the 
population is Baluchi). 
6. Apparently a certain western tendency to 
oppose the various linguistic groups, ethnics and 
religious traditions within Islam has led to the 
role of these diverging elements being exagger-
ated and to insufficient account being taken of 
national realities or of the role of modern 
ideologies. This is true of the clash between 
Shiism and Sunnism which, if not judged 
correctly, prevents one from seeing certain 
transdenominational movements throughout the 
Moslem world. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini's 
messianism spreads far outside the Shiite world 
and is felt fairly strongly as far as in the Sunni 
Maghreb. This explains the fear it inspires 
among all conservative Arab groups, as the 
General Affairs Committee saw when it visited 
Jordan in spring 1984. This fear is obviously 
even greater in the Arab Gulf countries. 
7. Since 1925, the Pahlevi emperors had 
endeavoured to unite all Iranians round a 
fee~ing which was both national and dynastic, 
whtch meant the state separating to some extent 
from Shiite Islam. The festivities at Persepolis 
to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the 
empire of Cyrus on 13th October 1971, thus 
sought to promote a concept of the Iranian 
nation going much further back than its 
lslamisation, which occurred in the seventh 
century A.D. 
8. However, once the Pahlevi empire had 
emerged from the trusteeship of the western 
powers, it adopted aims which were both 
territorial and hegemonous: it wished to be seen 
as the greatest power in the region and to 
control access to the gulf, which was then still 
known as the Persian Gulf. Better than any of 
its neighbours, Iran had managed to take 
advantage of the wealth drawn from its oil to 
develop certain parts of a modern, highly 
industrialised economy. In 197 4, it was the 
world's fourth oil producer, with an annual 
output of 300 million tons, second only after 
Saudi Arabia for exports with an oil income of 
$22,000 million. Its reserves were estimated at 
8,000 million tons which placed it in fourth 
position in the world. It had large reserves of 
natural gas, although transport requirements 
were still restricting the marketing of this 
commodity. 
9. Nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951 
allowed the Iranian state to keep a close control 
on oil production, trade and industry, to expand 
its domestic refinery capacity and related 
industries and to take advantage of the crisis 
which broke out in October 1973 to obtain a 
significant revaluation of its oil income. There 
was a very rapid rise in gross national product 
in the years preceding the fall of the Shah and 
although very unequally spread among the 
Iranian people, a middle class did however 
emerge which might have seemed to guarantee 
a better economic future and some political 
stability. 
10. Shah Reza Pahlevi had transformed part 
of this wealth into military power and his army 
of 400,000 men was equipped with modern 
weapons procured in the United States and 
other western countries and in the USSR. He 
had the most powerful and up-to-date air force 
in the region and was in a position to impose 
his will on his neighbours. Thus, on 30th 
November 1971, at the expense of the Emirates 
of Sharjah and Ra's al Khaymah, he annexed 
the three islands of Abu Musa and the Two 
Tumbs which offered control of the Strait of 
Hormuz and access to the Gulf. On 13th June 
1975, he imposed the Algiers Agreements on 
Iraq, which gave Iran half the channel and 
certain islands of the Shatt al' Arab, Iraq's only 
outlet on the Gulf and towards the high seas. 
Moreover, the Shah did not hesitate to arm the 
Iraqi Kurd rebels prior to the conclusion of the 
1975 Algiers Agreements and to mass forces 
along the frontier between the two countries 
when Iraq threatened Kuwait's sovereignty. He 
also took advantage of the existence of strong 
Iranian minorities in many territories of the 
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Arab peninsula to intervene actively, inter alia 
by providing the Sultan of Oman with military 
support against a rebellion, and also by laying 
claim to Bahrein and Qatar where Iranians 
form a major part of the population. 
11. In face of Iranian power, the Arab 
countries round the Gulf were disunited and 
incapable of offering effective resistance. At the 
time, Saudi Arabia's military strength was 
insignificant and the emirs often considered 
Iran as an essential protector when they faced 
internal rebellions or Iraqi imperialism, which 
was a particular threat to Kuwait. Only Iraq 
was seriously able to resist Iran, although its 
forces were far from equal and it was involved 
in various domestic and Middle Eastern con-
flicts which considerably limited its means of 
action. 
12. With 14 million inhabitants, oil output of 
150 million tons, reserves estimated at 5,000 
million tons and a relatively agitated recent 
political history, Iraq was not a negligible power 
but nor was it strong enough to face up to the 
Shah's Iran. Iraq has been a state only since 
the fall of the Ottoman empire. It was under 
British mandate until 1946 and it is still not 
ethnically, linguistically or religiously united. 
With 80% of its population Arab, it has 
constantly wished to belong to the Arab 
community and tried to be united with Jordan 
in 1958 and with Syria in 1979, but with no 
lasting effect. It has taken part in the various 
wars waged by Arab countries against Israel, 
although it has no common frontier with the 
latter. But 20% of its population are Kurds. 
They are a non-Arab race, spread over the 
territories of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, countries 
with which they have periodically fought. 
Moreover, religious differences are considerable 
in Iraq since the Sunnis represent only 40% of 
the population, half of whom are Kurds, 50% 
are Shiite and 10% Christian. Finally, between 
the revolution of 14th July 1958 and the coup 
d'etat of 31st July 1968, when President Hassan 
El Bakr finally came to power, there were ten 
years of civil war and regular demonstrations of 
force in Iraq. Since 1968, the Baath Party has 
been exercising a dictatorship with President 
Saddam Hussein at its head since 16th July 
1979. All opposition has been brutally repressed, 
including the Kurds between 1973 and 197 5, 
the Shiites in 1980, the communists in 1978 
and certain Baathists in 1979. 
13. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was to 
change completely a balance of forces which 
had until then been very much in Iran's favour. 
The Iraqi Government had the impression that 
the time was ripe for it to erase the results of 
twenty years of Iranian preponderance. Iraq 
had sound allies in the Arab world where many 
leaders wished to ward off the Islamic revol-
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utionary contagion, in the Soviet Union, allied 
with Iraq since 1972 by a treaty· of friendship 
and co-operation, and even in the West. Indeed, 
the United States was on the worst of terms 
with the government of Imam Khomeini who, 
after overthrowing the Shah, the United States' 
traditional ally, took as hostages the staff of the 
American Embassy in Tehran. Moreover, the 
United States and its European allies were 
anxious to protect their Arab allies against 
revolutionary threats. Finally, since 1976 France 
had been pursuing a major investment pro-
gramme in Iraq and was that country's second 
supplier of arms after the Soviet Union. 
14. Well supported from without and absolute 
master at home, Saddam Hussein's government 
found itself opposite an Iranian regime which 
seemed considerably weakened. The collapse of 
the Shah's regime at the end of 1979 had 
established an Islamic republic which seemed 
to be sinking into anarchy. Imam Khomeini's 
spiritual power openly clashed with the head of 
state, President Bani Sadr, who soon had to go 
into exile. The police and army were subjected 
to cruel repression which left them without 
leaders and Iran seemed unable to replace the 
officers who were executed by hundreds if not 
thousands. Isolated abroad, the Iranian Govern-
ment spurned with horror both the great 
American satan and the Soviet Union, respon-
sible for the invasion of Afghanistan, Iran's 
Moslem neighbour and the only country 
culturally close to it. The Kurds had been 
estranged and, reconciled with Iraq, they 
resumed their rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan. 
At the beginning of 1980, practically the entire 
Arab world had noted how Prime Minister 
Ghotzadeh, President Bani Sadr and Mr. 
Sadegh Rouhani, said to be Ayatollah Khom-
eini's spokesman, had resumed Iran's claims to 
the southern shore of the Gulf, and in particular 
Bahrein, "Iran's fourteenth department" in 
addition to the islands it already occupied. It 
was to be hoped that, in a war against Iran, 
Iraq would receive support from all the Arab 
states and also from the Arabs of Iranian 
Khuzestan on the frontier as well as from the 
Kurds and ethnic or religious minorities who 
were being harshly oppressed by the new 
Iranian authorities under the Shiite clergy. 
15. The Iraqi attack on 22nd September 1980 
was not a bolt from the blue. Since the 
beginning of the year, Iranian immigrants in 
Iraq had been agitating in a revolutionary 
manner which the Iraqi Government considered 
dangerous enough for it to expel some 60,000 
Iranians in spring 1980. Conversely, it received 
many Iranian political refugees who probably 
helped to give it the idea that the new regime 
was about to collapse and that the Iraqis would 
be received as liberators by a significant part of 
the population. On both sides, insulting and 
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threatening remarks were exchanged with 
increasing intensity and there were many 
frontier incidents which sometimes developed 
into real fighting and as from April the two 
countries mobilised their forces along their 
I ,500 km common frontier. 
16. Iraq obviously initiated the war, but it 
cannot be accused of being the sole aggressor. 
The Iranian revolution was a destabilising factor 
for the whole region. In foreign policy there 
was no interruption of the expansionist aims 
pursued by the Shah which were continued by 
political and ideological means rather than the 
military power which Iran had allowed to 
diminish. It is not suprising that Iraq wished to 
take full advantage of a situation which it 
considered favourable and which was not liable 
to last for long. In any event, study of the 
origins of the conflict shows that it was not 
limited to two powers but involved the fate of 
the whole region with the paradoxical aspect 
that Iraq, a child of the Baathist revolution, 
was defending the interests of the most 
conservative regimes in the Arab world in 
whose eyes it had been a threat a few years 
earlier and that Iran henceforth represented a 
considerable danger of subversion for those it 
had protected in the days of the Shah. 
17. Certain reliable observers even accord 
decisive importance to the policy pursued by 
Iran after the 1979 revolution among the 
reasons for the Iraqi decision. They stress that 
Iraq at first welcomed the Iranian revolution 
but changed its attitude following the distur-
bances and terrorist attacks fomented by 
Iranians on Iraqi territory or against Iraqi 
interests abroad. For instance, on 1st April 
1980 Tarek Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister, escaped an attack, on 6th April 
20,000 Iranians were expelled from Iraq and on 
15th April Ayatollah Khomeini declared that 
Iran would break Iraq and advance as far as 
Baghdad, while the Iranian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs insisted on the termination of Saddam 
Hussein's regime, linked with Israel, as a 
condition for settling the conflict between the 
two countries over the application of the Algiers 
Agreements and Iran's occupation of the Gulf 
islands. On 16th April, Ayatollah Bada Sadr, 
one of the leaders of the Iraqi Shiite clergy, 
was arrested and was to be assassinated shortly 
afterwards. On 27th April, the Iranian radio 
announced the death of Saddam Hussein, while 
the Iraqi radio broadcast statements by leaders 
of Iranian opposition movements in exile. 
Starting in the summer, frontier incidents 
increased before Iraq denounced the Algiers 
Agreements on 17th September and Iran called 
up reservists on 20th September. 
18. Relations between the two countries 
therefore certainly deteriorated very quickly 
after the Iranian revolution and because of 
Iran's subversive action in Iraq. However, this 
does not entirely demolish the other explanation, 
i.e. that Iraq wished to take advantage of what 
it considered to be a favourable situation to 
settle a dispute which had preceded the 1979 
revolution. Would it have done so even if Iran 
had not increased its provocation? There is no 
certain answer to this question. 
B. The stages of the war 
19. The war which broke out in September 
1980 has so far passed through three distinct 
stages of varying duration. 
20. (a) Between September and December 
1980 Iraq conducted an offensive in three 
sectors: along the Shatt al 'Arab towards 
Abadan, which was for a time encircled, in 
northern Khuzistan and in Kurdistan. The land 
offensive was covered by numerous air raids, 
mainly aimed at oil and port installations, 
which induced Iran to retaliate against Iraqi 
ports and oil industries, thus reducing the oil 
industry of the two countries to practically 
nought during the early months of the war. 
21. Iraqi offensives had limited results in the 
field, in spite of fairly heavy losses, and showed 
that Iran was capable of mustering strong 
defence. The Khuzistan Arabs proved loyal to 
the Iranian regime and the Kurd rebellion was 
less threatening than expected to the bitter 
disappointment of Iraq. The Iran army and air 
force showed a greater fighting capability than 
expected and above all, rather than encouraging 
the counter-revolutionary forces in Iran, the 
Iraqi attack apparently made a major contri-
bution to restoring national union round Imam 
Khomeini's regime, in spite of a rapid deterio-
ration in relations between the civil and religious 
leaders of the country and the serious crisis 
between Iran and the United States caused by 
American diplomats in Tehran being taken 
hostage. 
22. (b) Between January 1981 and spring 
1984 the war took a new turn. Operations were 
increasingly initiated by Iran, which recon-
quered the territory lost in 1980 and crossed 
the Iraqi frontier on three fronts. However, 
these offensives by large numbers of badly 
trained, poorly-led and under-equipped forces 
cost many lives and obtained no decisive results. 
Everything indicates that the Iraqi army, better 
trained, commanded and armed, particularly in 
tanks, artillery, missiles and aircraft, was able 
to resist close to the frontier and suffered far 
fewer losses. Hence, it became increasingly 
clear that neither side was in a position to win 
a decisive victory in the field. 
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23. The Iraqi Government seems to have 
realised quite quickly that it could not attain its 
initial objectives and that to prolong the war 
might make its internal position most difficult, 
particularly since although certain Arab coun-
tries were supplying it with generous financial 
assistance, e.g. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or 
even limited military assistance, e.g. Jordan, 
others, such as Libya and above all Syria, were 
taking the side of Iran. On 1Oth April 1981 , 
Syria cut the two oil pipelines still transporting 
Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, thus halting oil 
exports, the mainstay of Iraq. It also allowed 
parties opposed to the Baghdad regime to 
regroup in Damascus, thus creating a serious 
threat of subversion, particularly among the 
Shiite and Kurd elements of the Iraqi population 
and the Iraqi communists. 
24. As soon as it became apparent that 
Iranian resistance was much stronger than the 
Iraqi Government had expected, i.e. in Nov-
ember 1980, the latter looked for ways to end 
the war. While calling for the abrogation of the 
Algiers Agreements and referring to the 
dismantling of Iran and application of the rights 
of the occupying power, on 2nd December, in 
a message to the European Community, the 
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that 
his country had expansionist aims and referred 
to negotiations with Iran on the position of the 
common frontier. In March 1981, Iraq accepted 
the principle of an immediate cease-fire pro-
posed by a group of Islamic countries which 
tried to impose mediation, whereas Iran insisted 
on the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from its territory, full application of the 1975 
Algiers Agreement and an inquiry into Iraqi 
aggression by an international commission, 
which Iraq obviously found unacceptable. 
Finally, on 27th June 1981 the Islamic 
Conference Organisation drew up six proposals. 
These were rejected by Iran. Attempts by the 
United Nations and non-aligned countries were 
no more successful. In June 1981, Iraq proposed 
a truce and in October President Saddam 
Hussein said his country was prepared to end 
the war without conditions other than the 
safeguarding of its honour and dignity. It 
renewed its proposal for a cease-fire on 5th 
November. Imam Khomeini refused all these 
proposals, asserting that peace would be possible 
only if the Iraqi regime were first overthrown, 
thus excluding any possibility of negotiated 
peace. 
25. In these circumstances, the two sides had 
no choice but to intensify hostilities and try to 
extend them in the hope of finding a military 
solution. Iran's intention was to exploit the 
areas in which it had superiority to try to win 
the day through naval operations to blockade 
the Shatt al 'Arab and through offensives 
involving large numbers of troops to offset its 
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growing inferiority in the air and in land 
weapons since 1982. Thus, in autumn 1983 
children of fourteen were used in a series of 
offensives in the Shatt al 'Arab islands. These 
offensives had limited results. They met with an 
ever better defensive system, deployed to a 
depth of 30 to 50 km resulting in considerable 
losses for Iran. 
26. However, there are signs that limits to 
all-out war have been set if not through a 
formal agreement between the belligerents at 
least by some kind of tacit agreement. For 
instance, air raids on civil populations, frequent 
on both sides in the earlier months of the war, 
seem to have stopped. Iraq does not seem to 
have taken advantage of its superiority in the 
air to resume them. 
27. One committee member recalled the 
disturbing rumours circulating in the West 
about the fate of prisoners of war. Information 
on this matter is too rare and fragmentary, 
particularly about the situation in Iran, for a 
definite opinion to be expressed. However, on 
lOth October 1984 a delegation from the 
International Committee of the Red Cross was 
able to enter an Iranian camp for Iraqi prisoners 
of war in Gorgan to the north-east of Tehran. 
This visit was the occasion of demonstrations 
and a rebellion by the prisoners. The resulting 
repression caused six dead and thirty-five 
wounded among the prisoners- a sign that the 
situation is abnormal. However, an exchange of 
seriously wounded or disabled prisoners was 
held at the initiative of Iraq and through the 
intermediary of Turkey. A hundred prisoners 
were freed by Iraq and seventy-five by Iran. 
28. On the one hand, the decision taken by 
the Soviet Union in 1982 to grant large-scale 
assistance to Iraq allowed it to replace its land 
and air weapons with some very up-to-date 
surface-to-surface missiles and with surface-to-
air missiles and to build up considerable 
strategic reserves. It supplied Sukhoi fighter 
aircraft, a large number of tanks and artillery. 
France too supplied Iraq with armaments 
including, in 1983, sixty Mirage F-1, five 
Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet 
air-to-sea missiles, and artillery. Conversely, 
Iran had difficulty in finding suppliers of arms 
and spare parts in view of its unfriendly 
relations with the United States and the latter's 
embargo on deliveries to the belligerents. Iran's 
suppliers include the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic, Italy, Spain and Israel, which 
provided surface-to-air missiles and spare parts 
for American weapons in Iran since the Shah's 
time. It also has Soviet weapons recovered from 
the battlefields in 1973 and recycled by Israel. 
By and large, the balance was in favour of Iraq 
which henceforth has a clear superiority in land 
and air armaments and above all has strategic 
reserves which are lacking in Iran. 
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29. On the other hand, Iraq extended hostil-
ities to the Gulf. On 18th August 1982, Iraq 
proclaimed a blockade of the Kharg oil 
terminal, the principal outlet for Iranian oil, 
and started bombing it, while the Iraqi air force 
attacked the oil port at Bushehr and, at sea, 
any Iranian or foreign ships approaching Kharg. 
There is little doubt that one of its aims was to 
make non-belligerent countries bring pressure 
to bear on Iran to accept peace. Another aim 
was probably to encourage the Arab countries 
interested in the restoration of peace in the 
Gulf to increase their assistance to Iraq and to 
become more involved in the war. 
30. Iran retaliated by attacking ships calling 
at ports on the southern shore of the Gulf and 
threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz, thus 
leading the United States, the United Kingdom 
and France to bring their ships deployed in the 
Indian Ocean nearer to the strait. So far, Iran 
has not carried out its threats. 
31. Finally, during the winter 1982-83, Iraq 
appears to have used chemical weapons against 
Iranian forces. Victims of burns from a yperite 
type gas were visited by Red Cross delegations 
in Iranian hospitals at the beginning of 1983. 
At the end of October 1984, American sources 
indicated that Iraq had renewed the stocks of 
chemical weapons it had in reserve for use if 
necessary in the event of too threatening an 
offensive by Iranian forces. 
32. Is Iran the only one to have used 
adolescents in its armed forces, where there is 
a mixture of professional soldiers suspected of 
disloyalty to the regime either because they 
miss the former regime or because they are 
influenced by commmunist propaganda, and 
fanaticised volunteers of all ages unsuitable for 
modern warfare but undoubtedly loyal? Is Iraq 
the only one to have used chemical weapons 
produced who knows where? There is contra-
dictory evidence on these two points. 
33. (c) Since spring 1984 large-scale military 
operations have practically stopped. There is 
occasional mention of the idea of a major 
Iranian offensive, but it has not yet occurred 
and experts seem to consider it very doubtful 
that it would be successful in view of the 
defensive system deployed by Iraq. Ships 
continue to be attacked by both sides in the 
Gulf, but less frequently. The only new factor 
has been the appearance of mines in the Red 
Sea. The most recent indications from Egypt 
would attribute responsibility for laying them 
to Libya. After nineteen ships had been 
damaged, a minesweeping campaign was under-
taken by special-purpose ships from several 
countries, including the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Egypt, but results 
were very sparse and allowed no direct link to 
be established between the mines in the Red 
Sea and the Gulf war. 
34. Iraq is still proposing negotiations on the 
basis of the status quo ante helium and Iran has 
still not accepted the principle of negotiations 
with the government of Mr. Saddam Hussein. 
Iran's strategy still seems to be based on a 
large-scale land offensive although it has not 
yet found the wherewithal to take the initiative, 
whereas Iraq's strategy seems mainly defensive 
on land but does not exclude the extension of 
the war to the Gulf in case of need. 
C. The situation in October 1984 
35. The military situation at present offers no 
way out. In 1980 a decisive land victory might 
have seemed possible for Iraq when Iran's 
domestic or military collapse was likely. But it 
is hard to imagine a country of 14 million 
triumphing over one of more than 40 million 
unless the latter is torn by internal strife and 
the war seems to have strengthened Iranian 
national solidarity thus making such a collapse 
improbable. 
36. An Iranian victory also seems improbable 
in view of the very great increase in Iraqi 
armaments procured since 1983, mainly from 
the Soviet Union and France. Iraq now seems 
to have a definite quantitative and qualitative 
superiority in modern weaponry, much of which 
is being kept in reserve, whereas Iran, after 
heavy losses during the first years of the war, 
is having difficulty in replacing the equipment 
destroyed or lost and seems to have no reserves, 
even if the size of its population allows it to 
mobilise far more troops than Iraq. 
37. Naturally, the situation would be very 
different if other powers intervened, particularly 
the superpowers. However, there is no intimation 
of this. Of the Arab countries, only Jordan 
gives Iraq military assistance in the form of a 
limited number of "volunteers". The Arab 
countries of the Gulf grant it financial assistance 
and are hardly inclined to go any further so as 
not to give Iran a pretext for attacking their 
territory or closing the Strait of Hormuz. Some 
of them probably fear an increase in Iraqi 
power as much as Iranian power. Two Arab 
countries, Syria and Libya, have clearly opted 
for Iran, the former because of hostility between 
Iraqi and Syrian Baathists and the latter 
perhaps out of sympathy for the Islamic 
revolution. Both have very close relations with 
the Soviet Union, which nevertheless does not 
favour Iran. The only country in the area to 
give significant assistanc~ to Iran is Israel 
which, in spite of Imam Khomeini's violent 
anti-Israeli declarations, purchases much of its 
oil in Iran and, under a $5,842,000 contract of 
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24th July 1981, sells it missiles, artillery and 
munitions of American origin. 
38. The United States for its part was on the 
worst of terms with Iran at the beginning of the 
war since it was in 1981 that members of the 
United States Embassy in Tehran were taken 
hostage. However, it announced on 30th 
September 1980 that it would accept neither an 
escalation of the war nor any infringement of 
Iran's sovereignty and agreed to American arms 
being delivered to Iran by third countries. 
However, since 1983, its relevant policy has 
become gradually more restrictive and it seems 
to be bringing pressure to bear on its partners 
to make them join in the embargo which it has 
placed on deliveries of arms to all countries at 
war. Finally, China, Yugoslavia and the two 
Koreas supply Iran with certain equipment. 
39. Whatever their origin, it cannot be said 
that the armaments received by Iran come from 
true allies. Only Syria and Libya seem to be 
aiming at the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. 
Iran's other arms suppliers are pursuing mainly 
economic aims or at least wish to maintain 
relations with Iran in spite of its political regime 
in order to keep some balance in the area. In 
the event of a serious crisis, Iran would probably 
find little support abroad, at any rate as long as 
it is dominated by Imam Khomeini's regime. 
40. Iran therefore has only limited possibili-
ties of procuring the armaments it needs to 
continue hostilities. Admittedly it still exports 
oil and has large foreign currency reserves 
apparently in the region of $20,000 million, but 
the drop in oil prices, its diminishing exports, 
the disorganisation of its economy due to the 
1979 revolution and its aftermath, and its low 
credit-worthiness abroad prevent it from pro-
curing enough armaments to tip the present 
balance in its favour. It seems to be having 
difficulty in maintaining its current equipment 
for lack of spare parts and qualified personnel. 
41. Iraq, on the contrary, since 1983 has been 
receiving large-scale assistance from the Soviet 
Union which, after some hesitation in the early 
years of the war during which it sold small 
quantities of arms to both belligerents, seems to 
have deliberately opted for the Iraqi side. The 
Iraqi air force seems to have about the same 
number of aircraft as at the start of the war, 
but they are far more recent, and it has large 
stocks of missiles, including SS-21s, which have 
not yet been used. There are now as many as 
1,500 or 2,000 Soviet military advisers in Iraq. 
No reason has ever been given for the Soviet 
Union providing such massive assistance to 
Iraq, but it is perhaps due to the Iranian 
regime's persecution of the Tudeh Communist 
Party and its members as from 1983 and to 
more general views about balance in the area 
and the danger militant Islamism might 
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represent for internal order in the Soviet Union. 
As for France, to which Iraq is very heavily 
indebted, for reasons which are inter alia 
economic and financial, its interest is to assist 
its debtor in the hope of being paid one day. It 
also wishes to retain its influence among the 
Arab countries. 
42. Iraq has fairly meagre foreign currency 
reserves: they are believed to be about $7,000 
million, and when Iran and Syria closed all its 
oil outlets in 1981 it was in a difficult position 
and its oil exports fell to a very low level. Only 
the assistance of the Arab Gulf countries 
allowed it to pass quickly through this difficult 
period thanks to the construction of new 
pipelines. Hence there is every reason to think 
that as from the end of 1984 Iraq will be in a 
position to pursue the war without adding 
unduly to debts which have been exaggerated. 
In the event of a serious crisis, solidarity 
between the Arab Gulf countries might also 
help Iraq to pursue the war, as was the case in 
1982-83. 
43. The chances of one or other side 
collapsing therefore seem slight, as does a 
military victory, and there are serious reasons 
to fear a prolongation of the war unless 
something unexpected happens. This might 
arise from an extension of the war which, in 
present circumstances could but be to the 
advantage of Iraq in view of Iran's diplomatic 
isolation. It might also result from a change at 
the head of one of the states. There are many 
signs that Ayatollah Khomeini's uncompromis-
ing attitude since 1981 is criticised in the 
Iranian Government and he might tone it down 
if for some reason the Iraqi President, the main 
target of Iranian hostility, were no longer in 
office or if Khomeini's influence were to wane. 
However, it should be noted that Iranian circles 
the most hostile to Khomeini's dictatorship are 
no less nationalistic than he, far from it, and 
their possible return to power would not 
necessarily be accompanied by a more peaceful 
policy. This view is shared even by observers 
who see the Iranian revolution as being largely 
responsible for the outbreak of war. 
44. The only rational way out of this war 
now is through a compromise peace, more or 
less restoring the status quo ante helium. Since 
1980, Iraq has expressed its willingness to 
accept such a solution and has in fact accepted 
successive interventions by a United Nations 
mediator, the Islamic Conference, the movement 
of non-aligned countries and certain countries 
such as Sweden, Algeria and Turkey for the 
conclusion of a compromise peace, but Iran 
rejected them. It is clear that no country is in 
a position to impose mediation or arbitration 
until both belligerents accept the principle. But 
the trend in the balance of forces engaged 
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offers hope that Iran too will soon recognise its 
interest in restoring a peace which does not 
upset the regional balance. 
45. The Western European countries are 
certainly not particularly well placed to propose 
their mediation. Their forces in the Gulf area 
are very weak and their immediate interests do 
not converge, although they all wish peace to 
be restored and recognise that this would not 
be furthered by more definite intervention by 
one or other of the two great powers. They can 
do little more than act individually to bring to 
bear whatever influence they may have on one 
or other of the belligerents to accept the 
principle of a compromise. 
Ill. The economic consequences of the war 
46. If the Gulf war had broken out immedi-
ately after the 1973 oil crisis the consequences 
would certainly have been far worse. However, 
it came at a time when the world economic 
recession, together with the economy measures 
taken by countries and greater use of alternative 
forms of energy, had considerably reduced oil 
consumption and when OPEC and even more 
OAPEC had lost their near monopoly and 
much of their internal cohesion. Many new 
countries have become oil exporters without 
joining these organisations which can therefore 
now exercise only a limited influence on oil 
prices, which are kept relatively high thanks to 
an export quota system. The fall in Iranian and 
Iraqi exports in 1981 therefore merely helped 
to avoid a collapse in prices. The war did not 
therefore run counter to the immediate interests 
of the other exporting countries but nor did it 
lead to higher prices. It is the rising dollar, not 
the Gulf war, that raised oil prices calculated 
in European currencies. In fact, the price of oil, 
calculated in dollars, has fallen considerably 
since 1978. 
47. Nothing points to this trend being 
reversed, even if the war continues. Even though 
its extension to the whole Gulf and the possible 
closing of the Strait of Hormuz might disrupt 
supplies to the industrialised world and particu-
larly to Western Europe, neither one nor the 
other would probably be enough to cause a very 
serious oil crisis. 
48. During the second quarter of 1984, world 
production was 33 million barrels per day, 11 
million of which came from the Gulf countries, 
but world production capacity was then 43,-
700,000 barrels per day. Hence there was a 
reserve production capacity of 10,700,000 
barrels per day, of which 7,600,000 in the Gulf 
countries and 3,100,000 in the rest of the world. 
But the capacity of pipelines now in use leading 
from these countries to the open sea was 
3 050 000 barrels per day, not including 
1 :2oo:ooo barrels per day for. the pipelin~s 
leading from Iraq to the Mediterranean via 
Syria, which are at present closed. 
49. The only present outlet for Iraqi oil is the 
pipeline linking the_ Kirkuk region to ~umur­
talik, near Dortyol m Turkey. Its cal?acity was 
raised to 1 million barrels per day m August 
1984. A Turko-Iraqi agreement, signed at the 
same time, provided for this pipeline to be 
doubled. Another planned pipeline would link 
the Basra and Rumaila oilfields with Aqaba in 
Jordan, but its financing still depends on 
American backing. Finally, an agreement has 
been concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
for building a pipeline with a 1 ,600,000 barrel 
per day capacity towards the Red Sea. 
50. This means that the possible closing of 
the Strait of Hormuz, through which 7,800,000 
barrels passed per day in the first quarter of 
1984 (500,000 towards the United States, 
2,000,000 towards Western Europe, 2,600,000 
towards Japan and 2,700,000 towards the r_est 
of the world), might be partly offset by makmg 
better use of the pipelines, particularly those 
which cross Saudi Arabia (3,050,000 barrels 
instead of 1 ,800,000 i.e. 1 ,250,000 barrels 
more) and increasing production in other 
regions (3,100,000 barrels per day of unused 
capacity), which would limit to 4,450,000 
barrels per day the deficit in oil marketed in 
the world, i.e. about 14% of present consump-
tion. 
51. In view of the fact that Western Europe 
has reconstituted its stocks, which represented 
seventy-six days' normal consumption on 1st 
October 1984, and that production capacity 
could be increased within a few months in many 
producing regions outside the G~lf inclu~ing 
Syria and Egypt where new deposits have JUSt 
been discovered, it can no longer be held that 
either the Arab oil-producing countries or Iran, 
in spite of the fact that it i~ theoretically 
possible for it to close the Strait of Hormuz, 
has "a knife at the throat" of consumer 
countries as in 1973. 
52. Moreover, it should be recalled that the 
position of consumer countries ~hould. ill_lprove 
still further with the forthcommg butldmg of 
new pipelines in the East and the fall in world 
oil consumption (15.5% between 1980 a!ld 
1983) and particularly in the OECD countn~s 
(20.2%). Agreed, this fall is due to the economic 
recession as well as to economy measures and 
the development of the use of natural gas, the 
resumption wherever possible of coal-mining 
and the use of new sources of energy, 
particularly nuclear, the only one whose output 
is at present sufficiently large. At the ~nd ?f 
1982, there were 298 nuclear power stations m 
191 
DOCUMENT 994 
operation in the world, of which 91 in WEU 
member countries; 216 were under construction, 
of which 55 in WEU countries, and 107 were 
planned, of which 7 in WEU countries. They 
produced 176,000 MW. Those under construc-
tion will produce 205,000 MW and those 
planned 104,000, of which 47,000, 55,500 and 
8,178 respectively for WEU countries. It may 
therefore be thought that for some ten years 
the increase in the production of electricity by 
nuclear means, in the WEU countries at least, 
will be more rapid than the increase in energy 
· consumption and that oil imports will drop still 
further. 
53. However, it must be noted that there has 
been some increase in oil imports in the world 
(0.1%), and above all in the OECD countries 
(3%) in 1984, and it is expected that this trend 
will continue in 1985 (2.8% and 1.4% respec-
tively). The main reason is the reconstitution of 
stocks, which had fallen too low in 1983. It 
should also be noted that the production of 
electricity by nuclear means is very unequally 
spread since France, with 32 power stations in 
operation, 29 under construction and 1 planned 
at the end of 1982, has become an electricity 
exporter, while the other OECD countries have 
made a far more limited effort to produce 
energy by nuclear means. Finally, 42 power 
stations are planned in the Soviet Union 
compared with 18 in the United States and 7 
in the WEU countries, which means that 
nuclear electricity production will stop rising in 
these countries after 1990 if new programmes 
are not adopted soon. 
54. Total world oil production seems to have 
exceeded demand by 500,000 barrels per day in 
the first three quarters of 1984 with the result 
that there has been some reduction in official 
oil prices. Thus, Middle East prices varied from 
$31.10 to $41 per barrel in 1980, but from 
$26.40 to $30.40 in July 1984 and, on 1st 
September 1984, were $27 to $28 on the free 
market, in spite of repeated air raids on oil 
tankers in the Gulf in spring 1984. Between 1st 
February and 1Oth October 1984, forty-nine 
tankers were damaged or destroyed in this way. 
55. It therefore seems that even if the Gulf 
war were to spread and be intensified, it would 
no longer cause a serious oil crisis in the West 
and the likelihood will diminish the longer it 
continues. 
56. If it is now assumed that peace will soon 
be restored, it may be thought that the relative 
discipline shown by OPEC and OAPEC will 
prevent a collapse in prices. The main problem 
will be for their member countries to authorise 
a significant rise in the Iraqi quota, now fixed 
at 1,200,000 barrels per day because of Iraq's 
export difficulties. But as soon as its export 
capability has been restored, Iraq will need to 
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have its quota increased so as to be able to pay 
its debts. It is estimated that it would at present 
have to export 1,600,000 barrels per day to 
cover its war expenditure. It will have to 
produce more to catch up its backlog. It may 
be assumed, however, that the Arab countries 
which have earmarked part of their oil 
production for helping Iraq will agree to a 
reduction in their quotas to allow Iraq's to be 
increased. 
57. Furthermore, the destruction of the 
Abadan refinery in Iran will certainly limit 
Iranian exports of refined products for several 
years, but there is no indication that damage to 
the Kharg terminal or the oil ports along the 
Iranian shore of the Gulf will have very long-
term consequences. 
58. Iran for its part had little difficulty in 
exporting its oil during the first years of the 
war. In 1983, its output reached 2,500,000 
barrels per day, i.e. slightly more than the 
quota of 2,400,000 prescribed by OPEC, and 
this output was more or less sustained during 
the first half of 1984 (2,280,000 barrels), only 
to collapse during the summer, with a daily 
output of 1,100,000 barrels in mid-August. This 
reduced output was due to a drop in sales to 
450,000 barrels per day. Above all, exports to 
Japan {350,000 barrels per day in 1983) and 
the Soviet Union (100,000 barrels per day in 
1983) fell to practically nothing. Probably the 
Soviet Union's decision to stop buying Iranian 
oil is due to its opting for alliance with Iraq. 
The drop in Japanese imports is probably not 
due to considerations of this kind but rather to 
a realistic calculation of the economic interests 
of Japanese importers. 
59. In recent years, Iran has promoted its oil 
sales and applied tariffs lower than those fixed 
by OPEC to compensate for the difficulty 
buyers have in shipping the oil. It gave up this 
practice in August 1984. Iraqi air force attacks 
on ships near Kharg caused a slight increase in 
insurance premiums for ships using the Gulf 
and Japanese seamen's unions refused to load 
at Kharg. It is however difficult to ascertain the 
reasons for this reorganisation of Japanese 
buying and to draw conclusions for the future, 
except that the Iranian external trade deficit, 
which had remained moderate ($4,000 million 
in 1983-84), might increase sharply and make 
the pursuit of the war even more difficult since 
the credit-worthiness of the Iranian regime 
seems to be at a low ebb on the international 
financial market. It is not sure that Iran's 
investments to convey its oil to terminals outside 
the Gulf will be enough to remedy this situation. 
In any event, Iran will probably still need 
foreign currency for several years after the end 
of the war and will not willingly bow to OPEC 
orders but will continue to supply the free 
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market, which would make any spectacular 
increase in oil prices difficult. 
60. It may therefore be considered that if 
Europe adheres to the caution it has shown 
since 197 4, neither a return to peace nor the 
possible pursuit of the war, provided it remains 
confined to the Gulf area, should have major 
economic consequences for it. The necessary 
precautionary measures would obviously be first 
to maintain or reconstitute stocks covering more 
than three months' oil consumption for each 
European country, then to apply an energy-
saving policy and develop alternative sources of 
energy, and finally show great moderation in 
exporting to the belligerent countries and above 
all in granting their credits, so that there is no 
risk of the European countries finding them-
selves forced, for economic and financial 
reasons, to take political and military measures 
which would endanger peace. In this connection, 
it may be wondered whether France, which is 
moreover to be congratulated on an audacious 
policy to promote the production of nuclear 
energy, where it now occupies second place in 
the world after the United States and before 
the Soviet Union and Japan, did not commit an 
error in allowing Iraq to build up too high a 
level of debts which thus may restrict France's 
freedom of action. This does not now seem to 
be the case for other western countries. 
61. Apart from this moderation in exports 
and in the credit it makes available, Western 
Europe should also ensure that it reconstitutes 
its stocks of oil products so as not only to 
reserve the ninety days' stocks planned in 1974 
but to go well beyond this quantity, as certain 
countries have already done. It must also ensure 
that, just as the outbreak of war and attacks on 
tankers in the Gulf were not disastrous for 
Europe, any return to peace, which may be 
followed by a sudden collapse in oil prices and 
a slowing down in orders for equipment, both 
civil and military, by the oil-producing coun-
tries, will not have repercussions which are too 
serious for its economy. Diversification of outlets 
and moderate use of credit sales are the 
conditions. 
IV. The political consequences of the war 
(a) Balances in the Moslem world 
62. Since the nineteenth century, Islam has 
been divided between two views of its future. 
The first, while considering Islam as a factor of 
resistance to all foreign domination, aims, once 
independence has been achieved for the Moslem 
countries, to make them accede to modern 
industrial civilisation, with all its economic and 
social aspects. This was the case of the Shah's 
monarchy where the Iranian economy had made 
very rapid strides in later years. It is also the 
case of certain states with political regimes 
adhering in various ways to what is known as 
Arab socialism e.g. Iraq, Syria and Algeria, or 
still other states which have more or less liberal 
aims, e.g. Jordan and Egypt. This implies 
reading the Koran and the sacred Islamic texts 
while taking account of modern scientific 
knowledge, including history, and interpreting 
them bearing in mind that they were written 
for a certain society at a certain time and that 
they consequently express eternal truths only if 
one manages to determine the idea that inspired 
them by analysing the then contemporary 
realities. To use the vocabulary of the Christian 
churches, this is a liberal or modernistic Islam 
in which western or communist societies find a 
partner at both economic and political level and 
at cultural level. 
63. Conversely, there is Islamic fundamental-
ism which interprets the sacred texts literally as 
opposed to everything outside Islam. It refuses 
on principle any compromise with industrial 
civilisation, whether western or communist, and 
expresses the people's revolt against an over-
rapid transformation of economies and societies, 
which would upset the context of traditional 
thinking. For those who subscribe to this way 
of thinking, the Moslem past is the yardstick 
and everything modern must be rejected. 
Whatever the policy of the United States may 
be, American civilisation makes that country 
the Great Satan systematically denounced by 
Khomeini, who is the most outstanding figure 
of this retrograde philosophy in contemporary 
Islam. 
64. But it should not be forgotten that the 
Middle East covers only a significant but not 
preponderant part of the Moslem world which 
extends to much of Africa and Asia. Indonesia, 
Pakistan, the Soviet Union and West African 
countries have large groups of Moslems, but 
they seem far less inclined towards the more 
extreme forms. 
65. Shiism has certainly been more affected 
by this theology than Sunnism but, while it is 
to be found in power in Iran, it is not. absent 
from the leading circles of certain Moslem 
countries such as Sudan, where Shiism is also 
prevalent, and Sunni Libya. It is a hotbed of 
opposition which makes itself felt more or less 
strongly throughout the Moslem countries 
thanks to brotherhoods whose names vary, e.g. 
the Ulemas or, in Egypt, the Moslem Brothers. 
There is no doubt that the assassination of the 
Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat on 6th 
October 1981 was fomented by such secret 
societies. The governments of most Islamic 
countries now feel threatened by plots emanat-
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ing from these organisations, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, where the occupation of the Great 
Mosque at Mecca on 13th December 1979 by 
a group of some 1 ,300 fundamentalists was a 
violent shock to the regime. Similarly, Shiite 
fundamentalists have rightly or wrongly been 
held responsible for a number of terrorist 
operations in Lebanon, including the assassina-
tion of President Beshir Gemayel in 1983, the 
murderous attacks on French and American 
troops in the international buffer force, also in 
1983, and on the United States Embassy in 
Beirut in October 1984, not to mention many 
attacks on western diplomatic representations, 
Christian militia or Israeli forces in southern 
Lebanon. 
66. There is no doubt that this sometimes 
desperate militancy expresses a radical revolt 
not only against local leaders considered to have 
been corrupted by western influence or against 
the presence of foreign forces, but also against 
anything which may seem to jeopardise a 
traditional view of Moslem society. Its success 
implied reversion to obsolete forms of civilisation 
which flout all human rights not only in regard 
to political and religious freedoms, but also in 
regard to the most elementary aspects of human 
dignity, be it the mutilation of criminals or the 
fate of women. Minorities, particularly religious 
ones, are persecuted or even massacred in 
countries where Islamic fundamentalism has 
taken over. 
67. The Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly expressed the wish that the present 
report refer to the fate Khomeini's Iran reserved 
for the Bahai religious sect, which was founded 
in the mid-nineteenth century and advocates a 
liberal concept of Islam, or even some degree of 
syncretism: opposition to the death penalty, 
polygamy, wearing the veil and the influence of 
the mullahs were the main topics of their 
preaching, which led to their being persecuted 
and massacred in tens of thousands in 1979. 
They are but one example among others of the 
intolerance of the Shiite fundamentalists. 
68. This in no way means that regimes which 
are less fundamentalist are always open and 
tolerant, whether they subscribe to Islamic 
socialism or to the most traditional political 
forms. All fear the influence of fundamentalists 
to various degrees and make the concessions 
they consider necessary for maintaining internal 
order. Today, no Moslem country seems to be 
escaping the pressure of a part of society 
advocating fundamentalism. 
69. The war between Iran and Iraq therefore 
broke out in an extremely divided Moslem 
world, the former country incarnating Shiite 
fundamentalism, the latter a more modern view 
of mankind and society, although its regime 
was dictatorial and repressed public freedoms. 
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It is certain that the Iranian regime made use 
of the weapons provided by the fundamentalist 
opposition in the Moslem world against both 
Iraq and the western world. It is naturally very 
difficult to determine its exact role in inspiring 
and preparing the many terrorist operations 
which have taken place, particularly in Leba-
non, but also in many other Moslem countries 
and even in Western Europe in recent years. 
However this may be, an Iranian victory over 
Iraq, whether on the battlefield or through 
internal uprisings in Iraq would be a tremondous 
encouragement for the cause of Islamic funda-
mentalism and for subversive forces in the Arab 
countries round the Gulf where there are large 
minorities, or sometimes a Shiite and Iranian 
majority, and throughout the Moslem world 
where factions less marked by fundamentalism 
are still, in spite of everything, the only possible 
interlocutors for the western world. Probably no 
one would stand to gain. 
70. On the other hand, a decisive military 
victory by Iraq would perhaps not be able to 
keep down for any length of time a Shiite 
fundamentalism which has merely been conso-
lidated by ordeals in the past. It would certainly 
not mean that the Moslem world would once 
and for all opt for a western concept of the 
economy, society, human rights and public 
freedoms. It might even provoke wider recourse 
than before to the most desperate methods of 
fighting all forms of modernism, i.e. to terrorism 
of all kinds, both in the Middle East and in the 
western countries. It would probably also revive 
fears of Iraqi expansionism once evident among 
the Gulf countries. Finally, if Khomeini's 
regime were to collapse, those who took over 
would perhaps be closer to western ways of 
thinking but no less alive to Iranian nationalist 
aspirations and they would certainly be even 
less prepared for a compromise peace with Iraq 
since they would need a means of rallying the 
Iranian nation round them. 
71. Some observers do not preclude the fact 
that certain countries in the area find it useful 
for the war to be continued since, on the one 
hand, it allows their oil to be marketed more 
easily and keeps up prices in periods of over-
production and, on the other hand, it weakens 
the strongest two military powers which are 
also suspected of having imperialist aims around 
the Gulf. It is not easy to confirm or invalidate 
these accusations but if true they would be very 
short-sighted since all considerations about the 
internal order of these countries indicate that 
the pursuit of hostilities or a decisive victory by 
one side or the other would be an extremely 
dangerous destabilising factor for all the 
regimes in the area. It also involves a strong 
risk of hostilities spreading, as already shown 
by air or naval raids by both sides against ships 
of neutral countries in the Gulf. Thus, on 5th 
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June 1984, Saudi Arabia had to ward off an 
Iranian air raid against the island of Al 
Arabiyah, two Phantom aircraft being shot 
down. Finally, the moderation so far shown by 
the two great powers might be undermined if 
the war were to last and involve more definite 
intervention on their part, as shown by increased 
Soviet assistance to Iraq since 1983. 
72. In fact, the Arab countries round the 
Gulf seem to have well understood that it is in 
their interests to keep out of the war. Six of 
them (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrein, Oman and Kuwait) set up 
the Gulf Co-operation Council on 26th May 
1981 intended admittedly to afford support to 
Iraq to which it has given $40,000 million in 
four years, but also to dissociate their cause 
from the Iraqi cause, to maintain their 
neutrality and to oppose any extension of the 
theatre of operations. 
73. For these reasons your Rapporteur 
believes the only way out of the war which 
would ensure stability in the area while 
restoring the peace which everyone needs is 
through a compromise between the belligerents 
which would change little in the situation 
prevailing before the war, in any event 
territorially. But such a compromise can hardly 
be imposed from outside, above all by Europe, 
which does not have the wherewithal. The 
United States, which has a strong military force 
in the area, has very wisely refrained from 
using it and even from bringing pressure to 
bear too openly on the belligerents, while 
guaranteeing countries which have remained 
neutral the military means to defend their 
territory and remain neutral. It would presum-
ably be to Europe's advantage to follow this 
cautious attitude. 
(b) The world balance 
74. So far, the Gulf war has not endangered 
the balance between the great powers which 
have both shown great caution, but there are 
signs that this situation may not last indefinitely 
if the war continues. 
75. The Soviet Union seems to have hesitated 
for three years. It is engaged in a difficult war 
in Afghanistan which, since December 1979, 
has brought it into conflict with a Moslem 
people with which Khomeini's Iran and most of 
the Arab countries have shown some degree of 
solidarity. Iran in particular has taken in about 
a million Afghan refugees. There are moreover 
ethnic, linguistic and religious affinities between 
several factions of the Iranian population and 
of both the Afghan and Soviet people and the 
Soviet Union clearly fears the spread of Iranian 
fundamentalism to Soviet Moslems. Finally, 
Khomeini's regime, like the Iraqi Baathists, has 
persecuted the leaders and members of the 
communist parties in both countries. It has been 
reported that there are 60,000 Iranian commu-
nist refugees in the Soviet Union, while the 
Iraqi Communist party, which was banned, has 
been reformed in Damascus. 
76. Apparently it was only in 1983 that the 
Soviet Union opted for Iraq, i.e. when an early, 
decisive Iranian victory was in sight. The 
despatch of large quantities of modern weapons 
and some thousand military advisers to Iraq 
made a major contribution to that country's 
recovery, but obviously involved the Soviet 
Union deeply on Iraq's side. Its aim was 
presumably twofold: first, to avoid a victory by 
the Islamic power the most dangerous for Soviet 
internal order and, second, to recover its 
influence in the Arab world which it had lost 
through the war in Afghanistan. However, the 
fact that the Soviet Union's main allies in the 
Arab world are the very two countries which 
took Iran's side, i.e. Syria and Libya, and that 
there is no indication of a deterioration in their 
relations with the Soviet Union seems to show · 
that Soviet commitment to Iraq remains 
cautious and dependent on circumstances. It 
continues to supply Iran with arms through its 
two Arab allies, North Korea and several 
people's democracies. 
77. It may therefore be wondered, and the 
question has been raised, whether one of its 
real aims is not to prolong the war, at least 
until it has settled the Afghan affair. 
78. However this may be, it should be 
recalled that the Shah's downfall was politically 
favourable to the Soviet Union because it led to 
the departure of the Americans from a Soviet 
frontier area where they had had considerable 
influence until 1979. The clearly anti-western 
nature of the new regime and its discretion in 
the Afghan affair largely made up for the 
persecution of Iranian communists - in point of 
fact, their trials were hardly less in earlier 
decades -and the Soviet Union ultimately has 
just as much interest as the West in a return to 
peace which does not disturb regional balances. 
This is moreover an official position that has 
been asserted. 
79. The United States policy is also ambigu-
ous insofar as, in order to preserve the status 
quo in the Gulf area, declared to be a zone of 
vital interest for the United States, it maintains 
a base for its rapid deployment force in Oman 
and supplies modern weapons to the non-
belligerent Arab countries round the Gulf, 
particularly Saudi Arabia. At the same time it 
understands the Israeli fear lest the balance in 
the Middle East be tipped against it through 
supplies of ultra-modern weapons to the Arab 
countries. Every delivery of American arms to 
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Saudi Arabia is the subject of keen controversy 
in Congress and among American public 
opinion. Yet in 1982 an 8,000 strong Jordanian 
rapid deployment force was trained and 
equipped by the United States. In January 
1984, the Pentagon authorised the sale of two 
hundred surface-to-air Stinger missiles to Saudi 
Arabia, which had requested two thousand, and 
surface-to-air Sparrow and air-to-surface Mav-
erick missiles. Finally, the five AWACS aircraft, 
procured by Saudi Arabia after a difficult 
debate in Congress for the air control of the 
Gulf area are being operated by American 
technicians until Arab aircrews have been 
trained. These aircraft detected the Iranian 
attack of 5th June 1984. 
80. But a section of Arab public opinion 
considers the United States to be a very 
compromising ally for Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
the Emirates, not only because it supports Israel 
but probably far more because of what 
American power symbolises in the eyes of a 
large section of Arab opinion. Thus, with the 
exception of Oman, all the Gulf states, including 
Saudi Arabia, have refused to allow contingents 
of the American rapid deployment force to be 
stationed on their territory and are diversifying 
their armaments suppliers in Western Europe, 
or even the Soviet Union in the case of Kuwait 
which, in August 1984, signed a $300 million 
contract with that country so as not to seem too 
reliant on American supplies. Egypt on the 
contrary, has adopted a very positive attitude 
towards the American rapid deployment force 
since it has allowed it to conduct manoeuvres 
on its territory, sometimes with the participation 
of Egyptian forces. 
81. Finally, the United States has no interest 
in Iran becoming too weak because, following 
the invasion of Afghanistan, it is the last 
rampart cutting off the Soviet Union's direct 
access by land to the area of the Gulf. All 
official American Government statements since 
the beginning of the war and even at the most 
serious moments of the crisis provoked in 1981 
by members of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran being taken hostage have concorded in 
signifying that the United States would not 
tolerate the establishment of hegemony in the 
area of the Gulf. The rapid deployment force 
was formed to give the American Government 
means of action anywhere in the world if 
necessary. There has been no need so far. Units 
of this force are stationed in Panama or belong 
to the international force in the Sinai, but a 
large part is near the Gulf. The existence of 
this force is at least a valuable guarantee of the 
maintenance of the independence of the coun-
tries on the southern shore of the Gulf, whatever 
the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq, 
and an effective deterrent against any Soviet 
wish to intervene more directly in the area. The 
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presence of an American fleet in the Indian 
Ocean also helps. In October 1983, when Iran 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, the 
United States moved a few warships into the 
Gulf to back up its statements against any such 
measure. 
82. Western Europe for its part has played 
only a secondary role in these matters. On the 
one hand it has expressed its concern about the 
pursuit of the war, particularly in its votes in 
the United Nations, including the resolution of 
31st October 1983 calling for an immediate 
end to hostilities in the Gulf at a time when 
Iran seemed to be winning. However, this does 
not mean that there is a European Middle East 
policy. Some countries avoid any arms sales in 
the area while others deliver small quantities to 
Iran or the Arab countries to the south of the 
Gulf. The United Kingdom provides officers for 
the Omani army. In recent years, France has 
sold far larger quantities of armaments to Saudi 
Arabia, certain emirates, Jordan and above all 
Iraq. Should this fairly close co-operation 
between France and Iraq be taken to indicate 
a deliberate political choice in favour of one of 
the belligerents or merely the result of economic 
exchanges dating back to before the war which, 
making Iraq heavily indebted to France, led the 
latter to favour its debtor? It is difficult to say 
exactly, but it is evident that in France itself 
some observers consider that an unduly unilat-
eral commitment might jeopardise France's 
future relations with Iran. Others on the 
contrary, and not only in France, emphasise the 
political motives of all the countries interested 
in stability and peace in the Middle East in 
doing their utmost to ensure that Khomeini's 
revolutionary messianism is halted and wish 
France's European allies to participate in a 
pro-Iraqi policy. In any event, France's policy 
is quite different from that of all its European 
partners which are more concerned to avoid the 
extension of hostilities in the Gulf and not to 
break off their relations with Khomeini's Iran, 
however difficult these may be. However, all 
ultimately agree on one aim, i.e. to do 
everything to help restore peace on the basis of 
a compromise avoiding regional hegemony. This 
is one of the points on which closer consultations 
between the Western European countries should 
have allowed Europeans to avoid adopting such 
divergent policies and thus carry greater weight 
in promoting peace. 
83. However this may be, their means of 
action are very limited. No European country 
has means of intervening or, above all, adequate 
transport for sending large numbers of troops to 
the Middle East. United Nations resolutions 
carry very little weight in matters in which 
nations are so deeply committed and the 
religious aspects of the war hardly allow western 
countries to voice their views. It is always very 
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dangerous to commit oneself deeply in a war 
which one cannot master and the only policy on 
which agreement between Europeans may be 
possible would be a policy of non-intervention, 
moderation or abstention from delivering arms 
to the belligerents, discreet action to foster 
negotiations between the countries at war and 
measures to avoid an extension of hostilities. 
V. The military consequences of the war 
84. While there has been no lack of infor-
mation about the economic and political aspects 
of the war, the same is not true of its military 
aspects. In this field as in others, far more is 
known about Iraq's situation than that of Iran 
because it is more ready to receive foreign 
observers, but even here the possibilities of 
direct reporting are limited and the war 
communiques are neither detailed nor reliable 
enough for it to be possible to draw clear 
lessons from them. Iran for its part does not 
allow journalists to approach the front and only 
in rare cases has it allowed them to enter into 
direct contact with the combatants. The 
information it publishes is sparse, fragmentary 
and couched in such extreme terms as to be 
difficult to decipher. Your Rapporteur is 
therefore well aware of the weakness of this 
chapter which he will endeavour to improve in 
the second version of his draft report. 
(a) Features of the fighting 
85. A remarkable aspect of the four years of 
war is that in spite of the use of very modern 
weaponry, including tanks, missiles and combat 
aircraft, along a 1,600 km front, and in spite of 
determined offensives by Iraq in 1980 and by 
Iran in 1982-83, neither belligerent has been 
able to achieve a decisive success. The Iraqi 
advance into Iranian territory in 1980 was no 
more than some forty kilometres. The large 
towns attacked were not taken and it took 
almost three years for the Iranians to recover 
lost terrritory and penetrate Iraqi territory to 
depths of little more than twenty kilometres. 
The offensives, particularly those of the Irani-
ans, resulted in very heavy casualties. It is 
difficult to give accurate figures, but estimates 
given have often quoted Iranian losses of 
400,000 and Iraqi losses of 200,000. Yet these 
offensives achieved only very limited territorial 
gains and no decisive success. In many respects 
the military situation recalls that of the western 
front during the first world war or a front held 
by some kind of Maginot line. 
86. This seems to confirm observations during 
the 1973 Israeli-Arab war that modern weapons, 
particularly missiles, make the use of tanks and 
armoured vehicles difficult and not very effi-
cient, but enhance field organisation. For 
instance, when the Iraqi army was building a 
fortified zone behind the country's frontiers in 
1983, it buried a number of tanks and used 
them with success as means of defence. Iraqi 
fire power, based on superiority in modern 
artillery, missiles and aircraft, largely offset the 
numerical superiority of the Iranian army once 
Iraq adopted a defensive position, but failed to 
give it an adequate offensive capability. 
87. It may now be wondered whether the 
same might be true for the defence of Europe, 
where battlefield conditions, command, staffing 
and recruitment of troops would be different. 
Comparison with conditions in 1973 implies 
that it is mainly the result of technical progress 
in armaments that would prevail wherever 
modern defensive armaments are deployed and 
there is little chance of this situation changing 
for a long time to come. Such operations would 
be tolerable in sparsely-populated areas but not 
on a front in the more densely-populated areas 
of Europe. 
88. Another aspect of this low level of 
offensive capability is the temptation to resort 
to means contrary to the rules of war in an 
effort to win. Iraq's quickly-acquired air 
superiority induced it to bomb towns and 
industrial and port installations. Iran retaliated 
with like methods but with obviously less 
powerful means. More serious was the use of 
chemical weapons, certainly by the Iraqi army 
-as was established by Red Cross observers in 
1983 in Iranian hospitals - but perhaps by Iran, 
too, as well as the use of adolescents in the 
Iranian army's autumn 1983 offensives, as 
proved by a visit by foreign observers to the 
Iraqi front and prisoner of war camps. Some 
sources also accuse Iraq of having used 
adolescents. Demonstrations of international 
disapproval were probably not foreign to such 
practices being abandoned in 1984, but there is 
no proof that they might not be resumed. 
89. Iraq has also been tempted to try to 
extend the theatre of operations, to involve 
other countries in the war and to provoke an 
international reaction in favour of peace or at 
least to obtain more foreign assistance by air 
raids on navigation in the Gulf. Nor has it 
hesitated to attack merchant shipping from 
countries not involved in the war, generally near 
the Kharg terminal which it was blockading, 
but sometimes much farther off shore. Between 
January and October 1984, forty-nine merchant 
ships, usually tankers, were thus the target of 
air-to-sea missiles. Most were seriously damaged 
but few were destroyed. The Iranian response 
was not only to blockade the Shatt al 'Arab 
delta, already a fact since the beginning of the 
war, but to attack a few tankers long the Arab 
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coast of the Gulf, provoking complaints, threats 
and even an armed reaction from Saudi Arabia. 
90. Attempts to extend the war have admit-
tedly not led to other countries becoming 
involved nor to serious efforts to impose peace. 
However, to an extent difficult to assess, they 
have helped to strengthen solidarity between 
the Arab countries, shown mainly in financial 
assistance to Iraq, made the United States 
assert its intention to oppose any blockade of 
the Strait of Hormuz and produced several 
international initiatives, admittedly to no effect, 
for a cease-fire or a compromise peace. 
91. Your Rapporteur considers that these 
attempts to radicalise and extend the conflict 
are almost inevitable consequences of the 
strategic confinement of the war to a front close 
to the frontier, itself due to the kind of modern 
weapons used. It is to be feared that one of 
them may succeed in the near future. One risk 
of flouting the rules of war might be to make 
that the whole world believe that attempts in 
this century to limit the human consequences of 
warfare are obsolescent. Another, the extension 
of the war to other Arab countries, would make 
direct intervention by the great powers probable 
in a war which they have so far managed to 
keep out of. As long as peace has not been 
restored, this risk will remain. 
92. But considering these events and threats 
in perspective, the idea that local wars outside 
areas protected by the nuclear weapons of the 
two great powers will not affect overall security 
henceforth seems very fragile. It might even be 
thought that if Iran and Iraq had had nuclear 
weapons they would have been unlikely to 
pursue a bloody and hopeless war for four years 
without using them, which would have escalated 
the war to world level. Such considerations can 
but encourage the Western European countries 
to strengthen their consultations on the defence 
and political aspects of matters arising outside 
the North Atlantic Treaty area and to search 
for joint codes of conduct in the arms trade and 
the application of measures under the treaty on 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
93. Furthermore, they would have every 
interest in studying together any lessons which 
Europe can draw for its own security from the 
military aspects of the Gulf war, the main one 
perhaps being that modern weapons give the 
defensive superiority over the offensive, with the 
implicit reversal of estimates of the possible 
duration of hostilities. One may also wonder 
how far such conditions still allow mobile forces 
to be used, as had been envisaged only a few 
years ago. There now seem less grounds for the 
idea that a modern war would be of short 
duration, at least in the case of a conventional 
war. It would certainly seem desirable for the 
deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance to 
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be enhanced by a stronger European conven-
tional defence system, but this would no doubt 
mean having far larger strategic reserves than 
has hitherto been the case. 
(b) Armaments 
94. Iraq's superiority appears clearly in land 
and particularly air armaments. Your Rappor-
teur has examined the 1984-85 edition of the 
Military Balance published by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London which, 
while expressing firm reservations about most 
recent knowledge of losses suffered and pur-
chases made by the two belligerents, neverthe-
less gives figures which are probably the most 
reliable currently available. 
95. According to this publication, the Iraqi 
air force is believed to have 580 combat 
aircraft, compared with about 95 in Iran, and 
160 combat helicopters, compared with 96. This 
would explain Iraq's apparent air supremacy 
which allows it to command the skies in the 
zone of operations, to bomb towns and economic 
and military installations over a wide area of 
Iran and largely make up for its naval 
inferiority. 
96. It is believed that Iraq could arm a total 
of 642,000 regular· soldiers, plus 650,000 men 
in the people's army, while Iran, with far larger 
human reserves, could arm only 550,000 men 
in the regular army, 250,000 Pasdarans and 
200,000 to 250,000 men specially recruited for 
certain war operations. Hence the Iraqi forces 
appear to have numerical superiority backed by 
better weapons. 
97. According to the same publication, Iraq 
has 4,500 tanks, compared with 1 ,050 in Iran, 
3,500 other armoured vehicles, compared with 
1,342, and 3,500 pieces of ordnance, compared 
with 1 ,000. Armaments on order which are 
listed are far more numerous in the case of 
Iraq. Similarly, those in service are on the 
whole far more modern than Iranian arma-
ments, most of which were procured under the 
Shah's government for an army which virtually 
no longer exists, by military staff who have in 
the meantime been completely eliminated. The 
Military Balance reports only very small 
quantities being delivered to Iran. Conversely, 
Iraq has very modern armaments and a number 
of contracts have been concluded with the 
Soviet Union and France, inter alia for 219 
combat aircraft, 39 helicopters, 140 tanks, 180 
armoured vehicles and many missiles of all 
kinds; 4 frigates and 6 corvettes have been 
ordered from Italy and they are believed to be 
capable of levelling out the naval forces of the 
two countries. A major agreement on military 
supplies was also signed between Iraq and the 
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Soviet Union in November 1983 for the delivery 
of new equipment in exchange for sales of Iraqi 
oil. This includes many surface-to-surface and 
surface-to-air missiles which are believed to 
have been delivered to Iraq already but which 
it is keeping in reserve and has not yet moved 
to the battlefield. 
98. Furthermore, if account is taken of the 
large quantities of arms procured in recent 
months by Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf 
countries which have so far remained outside 
the war, but which, it is known, would not 
tolerate an Iranian victory, it is hard to see how 
Iran could hope to win a decisive victory. 
99. Insofar as these figures can be relied 
upon, it would therefore seem that the balance 
of forces has already swung in favour of Iraq 
although it is not in a position to wage an 
offensive war against Iran. To strengthen it 
further by additional deliveries of arms might 
renew its hopes of success and consequently 
incite it to abandon the favourable attitude it 
has had towards a compromise peace since 
1981. 
100. Nevertheless, the definition, respect and 
maintenance of an embargo are particularly 
difficult since the number of countries producing 
weapons, directly or under licence, is still 
growing and purely European measures might 
be ineffective since the belligerents will still be 
able to procure weapons, even of European 
design, from third countries or from private 
firms not over concerned about respecting 
decisions taken by the governments of countries 
where they have their head offices. 
VI. Conclusions 
101. (i) In autumn 1984, the war between 
Iran and Iraq seems to have entered a period of 
relative calm, but there is every reason to fear 
that this calm is only provisional and that the 
day one of the belligerents can rightly or 
wrongly hope to win a decisive victory it will 
reignite hostilities. 
102. (ii) The interest of peace in the region, of 
peace in the world and consequently of Europe's 
security, lies in the re-establishment of peace 
which is not based on the victory of one of the 
belligerents. On the contrary, any decisive 
success by one or other would sow the seeds of 
other wars in the region. 
103. (iii) While it is true that so far the war 
between Iraq and Iran has led to no major 
economic or political upheavals and has not 
seriously endangered Europe's oil supplies, an 
extension of the war in the Gulf area might 
have serious consequences for the world econ-
omy, and particularly for oil prices, and might 
reactivate the economic recession from which 
Western Europe is now in the process of 
recovering. 
104. (iv) The delicate balance throughout the 
area of the Gulf, its unstable economy, the 
political regimes of the Gulf states and the 
revolutionary force of the so-called fundamen-
talist Islamic movements make it a high stake 
in international rivalry and any extension of the 
present war would probably involve the great 
powers and thereby threaten peace in the rest 
of the world. 
105. (v) The deployment of very modern 
weaponry by the belligerents already allows a 
number of lessons to be learned from the Gulf 
war which may be extremely useful for Western 
Europe's defence concept. It would be of the 
utmost interest for the WEU Council here and 
now to instruct an appropriate technical body 
to analyse the development of hostilities in 
terms of the use of weapons and the conduct of 
the war. 
106. (vi) Following the Gulf war, it is to be 
feared that there will be an increase in terrorist 
action in that area and throughout the world, 
since there is every reason to think that the 
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prolongation of the war would exasperate 
politico-religious fanaticism just as much as a 
compromise peace. Europe collectively should 
therefore work out measures here and now for 
countering a new outbreak of terrorism of 
which the Gulf war might well be the detonator. 
Events in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984 have 
obvious links with this war and are a serious 
warning of the danger. 
107. (vii) Western Europe's obvious interest is 
in an early return to peace which does not 
disturb the balance of the region. However, its 
action must be cautious and limited. Its 
effectiveness will depend on the degree to which 
it is distinct from but co-ordinated with that of 
the United States. 
108. (viii) Europe will be able to play such a 
role only if it is united in its approach and is 
truly impartial in its relations with the 
belligerents. 
109. (ix) Warnings by world public opinion 
about threats of extending the war or violating 
the rules of war seem to have been heeded by 
the belligerents more than once and this should 
encourage Europe to be vigilant and to renew 
such warnings whenever necessary. 
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Letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to the President of the Security Council 
14th June 1984 
As the Security Council is aware, in 
response to my proposal, the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government 
of the Republic of Iraq have given the 
Secretary-General undertakings that all delib-
erate military attacks by any means on purely 
civilian population centres in either country will 
cease effective 0001 hours GMT on 12th June 
1984. The relevant communications are con-
tained in Security Council documents S/16609, 
S/16610, S/16611, S/16614 and S/16615. 
As I stated in my messages to the two 
governments, I trust and expect that both sides 
will scrupulously implement these undertakings. 
I am gratified that, so far, there has been no 
incident. 
As, however, each of the governments, in 
its response, has made independent requests for 
arrangements to verify compliance with the 
undertakings, consultations were held with the 
Permanent Representatives of the two govern-
ments, with a view to working out the measures 
that might be essential to verify that the 
commitments are adhered to. 
Understandings have now been reached 
with the Government of Iran and the Govern-
ment of Iraq. Accordingly, it would be my 
intention, as an immediate step, to set up 
simultaneously, as at 15th June 1984, two 
teams, each consisting of three officers drawn 
200 
from among the military personnel of the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation 
(UNTSO) and one senior official of the United 
Nations Secretariat. Each team would be ready 
to proceed to the respective country as soon as 
so requested by its government. 
The mandate of the teams would be to 
verify compliance with the undertakings given 
by the Governments of Iran and of Iraq to end 
and in the future refrain from initiating, 
deliberate military attacks, by any means, on 
purely civilian population centres. The teams, 
following each inspection of a specific allegation 
of any violation, would report to me, and it is 
my intention to keep the Security Council 
informed of their findings as required and in a 
timely manner. I would, of course, request 
assurances from the two governments that they 
will provide the necessary conditions of safety 
for the teams while they are in areas subject to 
hostilities. The concurrence of the contributing 
countries concerned will be secured. 
These arrangements would be kept under 
constant review in the light of circumstances 
and in further consultation with all parties 
concerned. 
I should be grateful if you would bring 
this matter to the urgent attention of the 
members of the Security Council. 
(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR 
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Amendment 1 
Consequences of the Gulf war 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
3rd December 1984 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by the United Nations and by 
Middle Eastern countries" and insert "by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by 
other countries". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
l. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 2 
Consequences of the Gulf war 
AMENDMENT 21 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
2. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper. 
l. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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3rd December 1984 
Signed: Hardy 
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Amendments 3 and 4 
Consequences of the Gulf war 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 41 
tabled by Mr. Beix and others 
3rd December 1984 
3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"Deploy every effort to support United Nations Resolution 540 of 31st October 1983 on 
preventing the spread of the war in the Gulf and the bombing of towns, at the same time 
condemning recourse to particularly reprehensible weapons;". 
4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"Foster the maintenance of a balance between Iraq and Iran likely to convince the two 
opponents that they have nothing to gain from continuing hostilities;". 
Signed: Beix, Bassinet, Pignion 
l. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendments negatived). 
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Armament sector of industry in the member countries 
ECONOMIC STUDY 
prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee 
This study has been circulated separately. 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 403 to 410 
RECOMMENDATION 4031 
on the situation in the Middle East and European security2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389; 
(ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security; 
(iii) Considering in particular that there is a serious risk of the war between Iran and Iraq 
escalating and further endangering stability in the area and the world economy; 
(iv) Considering that the use of chemical weapons by either of the belligerents seriously undermines 
respect for international conventions in all international warfare; 
(v) Condemning also the use of children in an army at war, and the ill-treatment of prisoners; 
(vi) Considering that the situation of Lebanon continues to be likely to provoke international crises 
and that such a risk remains grave whilst part of the country is subject to foreign domination; 
(vii) Considering that the situation in Lebanon should not be seen only nor even primarily in terms 
of the East-West conflict; 
(viii) Welcoming the formation in Lebanon of a government which reflects the demographic balance 
and the rights of the different political and other elements in the country; 
(ix) Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force 
and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units; 
(x) Convinced that all foreign forces other than those of the United Nations should leave Lebanese 
soil completely; 
(xi) Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression and the installation of 
settlements are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather 
requires: 
- recognition by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, 
of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers; 
- recognition by Israel of the fact that most Palestinian people still consider the PLO under 
its present leadership as their representative and of their right to their own national 
homeland; 
(xii) Welcoming the improvement in relations between the PLO and Jordan with a view to solving 
the Palestinian problem, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Co-ordinate the policies of member countries towards Iran and Iraq with a view to ensuring 
that no action is taken which might prolong the conflict and to help to restore peace beween these 
two countries; 
2. In order to confirm declarations by member countries that they have not supplied the 
belligerents, directly or indirectly, with chemical weapons, instruct the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments to verify declarations made by member countries in this connection; 
3. Press for the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, except for those of the 
United Nations, in application of United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
978). 
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4. Formally reaffirm the joint views of the Western European countries expressed by the Ten in 
their Venice declaration of June 1980, and in particular: 
(a) recall that stability in the Middle East depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all 
nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the 
fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland and that 
they are represented by the PLO; 
(b) repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 
1967 and warn that country that there must be no further explusion of Arab populations 
from these territories. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL1 
to Recommendation 403 
The Council has given careful consideration to the lines of thought and preoccupations 
contained in Recommendation 403 of the WEU Assembly on the situation in the Middle East and 
European security. 
In particular: 
1. The member countries of WEU have made all possible efforts, with the competent international 
agencies, as well as in bilateral contacts with the parties concerned, in favour of a negotiated solution 
to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in order to avoid its spreading. Moreover, they have supported 
the action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this direction which has brought about 
as a first result the suspension of the bombing of civilian targets. 
2. Confirmation of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict has underlined the urgency 
of reaching agreement at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a total worldwide ban on the 
manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It is only through a comprehensive and 
effectively verified global ban that these odious weapons can be removed once and for all. Neither 
strengthening of European controls under the aegis of WEU nor a regional ban in Europe as a first 
step would be a substitute. 
3. The member countries of WEU have always maintained that a peaceful solution to the 
Lebanese question can only be achieved by safeguarding the unity, independence and national 
integrity of the country, and they have stressed the importance of the withdrawal of all foreign forces 
whose presence is not authorised by the Lebanese Government. 
4. On several occasions, individually and in the context of the EEC, the member countries of 
WEU have expressed themselves in favour of the recognition of the right to existence and to security 
of all the countries in the region, including Israel, and justice for all. This implies the association of 
the representatives of the Palestinian people and consequently of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation with a future peace process. Such a process must be based on the recognition of the 
right to self-determination of the Palestinians, with everything which this entails. In the same 
context, the member states of WEU have repeatedly affirmed their belief that Israel's settlement 
policy on the occupied territories constitutes a negative factor as far as the commencement of the 
peace process is concerned. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4041 
on the state of European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Reiterating its belief that a European view on defence policy should be formulated collectively 
in WEU and in close consultation with all other European allies; 
(ii) Paying real tribute to the vital contribution to the defence of Europe which the United States 
continues to make after forty years, and being convinced that collective defence should continue to 
be organised in NATO to which WEU is inextricably linked by the terms of the modified Brussels 
Treaty; 
(iii) Recognising however that the European allies today contribute 65 to 75% of the ready forces 
in Europe and believing that some adaptation of NATO is necessary for it properly to reflect the 
European view of defence requirements; 
(iv) Stressing the overriding importance of allied solidarity and the need for all countries, with due 
regard to their resources and geographical position, to accept their full responsibilities in the alliance; 
(v) Welcoming the perceptive study on collective logistical support by General C.J. Dijkstra, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to recommend in NATO: 
1. That the structure of NATO be modified to reflect properly the European view of defence 
requirements, and to improve efficiency; in particular: 
(a) that the position of the Military Committee as the highest military authority under the 
Council and Defence Planning Committee should be clarified; 
(b) that the International Military Staff be fused with the Defence Planning and Policy 
Division of the international staff, and that defence and force planning matters be handled 
by the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session; 
(c) that the prerogatives of the three major commanders be adjusted to place them on a more 
equal footing and to reflect the primacy of the Military Committee; 
(d) that a European officer should be appointed as Chief-of-Staff in SHAPE, and a European 
as Special Assistant to SACEUR for international affairs; 
2. That every effort be made to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, and to ensure that all 
members assume corresponding responsibilities; 
3. That the NATO authorities take note of and act on the study on collective logistical support, 
and in particular: 
(a) reaffirm the logistics authority of SACEUR under paragraph 9 of the North Atlantic 
Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954; 
(b) establish a communications zone command in the central region, under the command of 
Deputy CINCENT; 
(c) arrange common funding of sustaining stocks and greater use of NAMSA; 
(d) agree that essential logistics units would be mobilised at the earliest stage of the alert 
process; 
4. That, as a matter of urgency, a common IFF aircraft recognition system be introduced on all 
NATO aircraft. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 971). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 404 
The Council has noted with interest Assembly Recommendation 404 on the state of European 
security. Since this Recommendation relates essentially to the structures of the integrated military 
organisation of NATO, the Council has deemed it advisable to inform the competent authorities of 
the Atlantic Alliance of the recommendation and of the specific ideas that it contains. 
The Council shares the Assembly's belief on the advisability of formulating a European view 
on defence policy within WEU, in close consultation with all the other allies. 
Like the Assembly, the Council is convinced that the security of the WEU member countries 
continues to be assured by the Atlantic Alliance to which WEU is linked by virtue of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, every effort must be made to stress the overriding importance of 
solidarity among allies and of the strengthening of the contribution of WEU member countries to the 
transatlantic dialogue, as well as the necessity for all the member countries to assume their full 
responsibilities within the alliance. 
The Council will obviously keep these essential principles in mind when meeting at ministerial 
level in Rome on 26th and 27th October. 
It is in the context of the fundamental solidarity of all the members of the alliance that the 
seven member states of WEU, after their deliberations in Rome, could consider how to initiate a 
process of reflection that could have a follow-up within the alliance, so that the European view of 
defence requirements could become more visible. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th October 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 40S1 
on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Following with great interest the build-up of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force 
composed of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A component at Geilenkirchen in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Nimrod component at Waddington in the United Kingdom; 
(ii) Welcoming the integrated nature of the NATO AWACS force's E-3A component in which 
airmen of nine continental European forces as well as from the United States and Canada participate 
and considering it to be an example for future schemes for multilateral units; 
(iii) Aware also that this NATO force is directed politically by the North Atlantic Council as such 
and militarily by SACEUR and his subordinate commander, the Commander of the NATO 
Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force; 
(iv) Noting with satisfaction that this important force is being set up speedily in accordance with 
the plans agreed to at the outset; 
(v) Welcoming the fact that France might also associate its air defence more closely with that of 
NATO by ordering the same type of AWACS aircraft and thus reinforce the common defence 
potential; 
(vi) Considering that the British decision on the Nimrod component might benefit the other 
member countries as well because of its maritime capability, but only provided its eleven aircraft are 
operational by 1986, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Promote within NATO 
(a) Organisational structures to ensure that the national American AWACS force, the NATO 
E-3A component, the Nimrod component and any future French AWACS force will be equipped 
with the same type of hard- and software and with harmonised procedures so as to derive the 
maximum effectiveness from allied defence efforts and expenditure; 
(b) The improvement of the NATO E-3A component by providing its aircraft with airborne 
refuelling capabilities involving financially-acceptable modifications and appropriate training for its 
crews, taking into account the existence of American and British tanker aircraft; 
(c) Training for the necessary number of air staff officers in order to use the NATO E-3A aircraft 
as command and control aircraft in emergencies; 
(d) A set of rules which can be applied in the event of more multilateral military units being set 
up for common defence purposes thus codifying the lessons learned from the formation of the NATO 
AWACS force E-3A; 
11. Remind the French Government of the importance it attaches to an early decision being taken 
on the procurement of its AWACS force. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Spies von BUllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 974). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 405 
The Council welcomes the Assembly's interest in the development of a new airborne early 
warning force based in Western Europe. Like the Assembly, the Council considers that this will 
contribute greatly to the enhancement of the air defences of the member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance. With this goal in mind, the United Kingdom has selected Nimrod; other countries have 
opted for the E-3A and France, which has decided to procure an equivalent system, is currently 
evaluating the various possibilities. The Council notes the Assembly's views on the adoption by 
individual member countries of the alliance of different AEW systems, but considers that all these 
systems will make a major and valuable contribution to the goal stated by the Assembly. 
The Council understands that: 
I. (a) Interoperability between different components of the AEW force has been a priority 
concern of the various NATO authorities responsible for the .co-ordination of operational planning 
and procurement: the degree of interoperability is intended to be very considerable (including for 
example software to common NATO standards) although it will not be practicable to introduce 
literally the same type of hardware and software for a number of tasks. . 
(b) The E-3A component, like the Nimrod, already has an air-to-air refuelling capability, and 
crews are now being trained in its operation. 
(c) The question of training staff officers, and the likely benefit accruing therefrom, must be 
examined in the light of the requirements and preoccupations of the member states. 
(d) The extension of a mixed· force concept to other applications and the development of a set of 
general rules for such requirements is something which needs to be explored in the light of 
experience, when the AEW force is fully operationaL 
· 11. The French Government's decision to procure for its forces, under its 1984-88 programme law, 
an airborne early warning system has not been changed. The study relating to the type of aircraft 
and equipment has entered its final phase and the choice should soon be made. Interoperability with 
other alliance forces will make it possible to increase, where necessary, the volume of exchanges of 
air defence data. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November 1984. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 4061 
on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the CounciP 
(i) Believing it to be urgent to reinforce deterrence and safeguard peace, to organise within the 
Atlantic Alliance a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar; 
(ii) Considering that setting up a European pillar of the alliance should in particular serve the 
object of strengthening co-operation with our American allies, while giving a more European 
dimension to the discussion of questions touching the security of our continent; 
(iii) Believing that WEU should be used fully by the member states as a forum for analysis, debate 
and concerted action on the requirements of European defence, and that the other European allies, 
and other partners in the Ten should be kept fully informed; 
(iv) Recalling its Recommendation 380 and reiterating its belief that WEU should be adapted to 
meet the requirements of the 1980s, in particular through the abolition of controls on conventional 
weapons; 
(v) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty have never been applied, but considering that in present circumstances it is no longer 
appropriate to apply them, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine and redefine the problems of European security and, to this end, 
(a) meet regularly at a high level; 
(b) hold at least two ministerial Council meetings a year, in particular to prepare NATO 
ministerial meetings, with the participation of defence ministers at at least one of these 
meetings; and 
(c) keep the Assembly informed of these proceedings; 
2. Strengthen the Permanent Council through the attendance as required of the senior officials 
concerned from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence and of the chiefs of defence staff; 
3. Be assisted in its work by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments, instructing: 
(a) the Standing Armaments Committee to assist the Council in preparing a European policy 
in new conventional armaments, with particular regard to problems raised by emerging 
technologies; and to help the Council lay the foundations of a policy on the defensive use 
of space technology; and to secure international agreement to ensure that such 
developments are adequately and effectively controlled; 
(b) the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake, on behalf of the Council or the 
Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitation of 
armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements; 
4. Pursue ~he adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s by: 
(a) abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes Ill and IV to Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(b) reorganising the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments to enable them to accomplish their new tasks; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 973). 
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(c) making the necessary arrangements to eo-locate the ministerial bodies of WEU in a single 
place; 
5. Establish appropriate procedure for informing European and Atlantic bodies about the 
conclusions of ministerial meetings. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4071 
on the political implications of European security in 1984 -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the CounciP 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the difficulties in defence policy, not only in Europe but throughout the western 
world; 
(ii) Aware also of the fact that in the medium and long term the only way to end the unbridled 
armaments race and the division of Europe is to find firm answers to the many political, social, 
economic and strategic questions of our era; 
(iii) Emphasising that in present circumstances a conflict between the two blocs might lead to the 
near-total destruction of Europe; 
(iv) Aware of the overriding need for: 
- a balanced, general, effective and verified disarmament policy; 
- political control of armaments and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the 
event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces; 
- the meaningful pursuit of East-West disarmament negotiations in spite of the difficulties and 
setbacks in recent months; 
- political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the 
Helsinki final act; 
(v) Therefore underlining: 
- the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe; 
- the need for the European members of NATO to assume greater weight but also greater 
defence responsibilities vis-a-vis their North American partners, while maintaining close 
co-operation with them; 
(vi) Taking note that the Council is examining the structural and operational changes to be made 
in WEU to allow it better to fulfil the role assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(vii) Considering that recent developments in Europe and in transatlantic and international relations 
make this an appropriate time for such an examination; 
(viii) Considering that the way the Council now operates does not allow it to give continuous 
political impetus to the organisation; 
(ix) Welcoming the Italian proposal to hold a meeting of ministers of defence of the WEU member 
countries in Rome in October 1984 and hoping this meeting will lead to decisions likely to promote 
a European armaments policy; 
(x) Regretting that the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council does not refer to the problems 
raised by the reorganisation of WEU and that the Assembly is systematically left without knowledge 
of the Council's activities on this essential matter, 
RECOM~ENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Be guided at all times by the preceding considerations and general principles, particularly in 
the necessary reactivation of WEU; 
2. Examine attentively the conditions in which better use might be made of WEU in the coming 
decades to achieve in particular: 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Thoss on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
979). 
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(i) a permanent representation of member countries on the Council so that it may take more 
effective action; 
(ii) more frequent meetings, particularly at ministerial level, and the continuation, after the 
Rome meeting, of regular meetings of ministers of defence in the framework of WEU, inter 
alia so as to give steady encouragement to the European armaments policy; 
(iii) a regrouping of the various WEU organs; 
(iv) an adaptation of the Secretariat-General to the organisation's new requirements; 
(v) an agenda for its meetings allowing consultations on all matters relating to the security of 
Western Europe and the definition of a collegial European position prior to each meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council; 
(vi) a possible enlargement of Western European Union; 
(vii) co~operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the Independent European Programme Group without jeopardising the other tasks of 
the SAC, in view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the statute of the SAC specifies that 
agreements or arrangements concluded in the framework of that body remain open to 
participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; 
(viii) an assessment of the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of 
cancelling Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill and possible modifications to Annex IV; 
(ix) a definition of Europe's present requirements in the control of armaments and the 
adaptation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to a different role; 
(x) the possible use of the competence acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
for the benefit of representations of member countries at international conferences on 
disarmament or the limitation of armaments and for more general research on the level of 
world armaments; 
(xi) the provision of financial means for the Assembly allowing it better to carry out its role; 
3. Keep the Assembly properly informed about the stage reached in its discussions on all matters 
relating to the future of WEU and in any event report on them either in its next annual report or 
in a supplementary report to be submitted to the Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth 
anniversary of WEU. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendations 406 and 407 
1. The Council has noted with satisfaction Assembly Recommendations 406 and 407 and believes 
that they both confirm and support the policy it has adopted. 
2. At its extraordinary session in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984, the Council of Ministers 
took a number of wide-ranging decisions on WEU and how to make better use of the organisation. 
It charged the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General with certain tasks in implementation 
of these decisions. In terms of basic objectives and on many points of detail, the decisions taken by 
the Council of Ministers coincide with the Assembly's proposals, as contained in Recommendations 
406 and 407. 
3. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Genscher, gave a 
detailed explanation to the Assembly, at its extraordinary session on 29th October, of the decisions 
taken by the Council of Ministers on 26th and 27th October. The documents approved at the 
anniversary meeting of the Ministers on 26th and 27th October (the Rome Declaration and the 
document on the institutional reform of WEU) have already been communicated to the Assembly. 
4. The Assembly will be briefed immediately and comprehensively on all further measures taken 
in implementation of the Rome decisions. 
5. The Council welcomes any comments from the Assembly which would contribute to the 
effective implementation of the Rome decisions. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4081 
on the control of armaments and disarmament2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Concerned at the deterioration in the atmosphere of East-West relations, aggravated by the 
lack of personal contact between the superpowers at a time of change or prospective change in the 
leadership, and at the suspension of negotiations in three fields of arms control: a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban, INF, and START; 
(ii) Believing that all the more importance now attaches to the three remaining disarmament 
conferences in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, in all of which there is prospect of agreement in due 
course; 
(iii) Calling on member governments to take the initiative in these fields of primary interest to 
Europe by injecting a sense of urgency into the negotiations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge upon member governments the need: 
1. To draft a joint, solemn declaration setting out their aims in the control of armaments and 
disarmament and to call on the superpowers to resume without delay negotiations which have been 
interrupted or to stimulate discussion when they take place; 
2. To take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a 
precondition of any arms control agreement, by promoting .personal contact at the highest level 
between member governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships; 
3. To study the possibility of concluding interim agreements this year in the conference on 
disarmament in Europe and mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations based on the common 
elements in present eastern and western proposals and taking account of the importance of 
verification measures. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 972). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL' 
to Recommendation 408 
1. The Council fully shares the importance the Assembly attaches to maintaining and improving 
the East-West dialogue in the interest of peace, security and stability in Europe. The WEU member 
states will continue to pursue their efforts to achieve, within the framework of an extended political 
dialogue, balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and its 
allies. It is important that this dialogue should include meetings at high political level. In fact, quite 
frequent talks between members of WEU governments and the leadership of the Soviet Union and 
the other East European states have already taken place on a bilateral basis and in the margins of 
multilateral fora such as the United Nations. 
2. The Council shares the Assembly's view that arms control is one of the important elements in 
the relationship between East and West. It recalls that at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
on 31st May this year, the WEU member countries adopted, together with the other members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, the Washington statement in which they reaffirmed their offers to improve East-
West relations, made most recently in the declaration of Brussels of 9th December 1983. At the 
same time they restated their aim of achieving security at the lowest possible level of forces through 
balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control, disarmament and concrete 
confidence- and security-building measures. 
3. The Council points out that the WEU member states have welcomed, on various occasions, the 
readiness of the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) and strategic arms reductions (START) with the Soviet Union without preconditions and 
have called on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table. They welcome the announcement 
that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th 
and 8th January 1985. 
4. The Council would like to draw attention to the major individual and collective proposals put 
forward by western countries at the existing arms control and disarmament fora as a further proof 
of western determination to make every effort required to ensure progress. It is regrettable that no 
positive Soviet response to these proposals has been forthcoming. 
5. The WEU member countries hope that in a first stage of the Stockholm conference agreement 
can be reached on a set of militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building 
measures covering the whole of Europe and designed to diminish the risk of military confrontation 
there. This would pave the way for further stages of the conference where the participating states 
would continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe with a view to concrete and 
verifiable results. 
6. Together with the other western states the WEU members have made every effort to ensure 
a sustained negotiating pace in Stockholm. At the beginning of the first round of the conference they 
tabled detailed proposals for a set of concrete confidence- and securi~y-building measures. On a 
number of important points the proposals tabled by the neutral and non-aligned countries at the end 
of the first round are in line with the western proposals. The Soviet Union tabled proposals only at 
the beginning of the second round, which gave comparatively little attention to the kind of concrete 
m'!asures that are the aim of the conference, in accordance with the mandate defined in Madrid in 
1983. Soviet negotiators have so far proven reluctant to engage in a substantive discussion of such 
measures. 
The WEU member countries are determined to seek ways to achieve progress. The Council 
hopes that intensive efforts to set up a work structure will lead to a result. 
7. The WEU member countries concerned recall that the NATO countries participating in the 
MBFR initially favoured a two-phased approach and proposed, in an effort to speed up agreement, 
a simplified interim phase I in 1979. 
The East, however, insisted on a strong link between the two phases in order to ensure the 
continuity of the reduction process. To meet this concern and at the same time to do away with 
complicated discussions on how to link the two phases, western participating countries proposed in 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984. 
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1982 to seek a single comprehensive agreement. The East agreed to the concept of a single treaty, 
but proposed initial United States-Soviet reductions followed by a freeze prior to signature of the 
actual treaty. These introductory steps would, according to the East, have the character of a political 
commitment. These proposals for phasing the reductions, however, could not be pursued further with 
the East because of lack of agreement on the fundamental and interrelated issues of data and 
verification which remain crucial and cannot be evaded or circumvented. 
In April 1984 the western delegations in Viennna, with full participation of the WEU member 
countries involved, tabled new and open-minded proposals which specifically address these issues and 
at the same time portray how the "data impasse" could best be overcome. The WEU member 
countries concerned regret that hitherto eastern reactions to these proposals have not been 
encouraging. 
8. The Council would also underline the importance of the role of the United Nations, especially 
the Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament and Security and the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission (UNDC), as well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), in all of which the 
WEU member countries play an active role. The Council welcomes the efforts made by the 
Conference on Disarmament to achieve, among others, a complete and worldwide ban on chemical 
weapons. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 4091 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 19832 
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Having taken note of the contents; 
(iii) Considering that: 
(a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends 
essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be 
taken on this matter by the Council; 
(b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the 
cost-effectiveness of these organs; 
(c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the 
ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the 
integration of their services; 
(d) in preparing the budget the criterion of "zero growth" was applied, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to 
integrating joint services; 
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the 
ministerial organs of Western European Union; 
3. Specify that the criterion of "zero growth" applies only to operating expenses and that 
expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the 
budget; 
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff 
announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff 
associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatol)' memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 983). 
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REPLY OF mE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 409 
1 and 2. Discussions on the reactivation of WEU have not yet reached the stage at which the 
new tasks of the organisation, the Council and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly defined. 
Conclusions on these matters must first be reached before the future structure, size, location and 
other administrative requirements can be foreseen. Included in this second stage of the Council's 
considerations would be recruitment policy. 
3. The criterion of "zero growth" is already applied to the budget of the ministerial organs. The 
present budget format includes a separate statement of pensions' costs. While these have been taken 
into consideration by governments in determining the total acceptable budget, the Council is a"'are 
that with increases foreseeable in pensions' costs over the coming years, the situation will have to be 
kept under review. 
4. The position of the combined staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations has impn>Ved 
considerably over the past few years. The previously ad hoc attendance of staff representati~n at 
meetings and discussions in the framework of co-ordination has given way to regular and overall 
participation by the associations. Negotiations on this matter still continue within the co-ordinated 
organisations and in the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts, at present 
concentrating on refining current procedures for consultation and on possible conciliation structures. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th September 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4101 
on the military use of spact?-
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the consistent interest shown by Western European Union in the strategic and 
industrial implications of the space capabilities of the member countries; 
(ii) Appreciating the considerable achievements of Western European countries in the space field 
both nationally and under the aegis of the European Space Agency, most notably in the Spacelab 
and Ariane and satellite programmes; 
(iii) Conscious of the need for Europe to initiate new projects in both the space science and 
applications fields if Europe's successful development of telecommunications and remote-sensing 
satellite systems, together with launch vehicles and manned work modules, are to be fully exploited; 
(iv) Understanding that the United States spends about ten times as much as Western Europe on 
space activities and that at least half the United States space programme is directly or indirectly 
funded by the Department of Defence; 
(v) Aware also that current efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its present space capability 
should not go unmatched by western countries; 
(vi) Concerned that in addition to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
other major nations, such as Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China, are pursuing 
active space programmes which could jeopardise Europe's current position as the established third 
force after the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities; 
(vii) Believing that space capability will be a key determinant in future warfare, that in military 
terms the difference in potential between the space-capable nations and the others will be almost as 
great as the current difference in power between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and that Europe 
should not only take note but act upon this fact; 
(viii) Noting President Mitterrand's call in his speech of 7th February 1984 for a "European space 
community" and his remarks on the potential of a manned European space station as well as current 
Western European interest in this subject; 
(ix) Supporting initiat\ves to exploit space technology to bring about confidence-building measures 
such as the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and determined to use Europe's space 
capabilities in order to reduce the risk of war by eliminating the advantage of surprise through 
surveillance satellite systems; 
(x) Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the 
implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as 
an institutional framework untrammelled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention for the 
initiation by the principal space-capable nations of Western Europe of a defensive European military 
space programme, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge the governments of member countries to do all in their power to secure negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to prevent the military use of space through 
the deployment of offensive space weapon systems by promoting new international treaties and 
related verification procedures, as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the 
military uses of space; 
2. Demand a larger European industrial involvement both in NATO telecommunications satellites 
and in NATO military satellite programmes as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, 
in addition to supporting successful national military communications satellites like Skynet; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 976). 
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3. Commission a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for 
European defence of developments in military space technology and in particular of Soviet and 
United States research and development in this field; 
4. Initiate a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the confidence- and 
security-building measures that could be taken in Europe following the establishment of either an 
international satellite monitoring agency or of Western European oceanic and terrestrial surveillance 
satellite systems and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are 
being respected; 
5. Establish a dialogue with the European Space Agency whereby the industrial implications of 
ESA scientific or applications programmes can be discussed in an institutional framework appropriate 
for the formulation of Western European security policy; 
6. Set clear European space policy objectives and priorities in the course of its politico-military 
consultations in the key strategic fields of launchers, manned modules, space station integration, 
telecommunications, meteorological and remote-sensing satellites and manned reusable service and 
space transport vehicles; 
7. Propose a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme adapting and refining 
the sensor technologies in the existing CNES Spot project and the ESA ERS-1 project; 
8. Concert a joint response by the member countries to the NASA proposals for European 
participation in the projected United States space station and evolve a common strategy to utilise the 
consequent technological expertise should a European space station programme be initiated; 
9. Require the construction of a Western European military meteorological satellite programme 
to follow the successful series of civil Meteosat satellites; 
I 0. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments 
Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned 
measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and 
related military space problems through a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability 
of the use of outer space for military purposes. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL1 
to Recommendation 410 
It was with very great interest that the Council took note of this recommendation, 
commendable for both its quality and topicality. The problem of the military use of space is a 
particularly appropriate and topical subject for discussion and analysis. 
The member countries of WEU consider it of the utmost importance to prevent a destabilising 
arms race in outer space. 
They therefore encourage bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States, the two 
main space powers, on verifiable steps to avert this danger, and hope that significant progress can be 
achieved also through multilateral work at the conference on disarmament. 
Also the existence and potential further development of anti-satellite systems pose a problem 
of immediate concern and developments in the field of anti-ballistic missiles raise new questions 
about the future relationship between offensive systems and ABM technologies. 
In view of the inseparable link between offensive and defensive systems, a resumption of 
negotiations on the limitations and reductions of offensive nuclear weapons is as important as ever. 
WEU member countries have regretted that bilateral talks between the two leading space 
powers have until now not taken place. They have, however, been encouraged by recent statements 
by the leaders of those two powers that both sides recognise that a dialogue to deal with these 
questions is needed. They welcome the announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union 
have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985. 
WEU member countries stress the continuing importance of the 1972 ABM treaty between the 
United States and the USSR, and the 1967 outer space treaty. 
As far as the implications of developments in space for European industry are concerned, the 
Council would point out that opportunities already exist in this field for European industries. 
Moreover, two important conclusions may be drawn from the Assembly recommendation in this 
connection. Firstly, the European space industry is a reality; its achievements are considerable and 
its potential is far from insignificant. Secondly, it is clear that Europe's international influence, and 
to some extent its security, will, in the long term, also depend on what position it will occupy in the 
field of space activities. In this connection the Council underlines the importance for the WEU 
member states to strengthen and improve their collaboration in the field of space technology. 
Generally speaking, it should be borne in mind that the principle of co-operation between the United 
States and Europe raises no difficulties and can be mutually profitable. 
The Council has taken note with interest of the Assembly's recommendation and the proposals 
contained therein. However, it is not in a position, at this stage, to give precise and detailed replies. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984. 
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Written questions 240, 244 and 247 to 251 and replies of the Council 
to written questions 240, 244, 247 and 248 
QUESTION 240 
put by Mr. Bassinet 
on 13th October 1983 
Since European co-operation in arma-
ments matters is essential, can the Council give 
the Assembly information about the tripartite 
discussions between France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United Kingdom in 
Paris on 21st September 1983? 
Will co-operation in overall research and 
development be strengthened? 
Is standardisation possible for NATO 
frigates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters 
and above all tactical combat aircraft? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 19th September 1984 
European co-operation on armaments is 
indeed essential. 
1. This was the main subject discussed last 
year at the tripartite meeting of defence 
ministers. On that occasion, the ministers made 
a general survey of the situation and noted with 
interest the status of armaments co-operation, 
reaffirming their interest in the following: the 
European development of an advanced combat 
aircraft in the mid-nineties; the production in 
Europe of a multiple-launch rocket system 
(MLRS); third generation anti-tank missile 
programmes. 
The Ministers also confirmed their strong 
interest in the development of emerging tech-
nologies in Europe as well as closer European 
industrial links. 
2. Within the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the European countries agreed to 
encourage co-operation on technologies and 
components, this being the only means of 
achieving increased collaboration on weapons 
systems in the future. This would involve the 
transfer of technologies among European coun-
tries and between the United States and 
Europe. 
3. With respect to the NATO frigate 
programme for the nineties, a memorandum of 
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understanding for starting the feasibility studies 
has been signed between France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Canada. These studies will enable the 
satisfactory level of standardisation to be 
achieved. 
As for guided anti-tank weapons, the 
Defence Ministers of the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and France have 
signed a memorandum of understanding relating 
to the definition phase of the third generation 
anti-tank weapons systems, including two con-
cepts - one medium-range and the other long-
range (with land-transported version and 
helicopter-launched version). The development 
phase will begin around the middle of 1985. 
Wider co-operation is being discussed to include 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and 
Spain. 
As regards tactical combat aircraft, the 
Council in their reply to written question 239 
informed the Assembly of the procedure which 
has now been set in motion for intra-European 
co-operation in this area. 
With respect to operational specifications, 
note should be taken of the particularly 
important work of the FINABEL group, which 
will allow work to be done on common bases as 
regards military requirements. 
QUESTION 244 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 24th January 1984 
The European market for military flight 
simulators and training systems for the decade 
1984-94 would amount to some $8 billion -
France $286 million, Germany $339 million, 
United Kingdom $311 million - and further 
sizeable sums of money for Belgium, Italy and 
the Netherlands. 
Would the Council promote a joint or at 
least co-ordinated effort by the countries 
concerned, not so much for existing basic needs 
but for new aircraft, helicopters and other 
weapons systems? 
DOCUMENT 997 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 6th July 1984 
1. Independently of the exact size of the 
European market for military flight simulators 
and training systems for the decade 1984-94, 
the Council would like to point out the 
following: 
For many of the collaborative aircraft 
projects in which WEU member states have 
been involved, the related flight simulators have 
been purchased nationally. It is however 
important to point out that the financial 
incentives for collaboration on simulators are 
not so strong as for collaboration on aircraft 
because of the much less extensive development 
task, and the smaller quantities involved. 
Individual members moreover have different 
approaches to pilot training and this makes 
agreement on specifications rather difficult. 
2. The Council agree that pooling of certain 
simulation facilities should however be encour-
aged in the context of future co-operation in 
the aeronautical field, but consider that the 
impetus for this will need to come from the 
~uropean countries involved in particular pro-
Jects. 
QUESTION 247 
put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
on 20th June 1984 
To ask the Council if, when replying to 
written questions, they will give the date of 
both the original question and the answer so 
that the members of the Assembly may see 
how long it has taken to reply. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 27th July 1984 
The Council is prepared to follow up this 
request. It would like to avail itself of this 
opportu~ity to J>?int out that its ~ncern to give 
substantial rephes both to wntten questions 
from members of the Assembly and to 
recommendations adopted by the Assembly, as 
well as the principle of unanimity governing its 
work, involve extensive consultations that may 
take time. 
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At all events, the Council in the context 
of its current reflections on the reactivating of 
WEU - one of the main elements of which is 
the strengthening of the dialogue with the 
Assembly - is examining, inter alia, how the 
procedure for preparing its replies to recommen-
dations and written questions might be 
improved. 
QUESTION 248 
put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
on 20th June 1984 
To ask the Council, based on the 
assumption that the workload of WEU remains 
unaltered, how much they estimate it would 
cost to eo-locate all the organs of WEU on a 
first-year basis as well as for subsequent years. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 13th August 1984 
This matter has not yet been considered 
in the WEU Council. Conclusions regarding 
future activities of the organisation, now under 
review, must first be reached by member 
governments before any useful study of the 
administrative implications can be made. 
QUESTION 249 
put by Mr. Hill 
on 17th October 1984 
Is the Council aware that the Belgian 
Government is examining a contract for the 
sale of $1 billion worth of nuclear equipment to 
Libya? 
Why should Libya, with vast reserves of 
gas and oil and a small population, need a 
nuclear power plant? 
Will the Council give the Belgian Govern-
ment assurances that, if it decides not to accept 
this contract, no other Western European 
country will accept such a contract from Libya? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 250 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 22nd October 1984 
Is the Council aware of the passing of a 
nuclear attack submarine of the Soviet Union 
hidden behind a Soviet freighter through the 
Straits of Gibraltar on 19th September 1984 
under water instead of surfacing and showing 
the flag? 
Is such a passage acceptable to the 
coastal states of Spain and Morocco and 
according to the 1958 Geneva law of the sea 
convention? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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QUESTION 251 
put by Mr. Lenzer 
on 27th October 1984 
Further to written question 240 of 17th 
October 1983 and the Council's reply of 19th 
September 1984, will the Council inform the 
Assembly on: 
(a) the progress of the proposed European 
fighter aircraft; 
(b) the bi- and trilateral plans of member 
governments on joint helicopter pro-
jects; 
(c) the development of new military 
transport aircraft; 
(d) the development of the second genera-
tion of European missiles; 
(e) the planning of "emerging technolo-
gies" in Europe, as adopted by the 
Conference of National Armaments 
Directors. 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
13th August 1984 - Conference on Disarmament, Geneva: 
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H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to 
the United Nations in Geneva, Head of Delegation; Mr. Jaap Ramaker, Counsellor, and Mr. Robert 
Jan Akkerman, First Secretary; 
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of Swedish Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of Soviet Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Qian Jiadong, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of China; 
The Hon. Louis Fields Jnr., Ambassador, United States Representative to the Conference, and 
Mr. Emery, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
H.E. Mr. Milos Vejvoda, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia; 
Mr. Teodor Mescanu, Counsellor, Deputy Head of the Romanian Delegation. 
The committee as a whole met in the Federal Republic of Germany from 15th-17th October 
1984, where it was briefed by: 
Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 
Mr. William Mahoney, Office of Public Affairs; Mr. Keith Bush, Director of Research, Radio 
Liberty; Ms. Elizabeth Teague and Dr. William Murphy, Radio Liberty Research and Analysis 
Department; 
Ministry of Defence, Bonn 
Dr. Manfred W6riler, Minister of Defence; Brigadier General Oppermann; Colonel Bromeis; 
Lt.Colonel Keller; Colonel Kellein; 
Fighter-Bomber Wing 33, Bachel Air-Base 
Colonel Helmut Borchers, Commander; Lt. Colonel Jiirgen Stehli, Deputy Wing Commander; 
Major Schr&ier; Major Becker; Lt. Colonel Christoph Keitel, Commander Flight Support Group; 
Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Brunssum, Netherlands 
General L. Chalupa, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe; Air Chief Marshal 
Sir Michael Beavis, Deputy Commander-in-Chief; Lt. General H. Depoorter, Chief of Staff; Lt. 
Colonel. L. Denniston, Intelligence Division; Major R. Boryer, Operations Division. 
The committee subsequently met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 8th November 1984 
when it discussed the present report, which was adopted at a subsequent meeting on 3rd December 
1984. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of 
parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee 
and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the control of armaments and disarmament 
The Assembly, 
(i) Endorsing the Council's view expressed in the Rome Declaration that increased co-operation 
in WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity 
and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and 
West by fostering dialogue and co-operation; 
(ii) Believing that negotiations on arms control and disarmament, such as those conducted in the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are too important for the security of Europe and the 
Atlantic Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union; 
(iii) Welcoming, therefore, the inclusion of arms control and disarmament among the specific 
conditions of security in Europe on which the Council of Ministers will hold comprehensive 
discussions and seek to harmonise their views; 
(iv) Reiterating its view that it is impracticable, and indeed undesirable, to seek to establish a 
separate East-West balance in different categories of nuclear weapons - strategic, intermediate- or 
short-range - and that any such nuclear balance can be assessed only globally; 
(v) Believing, however, that actual negotiations on reducing present levels of nuclear weapons may 
best be pursued by such categories, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Seek agreement on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance 
of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive 
test ban, and MBF~ reductions; 
2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing the early conclusion of agreements 
on a chemical weapons ban; a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM 
systems; and a comprehensive test ban; 
3. Call simultaneously on the United States to ratify the threshold test ban treaty and the 
peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations 
on a comprehensive test ban treaty; 
4. Examine any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union linked with the early resumption of 
INF and START negotiations, not excluding a possible mutual temporary freeze on further 
deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons; 
5. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out specific studies to assist it in 
the foregoing tasks, and those identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. BlfUUIMI, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. In considering its programme of work for 
1984, the committee decided to report twice on 
the subject of arms control and disarmament, 
first in the spring on two international arms 
control conferences - the Conference on 
Disarmament which held its first session in 
Stockholm on 17th January 1984, and the 
mutual and balanced force reduction negotia-
tions, which have been continuing in Vienna for 
the last ten years1, and secondly to report to 
the second part of the session on the status of 
the INF and START negotiations; and negoti-
ations within the general framework of the 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with 
particular reference to the prohibition of 
chemical weapons; the suspension of nuclear 
tests; and a ban on weapons in space. 
1.2. The last part of 1984, during which there 
have been no bilateral arms control negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, is not a propitious time to report on the 
subject. The presidential election year in the 
United States and the two changes in rapid 
succession in the leadership of the Soviet Union 
have had the combined effect of virtually 
freezing superpower relations in the area of 
arms control. It is significant that neither 
President Reagan nor President Chernenko has 
ever visited the other's country. Nevertheless, 
the two countries have, during the year, 
continued to participate in all multilateral arms 
control forums - the Conference on Disarma-
ment and the MBFR talks on which the 
committee has already reported, as well as the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The 
two superpowers have also continued to meet 
bilaterally in Geneva in the Standing Consulta-
tive Commission, established under SALT I, 
and have agreed to improve the "hotline". 
1.3. It is not possible at the present time, 
however, to see what changes there may be in 
the climate of relations between the two 
superpowers in 1985. Yet, arms control negoti-
ations are too important for the security of 
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to be made 
dependent entirely on the state of relations 
between the superpowers. Thus, in the opinion 
of the committee at the present time, the 
European members of the alliance must bear a 
far greater share of responsibility for maintain-
l. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 
972, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries. 
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ing and developing relations with the Soviet 
Union and its allies, and if necessary in taking 
the initiative with specific proposals in certain 
fields at the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva which could open the way to mutually 
advantageous agreements in the arms control 
field. 
1.4. The report analyses the present status of 
the particular negotiations listed above and 
makes specific recommendations for further 
progress. 
11. INF and START 
2.1. There have been no bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
in Geneva in either the INF or the START 
frameworks during 1984. The first cruise missile 
to be deployed in Europe arrived at Greenham 
Common in the United Kingdom on 14th 
November 1983; the first Pershing 11 missile 
arrived at the Ramstein air-base in Germany 
on 23rd November, for deployment at the 
Mutlangen base, and the Soviet negotiator left 
the INF talks in Geneva on the same day - the 
Soviet Union had consistently maintained that 
the talks would be suspended if NATO began 
deployment of the cruise and Pershing 11 
missiles in accordance with the 1979 dual 
decision. On 27th November 1983 the first 
cruise missile to be deployed in Italy arrived at 
the Sigonella air-base in Italy for temporary 
deployment, pending the completion of the 
permanent base at Comiso in March 1984. 
2.2. The Soviet Union had not previously 
linked the deployment of INF missiles in 
NATO countries in Europe with the START 
talks - successors to the earlier SALT talks -
also being conducted in Geneva, and covering 
strategic missiles and bombers based in the 
United States and the Soviet Union or in 
submarines. As late as 2nd December 1983 
cautiously optimistic statements were being 
made by the North Atlantic Council at 
permanent level following briefings by the 
United States START negotiator, Mr. Rowny, 
but at a press conference in Moscow on 5th 
December 1983 General Ogarkov, then Chief 
of Defence Staff of the Red Army, warned that 
the START talks were "heading in the same 
direction as INF". The Soviet negotiator left 
the Geneva talks on 8th December, without 
agreeing a date for their resumption, and a 
Tass communique issued afterwards stated that 
"the change in the global situation, linked with 
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the commencement of the deployment of the 
new American missiles in Europe, obliges the 
Soviet Union to review all the questions under 
discussion" in Geneva. Intense Soviet efforts 
over four years to prevent the deployment of 
the NATO missiles had failed; after some 
hesitation the Kremlin leadership had clearly 
decided to suspend all bilateral arms control 
negotiations with the United States, at least 
during the year of the presidential election. 
2.3. Overall, the rate of deployment of nuclear 
weapons by both the United States and the 
Soviet Union during 1984 has not significantly 
modified previous levels. Both sides have been 
progressively replacing older weapons systems 
with more modem- in the case of the United 
States, some Titan missiles and older models of 
the B-52 bomber have been withdrawn, while 
the fourth Ohio class ballistic missile submarine 
has entered service, with a further 24 Trident 
C-4 missiles, each with ten warheads. The 
Soviet Union has withdrawn the last of its SS-
5 missiles and continued to replace SS-11 s by 
SS-19s. A second Typhoon ballistic missile 
submarine with 20 SSN-20 missiles, each with 
nine warheads, has entered service. The United 
States has continued deployment of air-
launched cruise missiles on its B-52 bombers 
and has now introduced on two of its nuclear-
propelled attack submarines the first eight out 
of a planned total of 758 nuclear sea-launched 
cruise missiles. The Soviet Union announced in 
an official Tass communique of 16th October 
that it had begun to deploy cruise missiles on 
stategic fighter bombers and submarines. Cur-
rent data are given at Appendix IV. 
2.4. As far as INF forces are concerned, since 
December 1983, the number of SS-20 missiles 
actually deployed by the Soviet Union has 
remained frozen at 378 with 1,134 warheads, 
reported in the Nuclear Planning Group 
communique of 7th April 1984. Of these, 243 
missiles are within range of Europe. Official 
western sources, however, report that fourteen 
further SS-20 sites are under construction west 
of the Urals, and that there are a number of 
unoccupied sites in eastern Soviet Union. A 
clear difference of interpretation on this issue 
between the United States, on the one hand, 
and its European allies on the other, emerged 
from the meeting of NATO defence ministers 
in the Nuclear Planning Group, held at Stresa 
on 11th and 12th October. For the first time for 
a number of years, the communique did not 
state the numbers of SS-20 missiles deployed, 
but pointed out that "new SS-20 bases, east 
and west of the Ural mountains, are under 
construction which, when operational, will 
significantly increase the number of deployed 
SS-20 launchers". The United States Secretary 
of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, however, is 
reported as saying to journalists at the meeting 
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" ... to my knowledge the number has increased 
... there are additional SS-20 missiles since the 
January count that are ready and able to be 
shot"1• The issue was further complicated by a 
statement attributed to a senior (United States) 
State Department official at NATO Head-
quarters, Brussels, following the Special Con-
sultative Group meeting on 20th November. He 
was quoted as saying that numbers of SS-20s 
were "fluctuating" with new bases being built 
while some existing bases were converted to 
other uses, assumed to be for an experimental 
intercontinental missile, the SS-X-25. The 
question of numbers of SS-20s actually deployed 
is particularly significant in view of the 
Netherlands decision of 1st June referred to 
below. 
2.5. There are of course other examples of 
attempts to influence public or parliamentary 
opinion through variations in assessments of the 
Soviet defence effort. On 14th June 1984 the 
United States Defence Intelligence Agency, at 
a background briefing in the Pentagon, issued 
an estimate claiming that Soviet expenditure on 
170 weapons systems had increased by 5% and 
10% over 1983 levels. At the same time, the 
Central Intelligence Agency declined to confirm 
the figure; the previous year it had revised 
downwards to 2% its earlier estimate that Soviet 
defence expenditure had been increasing at 
between 3% and 4% annually. The unattribut-
able Pentagon briefing took place at a time 
when the Senate was due to vote on the defence 
budget, and the New York Times refused to 
send a reporter to it. As previously pointed out, 
the Assembly itself was informed by General 
Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
on 7th June 1983, that there were 2,100 SS-20 
warheads. These were deployed on 351 launch-
ers, with a second missile at each launch site. 
This contrasts with the official NATO estimate, 
in a Nuclear Planning Group communique of 
23rd March 1983, that there were only 1,053 
warheads and only 351 SS-20 launchers 
deployed. The Council, in reply to Written 
Question 235 on the subject, did not confirm 
SACEUR's estimate, reiterating that "the 
number of 351 operational SS-20 missiles was 
valid on 7th June 1983". 
2.6. The Nuclear Planning Group commu-
nique of 12th October referred to above 
provided other qualitative information about 
Soviet nuclear developments: "Ministers 
expressed their concern that the Soviet nuclear 
build-up continues unabated at all levels. In the 
strategic field, the Soviet Union is pressing 
1. Atlantic News, 17th October 1984. Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia. The SS-22 is reported to 
have a range of 900 kilometres, and could be well within 
range of targets in Germany and the Benelux countries. 
ahead with the development and testing of a 
wide range of new systems, including two 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a 
new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a 
new bomber, and a new generation of ground-, 
air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, which are 
expected to enter operational service in the near 
future. The communique also pointed out that 
SS-21 and SS-22 shorter-range nuclear missiles 
were being deployed in the German 
2. 7. Since the announcement at the end of 
1983 of the deployment of the first 16 Pershing 
or cruise missiles in each of Germany, Italy and 
United Kingdom, it has apparently not been 
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official policy of these governments to announce 
further deployments under the 1979 decision, 
as and when they occur. From press reports 
and evidence given to Congress committees, it 
is known that deployment of Pershing 11 
missiles continued fairly rapidly in Germany 
and that further cruise missiles had been 
deployed in the United Kingdom. On 
20th November 1984, however, General Rogers, 
SACEUR, stated that 93 missiles were 
deployed, including 32 cruise missiles at 
Greenham Common and 45 Pershing 11 missiles. 
The present deployment status appears to be as 
follows: 
NATO INF deployment schedule 
Maximum levels agreed in 1979 Status of deployment Country Base 
Pershing II 
Belgium Florennes -
Germany Mutlangen 36 
Heilbronn 36 
Neu Ulm 36 
Bitburg -
Italy Comiso -
Netherlands Woensdrecht -
United Greenham 
Kingdom Common -
Moles worth -
Totals 108 
2.8. Deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium 
is not due until 1986, but preparatory work has 
begun at the Florennes base; the government 
has stated that it will review the deployment 
decision on a six-monthly basis in the light of 
any progress that may be made in arms control 
negotiations, and that deployment could begin 
in March 1985 if the government so decided. 
2.9. On 1st June 1984 the Netherlands 
Government took a special decision on INF 
deployment in the Netherlands under the terms 
of the 1979 decision 1• The government decided 
in essence that, in the event of an agreement 
being reached between the United States and 
1. Full text at Appendix I. 
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Cruise missiles November 1984 
48 Preparatory work begun to 
permit deployment from 
March 1985, subject to 
government decision 
- 36 deployed 
- 9 deployed 
- Due later in 1984 
96 Due in 1986 
112 16 deployed 
48 Due in 1986 subject to 
decision on 1st November 
1985 
96 32 deployed 
64 Due in 1988 
464 
the Soviet Union on the deployment of a 
number of INF weapons in Western Europe, 
the Netherlands would accept its share of such 
weapons. The dates of deployment of missiles in 
the Netherlands under the 1979 decision were, 
however, postponed, but not beyond the final 
date of deployment in the Netherlands. The 
cabinet will take a decision on 1st November 
1985 on numbers to be deployed in the 
Netherlands and submit a bill to parliament on 
1st January 1986. If no agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on 
deployment of missiles has been reached by 
1st November 1985, and if the Soviet Union 
then has deployed a greater number of SS-20 
missiles than were deployed on lst June 1984 
(i.e. 378), then the Netherlands will agree to 
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deploy its full share of 48 cruise missiles. The 
government decision is understood to imply that 
if the number of deployed SS-20 missiles is not 
increased beyond the present 378, then there 
would be no requirement to deploy any cruise 
missiles in the Netherlands. 
2.10. The Nuclear Planning Group commu-
nique of 12th October 1984 referred to above 
reiterates the language of previous commu-
niques according to which: "Ministers repeated 
their willingness to reverse, halt or modify the 
LRINF deployment - including the removal 
and dismantling of missiles already deployed -
upon achievement of a balanced, equitable and 
verifiable agreement calling for such action". 
When it withdrew from the INF talks on 
November 1983, the Soviet Union asserted that 
they could not be resumed until NATO 
removed the missiles it had begun to deploy. 
Because the Soviet leaders had not recently 
reiterated that condition, there had been 
speculation that it might be dropped in favour 
of the Soviet proposal for a quantitative and 
qualitative freeze on all nuclear weapons at 
their present levels - a proposal reiterated by 
President Chernenko in his interview with the 
Washington Post, published on 17th October, 
wher he said: 
" ... the Soviet proposal that the nuclear 
powers freeze quantitatively and qualita-
tively all nuclear weapons at their disposal 
also remains valid. Agreement on this 
matter would mean mutual cessation of 
the build-up of all components of the 
existing nuclear arsenals, including deliv-
ery vehicles and nuclear warheads. The 
nuclear arms race would thus be stopped. 
This would radically facilitate further 
agreements on reductions in and even-
tually complete elimination of such 
weapons. The White House still has 
before it our official proposal that the 
Soviet Union and the United States 
initially agree to freeze their nuclear 
weapons, thus setting an example for 
other nuclear powers ... " 
However, the withdrawal of NATO's INF 
missiles as a precondition to a resumption of 
INF talks was reiterated by a Soviet spokesman 
in October. But on 23rd November a joint 
statement issued in Moscow and Washington 
said: 
"The United States and the Soviet Union 
have agreed to enter into new negotiations 
with the objective of reaching mutually-
acceptable agreements on the whole range 
of questions concerning nuclear and outer 
space arms. In order to reach a common 
understanding as to the subject and 
objectives of such negotiations, Secretary 
of State George P. Shultz and Foreign 
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Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will meet in 
Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985." 
Mr. Chernenko's comments on 26th November 
made during the visit to Moscow by the British 
Labour Party leader Mr. Kinnock, but released 
by Tass, said specifically that the Soviet Union 
wanted to start negotiations on " ... reduction of 
strategic nuclear weapons" but did not mention 
preconditions. 
2.11. It is nearly five years since NATO, on 
12th December 1979, announced its dual 
decision concerning what it was then calling 
"long-range theatre nuclear forces". The main 
provisions of the communique issued at the 
conclusion of the special meeting of foreign and 
defence ministers is worth recalling. The 
communique announced that 572 United States 
nuclear missiles would be deployed in Europe, 
and: 
"As an integral part of TNF modernisa-
tion, 1,000 United States nuclear war-
heads will be withdrawn from Europe as 
soon as feasible ... The 572 LRTNF 
warheads should be accommodated within 
that reduced level." 
The communique stressed the importance of 
arms control and supported the United States 
decision to negotiate LRTNF limitations with 
the Soviet Union along the following lines: 
"A. Any future limitations on United 
States systems principally designed for 
theatre missions should be accompanied 
by appropriate limitations on Soviet 
theatre systems. 
B. Limitation on United States and Soviet 
long-range theatre nuclear systems should 
be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT Ill 
framework in a step-by-step approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment 
of agreed limitations on United States 
and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these 
systems must be consistent with the 
principle of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality in ceilings and in 
rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be 
adequately verifiable." 
The communique concluded that: 
"A. A modernisation decision, including 
a commitment to deployments, is neces-
sary to meet NATO's deterrence and 
defence needs, to provide a credible 
response to unilateral Soviet TNF deploy-
ments, and to provide the foundation for 
the pursuit of serious negotiations on 
TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in constraining 
the Soviet build-up can enhance alliance 
security, modify the scale of NATO's 
TNF requirements, and promote stability 
and detente in Europe in consonance with 
NATO's basic policy of deterrence, 
defence and detente as enunciated in the 
Harmel report. NATO's TNF require-
ments will be examined in the light of 
concrete results reached through negoti-
ations." 
The communique stressed the importance of 
arms control and SALT 11: 
"8. Ministers regard arms control as an 
integral part of the alliance's efforts to 
assure the undiminished security of its 
member states and to make the strategic 
situation between East and West more 
stable, more predictable, and more man-
ageable at lower levels of armaments on 
both sides. In this regard they welcomed 
the contribution which the SALT 11 
treaty makes towards achieving these 
objectives." 
2.12. A fundamental premise of the December 
1979 decision was that the SALT 11 treaty, 
signed on 18th June 1979 after seven years of 
negotiations, would very shortly enter into force, 
leading to the opening of SALT Ill talks for 
which it made provision. In practice substantive 
INF talks between the United States and the 
Soviet Union began only on 30th November 
1981 - nearly two years after the INF decision. 
2.13. Reports of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments have endorsed both 
aspects of the NATO dual decision on a 
number of occasions. At the same time, the 
reports have made a number of specific points 
about the INF situation. First, it is not 
meaningful to attempt to measure the balance, 
or lack of balance, of INF systems in Europe in 
isolation. Any Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons 
which are within range of the capitals or major 
industrial areas of the European NATO 
countries are "strategic", as far as those 
countries are concerned. Secondly, many of the 
Soviet SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs, counted in the 
strategic weapons category, have been spefically 
designed and deployed so that they can be fired 
at targets in Europe as well as in the United 
States. Thirdly, there is considerable uncertainty 
as to which classes of aircraft should or should 
not be included in any theatre balance. 
Certainly carrier-borne aircraft are so counted 
by the Soviet Union. Deterrence, in any case, 
must rely on the existence of the whole range 
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of nuclear weapons available to the West so as 
to avoid any suggestion of "decoupling" United 
States strategic nuclear forces from the defence 
of Europe; European security would not be 
enhanced if the Soviet Union were led to 
believe that at a particular level of conflict 
NATO retaliation would be limited to the use 
of nuclear weapons actually based in Europe. 
2.14. Where specific negotiations on arms 
limitations are concerned, however, the com-
mittee has supported the view that agreement 
can be facilitated by attempting to negotiate 
specific packages limited to more narrowly-
defined categories of weapons system. Although 
the INF and START negotiations cannot be 
viewed in isolation, for many reasons it makes 
good sense to attempt to negotiate separately 
on possible mutual reductions in each category 
of weapons system. 
2.15. As far as the British and French nuclear 
forces are concerned, the Soviet Union has 
repeatedly sought to include them in negotia-
tions on INF forces, while the United States, in 
agreement with its NATO allies, has as 
consistently refused to take them into consider-
ation. The committee has always endorsed the 
view that while United States and Soviet 
nuclear weapons remain at their present very 
high levels, there can be no question of 
negotiating reductions in the relatively small 
levels of nuclear weapons controlled auton-
omously by two European governments. Never-
theless, it is obvious that the Soviet Union must 
count the levels of British and French nuclear 
forces in its own assessment of the threat, and 
they inevitably form part of the overall 
assessment of levels of nuclear weapons. With 
the introduction of multiple independently-
targeted warheads on the submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles of these countries at a later 
date, their significance in the numbers game 
will increase. The Trident D-5 missile which is 
scheduled to be fitted to United Kingdom 
submarines in the mid-1990s can carry ten 
MIRVs. Although the United Kingdom has 
stated that it is not its intention to deploy this 
number of warheads on its submarines, from an 
arms control standpoint there will be difficult 
problems of verification if the Soviet Union is 
to be given assurances concerning the actual 
numbers deployed. · 
Ill. Space 
3.1. While the committee was being briefed in 
the Pentagon on 23rd March 1983, President 
Reagan made a televised speech on defence 
spending and defensive technology about which 
the committee learned later from the press. The 
senior officials and officers briefing the commit-
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tee, and indeed the ministers attending the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which hap-
pened to be meeting the same day, do not 
appear to have had any prior knowledge of the 
speech. Suggesting a research and development 
programme on defensive systems against ballis-
tic missiles, the President said "I call upon the 
scientific community in our country, those who 
gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their talents 
now to the cause of mankind and world peace, 
to give us the means of rendering these nuclear 
weapons impotent and obsolete". 
3.2. Dubbed star wars by the media, these 
proposals, which had not been studied by the 
Department of Defence at the time they were 
made, have since been presented as the strategic 
defence initiative (SDI) for which $2 billion is 
being budgeted in financial year 1985. This 
programme is running in parallel with a space 
defence programme to provide an anti-satellite 
(ASAT) capability, for which $226 million is 
being budgeted in financial year 1985. President 
Reagan's star wars speech was not directed to 
the space defence programme, but the SDI and 
ASA T programmes, although presented as 
distinct, have to be considered together for four 
reasons: 
(i) they have inevitably been confused in 
the public mind; 
(ii) both could involve weapons systems 
based on satellites in outer-space; 
(iii) some of the technology is common to 
both: in particular, the United States 
Defence Department is reporting as 
anti-ballistic missile tests the testing 
of certain anti-satellite weapons sys-
tems, because Congress introduced an 
amendment in 1983 preventing the 
administration from attacking any 
point in space with an ASAT test 1; 
(iv} both the SDI and ASAT research and 
development programmes have a par-
allel impact, both on western defence 
strategy and, most important as far 
as this report is concerned, on arms 
control policy and negotiations. 
The 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty between 
the United States and the Soviet Union remains 
at the present time the only arms control 
agreement between these two countries concern-
I. See interview with Dr. Richard L. Garwin of the IBN 
Thomas J. Watson Research Centre in CLSW, 24th June 
1984. The United States launched a missile from the 
Kwajalein missile range on lOth June 1984, which 
successfully destroyed in flight a ballistic missile warhead 
fired from Vandenberg air force base. This weapon would 
not be capable of destroying enemy ballistic missiles under 
operational conditions, but could be used to destroy satellites 
because their orbits are predictable. 
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ing strategic weapons which is actually in force. 
While research and development is permitted 
under the terms of the treaty, it would have to 
be abrogated before ABM weapons were 
deployed. 
3.3. The present SDI programme is a long-
term research and development programme: 
" ... previous programmes emphasised point 
defence systems that would protect 
selected military targets by intercepting 
re-entry vehicles in the terminal phase of 
their flight. The new strategic defence 
initiative programme is designed to exam-
ine the feasibility of a system that could 
engage ballistic missiles and warheads 
along their entire launch to impact 
trajectories ... Major research efforts will 
be required in directed energy weapons, 
conventional weapons, and surveillance 
and target acquisition systems. An essen-
tial element of the programme is the 
early demonstration of key technologies 
needed for an effective ballistic missile 
defence."2 
Decisions on the development of actual ballistic 
missile defences are not planned until the 
1990s. 
3.4. The ASAT programme is more advanced, 
at least as far as low-level satellites are 
concerned. 
"The centre-piece of our ASAT pro-
gramme is the air-launched miniature 
vehicle, which is designed to be launched 
from F-15s (aircraft). Successful comple-
tion of this programme will give us the 
means of destroying Soviet satellites 
orbiting at low altitudes, thereby 
enhancing deterrence against Soviet use 
of ASAT weapons .... For the long run, 
we are assessing in conjunction with SDI 
the feasibility of advanced technologies, 
such as space-based lasers for ASAT 
missions. "3 
Technical criticism 
3.5. Previous United States administrations 
had continued basic research into ABM systems, 
knowing that the Soviet Union did not have an 
operational capability beyond the one rather 
2. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to 
the Congress, fiscal year 1985, 1st February 1984, pages 
192 and 193. 
3. Idem. smallest of which would have an explosive yield 
ten times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. To 
counter such a system, the Soviet Union, for a fraction of 
the cost of the ballistic missile defence, could, with existing 
technology, multiply ten-fold the numbers of warheads and 
possible decoys in order to swamp any defensive systems. 
primitive ABM site permitted under the 1972 
ABM treaty. Department of Defence reports 
had drawn attention to Soviet development of 
directed energy systems (both of lasers as well 
as of particle beams), but had concluded that, 
in the present state of basic research, such 
devices could not be developed as satisfactory 
weapons systems, and that the Soviet Union 
was wasting its money on the development it 
was then undertaking. Even after President 
Reagan's March 1983 speech, the President's 
Commission on Strategic Forces (known as the 
Scowcroft Commission), reporting in April that 
year on strategic missile systems in general, 
concluded that: 
"applications of current technology offer 
no real promise of being able to defend 
the United States against massive nuclear 
attack in this century ... no ABM 
technologies appear to combine practical-
ity, survivability, low cost, and technical 
effectiveness sufficient to justify proceed-
ing beyond the stage of technology 
development." 
3.6. The United States administration is not 
now claiming that the SDI could make nuclear 
weapons obsolete as the President originally 
said, but suggests that it might be possible to 
develop a defence which would reduce the 
weight of a missile attack- however, it remains 
impossible to guess at the percentage of 
attacking missiles that might be destroyed. 
Even if 90% of existing Soviet strategic missile 
warheads could be destroyed, that would still 
leave some 770 which would strike targets in 
the United States, the 
Strategic impact 
3.7. Critics of the SDI have feared that, apart 
from its possible effect of stimulating further 
increases in present offensive strategic forces, it 
could prove destabilising if it heightened the 
advantage of surprise attack. Moreover, as there 
is far less chance of providing ABM defence for 
Europe because of the very short flight times 
for Soviet missiles fired against Europe, present 
fears that the United States might be developing 
"war fighting" nuclear capability, as opposed to 
a deterrent capability, would be heightened if 
the United States were seen to be seeking to 
acquire for itself immunity to nuclear attack. 
Soviet fears of a pre-emptive strike on its 
land-based ICBMs could be heightened because 
a 90% effective ABM system might seem 
attractive if Soviet missile forces were first 
reduced by such an attack. 
3.8. The ASAT programme itself could have 
a destabilising impact on strategic relationships, 
because military satellites are used essentially 
for surveillance and communications - both 
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vital for providing advance information of an 
adversary's activities and hence stabilising in 
their effects. The capability to destroy stabilising 
systems can only in itself be destabilising, 
increasing the advantages of surprise attack. 
Impact on arms control 
3.9. As with multiple inde~ndently-targetable 
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), the problem of 
verifying the existence of ABM systems or 
ASAT systems may well be insoluble if such 
weapons are deployed. Development testing of 
these systems, however, is readily observable by 
an adversary through his national technical 
means - both radar and radio intercept, as well 
as satellite observation. It should therefore be 
possible to reach an arms control agreement to 
ban such weapons systems before development 
testing has gone too far, but impossible 
thereafter. The value of the introduction of 
MIRV s for western security is now in consider-
able doubt. From the first nuclear stalemate of 
about 1970 when the United States had some 
1,700 single warhead strategic missiles com-
pared with the Soviet Union's 1 ,500, the 
deployment of MIRVs by the United States led 
through a brief four years of overwhelming 
superiority with 7,300 United States warheads, 
to renewed stalemate in 1980, by which time 
the Soviet Union had deployed 6,300 MIRVs. 
The opportunity to stop MlR Vs through arms 
control had been abandoned in the late 1960s, 
partly because United States expenditure on 
the systems had become too large to be stopped. 
Budget requests for the SDI and ASAT 
programmes for financial year 1985 already 
exceed $2 billion, of which $53 million is to be 
spent on actual procurement of ASA T systems. 
Projects of this magnitude in the United States 
rapidly become politically unstoppable when 
production contracts are spread over factories 
throughout the country, and in themselves 
generate domestic opposition to possible arms 
control agreements. 
European attitudes 
3.10. Mr. Wi:irner, the German Defence Min-
ister, has perhaps been the most outspoken 
governmental critic of the SDI. France, in the 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament described 
in the following section, has called for negotia-
tions to ban space weapons systems. In an 
interview with La Croix on 11th July, the 
French Foreign Minister, Mr. Cheysson, said: 
"We want the prohibition of arms based in 
space or capable of destroying satellites or 
missiles in space." The Netherlands represen-
tative to the Conference on Disarmament has 
adopted a very similar position. 
Arms control negotiations 
3.11. The agenda item "Prevention of an arms 
race in outer space" has been discussed in the 
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forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, but little concrete progress has been 
made. No agreement has been reached on a 
mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with 
this subject. A joint western proposal limited 
such a mandate to purely exploratory and 
verification issues, without powers to negotiate 
a draft treaty; other countries demanded powers 
to negotiate the treaty, as for example the 
existing ad hoc committees on chemical weapons 
and radiological weapons are doing. It is clear 
from discussions in Geneva that the restricted 
western proposals were at United States urging. 
On 2nd April, President Reagan sent a report 
to Congress with an accompanying letter saying 
that the government would proceed with the 
development of an anti-satellite missile system, 
and that it was not considered productive to 
engage in formal international negotiations to 
ban such weapons until practical solutions had 
been found to verification and related problems. 
While the United States was ready to examine 
these problems in a working group in the 
Conference on Disarmament, that group should 
not have authority to negotiate. 
3.12. In the Conference on Disarmament on 
20th March the Soviet Union tabled a draft 
treaty on "the prohibition of the use of force in 
outer space, and from space, against the earth" 
which would ban the placing of weapons in 
orbit or on celestial bodies designed to destroy 
objects on earth, in the atmosphere or in outer 
space. The treaty would also prohibit any 
interference with space objects belonging to 
other states, and would prohibit the testing, 
production or possession of any anti-satellite 
systems. It would also prohibit the use of 
manned spacecraft for any military purpose. 
The draft treaty makes no reference to anti-
satellite ballistic missile systems as such, or to 
directed energy systems. 
3.13. President Chernenko, in his Washington 
Post interview of 17th October quoted above, 
said: 
"We are ready to proceed with negotia-
tions, with a view to working out and 
concluding an agreement to prevent the 
militarisation of outer space, including 
complete renunciation of anti-satellite 
systems, with a mutual moratorium - to 
be established from the date of the 
beginning of the talks - on testing and 
deployment of space weapons ... " 
3.14. France, in ·a major statement to the 
conference on 12th June, called on all countries 
concerned, but in the first place the United 
States and the Soviet Union, to engage in 
multilateral negotiations on the properly verified 
limitation of new anti-ballistic technologies, 
which would prohibit both new anti-ballistic 
missiles systems as well as anti-satellite systems, 
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directed energy systems and particle-beam 
systems. France called in particular for: 
(i) the strict limitation of anti-satellite 
systems, including the prohibition of 
any that could reach satellites in high 
orbit; 
(ii) the prohibition, for a renewable period 
of five years, of the deployment or 
testing anywhere of directed energy 
systems capable of destroying ballistic 
missiles or satellites; 
(iii) the strengthening of the existing 
system for registering objects in space 
(established by the convention of 14th 
June 1975) so as to improve the 
possibility of verification; and 
(iv) an undertaking by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to extend to the 
satellites of third countries the pro-
visions concerning immunity of certain 
space objects on which they have 
already agreed bilaterally. 
3.15. In his speech to the Conference on 
Disarmament on 24th July 1984, the Nether-
lands representative proposed an analysis of 
existing international law in order to ascertain 
to what extent it already restricted the military 
use of outer space. He continued: 
"The conference should, on a priority 
basis, focus attention on the issues raised 
by the development of anti-satellite 
weapon systems, in particular on the 
prohibition of the testing, development 
and use of specific anti-satellite weapons 
systems ... An agreement which compre-
hensively bans all means of anti-satellite 
warfare appears to be impossible. Resi-
dual ASA T capacities of certain space 
systems are amongst the main obstacles. 
We have to look for a combination of 
verifiable and co-operative elements in a 
future agreement, which would prevent 
anti-satellite warfare from any longer 
being an effective military option. In the 
Netherlands' view negotiated constraints 
on ASAT would be greatly preferable to 
a totally unrestrained ASA T competition 
.. . Intensive research efforts are taking 
place in the field of ballistic missile 
defence, including space-based systems. 
The process could, if carried beyond the 
present stage of feasibility research, have 
far-reaching implications for arms control 
and stability. We therefore very much 
hope that the United States and the 
Soviet Union will reach agreement to 
hold further talks on that subject too." 
3.16. During his talks in Geneva, your Rappor-
teur obtained the impression that representatives 
of the European NATO countries widely shared 
the French view and recognised that the 
proposals went beyond the restricted terms of 
reference for an ad hoc committee on space 
that the western countries had proposed. 
3.17. President Chernenko, in June this year, 
called in general terms for the negotiation of a 
treaty to ban the use of anti-satellite weapons. 
Then, ont 29th June, a Tass statement 
announced that the Soviet Union had proposed 
bilateral negotiations with the United States, to 
begin in Vienna on 18th September, designed 
to block the development and deployment of all 
space weapons, including the renunciation of 
anti-satellite systems. The statement said it 
would mean banning weapons of any kind, 
"conventional, nuclear, laser-beam or any 
other", and proposed a reciprocal moratorium 
on the testing and deployment of space weapons 
from the opening of the talks. 
3.18. The committee notes that the Soviet 
Union is reported to have had some anti-
satellite capabilities against near-earth orbits 
since 1971 with interceptors based at two 
launch pads at Tyuratam1• 
3.19. The United States, in its reply on 1st 
July, agreed to meet with the Soviet Union for 
the following purposes: 
"(i) to discuss and define mutually agree-
able arrangements under which nego-
tiations on the reduction of strategic 
and intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons can be resumed, and 
(ii) to discuss and seek agreement on 
feasible negotiating approaches which 
could lead to verifiable and effective 
limitations on anti-satellite weapons." 
The Soviet Union did not accept the condition 
of resuming discussion of intermediate-range 
and strategic nuclear weapons at such talks, 
and appeared to back away from its initiative 
amid speculation in the West of lack of clear 
leadership in Moscow. The joint United States 
and Soviet statement of 23rd November agreed 
to a meeting of foreign ministers at Geneva on 
7th or 8th January 1985 to discuss the 
objectives of new talks on nuclear and space 
weapons (text quoted in paragraph 2.10). 
3.20. The committee considers that arms con-
trol negotiations on space weapons of all kinds 
should be pursued actively in the multilateral 
framework of the Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva, and that the WEU Council could 
l. According to United States Department of Defence 
publication, Soviet military power, April 1984, page 34. 
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well turn its attention to this issue and urge 
that agreed common instructions be sent to the 
representatives of the WEU countries which are 
members of conference - Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
IV. Comprehensive test ban 
4.1. The first item on the 1984 agenda of the 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament was 
"nuclear test ban". As in the case of space 
weapons, however, and for similar reasons, no 
agreement has been reached on the mandate of 
an ad hoc committee on the subject. The 
United States, with the support so far of the 
western countries, has proposed a mandate 
limited to discussing methods of verification, 
whereas the Soviet Union and its allies and the 
twenty-one non-aligned countries want a man-
date that would permit an ad hoc committee to 
negotiate the text of a treaty. The United 
States has stated, however, that its nuclear 
weapons modernisation programme will con-
tinue to require test explosions. The United 
Kingdom has not made such a statement. 
4.2. The partial test ban treaty of 1963 has 
probably been the single most successful arms 
control agreement concluded since world war 
11. It bans all nuclear test explosions in the 
atmosphere, in outer space or under water - i.e. 
in all environments other than under ground. 
112 countries are parties to it, including all the 
nuclear weapon powers except France and 
China, and these two countries in recent years 
have complied with it in practice, in that since 
1974 and 1980 respectively they have conducted 
only underground tests. 
4.3. Discussion and negotiations on the ban-
ning of underground tests have continued 
spor~dically s~nce 1963. On 3rd July 1974, 
Prestdents Ntxon and Brezhnev signed a 
bilateral agreement prohibiting nuclear tests of 
a yield in excess of 150 kilotons, and providing 
for verification by national technical means and 
the exchange of relevant data between the 
parties. This threshold test ban treaty has not 
been ratified by the United States, and the 
present administration has sought to reopen 
negotiations with the Soviet Union to seek 
further methods of verification. While both 
parties have said they are complying with the 
provisions of the treaty, the United States has 
claimed that certain Soviet underground nuclear 
explosions have fallen within a dubious range 
near the 150-kiloton threshold. 
4.4. On 28th May 1976, Presidents Ford and 
Brezhnev signed a further bilateral treaty 
banning peaceful nuclear explosions with a 
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yield exceeding 150 kilotons, and providing for 
verification by national technical means, and 
the access to sites of explosions in specified 
cases. Like the threshold treaty, the peaceful 
nuclear explosions treaty has not been ratified 
by the United States. 
4.5. Since 1976, in the framework of the 
Conference on Disarmament, an ad hoc group 
of experts has been working on the possibilities 
of verifying nuclear explosions through an 
international seismic network, and has agreed 
that events producing seismic waves of magni-
tude 4 or more would be detected with high 
probability of about 90%. A United Kingdom 
paper suggests seismic signals of magnitude 4.5 
would be produced by nuclear explosions as low 
as 3 kilotons in close contact with hard 
materials, or of 30 kilotons in soft materials. 
The paper concludes, however, that if a 
sufficiently large cavity can be created in a 
suitable geologic formation, an explosion of up 
to 300 kilotons could be conducted before a 
seismic wave of such magnitude was produced. 
The paper does not state the size of the cavity 
that would be required to produce this degree 
of "decoupling", and other international scien-
tific opinion has held that the 150-kiloton 
threshold of the bilateral treaty referred to 
above can be readily detected by existing 
seismic means. 
4.6. For three years from 1977 to July 1980, 
tripartite negotiations were conducted by the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States on a comprehensive test ban 
treaty which, in the words of the agreed 
tripartite report of 30th July 1980, "made 
considerable progress in negotiating the treaty". 
It was agreed that a treaty would ban all 
nuclear weapon testing and would be accom-
panied by a protocol laying down conditions 
under which nuclear explosions would be 
conducted for peaceful purposes. Verification 
would include national technical means; an 
international exchange of seismic data; and the 
right of the three parties to establish their own 
seismic stations on the territories of the other 
two. On-site inspection of dubious events would 
be permitted with the agreement of the party 
on whose territory the event had occurred. The 
tripartite report concluded as follows: 
"The three negotiating parties ... believe 
that their trilateral negotiations offer the 
best way forward. They are determined 
... to bring the negotiations to an early 
and successful conclusion." 
the other two; and details of facilities to be 
accorded to observers conducting on-site inspec-
tions. Since the date of the tripartite report 
these negotiations have not been resumed. The 
Soviet Union has proposed their resumption on 
a number of occasions and it is believed that 
the United Kingdom would have no objection 
to a resumption if the United States agreed. In 
his 17th October interview with the Washington 
Post, President Chernenko said: 
" ... There is a real opportunity to finalise 
the agreement on the complete and 
general prohibition of nuclear weapon 
tests. Should there be no such tests, these 
weapons will not be improved, which will 
put the brakes on the nuclear arms race. 
Here, too, the United States could prove 
in deeds the sincerity of its declarations 
in favour of nuclear arms limitations. The 
United States can also prove it by 
ratifying the Soviet-American treaties on 
underground nuclear explosions. These 
treaties were signed as far back as 1974 
and 1976 .... " 
4.8. Under the terms of the non-proliferation 
treaty a review conference of that treaty is due 
to be held in 1985; under Article VI the parties 
to that treaty undertake "to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament ... ". The 
committee believes it to be vitally important for 
the nuclear weapons powers to be able to show 
evidence of progress in the field of nuclear 
disarmament when the review conference con-
venes. The committee calls for the ratification 
of the bilateral threshold test ban treaty and 
peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and for the 
resumption of the tripartite talks on a compre-
hensive test ban. That failing, an ad hoc 
committee in the Conference on Disarmament 
should be enabled to negotiate a draft treaty on 
a comprehensive test ban - Sweden has already 
tabled such a draft in 1977 and a revised 
version on 14th June 1983. 
V. Chemical weapons 
5.1. Public attention has recently been drawn 
to the subject of chemical weapons through the 
use of nerve and mustard gas by Iraq against 
Iran early in 1984. An international investigat-
ing team of four experts from Australia Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland, appointed by the 
4.7. It is understood that, at the time they United Nations Secretary General, reported 
were suspended, the tripartite talks had come unanimously on 27th March that both a blister 
close to final agreement. The outstanding issues gas - sulphur mustard - and a nerve gas -
related to the duration of the treaty; the tabun- had been used in Iran. The team spent 
numbers of seismic stations the three parties six days in Iran, visited the war zone, and 
would be entitled to install on the territory of examined 47 wounded in hospital, 12 cadavers, 
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and unexploded bombs and shells on the 
battlefield. Although the experts' report did not 
name Iraq as the user of the weapons on the 
grounds that the experts were not present at 
the time the weapons were used, Iraq has not 
denied its use of chemical weapons. 
5.2. The unambiguity and unanimity of this 
authoratative international report contrasts 
sharply with the confusion which exists over 
United States allegations during 1982 and 1983 
of the use of trichothecene mycotoxins (yellow 
rain) by Vietnamese and Lao forces in 
Kampuchea and Laos1• The report of the 
United Nations investigating team led by 
Major General Ismat al-Ezz of Egypt, published 
on 8th December 1982, was unable to confirm 
or refute the United States allegations. The 
team did not secure access to the territory of 
Kampuchea or Laos, but visited refugee camps 
along the Thai border with the two countries in 
the autumn of that year. The international 
scientific community has been divided or 
sceptical on the issue. The Australian chemical 
warfare defence laboratories at Maribyrnong 
issued a report in August 1983 claiming that 
yellow rain samples were "the excrement of 
bees (or other pollen-eating insects)". Tricho-
thecene toxins are the natural products of 
certain moulds and scientific papers have been 
found dating from the 1930s reporting the 
natural occurence of such toxins in the area, 
although the United States reports claim that 
the particular variety of Trichothecene-2 does 
not naturally occur in the region. 
5.3. Trichothecene mycotoxins do not appear 
among the lists of bacteriological or chemical 
warfare agents approved for arms control 
purposes by the Council of WEU, or listed in 
the United Nations report of 1969: "Chemical 
and bacteriological (biological) weapons and 
the effects of their possible use". On military 
grounds it is not immediately obvious why, as 
is alleged, the Soviet Union should have 
supplied such toxins for use as chemical warfare 
agents, when it is known to have stocks of 
nerve gas which the military authorities from 
experiments on proving grounds in the Soviet 
Union would regard as a more effective 
chemical agent. During 1984 the United States 
does not appear to have reiterated its allegations 
concerning yellow rain. 
5.4. There has been less extensive interna-
tional comment on allegations made prior to 
1983 of the use of chemical warfare agents by 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It appears possible 
that either phosphorous weapons - used in 
1. For a summary of reports on the subject see SIPRI 
Yearbook 1984, Chapter 9, "Chemical and biological 
warfare: developments in 1983". 
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world war 11 for generating smoke screens - or 
incapacitants such as tear gas have been used 
there, but there have been fewer such reports in 
the last two years. 
5.5. As far as NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries are concerned, all are parties to the 
1925 Geneva protocol prohibiting gas and 
bacteriological warfare, but this protocol does 
not ban the possession or stockpiling of such 
weapons, and most parties have entered reser-
vations, reserving the right to use them in 
retalliation against their use by an enemy. It 
amounts to a "no first use" commitment. The 
United States acceded to the protocol on these 
terms in 1975. All these countries are parties 
also to the 1972 Bacteriological Warfare 
Convention2, which bans both use and possession 
of such weapons, but makes no provision for 
verification. 
5.6. While international agreements in force 
do not therefore ban possession of chemical 
weapons at the present time, it seems clear that 
among the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
such weapons are stockpiled only by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Although France, 
among the NATO countries, appears to main-
tain its policy of not making public statements 
as to whether or not it possesses any stock of 
chemical weapons, the language of annual 
reports from the WEU Council, slightly modi-
fied in the section concerning chemical weapons 
since reports of the committee drew attention 
to possible ambiguity, appear to rule out that 
possibility. The report for 1983, communicated 
to the Assembly on 2nd March 1984, states: 
"... the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments asked the member states, in 
the covering letter to its questionnaire, to 
declare any chemical weapons that they 
might hold, whatever their origins. Since 
all the member states replied in the 
negative, the Agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons 
in 1983." 
5.7. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, 
that country has persistently refused to confirm 
or deny that it possesses stocks of chemical 
weapons. There is, however, well documented 
evidence that it does, including the known 
transfer of a world war 11 nerve gas production 
plant from Germany to the Soviet Union at the 
end of the war, and other evidence of trials of 
chemical weapons in certain proving grounds in 
the Soviet Union. Evidence about the actual 
size of Soviet chemical weapon stocks, however, 
is tenuous and, in many cases, suspect. Prior to 
its 1969 decision to cease production of chemical 
2. France acceeded to this convention on 17th September 
1984, having reversed its earlier policy of non-accession. 
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weapons, the United States consistently claimed 
that the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile was 
enormous, amounting to one-fifth or one-sixth 
of the total ammunition stockpile1• Following 
its 1969 decision, the United States abandoned 
such claims and information appears to have 
been provided to the press to show that they 
had been exaggerated. The committee's rappor-
teur, in March 1980, in a briefing in the 
Pentagon, was informed merely that the Soviet 
chemical stockpiles were "sufficient for their 
requirements"2. 
5.8. In recent years, following the decision of 
the United States administration to produce 
binary chemical weapons (not yet finally 
authorised by Congress), claims have been 
renewed that there is a large Soviet chemical 
weapons stockpile, but authoritative quantitative 
information is lacking. The United States 
publication Soviet military power, in its latest 
1984 edition, claims merely that "the amount 
of agents, weapons and materiel in storage at 
these military depots for chemical weapons 
has increased significantly since the late 1960s". 
The fiscal year 1985 annual report to Congress 
by the Secretary of Defence, dated 1st February 
1984, is similarly imprecise: "The Soviet Union 
possesses a considerable advantage in chemical 
warfare capabilities ... ". Such quantitative 
statements concerning the Soviet chemical 
stockpile as are made from time to time by 
official spokesmen of NATO governments have 
ranged from 30,000 (somewhat less than the 
United States stockpile) tons to 700,000 tons, 
the most commonly used figure in the last two 
years being 300,000 tons. No definition has 
been associated with these figures to show 
whether they refer to the quantity of chemical 
agent contained within ammunition, or to the 
total weight of arrimunition containing chemical 
agents. It is believed that the figure of 300,000 
tons has been derived by intelligence sources 
from arbitrary assumptions as to the proportion 
of the Soviet ammunition stockpile that is likely 
to consist of chemical weapons. The figure 
would relate to the weight of ammunition, not 
to the weight of contained chemical agent 
which, in most weapons, will be a fraction of 
the total weapon weight. 
5.9. The committee can only conclude that 
the existence of a chemical weapon stockpile in 
the Soviet Union is well established, but that 
there is no reliable evidence to show whether 
that stockpile is greater or less than the present 
United States stockpile. Certainly production of 
1. The evidence is reviewed in the committee's report on 
nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Banks, Document 838, 29th April 1980. See explana-
tory memorandum, paragraphs 2.50 et seq. 
2. Idem. Paragraph 2.50. 
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chemical weapons in the Soviet Union appears 
to have continued after the United States 
ceased their production in 1969. 
United States 
5.1 0. In contrast to the secrecy of the Soviet 
Union there is official information concerning 
United States stockpiles of chemical weapons 
which consist of mustard gas and two nerve 
gases - GB (sarin) and VX. Nerve gases in 
particular were in full-scale production up to 
1968. As noted above, production of all 
chemical weapons was stopped in the United 
States in 1969 when President Nixon announced 
a new policy renouncing the first use of 
chemical weapons. Although the United States 
does not appear to have published details of its 
stocks by type of agent and location, a good 
deal of evidence has been given to Congress 
over the years and the committee has previously 
published the following academic estimate: 
United States stockpile of chemical warfare agents3 
(thousands of tons) 
Nerve gas Mustard gas 
Total stockpile 16-18 16-18 
In bulk storage 2-5 11-16 
Contained in filled muni- 11-16 2-5 
tions 
Stored in United States 11-16 16-18 
Stored in Germany 2-4 Nil 
5.11. The munitions filled with this chemical 
agent are believed to include projectiles for 105 
mm, 155 mm and 8 in cannon, rockets, land 
mines and aircraft spray tanks and bombs. 
5.12. It remains United States policy to reserve 
the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation 
against such use by an adversary. The latest 
report to Congress by the Secretary of Defence 
states: "However, our current aging stocks of 
chemical weapons, produced in the 1950s and 
1960s, no longer constitute an adequate deter-
rent, primarily due to obsolete means of 
delivery". The problem appears to be not 
deterioration of the chemical agents themselves, 
but the fact that some of the weapons systems 
3. Source: Should NATO keep chemical weapons? A 
framework for considering policy alternatives, J.P. Perry 
Robinson, Science Policy Research Unit, University of 
Sussex, August 1977. Figures converted to metric tons. 
which would fire the ammunition produced 
twenty years ago are being withdrawn from 
service. This may be the case with the 105 mm 
artillery ammunition. Plant is now being 
constructed for the production of "binary" nerve 
gas ammunition, both 155 mm shells for GB 
agent, and "Bigeye" aircraft bombs to be filled 
with VX. Considered safer to stockpile, binary 
ammunition would contain two or more com-
paratively non-poisonous chemical agents which 
would mix only as the round was fired so as to 
produce a toxic agent on arrival at the target. 
However, Congress has not so far authorised 
actual production of binary weapons, despite 
several conflicting votes in both the Senate, the 
House of Representatives and in House-Senate 
conference. 
NATO policy 
5.13. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
General Bernard Rogers, at a press conference 
given during manoeuvres in Germany on 21st 
September, said that United States chemical 
weapons stocks in America and Europe were 
approaching obsolescence. He urged the pro-
duction of modern chemical weapons. In 
particular, he sought clarification of the political 
controls to be exercised over the use of such 
weapons: 
"We need to strengthen the political 
voice, I think. Because if they have 
assigned me the responsibility to retaliate 
in kind if chemical weapons have been 
used against us, I want to be sure thai 
the political authorities play the key role 
in the release of these weapons ... "1• 
At the same time, Mr. Michael Heseltine, 
British Secretary of State for Defence, said he 
knew there was a "military preoccupation" with 
chemical weapons, but said the British Govern-
ment's first priority was to negotiate a ban and 
to impress on the Soviet Union the urgency of 
an agreement: "We do not simply take military 
judgment into account. "2 
Negotiations on a chemical weapons ban 
5.14. In the late 1970s there were bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on the prohibition of chemical 
weapons on which a joint report was submitted 
to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 
1980. The talks were subsequently broken off 
by the United States. Since then, the subject 
has been discussed in the conference as a whole, 
and an ad hoc working group has considered 
1. The Times, 22nd September 1984. 
2. Guardian, 22nd September 1984. 
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the basic provisions to be included in a treaty. 
By the end of 1983 some consensus had been 
reached on fundamental provisions, including 
the listing of chemicals which should be 
forbidden and those that should be permitted 
for industrial purposes; the concept of destruc-
tion of existing stocks of weapons; and the 
recognition of the need for proper verification, 
including the right of inspection by challenge. 
The Soviet Union had conceded the right of 
continual inspection of the process of destruction 
of stocks. At the beginning of the 1984 session 
the Conference on Disarmament was expected 
to make substantial progress on a chemical 
weapons ban, and converted its ad hoc working 
group on the subject into an ad hoc committee 
responsible for drafting an appropriate treaty. 
5.15. The problem of verification of chemical 
weapons is a . particularly difficult one because 
the nerve gases are closely related to the 
organo-phosphorous compounds used in insec-
ticides, factories for the production of which 
are distributed widely in many countries. 
5.16. On 15th April the United States Vice-
President Bush introduced in person in the 
Conference on Disarmament a draft convention 
on the prohibition of chemical weapons which 
included many of the previously agreed concepts 
in treaty language, including in Article XI the 
right of ad hoc on-site inspection which would 
give a challenged party the right to offer an 
alternative means of resolving a challenge. But 
the United States draft included in its Article 
X a new concept of "special on-site inspection" 
which would give a major party such as the 
United States or the Soviet Union the right to 
demand inspection of any location or facility 
"owned by the government of a party" within 
twenty-four hours. 
5.17. NATO appears to have been informed of 
the new United States proposal only on 9th 
April, when consultations were held in Brussels, 
but no agreement was reached to adopt a 
common position in Geneva. European NATO 
countries have welcomed the United States 
proposals in general terms, but in private have 
reservations about the new Article X which is 
described as running counter to the consensus 
which had been emerging in the Conference on 
Disarmament prior to the tabling of the United 
States draft treaty. 
5.18. The Soviet Union and its allies, while not 
refusing to consider further proposals for 
verification, have objected vehemently to the 
United States draft, in particular to what they 
describe as the "intrusive" Article X, the fact 
that the draft refers only to government-owned 
installations, whereas many private companies 
in the United States are engaged in government 
defence contracts, and to the fact that the 
United States draft does not specifically ban 
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binary chemical weapons in its present wording. 
The Soviet representative has been able to 
quote the United State's Assistant Secretary of 
Defence, Mr. Richard Perle, in an interview, as 
claiming that the United States would come up 
with verification proposals unacceptable to the 
Soviet Union. 
5.19. In the light of available evidence, the 
committee concludes that, at the present time, 
existing stocks of United States chemical 
weapons remain sufficient for deterrent pur-
poses. It believes that every effort should be 
made to reach agreement on an adequately 
verifiable ban on such weapons. The problem of 
verification will inevitably be the most compli-
cated issue, but unnecessarily intrusive pro-
visions will be as unacceptable to western 
countries with significant chemical industries as 
they are to the Soviet Union. This appears to 
be the third disarmament issue on which there 
is now a marked difference of approach between 
the United States and its European allies. The 
committee recommends that this issue be 
considered by the WEU Council, with a view to 
agreed common instructions being given to the 
representatives of WEU countries to the 
Conference on Disarmament. It draws attention 
to the resolution of the Liberal International 
1984 Congress1• 
VI. Emerging technology 
6.1. The committee is to report to the first 
part of the next session of the Assembly on 
"emerging technology and military strategy". 
In addition to the prospects of anti-ballistic 
missiles and anti-satellite weapons, that report 
will consider recent propo_sals for "deep-strike" 
battlefield tactics that mtght use new technology 
weapons with conventional warheads capable of 
identifying and destroying point targets tens or 
hundreds of kilometres behind the battleline. 
These proposals have been spoken of in 
conjunction with the United States "air-land 
battle" concept. 
6.2. In this report devoted to disarmament, 
the committee draws attention to the possible 
consequences for arms control negotiations of 
the introduction of new weapons systems, 
particularly those that may affect existing 
perceptions of military balance. The committee 
renews its previous proposals for the production 
by the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments of arms control impact statements 
on the lines of those which the President of the 
United States is required to submit to Congress 
each year, pursuant to Section 35 of the Arms 
1. Appendix 11. 
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Control and Disarmament Act. These state-
ments, prepared by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency for the last 
nine years, were intended by Congress to result 
"in a greater integration of arms control 
considerations by the Executive Branch in 
major defence and nuclear programmes".2 
VII. Conclusions 
7 .1. The committee's chief conclusions are set 
forth in the draft recommendation to which the 
explanatory memorandum relates as follows: 
Preamble 
Paragraphs (i) to (iii) The introduction 
mentions the state of East-West relations. The 
Rome Declaration is circulated separately as 
Document 989. 
Paragraphs (iv) and (v) See explanatory 
memorandum, paragraphs 2.13 and 2.14. 
Operative text 
Paragraph 1 Problems of verification 
measures are mentioned in respect of the 
various negotiations in paragraphs 3.9; 3.11; 
4.5-4.7; 5.11-5.15 of the explanatory memor-
andum. 
Paragraph 2 See explanatory memor-
andum, paragraphs 5.15; 3.20; 4.8. 
Paragraph 3 See Chapter IV of the 
explanatory memorandum. 
Paragraph 4 See Chapter 11, especially 
paragraphs 2.13 et seq. of the explanatory 
memorandum. 
Paragraph 5 Tasks which might profitably 
be undertaken by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, with a view to providing informa-
tion both for the Council and the Assembly, are 
suggested at Appendix IV. 
2. Foreword by Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the 
Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, to the fiscal year 
1985 arms control impact statements, March 1984. 
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Netherlands Government decision on INF 
1st June 1984 
1. The Netherlands Government declares 
now that if the United States and the Soviet 
Union reach an agreement on arms control, on 
the basis of which a number of LRINF weapons 
systems are retained in Western Europe, the 
Netherlands will accept and deploy its share of 
such systems. 
2. The dates of deployment in the Nether-
lands as envisaged in the NATO deployment 
schedule are being postponed; they will, how-
ever, not be postponed beyond the final date of 
the NATO deployment schedule. 
3. (a) To that end the cabinet will take a 
decision on 1st November 1985 concerning an 
agreement then to be concluded with the United 
States on the deployment of cruise missiles in 
the Netherlands, thus enabling the appropriate 
bill to be presented to parliament on 1st 
January 1986. 
(b) In preparation for the conclusion of such 
an agreement, parliament and the allies will be 
consulted well in advance on the "control 
aspects" of any cruise missiles so deployed. 
(c) The preparatory activities for possible 
deployment, i.e. physical planning procedures, 
the arranging for the necessary permits and the 
drawing up of specifications for tenders, will go 
ahead. 
(d) Tenders will be invited on 1st November 
1985 in order to allow for contracts to be 
awarded early in 1986. 
4. (a) If an arms control agreement as 
referred to under 1 above is reached prior to 
1st November 1985, an agreement will be 
concluded with the United States concerning 
deployment of the number of cruise missiles 
which the Netherlands will reasonably have to 
accept as its share. 
(b) If no such arms control agreement has 
been reached by 1st November 1985 and the 
Soviet Union has as of the date of this decision 
(i.e. 1st June 1984) increased its number of 
deployed SS-20s or has not reduced it to the 
level of 1st June 1984, the agreement to be 
concluded with the United States will relate to 
the deployment of 48 cruise missiles. 
5. The decision to deploy cruise missiles 
thus having been taken, contracts will be 
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awarded and construction operations will begin 
immediately after parliament has approved the 
agreement, in order that the time schedule 
referred to at 2 can be met. 
6. In the context of the above, the cabinet 
has decided to continue to perform the present 
nuclear tasks up to 1st January 1986, when 
they will be reviewed anew. 
Exposition 
re 1. This conditional withdrawal of the reser-
vation should be viewed in conjunction with 
point 2. While deciding on a limited postpone-
ment for the purposes of arms control, the 
Netherlands also accepts a commitment. The 
Netherlands stance is described by many both 
inside and outside the alliance as "have them 
elsewhere in Europe, but not in the Nether-
lands". It is very important that this erroneous 
impression be completely dispelled. Point 1 also 
makes this clear. 
re 2. The NATO deployment schedule for 464 
cruise missiles (the remaining 108 weapons are 
Pershing lis) envisages deployment between 
December 1983 and December 1988. According 
to the schedule, the Netherlands is to deploy 16 
weapons at the end of 1986, and 32 in the first 
half of 1987. The planning of the infrastructure 
for the deployment of the weapons is based on 
this schedule. The following points should be 
noted in this connection: 
- the Netherlands stated in 1979 that it 
would not decide until later whether it 
would actually deploy the 48 cruise 
missiles allotted as its share; 
- the Netherlands recognised the NATO 
double-track decision as a fact and has 
supported the negotiations conducted 
on this basis; 
- the Netherlands has to date taken all 
the practical preP.aratory steps to make 
deployment possible in accordance with 
the NATO deployment schedule. 
One of the most important reasons for 
the Netherlands not taking a decision on 
construction operations and deployment until 
now, but keeping that option open, has from 
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the outset been the idea of exerting optimum 
influence on the negotiating process. 
The Netherlands desire for and views on 
arms control have always played an important 
role in that respect. This gives rise to the 
question whether- as there are no perspectives 
for a breakthrough in the negotiations right 
now - substance can be given in a responsible 
way to the Netherlands policy of restraint and 
the desire for a result by way of negotiations, 
by allowing for more time. 
The deployment schedule of the alliance 
as mentioned above indicates that this is 
possible; however, it can only be done in a 
responsible way if the adjustment of the timing 
would not push a possible deployment in the 
Netherlands beyond the final date of the 
deployment schedule of the alliance as a whole 
(December 1988). 
The margin between the timing of 
deployments as presently envisaged for the 
Netherlands and the final date of the NATO 
deployment schedule amounts to approximately 
one and a half years. Such an adjustment of 
the timing is defensible inasmuch as it expresses 
the specific position which the Netherlands has 
assumed concerning the NATO double-track 
decision from the outset. 
Such an adjustment of the timing 
expresses the Netherlands desire to create as 
much room as possible for the negotiations. At 
the same time, however, the decision-making at 
the present point in time must indicate clearly 
that this postponement is not tantamount to 
cancellation but takes place with a view to arms 
control only. 
re 3. The time schedule specified here for the 
various activities involved ensures that construc-
tion and deployment can be carried out 
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promptly and effectively, should this prove to 
be necessary. The time available will also need 
to be used to clarify the procedure to be 
followed in the event of the release of cruise 
missiles deployed in the Netherlands to be 
specified in the agreement with the United 
States. 
re 4. If the Soviet Union were now to cease 
deploying additional SS-20s and the NATO 
double-track decision of 1979 on deployment of 
572 LRINF weapon systems in Western Europe 
were to be fully implemented, the resulting 
ratio would be approximately two Soviet 
weapons to one weapon in Western Europe. It 
is feared that this ratio will further deteriorate. 
In order to bring about a reversal of this trend 
on the part of the Soviet Union, the cabinet 
now wishes to give a clear signal - to draw a 
line - by making the deployment of cruise 
missiles in the Netherlands dependent on the 
actual willingness of the Soviet Union to 
exercise restraint now. It should and must then 
be possible to arrive by means of negotiations 
at the more balanced situation which is needed 
between East and West. The Netherlands will 
thus continue to support the basic principles of 
the alliance in those negotiations. Following 
upon the reversal referred to above, a further 
arms reduction will of course be necessary. 
As is also apparent from points 1 and 2 
and the exposition thereof, the Netherlands 
continues to attach great importance to an arms 
control agreement on intermediate-range 
weapons between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. If, however, the Soviet Union 
continues its build-up and no such agreement is 
reached, the deployment of cruise missiles also 
in the Netherlands will in the end become 
inevitable. This combination of restraint (points 
1 and 2) and commitment (point 4) preserves 
the credibility of the Netherlands efforts to 
promote arms control. 
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Resolution on chemical and biological weapons adopted by the 
Liberal International Congress, Tel Aviv, 1984 
1. Peace and disarmament 
2. Chemical and biological weapons - Pro-
posed by LI Resolutions Drafting Committee 
on the basis of a suggestion by the Dutch 
Group 
This Congress 
1. Recalls Resolution I, peace and disarma-
ment, adopted at the 1983 Congress in 
Stockholm, more in particular paragraph 11 of 
that resolution on the subject of chemical and 
biological weapons; 
2. Sharply condemns the coptemporary use 
of chemical weapons in various conflicts 
throughout the world and especially in the 
ongoing wars between Iraq and Iran, as 
confirmed by the UN investigation, and in 
Afghanistan; 
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3. Calls on all member parties of the LI to 
advocate that governments should: 
- press at the Geneva negotiations for a 
comprehensive treaty on the develop-
ment, production, storage and use of 
chemical weapons, including adequate 
verification of such a treaty aiming at 
a complete abolition of chemical 
weapons as well as their production 
facilities; 
- in the meantime adhere to the 1925 
protocol prohibiting the use of chemical 
weapons; 
- strive to strengthen the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention by means of 
adequate provisions on verification and 
procedure, now absent from this treaty; 
4. Opposes any production or deployment of 
those weapons in their territories. 
DOCUMENT 998 APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Specific tasks suggested for the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(with some comparison with the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency) 
Europe should have its own source of 
comparative factual information on defence 
capabilities of various countries and arms 
control issues. At present, the United States is 
the principle source of much public information. 
A. Studies 
1. Study extent of verification measures 
necessary to provide adequate assurance of 
compliance with arms control agreements, in 
particular a chemical weapons ban, a compre-
hensive test ban, and MBF reductions. 
2. Arms control impact statements. The 
United States ACDA reports annually to 
Congress on the possible effect on disarmament 
negotiations of the introduction of any new 
weapon system being considered in the United 
States. A similar assessment should be available 
to European governments and parliaments. 
3. World military expenditure and arms 
transfers. United States ACDA publishes this 
statistical data each year. It covers all countries 
of the world, as well as regions and major 
alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact). There 
should be an independent European source, not 
open to accusations of political manipulation. 
4. In the above context, there should be an 
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independent European assessment of the level 
of the Soviet defence effort, based both on 
rouble costs and dollar (or other convertible 
currency) costs. 
5. Threat assessment. On the basis of 
statistical data and value judgements concerning 
intentions, the Agency could assist in preparing 
a European threat assessment. It could contrib-
ute also to the NATO publication NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact - Force comparisons, two 
editions of which have not been published by 
NATO- they are far more objective than the 
popularised United States publication, Soviet 
Military Power. 
B. Operational activities 
6. The Agency could conduct field exercises 
by sending observers to allied manoeuvres to 
investigate the extent of facilities which observ-
ers would require in the context of any MBFR 
agreements if they were to be able reliably to 
detect the size and extent of movements of 
troops and military equipment. 
7. The Agency could also train and co-
ordinate the activities of observers sent by 
European allied countries to observe Warsaw 
Pact exercises under the terms of the Helsinki 
agreements. 
APPENDIX IV DOCUMENT 998 
APPENDIX IV 
Levels of nuclear weapons - mid -1984 
A. Total warheads all systems 
Numbers of nuclear warhead mid-1984 
(Figures rounded to nearest hundred) 
United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,100 5,300 
SLBM 5,400 2,400 
Strategic 2,500 300 
bomber 
Total strategic1 10,000 8,300 
All other2 19,000 9,100 
Grand totaP 29,000 17,400 
Sources: l. As in following table. 
2. Deduced by difference. 
3. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983, Arms Control Association et.al. Washington. 
Type 
ICBMs 
Titan 11 
Minuteman 11 
Minuteman Ill 
Sub-total 
SLBMs 
Poseidon C-3 
Trident C-4 
Sub-total 
BM total 
Aircraft B-52 G 
B-52 H 
TOTAL 
B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons 
( coPered by SALT) 
(i) United States strategic systems (covered by S4.LT) 
Maximum-range Number Number of independent (km) 
warheads each 
15,000 37 1 
11,300 450 1 
13,000 
{ 250 (160 kt) 
300 (335 kt- 3 
Mk 12A) 
1,037 
4,600 304 10-14 
7,400 288 8-14 
592 
1,629 
16,000 151 12 ALCM + 8 
90 8 
1,870 
l. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
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Assumed total 
number of warheads 
37 
450 
1,6501 
2,137 
3,040 
2,320 
5,360 
7,500 
2,500 
10,000 
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(ii) Soviet strategic systems (covered by S4LT) 
Maximum-range Type Number (km) 
ICBMs 
SS-11 10,500 520 
SS-13 10,000 60 
SS-17 10,000 150 
SS-18 9-10,500 308 
SS-19 11,000 360 
Sub-total 1,460 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 1,120 45 
SSN-6 2,400-3,000 368 
SSN-8 8,000 292 
SSN-17 5,000 12 
SSN-18 8,000 224 
SSN-202 8,300 40 
Sub-total 980 
BM total 2,380 
Aircraft Combat radius 
(km) 
Bear Tu-95 5-6,000 100 
Bison Mya-4 4-6,000 43 
Sub-total 143 
TOTAL 2,520 
I. On the assu~ption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
2. Entry into service expected before end 1983. 
Number 
of independent 
warheads each 
1 or 3 
1 
1 or 4 
1 or 8 or 10 
6 or 1 
1 
1 or 2 
1 
1 
3-7 
9 
2-4 
4 
Note: Forces loadings for aircr~ft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1983-84. 
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal years 1982 to 1985 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, March 1983. 
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Mimstry of Defence, January 1982. 
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Assumed total 
number of warheads 
520 
60 
6001 
2,4651 
1,745 
5,390 
45 
384 
292 
12 
1,514 
360 
2,610 
8,000 
210 
90 
300 
8,000 
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C. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles 
Total Total Total Total 
Year of SS-4 SS-20 Total Total yield equivalent warheads Notes missiles warheads' in range of and SS-5 MP megatons3 Europe4 
1962 200 - 200 200 200 200 200 Period of 
SS-4 
and 
SS-5 
build-up 
1963-1971 700 - 700 700 700 700 525 
1972-1976 600 - 600 600 600 600 450 
1977 600 (20) 620 660 609 617 440 
1978 590 100 690 890 635 675 642 Start of 
SS-20 
deploy-
ment 
1979 590 120 710 950 644 692 682 
1980 440 160 600 920 512 576 650 
1981 380 230 610 1,070 483 575 745 
19825 230 324 554 1,200 376 504 820 
19835 239 351 590 1,300 397 536 970 
19845 2246 378 602 1,358 394 544 900 
Source : Successive editions of ISS Military Balance. 
1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads. 
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads. 
3. Total of Y i where Y is yield of each warhead in MT. 
4. Assuming jss-4, 5 and ~SS-20 in range of Europe. 
5. Figures from NATO NPG communiques up to 7th April 1984. 
6. SS-4 only; SS-5 phased out. 
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Amendment 1 
Control of armaments and disarmament 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Haase and others 
1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
3rd December 1984 
"Welcome the resumption in the near future of negotiations on disarmament between the 
United States and the Soviet Union and at the same time call for intensive consultations 
between the United States and the European allies during those negotiations;". 
Signed: Haase, Gansel, Klejdzinski 
l. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment 2 
Control of armaments and disarmament 
AMENDMENT 21 
tabled by Mr. CllValiere 
3rd December 1984 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end 
of the paragraph. 
Signed: Cavaliere 
1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendments 3, 4, S and 6 
Control of armaments and disarmament 
AMENDMENTS 3, 4, S and 61 
tabled by Mr. Pignion 
3rd December 1984 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Agree common instructions to" 
and insert "Promote exchanges of views between". 
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and a comprehensive test 
ban". 
5. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and with the United 
Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty". 
6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end 
of the paragraph and insert "avoiding any measure liable to confirm present imbalances;". 
I. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Pign.ion 
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Amendment 7 
Control of armaments and disarmament 
AMENDMENT 71 
tabled by Mr. H1111se 
3rd December 1984 
7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never 
prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the 
contrary has paved the way for the policy of detente and aims at peaceful interaction and 
reduction of tension among the European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact 
to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the 
United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on 
the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position 
for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact." 
Signed: Haase 
I. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 8 
Control of armaments and disarmament 
AMENDMENT 81 
tabled by Mr. Pignion 
4th December 1984 
8. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "early" and insert "quick". 
l. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Pignion 
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Amendment 9 
Control of fUIIUJments and disariiUJment 
AMENDMENT 91 
tabled by MM. Ht~t~~e and Gansel 
4th December 1984 
9. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following: 
"and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and 
the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations". 
l. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance 
OPINION1 
on the draft recommendation 
in the report of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 990) 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur 
The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
3rd December 1984 
Agreeing with the broad lines of the abovementioned recommendation but considering that 
certain improvements might be made to it, 
PROPOSES the following amendments to the Assembly: 
Amendment 1 
Make the present paragraph (v) of the preamble paragraph (iii) and add a new paragraph (iv) 
as follows: 
"(iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and 
to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular 
on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration;". 
Consequently renumber (v) and {vi) the present paragraphs (iii) and {iv) and renumber (vii) to 
(xi). 
Amendment 2 
At the end of paragraph (vii) of the preamble (now paragraph (viii)) insert: "and the decision 
to delete as from 1st January 1986 conventional weapons from the list in Annex IV to this protocol". 
Amendment 3 
In the second line of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "obtain" and 
insert "afford both the Council and the Assembly" and at the end of the line leave out "it" and insert 
"them". 
1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: ·Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, K.ittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini 
(Alternate: Milani), Amadei (Alternate: Cifarelli), van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown (Alternate: Dr. Miller), Cox 
(Alternate: Lord Newa/1), Dejardin, Ertl (Alternate: Rumpj), Galley, Gerstl (Alternate: Klejdzinski), Giust, Sir Anthony Grant, 
MM. Huyghues des Etages, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli, Sarb, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. 
Steverlynck, Stokes. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. De Declcer, Rapporteur) 
1. The Presidential Committee referred the 
subject on which the General Affairs Committee 
is reporting to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments for an opinion. 
2. The committee has studied the draft 
recommendation contained in the report of the 
General Affairs Committee. The first paragraph 
of the preamble recalls the Recommendations 
406 and 407 adopted by the Assembly in June 
1984, the first of which was adopted on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments "Thirty years of the modified 
Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth 
annual report of the Council". The present draft 
recommendation from the General Affairs 
Committee follows in general the Assembly's 
earlier recommendations, and takes account of 
the Rome Declaration adopted by the Council 
on 27th October 1984. 
3. The Committee has no hesitation in 
supporting the main lines of the present draft 
r~commendation, but proposes to the Assembly 
three amendments which, it feels, would 
improve the present draft. 
Amendment 1 
The committee proposes that paragraph 
(v) of the preamble become (iii), and that a new 
paragraph (iv) be added. The text of this 
proposed new paragraph (iv) is largely a 
quotation from the very important paragraph 8 
of the Rome Declaration, which reads as 
follows: 
"The Ministers therefore decided to hold 
comprehensive discussions and to seek to 
harmonise their views on the specific 
conditions of security in Europe, in 
particular: 
- defence questions; 
- arms control and disarmament; 
- the effects of developments in East-
West relations on the security of 
Europe; 
- Europe's contribution to the strength-
ening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing 
in mind the importance of transatlantic 
relations; 
- the development of European co-opera-
tion in the field of armaments, in 
respect of which WEU can provide a 
political impetus. 
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They may also consider the implications 
for Europe of crises in other regions of 
the world." 
The committee feels that this is the 
most important feature of the Rome Declaration 
- the decision of a number of European 
countries to harmonise their views "on the 
specific conditions of security in Europe" and to 
enumerate the topics they will consider. It 
seems logical to the committee that the 
Assembly should welcome this important deci-
sion first, and that the present paragraph (iii) 
of the preamble, which welcomes the Council's 
desire to give new life to WEU, should then 
follow as a corollary of the first decision. 
Amendment 2 
In Recommendation 406 adopted on 20th 
June this year, the Assembly recommended 
that the Council pursue the adaptation of WEU 
to the needs of the 1980s, inter alia by 
"abolishing the controls on conventional 
weapons set out in Annexes Ill and IV to 
Protocol No. Ill". 
The present paragraph (vii) of the pream-
ble welcomes the decision taken by the Council 
in the week following the adoption of Recom-
mendation 406 to delete the remaining items on 
the list of conventional weapons which Germany 
had agreed not to produce on its territory 
(Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill), but does not 
refer to the equally important decision 
announced by the Council in the document 
concerning the institutional reform of WEU 
annexed to the Rome Declaration, according to 
which: 
" ... the Ministers decided, in accordance 
with Article V of Protocol No .. III, ... to 
abolish gradually the remaining quanti-
tative controls on conventional weapons. 
The Ministers agreed that these controls 
should be substantially reduced by 
1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 
1st January 1986. The commitments and 
controls concerning ABC weapons would 
be maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed at 
the present time." 
The Council's decision is entirely in 
accordance with Recommendation 406 already 
adopted by the Assembly, and the committee 
feels that it should be welcomed in the same 
way as the lifting of restrictions on the 
production of conventional weapons in Ger-
many. 
DOCUMENT 999 
Amendment 3 
In Recommendation 406 mentioned above 
the Assembly also recommended that the 
Council should instruct the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments to undertake "on behalf 
of the Council or the Assembly, studies and 
analyses of problems related to disarmament, 
the limitations of armaments and the problems 
of verification of disarmament agreements". The 
Assembly has made similar recommendations 
in the past. A very welcome feature of the 
decisions taken by the Council in Rome is the 
full acceptance of the Assembly's recommen-
dation in this connection, as set forth in the 
document on institutional reforms of WEU 
mentioned above: 
"3(b) The Ministers have instructed the 
Permanent Council to define ... the precise 
modalities of an overall reorganisation 
affecting both the ACA, the international 
secretariat of the SAC, and the SAC, 
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which could be structured in such a way 
as to fulfil a threefold task: 
- to study questions relating to arms 
control and disarmament while carrying 
out the remaining control functions; 
- undertake the function of studying 
security and defence problems ... ; 
(c) As regards the first two functions 
indicated above the intention would be to 
have available a common basis of analysis 
which could form a useful point of 
reference for the work of both the Council 
and the Assembly and also for informing 
public opinion." 
Amendment 3 is therefore proposed in order to 
place on record in the draft recommendation 
the fact that the future work of the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments can be for the 
benefit of the Assembly, as well as for the 
Council. 
Document 1000 
Warsaw PIICt and disarmament 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION1 
tabled by Mr. Haase and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
3rd December 1984 
The Assembly recalls that on 5th June 1955 the alliance provided for in the Warsaw Treaty 
entered into force. In the preamble, WEU is cited as one reason for the threat facing the Warsaw 
Pact countries. 
Pursuant to this treaty, the alliance of the Warsaw Pact expires on 3rd June 1985. The 
Assembly of WEU therefore wishes to make the following statement: 
Since it was founded over thirty years ago, WEU has never prepared or taken any aggressive 
and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact states. 
On the contrary, WEU has, through its member states, paved the way for the policy of detente 
and endeavoured actively to promote it. In particular, its member states have played a crucial role 
in the conclusion of the final act of the CSCE. 
Today, too, the Assembly declares that its express aim is to help ensure that the peaceful 
interaction of peoples, especially in its European sphere of responsibility, and the reduction of 
tension, is actively promoted. The Assembly therefore calls upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to 
take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position 'of the United 
States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the 
continuation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the 
continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact. 
Signed: Haase, Gansel, Ahrens, Hardy, Millan, Stoffelen, Beix, de Vries, Masciadri, Schulte, 
Klejdzinski, Adriaensens "'-• 
1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (urgent procedure not agreed to). 
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Document 1001 4th December 1984 
DRAFf BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 19851 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts for the financial 
year 1985 
Analysis of budget estimates : 
Part I : Operating budget 
Section A : Expenditure 
Section 8 : Receipts 
Part 11 : Pensions budget 
Section A : Expenditure 
Section 8 : Receipts 
Explanatory memorandum 
APPENDICES 
I. Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly 
11. Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
Ill. Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme 
for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk 
IV. Foreseeable trend of pensions in the period 1985-89 
V. Table showing the correspondence between heads and 
sub-heads in the 1984 and 1985 budgets 
1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention and approved by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman) ; MM. Beix, Haose (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens, 
Biefnot, Bob!, Enders, Fe"ari Aggradi, Foschi, Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster (Alternate: Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges), Morris, 
Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Schmitz, Stokes, vaR Tets, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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I 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1985 
Details Expenditure 
PART I Operating budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Permanent staff 8,725,000 
Head II: Temporary staff 2,588,800 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and 1,292,000 
equipment 
Head IV: General administrative costs 2,161,300 
Head V: Other expenditure 1,270,700 
Section B: Receipts 
16,037,800 
NET TOTAL 
16,037,800 
PART 11 Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Pensions, allowances and social 683,500 
charges 
Section B: Receipts 
683,500 
NET TOTAL 
683,500 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
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Receipts 
458,000 
458,000 
15,579,800 
16,037,800 
383,000 
383,000 
300,500 
683,500 
15,880,300 
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Analysis of budget estimates 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Sub-Heads 
Sub-Head I - Basic salaries 
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances : 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 555,000 
2.2. Household allowance 253,000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 200,000 
2.4. Rent allowance 25,000 
2.5. Education allowance 90,000 
2.6. Allowance for language 
2,000 
50,000 
Estimates 
for 
1985 
6,330,000 
2.7. 
2.8. 
courses 
Overtime 
Home leave 20,000 1,195,000 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
Social security 
Supplementary insurance 
Provident fund 
845,000 
227,000 
120,000 1,192,000 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of can-
didates for vacant posts pro mem. 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arri-
val and departure of per-
manent officials and their 
families pro mem. 
4.3. 
4.4. 
Removal expenses 
Installation allowance 
pro mem. 
pro mem. 
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination 8,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 725,000 
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Sums 
authorised 
for 1984 
6,054,000 
1,133,700 
945,500 
65,000 
7,000 
8,205,200 
Expected 
expenditure 
in 1984 
6,010,000 
1,150,000 
1,125,000 
93,000 
7,000 
8,385,000 
DOCUMENT 1001 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to 
permanent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the staff rules of the Office of the Clerk of the 
WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of scales in force on 1st January 19841, adjusted 
in accordance with the following expected increase : 
2.5% as from 1st July 1984 (total F 200,000); 
4.5% for 1985 (total F 366,000). 
A list of staff of the Office of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix I. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)2; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)3; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension 
scheme (Sub~Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
As it is not planned to recruit any new staff, this sub-head is included pro mem. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medi~al check-up which all member~ of th~ staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the staff rules. Med1cal check-ups for WEU staff m Pans are 
carried out at the OECD medical centre. 
I. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU 
Council and the Councils of other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with 
the committee's I 59th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of 
living between I st July and 31st December rise by more than 3%, a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This 
threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 19Jst report). 
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and 
old-age pensions. 
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or 
permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum 
to the beneficiaries he has nominated. 
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Head Il- Temporary staff 
Estimates Sums Expected 
Sub-Heads for authorised expenditure 
1985 for 1984 in 1984 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the Assem-
bly: 
6.1. Sittings service 960,000 
6.2. Interpretation service 329,000 
6.3. Translation service 700,000 
6.4. Other services 50,000 2,039,000 1,726,000 1,670,000 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
work between sessions 400,000 337,000 300,000 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 60,000 75,000 65,000 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary 
staff other than interpreters 4,000 
9.2. Provident fund for interpre-
ters 83,000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 2,800 89,800 62,000 68,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 ................... 2,588,800 2,200,000 2,103,000 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the 
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation 
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix 11. These salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1984 in 
the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable 
grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, i.e.: 
2.5% increase as from 1st July 1984 (total: F 41,000); 
4.5% increase for 1985 (total: F 75,000). 
The salaries of interpreters also include an increase of 6% as from 1st July 1984, in application of 
the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of 
Conference Interpreters (IACI) ; 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, roneo staff, etc.). 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 105 in Paris and 45 elsewhere). 
Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-
Head 6). Their salary adjustments may be estimated as follows : 
1st July-31st December 1984: 2.5% (i.e. F 8,500); 
for 1985 : 4.5% (i.e. F 16,000). 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the 
Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1985. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible 
travelling expenses and insurance. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social c~arges : 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company 
against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the 
Clerk and 40% by staff. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident 
fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them 
from working. Two-thirds of premiums are paid by the Office of the Clerk and one-third by the 
interpreters. 
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Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates 
Sub-Heads for 
1985 
Sub-Head 10- Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises 430,000 
Sub-Head 11- Hire of committee rooms 15,000 
Sub-Head 12- Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions 315,000 
Sub-Head 13- Various services for the organisation of 
sessions 27,000 
Sub-Head 14- Maintenance of the premises of the Office 
of the Clerk 15,000 
Sub-Head 15- Purchase or repair of office furniture 65,000 
Sub-Head 16- Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment 150,000 
Sub-Head 17- Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
other office equipment 275,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,292,000 
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Sums 
authorised 
for 1984 
407,000 
15,000 
358,000 
33,000 
15,000 
10,000 
73,000 
84,000 
995,000 
Expected 
expenditure 
in 1984 
407,000 
290,000 
25,000 
15,000 
10,000 
105,000 
148,000 
1,000,000 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the 
Paris premises. The international secretariat of the SAC is responsible for co-ordinating and 
managing the programme for such expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, the ACA 
45% and the SAC 25%. 
These estimates conform to the opinion expressed by the WEU Budget Committee during its 
discussion of the budgets of the ministerial organs. They include the fixed annual sum of F 30,000 
which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as its share of the cost of replacing the telephone 
switchboard. 
Sub-Head 11 
It now seems probable that it will not be necessary to hire a committee room in 1984. However, 
the same estimate of F 15,000 is included in the 1985 budget for this purpose. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social 
Council during Assembly sessions. The sum is lower than that requested in 1984, mainly because, in 
spite of widespread price increases, the supplier of simultaneous interpretation equipment has agreed 
to reduce the amount charged in view of his operating results in 1983. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social 
Council, etc.). A strict economy drive should allow actual expenditure in 1984 to be lower than the 
sum allocated. Estimated expenditure for 1985 is therefore also lower. 
Sub-Head 14 
The same sum is requested for 1985 as for 1984 to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the 
premises of the Office of the Clerk. 
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance 
programme for equipment given at Appendix Ill to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation 
of this programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum. 
269 
DOCUMENT 1001 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
Estimates Sums Expected 
Sub-Heads for authorised expenditure 
1985 for 1984 in 1984 
Sub-Head 18- Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents 480,000 447,000 447,000 
Sub-Head 19- Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies 238,000 238,000 238,000 
Sub-Head 20- Printing and publication of documents 1,338,000 1,333,000 1,250,000 
Sub-Head 21- Purchase of documents 44,800 40,000 40,000 
Sub-Head 22- Official cars 60,000 40,500 50,000 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 500 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV ................... 2,161,300 2,099,000 2,025,500 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
The increase of F 33,000 as compared with 1984 ts calculated on the basis of an average 
inflation of 7.5%, this being the minimum foreseeable. 
Sub-Head 19 
A strict economy drive and use of the new offset machine, which can be used for minor printing 
work which hitherto had to be done outside, allow savings to be made and the estimate for 1985 is 
therefore the same as for 1984, in spite of a considerable increase in prices in this sector ( 12% ). 
Sub-Head 20 
The hire of word-processing equipment in 1984 has resulted in considerable time-saving in the 
printing of documents and savings in printing costs, which should cover the hire of this equipment. 
In 1984, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration therefore authorised a transfer 
between the two sub-heads concerned. Estimates for 1985 take account of the new situation. They 
are calculated on the basis of an increase of 12% (a weighted percentage, the increase in the cost of 
paper pulp having been more than 25% in one year) over 1984, less the cost of hiring data-processing 
equipment ( c.f. the three-year modernisation programme at Appendix Ill), which represents an 
increase in the estimates under Sub-Head 17. 
Sub-Head 21 
The increase of 12% corresponds to the increase in the INSEE index for books and newspapers 
for the most recent twelve-month period known at the time this budget was drawn up and to changes 
in exchange rates for publications purchased outside France. 
Sub-Head 22 
Compared with 1984, estimates under this sub-head are higher than the foreseeable rate of 
inflation due to the fact that the President of the Assembly, elected at the June 1984 session, is 
constantly at the seat of the Assembly. It will therefore be necessary to hire a chauffeur-driven car 
more often. 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
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Head V- Other expenditure 
Estimates Sums Expected 
Sub-Heads for authorised expenditure 
1985 for 1984 in 1984 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assem-
bly, chairmen of committees and rappor-
teurs 139,000 125,000 125,000 
Sub-Head 25- Expenses for representation 160,000 150,000 150,000 
Sub-Head 26- Committee study missions 3,300 3,000 3,000 
Sub-Head 27- Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk 321,900 290,000 230,000 
I 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor 75,500 68,000 56,700 
Sub-Head 29- Expenditure on information 275,000 253,000 253,000 
Sub-Head 30- Expenses for political groups 273,000 253,000 253,000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Sub-Head 32- Non-recoverable taxes 20,000 12,000 30,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD V o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 1,270,000 1,157,000 1,103,700 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by 
governments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the 
Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as 
these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys 
by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. 
The percentage increase is the same as for expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk 
travelling on official business, i.e. 11% (c.f. Sub-Head 27). 
Sub-Head 25 
The increase of 6.5% compared with the sum authorised for 1984 corresponds to the increase in 
the INSEE index for the cost of meals in restaurants in the Paris region for the most recent 
twelve-month period, which is included in the national consumer price index of the host country. 
Sub-Head 26 
For committee study missions, the increase is the same as for other official journeys, i.e. 11%. 
Sub-Head 27 
The increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st January 1984 
(202nd report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts) and the increase in 
the cost of air travel amount on average to 11%. Estimates for the travelling allowances of members 
of the Office of the Clerk for 1985 are therefore made on the basis of sums granted in 1984 plus 
11%. 
Sub-Head 28 
The increase is the same as for travelling expenses, i.e. 11%. 
Sub-Head 29 
The increase of 8.75% over sums granted in 1984 is an average between the 6.5% increase in the 
cost of representation and the 11% increase in travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 30 
The increase in the estimate for this sub-head takes account of the expected rise in the cost of 
living (8%). 
Sub-Head 31 
There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1984. 
Sub-Head 32 
The increase of F 8,000 as compared with 1984 is calculated on the basis of experience. 
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimate Budget Expected 
for for receipts 
1985 1984 in 1984 
Sale of publications 50,000 25,000 25,000 
Bank interest 250,000 100,000 200,000 
Social security reimbursements 8,000 15,000 15,000 
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials 150,000 90,000 90,000 
TOTAL RECEIPTS ..................... 458,000 230,000 330,000 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are 
calculated on the basis of experience. 
The amount of the levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials has been calculated at the rate of 
3% of such salaries for the first half of 1985 and 4.5% for the second half. 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Sums Expected 
Sub-Heads for authorised expenditure 
1985 for 1984 in 1984 
Sub-Head I - Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 402,000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions I8I,OOO 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 43,500 
1.4. Orphans ' or dependants' 
pensions 
-
1.5 Leaving allowances -
626,500 613,000 662,000 
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances I8,000 
2.2. Children's and dependants' 
allowances 22,000 
2.3. Education allowances 5,000 
45,000 55,000 42,000 
Sub-Head 3 - Supplementary insurance I2,000 9,000 I2,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD I .................... 683,500 677,000 7I6,000 
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Explanations 
Sub-Heads I and 2 
In 1985, the Assembly will be paying four pensions, as follows: 
- two old-age pensions ; 
- one invalidity pension ; 
- one survivor's pension. 
Entitlement to an orphan's pension paid in 1984 has now come to an end. 
Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the 
current provisions of the pension scheme rules. 
Sub-Head 3 
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the 
collective convention in force. Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the 
proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly. 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B : Receipts 
Estimate Budget Expected 
for for receipts 
1985 1984 in 1984 
Contributions by permanent officials 383,000 341,000 341,000 
383,000 341,000 341,000 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid 
by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary). 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and R~pporteur) 
1. Foreword 
1. The draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 could not fail to take into account 
the fact that the governments are determined to inject new life into WEU since the Assembly itself 
has regularly expressed its wish for the structure and functions of WEU to be adapted to Europe's 
new security requirements. 
2. Furthermore, in both the Council and the Assembly great importance is attached to developing 
the dialogue between the governmental body and the parliamentary body of an institution one of the 
fundamental merits of which is to allow qualified representatives of European public opinion to take 
part in a continuing process of reflection on Europe's defence. 
3. In 1984 it seemed possible to keep a negative growth rate in the Assembly's budget. This 
decision inevitably had repercussions on the work of the Assembly and its propagation and there can 
be no question of continuing along this course in 1985. 
4. In spite of the financial difficulties now facing all member countries, the will to give new life to 
WEU must be demonstrated in an improvement in the means of work at the Assembly's disposal. 
But the very short time available before having to submit the budget to the Assembly for approval 
prevented the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration from assessing this improvement 
accurately, in terms of both staff and equipment. The budget before you therefore shows only the 
most immediate requirements. The committee reserves the right to complete its study of the 
Assembly's essential requirements in the next few months and possibly to submit a supplementary 
budget at the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session. 
2. New structure of the budget 
5. The draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 is submitted to you in a new form, 
which was approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration at its meeting on 
26th April 1984. 
6. In accordance with Recommendation 409, adopted unanimously by the Assembly during the 
first part of its thirtieth ordinary session, operating expenses and receipts are set out separately from 
expenditure and income relating to pensions. The 1985 budget therefore has two parts : Part I : 
Operating budget, and Part 11 : Pensions budget. 
7. In accordance with the criteria in Article 2 of the financial regulations of the Assembly, 
estimates are divided into heads (homogeneous categories of expenditure) and sub-heads, forming the 
basic elements of the budget. In order to identify expenditure more accurately, certain sub-heads are 
further sub-divided. 
8. Appendix V is a table showing the correspondence between the 1985 and 1984 budgets. 
3. Operating budget 
3.1. General 
9. The operating budget now before you differs from the 1984 budget as follows : 
1985 1984 Difference Rate of growth 
Total expenditure 16,037,800 14,656,200 1,381,600 9.42% 
Net total 15,579,800 14,426,200 1,153,600 7.99% 
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This increase is higher than the zero growth rate estimated by the London Budget Committee at 
4.5% for 1985 but it should be underlined that sums granted to the Assembly in 1984 for operating 
expenditure represented a rate of growth of only 3.98% compared with the previous financial year, 
to meet an inflation rate of about 7.5%. It would be justified to deduct this difference from the 
growth rate of the 1985 budget since it had negative repercussions on the management of the 1984 
budget. 
3.2. Expenditure 
10. Technical criteria governing the preparation of the budget having been set out in the 
explanations given in the analysis of estimates for each head, this explanatory memorandum will 
describe the guidelines and options, which inter alia justify the substantial differences compared with 
the previous budget. 
Head I 
11. Estimates under this head include no change in the staff of the Office of the Clerk. As specified 
earlier, the structure of the Office of the Clerk will be studied very attentively in order to determine 
requirements in relation to the tasks it has to fulfil. 
12. Estimates under Head I represent an overall increase of 6.33% as compared with the sums 
granted in 1984. 
Head 11 
13. Estimates under this head are affected by the sharp rise in salaries payable to certain categories 
of temporary staff recruited for Assembly sessions. The difference between scales in force on 1st July 
1983 and 1st July 1984 is about 40% for verbatim reporters and summary reporters and 20% for 
other sittings staff. It is well known that such staff are increasingly difficult to recruit, but their 
presence is essential when holding plenary sessions of the WEU Assembly (as is also the case for the 
Council of Europe). 
14. The same applies to interpreters recruited for sessions and other meetings of parliamentarians. 
As specified in the explanations to Head 11, the agreement signed on 13th July 1984 between the 
co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI) 
introduced an additional amount of 6% in addition to their salaries, which is indexed in the same 
conditions as the latter, i.e. on the salary of a Grade L4, step 8, official. 
15. In view of these exceptional circumstances, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has adopted 
certain measures likely to limit the budgetary repercussions of these increases. On the one hand, an 
attempt is being made to recruit as many staff as possible in Paris itself in order to avoid additional 
expenditure such as transport, allowances for travelling time and daily allowances, and on the other 
hand it is trying to keep the length of contracts as short as possible. 
16. Furthermore, account has been taken of the fact that the Assembly's programme of work for 
1985 will mean an increase in the number of meetings of the Presidential Committee, Bureau and 
various other committees, thus justifying the increase in sums requested under Sub-Head 7. 
17. Finally, it seems appropriate to mention the special problem raised by the recruitment of 
verbatim reporters, which is becoming more difficult at each session because members of this 
profession are becoming rare. This matter will be studied in depth by the relevant Assembly bodies 
with a view to adopting an alternative solution, efficient and less expensive, possibly after amending 
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. If the results of this study are conclusive, they will be taken 
into account in administering the 1985 budget and in the preparation of the 1986 budget. 
18. Overall, estimates under Head 11 represent an increase of 17.67% as compared with sums 
authorised for 1984. 
Head Ill 
19. Explanations given for Sub-Heads 10 to 14 of this head justify the sums requested which are 
on the whole lower than total sums authorised for the same purposes in the 1984 budget. 
20. Conversely, there is a substantial increase in estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 which 
is moreover largely justified by a thr~-year programme for the modernisation and maintenance of 
equipment, prepared for the purpose and given at Appendix Ill. 
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21. This programme provides for the gradual replacement of certain office furniture which is so 
worn as to be unusable (Sub-Head 15), and the essential replacement of a second offset machine, the 
first having been replaced in 1984 (Sub-Head 16). But the key to this modernisation programme is 
the purchase of a personal computer for the administration service of the Office of the Clerk and the 
hire of five word-processors. 
22. For word-processors, a contract for their hire has been signed with Olivetti and will come into 
force in January 1985, once the equipment ordered has been delivered. In the meantime, the Office 
of the Clerk has carried out tests with five machines, made available free of charge by the same firm. 
Nearly all the documents for the first part of the thirtieth session of the Assembly were prepared by 
new methods and the test has therefore been conclusive. In 1984, the cost of hiring them will be 
offset by savings in printing costs thanks to the direct transmission of texts to the printer. After 
examining this question, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration authorised the 
transfer of the necessary sums from Sub-Head 8 to Sub-Head 7 of the 1984 budget. The same offset 
criteria have been adopted for the 1985 budget, so that the cost of hiring word-processors has been 
offset by an equivalent reduction in sums requested for printing and publishing. 
23. The usefulness of such a three-year programme seems clear. It will be kept regularly up to date 
and appended to budgets for future financial years. 
24. Overall, estimates under Head Ill represent an increase of 29.84% as compared with sums 
authorised for 1984, including the hire of word-processing equipment, the cost of which is offset by 
savings under Head IV. 
Head IV 
25. Criteria of strict economy have been used for estimating sums needed for 1985, as shown in the 
explanations. In view of the reduction in printing costs which will offset the cost of hiring word-
processing equipment, referred to under Head Ill, the rate of increase in this head as compared with 
the 1984 budget is 2.96%. 
Head V 
26. All estimates under this head have been made on the basis of the rates of inflation applicable 
to each category of expenditure. The overall increase in this head as compared with 1984 is 9.82%. 
3.3. Receipts 
27. Apart from receipts from the levy on the basic salaries of Grade A officials, which are an 
accurate assessment, receipts have been estimated on the basis of past experience. 
4. Pensions budget 
28. Estimated expenditure on pensions in 1985, taking into account the same changes in scales as 
for permanent staff, is lower than actual expenditure foreseen up to the end of 1984 because an 
orphan's pension will be terminated on conclusion of the entitlement of the beneficiary. 
29. The situation will be different in 1986 because of the foreseeable retirement of two Grade A 
officials who will reach the age limit of 65 during that year. 
30. Appendix IV to this budget shows the foreseeable trend of expenditure on pensions for the next 
five years, based on the age of staff. It is interesting to note that if the organisation's contribution 
(14%) -not included in the budget- is added to the staff contribution (7%), the cost of pensions is 
almost entirely covered by these contributions until 1987. As from 1988, expenditure will largely 
exceed receipts, but by referring logically to the savings made in earlier years it can be considered 
that the administration of pensions will be positive for several years to come. 
31. Receipts in this budget come from the serving staff's contributions to the pension scheme, 
calculated at the rate of 7% of basic salaries. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
Grade Duties 1985 1984 +or-budget budget 
H.C. Clerk I I -
A6 Senior counsellor I I -
A5 Counsellors 4 4 -
A4 First secretaries 2 2 -
A3 Secretary I I -
A2 TranslatorsfDocumentalist 3 3 -
B6 Chief accountant I I -
B4 Personal assistants 4 4 -
B3 Bilingual shorthand-typists 6 6 -
B3 Switchboard operator I I -
C6 Head of reproduction department I I -
C4 Assistants in reproduction department 2 2 -
27 27 -
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I 
APPENDIX 11 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
I. Sittings service 
No. of Daily Duties Number days* remunera-tion F 
Counsellors to the President of the Assembly .. 1 a 16 1,084 
1 b 18 1,084 
Heads of sections ....................... 1 a 10 816 
1 b 12 992 
I a 10 992 
I b 14 992 
Sergeant-at-arms ....................... I b 12 875 
Parliamentary secretaries ................. 3a 10 699 
2b 12 875 
Precis writers .......................... 3a 10 699 
3b 12 875 
Verbatim reporters ...................... 7a 10 875 
13 b 12 875 
Assistants ............................. 10 a 10 307 
I a 18 307 
I a 22 307 
I a 10 353 
I b 16 483 
2b 14 483 
28 b 12 483 
I 3b 12 529 Head ushers ........................... I a 10 288 
I a 12 288 
Ushers ............................... 8a 10 261 
I a 12 261 
I a 14 261 
I a 12 288 
I a 24 288 
3b 12 437 
Offset-assemblers ....................... 10 a 10 261 
112 
Total 
F 
17,344 
19,512 
8,160 
11,904 
9,920 
13,888 
10,500 
20,970 
21,000 
20,970 
31,500 
61,250 
136,500 
30,700 
5,526 
6,754 
3,530 
7,728 
13,524 
162,288 
19,044 
2,880 
3,456 
20,880 
3,132 
3,654 
3,456 
6,912 
15,732 
26,100 
Adjustment as from 1st July 1984 (2.5%) 
Adjustment for 1985 (4.5%) ................. 
Travelling expenses ........................ 
Rounded up to 
• In accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1984. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Total 
F 
36,856 
43,872 
10,500 
41,970 
52,470 
197,750 
249,094 
6,336 
53,766 
26,100 
718,714 
17,968 
736,682 
33,150 
769,832 
190,000 
959,832 
960,000 
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2. Interpretation service 
Duties Number No. of F F days 
Interpreters 6a 10 120,360 
6b 14 173,920 294,280 
Adjustment as from 1st July 1984 (2.5%) 7,000 
301,280 
Adjustment for 1985 (4.5%) 12,000 
313,280 
Travelling expenses 15,000 
328,280 
Rounded up to 329,000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B. On 1st January 1984, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2,005.38. In addition, interpreters recruited 
outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way}, a daily allowance (per diem) 
corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
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3. Translation service 
Duties Number 
Daily 
remuneration 
' 
F 
Revisers .............................. 3a 801 
4b 1,336 
Translators ............................ 3a 640 
5b I ,II4 
Assistants ............................. 6a 307 
2a 353 
3b 483 
2b 529 
Adjustment as from I st July I984 (2.5%) 
Adjustment for 1985 ( 4.5%) 
Travelling expenses 
Rounded up to 
I Based on 30 days for revisers and translators and a varying number of days for assistants. 
a Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Estimate 1 
F 
232,410 
224,700 
I7I,994 
629,I04 
I5,727 
644,83I 
29,0I8 
673,849 
26,000 
699,849 
700,000 
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Ref. 
No. 
2 
3 
4 
APPENDIX Ill 
Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Equipment 
A. Reproduction equip-
ment 
1 RX 1045 photocopier 
1 RX 3107 photocopier 
2 Gestetner offset 209 
machines with 1 applica-
tor 
1 Gestetner PM/9 elec-
trostatic stereotyper 
Budgets 
Explanations 
1985 1986 1Q87 
This new model replaced the RX 5400 42,600 42,600 42,600 
in April 1984. It has a better perfor-
mance than the old model and costs 
less to hire. The sum thus saved has 
been used to finance a contract for 
servicing the Office of the Clerk's second 
photocopier. The contract for the hire 
of the RX 1045 provides for a fixed 
charge of F 1, 712 per month and an 
indexed maintenance charge of F 1,837 
per month. 
When a leasing contract came to an 
end in April 1984, this machine became 
the property of the Office of the Clerk. 
The maintenance contract was negotia-
ted at the same time as the hire of the 
RX 1045 (F 1,533 per quarter). 
These 2 machines were purchased in 
1978. They are in poor condition due to 
age and intensive use. It is planned to 
replace them, since they are essential 
for the Assembly's work, in accordance 
with the following programme : 
- in 1984 - replacement of 1 of the 
(2nd half): 2 machines by the 
Gestetner 311, which 
has a better perfor-
mance; 
6,132 6,132 6,132 
- maintenance of this 6,000 6,000 6,000 
machine on the basis 
of an annual contract ; 
- in 1985: - replacement of the 105,000 
second machine by 
another Gestetner 311 ; 
- maintenance of this 6,000 6,000 6,000 
machine on the basis 
of an annual contract. 
It will be possible to use this stereotyper, 
purchased in 1980, until 1986 at latest 
by extending the current maintenance 
contract. 
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Ref. 
No. Equipment Explanations 
APPENDIX Ill 
Budgets 
1985 1986 1987 
In 1986 it will be replaced by a more 69,000 
recent model, more suitable for use with 
the Gestetner 311 offset machine. A 
new maintenance contract will have to 
be signed for this stereotyper. 3,700 3,700 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 Gestetner 100 binding 
machine 
1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 
assembling machine with 
stapling machine 
1 AM International 
addressograph 
1 Fortematic 655 paper-
cutting machine 
Purchased in 1979, this machine is still 
in good condition and it will be possible 
to use it for another five years, until the 
current maintenance contract expires. 
Purchased in 1977, these machines are 
serviced when required. Since the cost 
of a maintenance contract is exorbitant, 
the expediency of continuing this form 
of maintenance is being examined. The 
estimate is based on experience. 
This machine is on hire for a five-year 
period which began on 1st July 1981. 
Maintenance is included in the cost of 
hire. The expediency of renewing the 
contract when it expires on 30th June 
1986 is being examined. 
Purchased in 1976, this machine is 
serviced when required. A single annual 
service is enough to keep it in good 
working order. 
1 Orpo-Planax binding Purchased in 1964 
machine 
These machines 
are in good 
working order 
and no mainte-
nance contract 
seems necessary. 
1 Orpo-Thermomatic 
binding machine 
B. Typewriters and cal-
culators 
(a) Office of the Clerk 
! 
' 
, 
Purchased in 197 4 
11 8 Olivetti ET 121 electro- Purchased between 1981 and 1983, 
nic typewriters these typewriters are in perfect condi-
tion. 
12 1 Olivetti ET 221 electro- Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in 
nic typewriter perfect condition. 
13 4 Olympia SGE 51 elec-
tric typewriters (2 with 
English keyboards and 2 
with French keyboards) 
This is an old model which is no longer 
on the market and is therefore difficult 
to repair. The typewriters will remain in 
service as long as their condition allows. 
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18,000 18,000 18,000 
600 600 600 
APPENDIX Ill 
Ref. 
No. Equipment Explanations 
14 2 IBM electric typewri- Purchased in 1968 and 1975, these 
ters ( 1 with an English typewriters will remain in service as 
keyboard and 1 with a long as their condition allows. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
French keyboard) 
3 Olivetti 
machines 
calculating Purchased between 1968 and 1979, 
these machines are in good working 
order. 
(b) For use during ses-
sions 
4 Olympia SGE 51 elec-
tric typewriters ( 1 with 
an English keyboard and 
3 with French keyboards) 
4 IBM electric typewri-
ters (2 with English key-
boards and 2 with French 
keyboards) 
3 Olivetti Editor 4 elec-
tric typewriters (with Ita-
lian keyboards) 
21 Olympia mechanical 
typewriters ( 19 with 
English keyboards and 2 
with French keyboards) 
Electric typewriters 
These typewriters are the same model 
as those under 13 above. They will be 
assigned to national delegations as long 
as their condition allows. 
These typewriters are the same model 
as those under 14 above. They will be 
assigned to national delegations and 
political groups as long as their condition 
allows. 
Purchased secondhand in 1980, these 
typewriters are assigned to the Italian 
Delegation and the Italian summary 
reporters. They will remain in service as 
long as their condition allows. 
Purchased between 1966 and 1979, 
these typewriters are used only occasio-
nally because they are old models and 
staff are no longer used to working on 
such machines. It is planned to keep the 
best of them in reserve in case of 
electricity cuts and to scrap the others. 
To meet requirements during Assembly 
sessions, it is becoming necessary to hire 
a number of electric machines m 
addition to those already available. 
Taking account of the need to replace 
mechanical machines still in use, the 
following hire programme is envisaged 
for each session : 
English 
keyboards 
French 
keyboards 
1985 1986 1987 
12 16 16 
15 15 15 
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Budgets 
1985 1986 !987 
9,600 10,800 10,800 
12,750 12,750 12,750 
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Ref. 
No. 
21 
22 
23 
Equipment 
(c) Maintenance 
and repairs 
C. Miscellaneous equip-
ment 
2 UHER 5000 dictapho-
nes 
11 Grundig Stenorette 
dicta phones 
Budgets 
Explanations 
1985 1986 1987 
All typewriters and calculators are 6,000 6,000 6,000 
serviced twice a year, before each 
session, by a mechanic recruited for this 
purpose. However, a lump sum should 
be earmarked for possible repairs at 
other times. 
Purchased in 1971 and 1980, these 
dictaphones ~re in good condition. It is 
not planned to replace them in the 
period 1985-87. 
Purchased between 1963 and 1983, 
these dictaphones are in good condition. 
It is not planned to replace them in the 
period 1985-87. 
24 1 Grandjean stenotyping Purchased in 1974, this machine is in 
machine good working order. It is planned to 
keep it in use for the next five years. 
25 
26 
27 
D. Word-processors and 
computers 
5 Olivetti ETS 2010 
word-processors with 4 
printers 
1 personal computer with 
"wages" and "book-
keeping" software 
E. Office furniture 
Overall estimate for possible repairs to 4,000 4,000 4,000 
equipment in this category. 
After a trial period with 3 machines 
provided by Olivetti free of charge, it is 
now intended to increase the number to 
5. They have been hired on a five-year 
quarterly leasing basis. 
125,000 125,000 125,000 
The machines are maintained by Oli- 30,000 30,000 30,000 
vetti on the basis of an ad hoc contract. 
This will be purchased in 1985 in order 
to modernise the administration service. 
It will be maintained by the supplier on 
the basis of an annual contract. 
45,000 
3,000 3,000 3,000 
28 Offices 107, 113 and 118 Purchase of 5 "computer" desks for 35,000 
committee assistants using word-proces-
sing machines. 
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Ref. 
Budgets 
No. Equipment Explanations 
1985 1986 1987 
29 Offices 104 and 105 Replacement of furniture 20,000 
30 Office 103 Replacement of furniture 12,000 
31 Office 108 Replacement of furniture 18,000 
32 Swivel armchairs 
easy chairs 
and Reupholstery of 14 armchairs 5,000 8,000 
33 Metal cupboards Repair of 10 cupboards 5,000 5,000 
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Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Budgets 
Ref. No. 
in programme 
Head Sub-head 1985 1986 1987 
Ill 15. Purchase or repair of office furniture 28 35,000 
29 20,000 
30 12,000 
31 18,000 
32 5,000 8,000 
33 5,000 5,000 
65,000 25,000 I8,000 
Ill I6. Purchase of reproduction and other 3 I05,000 
office equipment 
4 69,000 
27 45,000 
I50,000 69,000 
Ill I 7. Hire and maintenance of reproduction I 42,600 42,600 42,600 
and other office equipment 
2 6,132 6,132 6,132 
3 I2,000 12,000 12,000 
4 1,053 3,700 3,700 
5 976 976 976 
6 3,000 3,000 3,000 
7 18,000 18,000 18,000 
8 600 600 600 
20 22,350 23,550 23,550 
21 6,000 6,000 6,000 
25 4,000 4,000 4,000 
26 I55,000 I55,000 I55,000 
27 3,000 3,000 3,000 
274,711 278,558 ~78,558 
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N 
\0 
-
No. of monthly 
Grade Basic contributions salary taken into 
account 
A6 
A3 
B4 
Pensions already being paid 
Cl 
A6 417,575.35 306 
A4 338,472.90 333 
A5 403,729.06 325 
A5 403,729.06 402 
Employees' 7% = 
contributions 
Theoretical WEU 14% = 
contribution 
APPENDIX IV 
Foreseeable trend of pensions in the period 1985-89 
(calculated in accordance with /985 scales) 
%of 
salary 
1985 1986 
297,000 297,000 
212,000 212,000 
130,000 130,000 
44,500 44,500 
61 280,000 
65.5 222,000 
64.16 
70 
683,500 1,185,500 
383,000 
766,000 1,149,000 1,149,000 
Difference 
- 465,500 - 36,500 
Pensions 
1987 1988 
297,000 297,000 
212,000 212,000 
130,000 130,000 
44,500 44,500 
280,000 280,000 
222,000 222,000 
259,000 
283,000 
1,185,500 1,727,500 
1,149,000 1,149,000 
- 36,500 + 578,500 
1989 
297,000 
212,000 
130,000 
44,500 
280,000 
222,000 
259,000 
283,000 
1,727,500 
1,149,000 
+ 578,500 
> 
'"1:1 
'"1:1 
m 
z 
0 
>< 
-< 
g 
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APPENDIX V 
Table showing the correspondence between heads 
and sub-heads in the 1984 and 1985 budgets 
1985 Budget 
PART I 
Section A 
Head I 
Sub-Head I 
Sub-Head 2 
2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 
2.6. 
2.7. 
2.8. 
Sub-Head 3 
3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
Sub-Head 4 
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 
4.4. 
Sub-Head 5 
Head II 
Sub-Head 6 
6.1. 
6.2. 
6.3. 
6.4. 
292 
1984 Budget 
Head I 
Sub-Head I 
Sub- Head 2 (A) (c) 
2 (A) (a) 
2 (A) (b) 
2 (A) (d) 
2 (A) (g) 
2 (A) (h) 
2 (A) (e) 
2 (C) (e) 
Sub-Head 2 (B) (a) 
2 (B) (b) 
2 (B) (c) 
Sub-Head 2 (C) (a) 
2 (C) (b) 
2 (C) (c) 
2 (C) (d) 
Sub-Head 2 (C) (f) 
Head II 
Sub-Head 3.I 
3.2 (A) (a) 
3.2 (B) 
3.5 
APPENDIX V 
APPENDIX V 
Sub-Head 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
Head Ill 
9.1. 
9.2. t 
9.3. \ 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Sub-Head 12 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
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Document 1001 
Amendment 1 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins 
Stb December 1984 
1. In Part I, Section A, Head I of the budget estimates for 1985, increase the total provision by 
348,000 francs to provide for the head of the private office for the President. 
Signed: Hawkins 
I. See 12th sitting, 6th December 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Document 1002 
The Assembly, 
Relations between the Assembly and the Council 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committeel 
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur 
Draft Order 
011 relatio111 betwee11 the Asse11tbly a11d the Co1111Cil 
4th December 1984 
Expressing its satisfaction with the intentions proclaimed in the Rome Declaration, 
REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT 
To take the appropriate steps, in agreement with the Council, to arrange for the Assembly's 
participation in the discussions and decisions called for by the attribution of a new and more 
important rdle to Western European Union; 
INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
To establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that 
the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and 
more important rdle for WEU. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate: 
Haose), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, /Jogaerts, Burger, Hill, Koehl (Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Lagneau 
(Alternate: Pecriaux), Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Mal/er, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rump/. van der 
Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, Vogt, de Vries, (vacant seat) (Alternate: Mil/an). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
( s11bmined by Lord lhay, Rllpporte11r) 
1. On 27th October 1984, the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly met in Rome to 
prepare the extraordinary session held on 29th 
October. To this end, it adopted a draft order 
for debate at that session. However, in view of 
the way the session proceeded and the time 
filled - very advantageously for the Assembly 
- with ministerial addresses and the ensuring 
questions and answers, the plenary Assembly 
was not able to hold a proper debate on this 
draft order. On the proposal of the President of 
the Assembly, the Presidential Committee 
therefore agreed to refer the text back to the 
General Affairs Committee so that it might 
report on it at the second part of the ordinary 
session. This is normal procedure since, while 
the Presidential Committee had to take urgent 
action, it is for the committees to prepare the 
work of the Assembly in plenary sitting. 
2. The purpose of the order was to allow the 
Assembly to respond to the wish expressed by 
the Council, and in particular by its 
Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher, that con-
tinuing consultations be held between the 
presidency of the Council and the Assembly on 
matters arising from the governments' decision 
to give WEU a new and more important role. 
In practice, in agreement with the Presidential 
Committee, the President of the Assembly had 
taken the necessary steps to ensure that such 
consultations could start, and certain members 
of the Assembly took part in meetings with the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council prior to and 
following the ministerial meeting in Rome on 
26th and 27th October. 
3. However, such meetings raise a problem, 
the seriousness of which must not be underesti-
mated. On the one hand, the Rome Declaration 
seems to make a distinction between the 
"presidency" of the Council and the Council 
itself without being very explicit about what it 
means by this distinction. On the other hand, 
the frequency, relative brevity and informal 
nature of these meetings and the need to hold 
a dialogue make it necessary to reserve them 
for a small number of parliamentarians. The 
nature of a parliamentary assembly which 
cannot delegate its attributions makes it 
particularly difficult to set up an appropriate 
body for such a dialogue since it is essential 
that all national delegations be represented and 
all political groups, too. The solution adopted 
by the Presidential Committee was to make the 
Bureau of the Assembly responsible for this 
task. The Bureau is composed of the President 
and Vice-Presidents and a member of each 
delegation is therefore represented. Since certain 
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political groups are not represented on the 
Bureau, it was agreed to add the chairmen of 
the two political groups not otherwise repre-
sented. 
4. This method had the advantage of 
forming a group of nine persons, i.e. of 
reasonable size, meeting the twofold require-
ment mentioned above. However, there are 
disadvantages: 
(i) there is no system of weighting to 
compensate for differences in the size 
of delegations and political groups; 
(ii) there is no provision for alternates, 
since members of the Bureau as such 
have none, yet the frequency of 
meetings with the Council makes it 
difficult for many of them to attend 
regularly; 
(iii) it does not correspond to the status of 
the Bureau, which is not a political 
body; 
(iv) it is not an official organ of the 
Assembly, which may create delicate 
situations, particularly when justifying 
expenditure involved in meetings. 
5. Your Rapporteur sees no wholly satisfac-
tory solution to these problems but considers 
that the advantages of the method chosen 
outweigh the disadvantages, since it allows a 
true dialogue between the Council and the 
Assembly such as WEU has never known in 
the past. But he considers the situation can be 
improved by taking the following measures: 
(a) A special body might be set up responsible 
for contacts with the Council and recruited in 
the same way as the enlarged Bureau but, if it 
is formed by a decision of the Assembly, it 
would become official. It might be called the 
Group for Liaison with the Council. This is the 
purpose of the present draft order. 
(b) Delegations and political groups specially 
represented in the present enlarged Bureau 
might be asked to appoint alternates to stand in 
when the titular members are unable to attend 
certain meetings, and in those cases only. The 
procedure for replacing Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly when acting as members of the 
liaison group might help to introduce the 
desired political weighting without jeopardising 
the principle on which the Assembly's partici-
pation in the dialogue with the governments is 
at present based. 
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6. However, it should be ensured that the 
creation of this liaison group does not interfere 
with the work of the Assembly and its 
committees. Relations between the Council and 
the Assembly include official written and oral 
procedure in the form of recommendations and 
replies, written questions and answers, the 
participation of ministers in sessions and joint 
meetings between committees and the Council. 
For many years, the latter have been held in an 
informal manner with the result that official 
procedure for joint meetings has been left in 
abeyance. Admittedly, informal procedure has 
the advantage of allowing a freer, easier 
dialogue, but also the serious disadvantage of 
not obliging the Council to reach effective 
agreement on the answers it gives the Assembly 
and leaving some doubt about the nature of the 
commitments involved in the answers given by 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to 
questions put by members of parliament. The 
new procedure is certainly not likely to throw 
full light on this matter. 
7. Moreover, by adopting recommendations, 
the Assembly is generally able to give its views 
only after some time has elapsed. But the 
informal dialogue between a liaison group and 
the Ministers, designed to avoid this delay, will 
probably tempt the group to anticipate the 
Assembly's subsequent deliberations. 
8. For these reasons your Rapporteur con-
siders that the draft order prepared by the 
Presidential Committee may lead to a worth-
while debate, allowing the opinions of members 
of the Assembly to be obtained, as well as a 
decision which should make relations between 
the two WEU bodies more official and durable. 
• 
• • 
9. Moreover, your Rapporteur wishes to 
mention some of the problems which the Rome 
Declaration raises for the WEU Assembly, not 
with a view to taking immediate decisions but 
to guide the thinking of the Council and 
Assembly in the coming years. 
10. (a) Although the Council has never been 
very specific about this point, it does not at the 
present juncture seem to consider a revision of 
the treaty necessary. But for a long time the 
Assembly has been concerned that the 
generally-accepted interpretation of Article IX 
of the modified Brussels Treaty was to make 
national delegations to the WEU Assembly 
identical with those to the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. As a result, members of 
these two assemblies are overburdened with 
work and some members of parliament whose 
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tastes and responsibilities -make- them experts 
on defence questions ate~not-=tne.J:ilbers of the 
WEU Assembly because they are:-passed over 
in favour of persons more interesttd:in matters 
handled by the Council of Europe.-~ -
-
11. Any revision of the treaty would naturally 
have to include a revision of Article lX. But if 
the Council does not intend fo reviSe the treaty 
your Rapporteur considers the authorities 
concerned in member countries might appoint 
delegations in which titular members in the 
Council of Europe are substitutes in the WEU 
Assembly and vice versa without this infringing 
the obligations set out in Article IX. 
12. (b) In the Rome Declaration, the Minis-
ters "stress the value, in their eyes, of developing 
a dialogue between the Assembly and other 
parliaments or parliamentary institutions". The 
Assembly has always been aware of the 
usefulness of this. Its composition certainly 
means that its relations with the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe raise no 
real problem. 
13. The same is not true for the European 
Parliament. That assembly has been invited 
several times to be represented officially by 
observers at our sessions. It has never done so 
- although one or other political group of the 
European Parliament has sometimes sent a 
delegation - and it has never invited WEU 
observers to take part officially in its sessions. 
This is not surprising in view of the obligations 
all parliamentary assemblies have to fulfil, as 
your Rapporteur noted in connection with 
relations between the Assembly and the Council. 
In any event, it seems difficult for the WEU 
Assembly to take any further steps as long as 
the European Parliament has not given its own 
views on a possible dialogue with the WEU 
Assembly . 
14. The same does not apply to the North 
Atlantic Assembly which has no official status 
but whose interests cover the same areas as 
those for which our Assembly is responsible. 
Exchanges of information, links between secre-
tariats, reciprocal invitations and the fact that 
some members of parliament belong to both 
assemblies established connection with it a long 
time ago. But can one nevertheless speak of a 
dialogue? This would probably be saying too 
much, in the absence of an adequate effort on 
either side to ensure that due account is really 
being taken, in reports for instance, of infor-
mation exchanged by the two assemblies. Only 
the secretariats would be able to ensure that 
information circulates better and provides 
material for a true dialogue which might for 
instance be achieved by the rapporteurs con-
cerned taking part in the debates on each 
other's reports on the same subjects. Naturally, 
the main interest of relations with the North 
Atlantic Assembly is to allow exchanges of 
views with North American members of 
parliament, and this can be done only if careful 
attention is paid to the dates of that Assembly's 
sessions, it being easier for committees to 
establish such relations than the WEU 
Assembly meeting in plenary session. 
15. Observers from the parliaments of mem-
ber countries of the Atlantic Alliance, not 
members of WEU, have frequently been invited, 
often with success, when our Assembly was 
dealing with matters of particular interest to 
one or other of these countries. The interest 
shown by some of them in the reactivation of 
WEU should make this practice more system-
atic and general, as was the case at the 
extraordinary session in Rome. 
16. However this may be, the presence of too 
many members of parliament from outside the 
Assembly, who must obviously have the right 
to speak, might weaken the debates, and the 
WEU Assembly must not become a forum with 
vaguely-defined activities but remain what it is: 
an assembly composed of delegations from the 
parliaments of member countries for exercising 
parliamentary supervision of the WEU Council. 
17. (c) The Assembly can but welcome the 
intentions expressed by the Ministers in the 
second part of the Rome Declaration on the 
institutional reform of WEU. However, it 
should be noted that the development of 
contacts between the Council and the Assembly, 
like the dialogue with other parliaments, will 
have budgetary repercussions which the Council 
cannot overlook. The Assembly must also recall 
that more informal contacts must not be to the 
detriment of official procedure which alone 
compels the Council to act as a body which has 
to find terms on which it is unanimous. 
18. The proposal to hold "a colloquium 
involving the presidency of the Council and the 
committees of the Assembly" might be an 
interesting step provided the views of the 
governments and of the Assembly are made 
clear. What would be the aim of such a 
colloquium? Would it be open to the public? 
Would the presidency be acting on behalf of 
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the Council or on its own behalf? Would the 
whole Council take part? Would the agenda be 
proposed by the presidency or by the Assembly 
committees? The liaison group should seek 
details from the Ministers on these points and 
endeavour to obtain the widest possible scope 
for initiatives by the organs of the Assembly. 
19. The participation of representatives of the 
presidency - or other governments - at 
committee meetings has often been called for 
by the Assembly which can but be gratified if 
Ministers accede to these requests, which should 
raise no problems for the Assembly since the 
committees have to take the initiative for such 
participation. 
20. The WEU technical institutions already 
contribute to the Assembly's work in two ways: 
(a) joint meetings between the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and the 
Standing Armaments Committee on the work 
of the SAC; (b) the request conveyed by the 
Council to the international secretariat of the 
SAC that it prepare studies at the request of 
the Assembly. 
21. Both procedures might be developed 
without jeopardising the governmental nature 
of the WEU technical organs, i.e. their 
dependence on the Council alone. Should it be 
otherwise, there would be a serious risk of 
governments refusing to provide the technical 
organs with the information they need and 
more interference between the executive author-
ity and the parliamentary authority would 
making the work of these technical organs 
difficult. Conversely, it might be possible for 
the Council to transmit the Assembly's requests 
to the technical agencies more quickly thus 
allowing the Assembly to receive their studies 
earlier. 
22. Your Rapporteur considers these are the 
main positions which members of the group for 
liaison between the Council and the Assembly 
should uphold in relations between the 
Assembly and the Council. The draft order 
emanating from the Presidential Committee 
calls for such a group to be set up officially to 
allow a fruitful dialogue to be pursued with the 
Ministers. 
Document 1002 
Amendment 1 
Relations between the Assembly and the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Vecchietti and others 
4th December 1984 
1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add "including Europe's rdle for the 
strengthening of peace". 
Signed: Vecchietti, Fiandrotti, Amadei, Rubbi, Milani 
I. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Document 1003 Sth December 1984 
Political union of Europe 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER1 
tabled by Mr. Tummers and others 
The Assembly, 
Noting that, in June 1964, Mr. von Merkatz, as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee 
during the tenth session of Western European Union, prepared a brief on the political union of 
Europe containing a chronology (1946-63), documentation (seventeen historical documents) and 
comparative statistics concerning the EEC, EFfA and certain other countries; 
Noting that, in May 1974, Mr. Leynen, as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee 
during the twentieth session of Western European Union, prepared a brief on the political union of 
Europe containing a continuation of the document presented by Mr. von Merkatz, ending with a 
communique issued after the nine-power conference in Copenhagen on 15th December 1973, 
I. URGES THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
To elaborate a third brief in this series of historical surveys; 
11. AsKS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE AsSEMBLY OF WEU 
(a) To consider publishing these three surveys in one combined volume; 
(b) Pursuant to the Assembly's aims to make information on WEU more easily accessible to the 
general public, to consider publishing a special edition. 
Signed: Tummers, Vecchietti, van der Werff, Fourre, Stoffelen, Ganse/, van den Bergh, Wilkinson, 
Aarts, Worrell, Valleix, Reddemann, Spies von Ballesheim, Hughes, Blaauw 
I. See llth sitting, 5th December 1984 (order referred to the Presidential Committee). 
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